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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the significance of the Commonwealth in Canadian foreign 
policy, the motivations behind Canadian policy and the reasons for changes in 
this policy in the period 1956-1965 in particular. It does so by evaluating 
Canadian policy towards the development and use of Commonwealth institutions 
for cooperation.
The thesis begins by sketching the development of Canadian policy towards the 
Commonwealth between 1944 and 1955. It argues that Canadian behaviour during 
this period set a pattern, which as it evolved in the face of changing 
conditions, was generally pursued through the period 1956 to 1965. The 
Commonwealth's role in Canadian policy was as a 'bridge' between the West and 
the new members from the developing world in support of Western interests in 
the Cold War. The thesis then looks at the year 1956. When the Suez Crisis 
occurred, the Commonwealth seemed poised for another transformation as 
members prepared to admit the first African member and considered British 
plans for closer economic links with Europe. The Canadian government's 
actions highlight its efforts to counteract division within the Commonwealth 
and preserve the 'bridge' to the developing world.
The next three chapters review the record of John Diefenbaker's premiership. 
When he came to office in 1957, he proposed upgrading Canadian foreign policy 
towards the Commonwealth. Diefenbaker launched initiatives on trade and aid, 
and had to react to changing patterns of membership, a Commonwealth crisis 
over South Africa and the British application for EEC membership. Where the 
Diefenbaker government diverged from the established pattern of Canadian 
behaviour, its policies failed. For the most part, however, it maintained 
this pattern as the only practical way to effectively use the modem
1
Commonwealth in ways conducive to the maintenance and advancement of Canadian 
interests.
The last chapter examines the Canadian government's support for the 
Commonwealth secretariat. The thesis argues that this was not a substantial 
shift In Canadian policy, but rather a reflection of changes which had taken 
place within the Commonwealth and was largely consistent with previous 
policy.
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PREFACE
This thesis examines the significance of the Commonwealth in Canadian 
foreign policy, with an emphasis on the decade from 1956 to 1965. It does so 
by evaluating Canadian policy towards the use and development of Commonwealth 
institutions for cooperation. In so doing, it tries to account for the 
motivations of Canadian policy and to assess the Commonwealth's importance to 
Canada and the factors contributing to any changes in this.
The starting point, 1956, is the year of the Suez Crisis, an episode 
which shook the Commonwealth. The stress it placed on the Commonwealth shows 
much about the nature of the "new" post-war Commonwealth that emerged in the 
late 1940s with the addition of three South Asian members and the advent of 
republican membership. The end point, 1965, is the year when, in apparent 
contradiction to longstanding policy, the Canadian government supported the 
creation of a central Commonwealth Secretariat. This decade encompasses a 
period of profound change within the Commonwealth as it was transformed by 
decolonization, and British policy towards Europe challenged some of its long 
standing assumptions. The thesis reviews Canadian governments' responses to 
these changes by means of selective studies of key issues important to the 
Commonwealth. It is not a comprehensive survey of Commonwealth affairs or 
Canadian foreign policy, but it tries to identify aspects of continuity and 
change in Canadian approaches to the Commonwealth and to assess the 
Commonwealth's role as one of a growing number of international organizations 
through which Canadian governments pursued foreign policy objectives.
There has been no broad treatment based on primary sources of the 
Commonwealth's role in Canadian foreign policy over the decade which forms 
the main focus of this thesis. Host of the specific episodes it discusses 
are treated within more general works on Canadian foreign policy or, in some
8
instances, in studies focused solely on the event.1 This thesis draws the
various strands together in a single discussion as to how these often
disparate events reflected a generally consistent primary role for the 
Commonwealth in Canadian foreign policy.
Much of the originality of this thesis stems from its extensive use of 
both Canadian and British official records. Most of the Canadian records 
were obtained through access to information procedures and were previously 
unavailable to researchers. The use of British records, in addition to 
giving the record of the main protagonist within the Commonwealth, throws 
into relief some of the chief Canadian concerns by providing alternative 
perspectives to issues facing the Commonwealth. In 1945, Britain held a
unique position at the centre of the Commonwealth. This, and Britain's
greater relative power, gave British governments tremendous influence in 
shaping the Commonwealth's evolution in the post-war period. Invariably, 
they were important interlocutors for the Canadian government in Commonwealth 
matters. At times the direction British governments would have liked to see 
the Commonwealth go were in accordance with Canadian preferences and at times 
they were at variance. Indeed, the British sources occasionally contain 
comments about the Canadians and their attitudes which might have taken them 
aback had they been seen at the time.
Access to British records is limited by the thirty year rule, but some 
Canadian records are available up to and including 1965. Even then, some 
Canadian files are still closed, as are most of the relevant personal records 
held by the Manuscript Division of the Public Archives of Canada. Most of 
the Diefenbaker papers are held at the Diefenbaker Centre at the University
*A bibliographic essay at the end of the thesis discusses the published 
literature in more detail.
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of Saskatchewan and are still being prepared for access. The departmental 
records are, however, fairly comprehensive and some aspects unavailable 
through the Department of External Affairs records are available through the 
records of other departments or the British record (as far as it runs). 
Inevitably, there will be room for further studies of the issues considered 
here, especially of specific issues where individuals whose papers are not 
now readily available may have played key roles not reflected in departmental 
records. For a survey of the Commonwealth dimensions of Canadian policy in 
the years 1965-65, however, the available resource material is more than 
ample.
2
The first systematic evaluation of them will be contained in a 
forthcoming book by Professor Dennis Smith of the University of Western 
Ontario.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Coping with change was a central theme in Canadian policy towards the 
Commonwealth after the Second World War. Post-war Canadian governments faced 
the potentially difficult task of relating positively to a fast changing 
Commonwealth and fitting it into their burgeoning foreign policy as it 
operated within an international system at once paralyzed by Cold War
politics and invigorated by the effects of decolonization. The ’Statute of
Westminster Commonwealth*^ smoothly changed into a ’new’, multiracial 
Commonwealth with the addition of three South Asian members in 1947-8. Then,
between 1956 and 1965, the Commonwealth underwent a series of changes
affecting its composition, character and purposes, producing a 'third 
Commonwealth'. Membership rose from eight in 1956 to ten in 1969 and twenty- 
one by the end of 1965. Older members, such as Canada, had to adjust to a 
Commonwealth numerically dominated by members with different perspectives on 
political and economic issues and different priorities for Commonwealth 
activity. Nevertheless, despite the changes to the Commonwealth, Canadian 
policy concerning the Commonwealth, the use and development of Commonwealth 
institutions for cooperation, and the Commonwealth's role in Canadian foreign 
policy, all remained essentially unchanged from 1947 through the period 1956- 
1965.
The underlying continuity of Canadian policy is easily obscured by the 
tremendous variation in specific policy outcomes which took place on any 
issue over time. Successive Canadian governments, sometimes the same 
government, long opposed, then later supported open Commonwealth criticism of
This originally comprised Britain and the old Dominions: Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State, and Newfoundland. 
Newfoundland’s relinquished its Dominion status in 1934 as a condition for 
receiving financial aid from Britain. The Irish Free State formally left the 
Commonwealth in 1949.
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South Africa*s internal policies. They also accepted, then opposed, then 
finally accepted, closer British trade ties with Western Europe. Most 
dramatically of all, Canadian governments had, dating back to the 1897 
Colonial Conference, consistently opposed the creation of a central 
Commonwealth body. In 1964, however, Canadian support for a secretariat was 
initially critical. The particulars of Canadian policy responded to changing 
circumstances, but through it all Canadian policy was guided by the need to 
maintain the Commonwealth's role as bridge between the West and the newly 
independent members from *under-developed areas'.
The Commonwealth's 'bridging* role, of course, had not always existed. 
Prior to 1947, there were no so-called 'under-developed* members. In fact, 
the Commonwealth did not even serve as a 'bridge* between the ethnically and 
geographically diverse members of the 'white' Commonwealth. As the old 
members gained internal self-government, starting with Canada in 1867, and 
followed by the rest of the old members between 1901 (Australia) and 1921 
(Irish Free State), each was more concerned with its own interests than any 
notion of collective interests. They were separated by vast distances and 
were not even necessarily united by blood and kinship. The French in Canada 
and the Afrikaners in South Africa represented significant non-British 
minorities in the 'British* Commonwealth. There never really was, then, a 
'golden age’ of Commonwealth cohesion and harmony to look back on and against 
which to measure future change. Instead, Commonwealth ties were almost 
exclusively viewed in terms of members* relationships with Britain.
Canada was no exception to this. Of particular value to the Canadian 
government before the war, was the Commonwealth's role as a constitutional 
forum to assert and extend Canadian independence from Britain. Indeed, much 
of the Commonwealth's early development parallels the constitutional history 
of an independent Canada and its quest to pull away from an imperial external
12
policy and conduct its own foreign relations. Successive evolutionary moves
towards independence within the Commonwealth and the rejection of imperial
federation went hand in hand with Canadian government efforts to assert and
expand its autonomy. Even after the formal recognition of complete Dominion
autonomy in external as well as internal matters by the Statute of
Westminster of 1931, this history of dissent bequeathed a certain duality
towards relations with Britain and the Commonwealth which was still
2
observable twenty and even thirty years later.
This duality manifested itself in two conflicting policy tendencies 
which coexisted in Canadian government attitudes towards the Commonwealth. 
One tendency, or predisposition, resisted any strengthening of ties between 
Commonwealth members as incipient centralization and sought, instead, to 
maximize Canada's freedom to act unencumbered by collective Commonwealth 
commitments. Because of this, Canadian governments were always hesitant to 
agree to any formal institutionalization of the Commonwealth relationship. 
Nevertheless, there also existed for Canada an attraction to Britain in 
particular, traditionally the focus of Commonwealth relations, but also to 
the Commonwealth more generally. The Commonwealth provided a diversity of 
external partners and a possible alternative to the overwhelming 
preponderance of the United States in Canada's external relations and trade 
which gave a positive reason for pursuing Commonwealth ties. The preference 
for loose, undefined linkages between members implicit in the first tendency 
was not necessarily mirrored by efforts to strengthen ties in the second. 
Canadian governments, nevertheless, recognized, that ties should not become 
too loose and that they needed to develop actively cooperative relationships 
within the Commonwealth if it was to be used positively.
2
John W. Holmes described the contemporary manifestations of Anglophobia 
and Anglophilia among Canadians and the reciprocal equivalents in Britain in: 
"The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: A Mood of Exasperation**, Round Table. (223,
July 1966).
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The Commonwealth was only one of a number of multilateral instruments 
which the Canadian government had in its foreign policy repertoire. It was 
not by any means the most important one, and indeed, the Commonwealth’s role 
in Canadian foreign policy between 1956 and 1965 was much reduced from what 
it had been, for example, before the Second World War or especially in the 
late 1940s. Nevertheless, as an increasingly specialized association with 
which Canadian governments could base ties with an important set of 
developing countries, it was used to complement organizations such as the 
United Nations and NATO where Canadian governments focused their political 
and defence relations. Most of the basic questions of Canadian policy in 
these areas centred around the Cold War. Within the foreign policy framework 
which the Cold War represented, the Commonwealth gave the Canadian government 
a limited means to operate away from the United States' preponderant presence 
as the leader of the Western alliance and Canada's overpowering neighbour.
It was not, however, an escape from the Cold War. Canadian governments had 
greater latitude when acting within the Commonwealth than might have been 
available elsewhere, but they did not forget their membership in the Western 
alliance when they dealt with Commonwealth matters. Indeed, it was for its 
potential contribution to Western interests that the Commonwealth's bridging 
role was deemed so important by Canadian governments, especially since, from 
the mid-1950s onwards, the Cold War was prominently conducted within the 
developing world. Moreover, this role reflected a fairly realistic appraisal 
by Canadian governments of how the Commonwealth could be used. Canada was 
not prepared to sacrifice its wider interests and autonomy for the sake of 
Commonwealth cohesion, neither were other members, especially the newer ones. 
This imposed obvious limits on what the Commonwealth could achieve. For 
initiatives undertaken via the Commonwealth to succeed, governments had to 
reconcile their objectives with the Commonwealth's capacity to fulfil them, 
especially as it underwent major changes between 1956 and 1965.
14
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The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy
Like the basic pattern of Canadian policy towards the Commonwealth, the 
fundamental framework within which the Canadian government made its policies 
regarding the Commonwealth was also laid down in the first post-war decade 
and continued into the second. As foreign policy questions were rarely the 
source of domestic debate in Canada, and never a major election issue, 
Canadian foreign policy tended to be almost exclusively a product of the 
government apparatus. Ministers, especially prime ministers, being 
politicians, were keenly aware of the domestic context of policy and so too 
were officials since their duty included warning their political masters of
4
"politically unpalatable factors." Nevertheless, foreign policy decisions 
were generally made without direct input from other parts of Canadian 
society.
During his long tenure as Canada’s prime minister, William Lyon 
Mackenzie King often hid behind the constitutional formula "parliament will 
decide" and "cabinet must be consulted” to avoid making commitments at 
Commonwealth meetings. However, the truth of the matter was that he himself 
mostly determined the conduct of Canadian external relations. As both prime 
minister and, by law and personal preference, secretary of state for external 
affairs (SSEA), with only a nascent Department of External Affairs (DEA) to 
offer advice, Mackenzie King’s policy was, at least until the end of the 
Second World War, subject to readily forthcoming cabinet acquiesence,
Canada’s policy. Canada's international reticence during Mackenzie King’s 
premiership obscured the development of a small but talented corps of
3
This is only a brief sketch of the subject, a more detailed picture is 
provided in the various secondary sources cited below.
4
John Holmes, The Shaping of the Peace. Canada and the Search for World 
Order: 1943-1957. Volume 1. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1979) p. 298.
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officials in DEA under the direction of Oscar Skelton who was under-secretary
of state for external affairs from 1925 until his death in 1941. Men such as
Lester Pearson and Norman Robertson, who would influence Canadian external
policy in a variety of roles until the mid-1960s, were part of a group which
formed DEA's contribution to what is often considered the ’golden age' of
5
Canadian bureaucracy from the mid-1930s to 1957.
The demands of Canada's increased responsibilities brought about by its 
important role in the Second World War expanded the scope of Canada's 
international involvement. As DEA responded to the challenges and 
opportunities that this presented, its activist and internationalist 
officials took on more and more responsibility. In doing so, they had to 
drag along Mackenzie King, who was still reluctant to countenance new 
international commitments. This began to change in 1946 when Louis 
St.Laurent was named as Canada's first full-time SSEA. In day-to-day 
operations, the new minister allowed his officials substantial leeway and, 
even more importantly, he was prepared to argue forcefully in cabinet in 
favour of the activist foreign policy the department favoured. This new 
departmental freedom was enhanced when St.Laurent became prime minister in 
late 1948 and named the USSEA, Pearson, to succeed him as minister. Under 
Pearson, DEA was able to take advantage of the absence of pre-war divisions 
over whether or not Canada should undertake international involvements and 
strengthen its position within the Canadian bureaucracy.^ Thus, unlike most 
other departments, DEA's numbers continued to increase in the post-war period 
as they had during the war, although not fast enough to keep up with all the 
activities it was now able to undertake.
c
See for example: JL Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service 
Mandarins. 1935-1957. (Toronto, Oxford University, 1982).
^John English, Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson. Volume One: 
1897-1948. (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989) p. 320.
16
An important feature of the structure of Canadian foreign policy
decision-making was the absence of a cabinet committee overseeing foreign 
7
policy. The institution of cabinet committees in the Canadian federal
0
government did not begin in earnest until the Second World War0 and through 
to the end of the period under consideration there was never such a committee 
on external affairs. This left the prime minister with more control over 
foreign policy, even after a separate SSEA was appointed than if there had 
been a committee. The prime minister's control was, however, discretionary. 
Different prime ministers chose to involve themselves to different degrees. 
The 'ideal', so far as DEA and the SSEA were concerned, was what obtained 
under St.Laurent. As prime minister, St.Laurent, having chafed under 
Mackenzie King's reluctance to give him latitude in running DEA, did not 
interfere and not surprisingly, Pearson, as SSEA, worked well with his 
officials.
The excellent relationship between DEA, Pearson and St.Laurent meant 
that the foreign policy bureaucracy had a great deal of autonomy in 
conducting Canadian external policy in the period until the Liberal defeat in
1957. There was a broad national consensus in favour of the general line 
Pearson and his officials wished to take and cabinet and parliament posed few 
obstacles. The department's general freedom from outside intrusions in its 
conduct of Canadian external policy extended, for the most part, to 
Commonwealth relations as well. Nevertheless, with so much of Commonwealth 
relations revolving around Commonwealth prime ministers, the Commonwealth's
7
A Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs had existed 
since 1945, but much of its discussions tended to be devoted towards 
reviewing expenditures. For a discussion of this committee's activities, 
see: Don Page, "The Standing Committee on External Affairs 1945 to 1983 - Who 
Participates and When?” in David Taras, Parliament and Canadian Foreign 
Policy. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985).
o
See: James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign 
Policy in Canada. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1961) pp. 12-15.
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centrepiece being their periodic meetings, even after the designation of a 
SSEA, the prime minister retained a more active role in conducting Canadian 
policy regarding the Commonwealth than he did in other areas. Even so, 
ordinarily DEA would prepare background papers on specific issues to lay the 
groundwork for the prime minister to develop his ideas. In preparation for 
Commonwealth meetings, for example, whole briefing books were compiled to 
assist the prime minister. This gave DEA, which had primary responsibility 
for doing this, the ability to make its positions felt even where it was not 
the principal Canadian interlocutor.
Even with this latitude, however, DEA did not operate in isolation. The 
wide range of issues addressed in contemporary external relations meant that 
responsibility often overlapped with or required the expertise of other 
departments. The most important among these in Commonwealth matters were the 
Department of Finance, the Bank of Canada, and the Department of Trade and 
Commerce. Others, such as the Department of Transport and the Department of 
Agriculture were also consulted when functionally necessary. Activities in 
Commonwealth functional bodies were handled through the appropriate 
government department and so, for example, the Colombo Plan initially came 
under the Department of Trade and Commerce’s International Economic and 
Technical Co-operation Division until Canada’s aid activities became so 
extensive that in 1960 they were grouped together in an External Aid Office 
under DEA.
The division of functional responsibility for different technical 
aspects of Canada’s Commonwealth relations entailed a tremendous amount of 
interdepartmental liaison, especially through official committees, to develop 
and coordinate Canadian policy on Commonwealth issues. In the so called 
’golden age’, this liaison and the control senior officials were thereby able 
to exert on policy making was made more comprehensive and effective by the
18
close personal relations among these senior civil servants in the relatively
9
small world of Ottawa in the 1940s and 1950s. In the case of Commonwealth 
economic meetings and institutions, especially those related to and emanating 
from the 1958 Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, because the 
minister of finance took a leading role, his officials bore much of the work 
load. External Affairs, however, generally remained the principal conduit 
for communications within the bureaucracy in Ottawa and between other 
Commonwealth members.
This situation prevailed from the post-war period through the period 
under consideration ending in 1965. It was most harmonious under the Liberal 
governments which held power most of the time, the only exception being the 
years 1957 to 1963 when John Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservatives 
were in office. Relations between DEA and the prime minister in these years 
were very much the antithesis of those which prevailed during the St.Laurent 
years.^ Diefenbaker viewed DEA officials suspiciously because of their 
previously close association with Pearson, who after moving from the 
bureaucracy to the Liberal ministry became the leader of the Liberal party in
1958. Unable to see beyond his own intense partisanship and instinct for 
seeking domestic political advantage, Diefenbaker distrusted the 
"Pearsonalities" in DEA, as he called them, because of their Liberal 
associations. He also felt that they were too insulated from political 
pressures.^ There was also a clash of styles. Diefenbaker had no patience
q
See especially Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, passim.
^Frank Haves. The Evolution of Canada's Commonwealth Relations. 1945- 
1968. (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1979) p. 255.
^H.Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker*s World: A Populist in World Affairs. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1989) p. 35.
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12for the shaded language of diplomacy or lengthy, detailed, explanations.
This created obvious communications difficulties and threatened to leave DEA
out of the foreign policy decision making process. Indeed, in some instances
Sir Saville Garner, the British High Commissioner (1957-1962), had better
access to Diefenbaker than DEA officials. To mitigate this, Robert Bryce,
the cabinet secretary, arranged for Diefenbaker to have a personal liaison
officer from DEA, Basil Robinson. For the first year or so of Diefenbaker*s
prime ministership, Robinson had to spend a great deal of effort passing on
correspondence to DEA that Diefenbaker treated as so personal that the
n
officials could not perform their jobs properly. At times, the British 
government, aware of this fact, sought to take advantage of it by marking 
Diefenbaker*s copy of communications being sent to all Commonwealth 
governments, *personal*, with the full knowledge that this would at least 
delay Canadian officials from providing the prime minister with advice and 
counsel.^ Diefenbaker, as the British quickly learned, could sometimes let 
his emotional attachment to the Commonwealth influence his assessment of 
British proposals that his officials would view more critically.
A similar procedure was also employed by George Drew, Canada's high 
commissioner in London for most of Diefenbaker's premiership. Drew was 
Diefenbaker's predecessor as Progressive Conservative leader and just as 
emotionally attached to Britain and the Commonwealth. He was implacably 
opposed to British membership in the EEC and willing to use his position to
n
John Hilliker, The Politicians and the "Pearsonalities": The 
Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations. 
(Unpublished paper presented to the Canadian Historical Association Annual 
Meeting, University of Guelph, 12 June, 1984) p. 4.
Robinson, Diefenbaker*s World, p. 39.
14See for example: PRO DO 35/8021 Cyprus: Association with Commonwealth
- Discussions with Cypriot Leaders [file CON 205/40/10 part C] , Draft
Circular telegram to Commonwealth Prime Ministers, February, 1960.
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15encourage Diefenbaker*s opposition to it. Sometimes Robinson was able to 
pass on Drew's telegrams to DEA immediately, at other times not. One result 
of this was conflicting signals came from the Canadian government as 
Diefenbaker's statements, reinforced by Drew, went in one direction, and his 
ministers', incorporating official advice, went in another.
Diefenbaker*s relationship with DEA was all the more important because 
he insisted on a much greater role in foreign policy making than his 
predecessor. Rather than naming a SSEA on becoming prime minister in June, 
1957, he decided to act as his own foreign minister. Even after bringing in 
Sidney Smith, the president of the University of Toronto, as SSEA in mid- 
September, 1957, Diefenbaker retained personal control over some aspects of 
foreign affairs, including relations with the Commonwealth.^ After Smith's 
sudden death in March, 1959, Diefenbaker again assumed the role until June, 
when he named Howard Green as the new minister. Neither of his first two 
choices as SSEA had any previous experience in foreign affairs, and Green 
especially could be counted on not to differ on foreign policy matters. In 
Green's own words: *'We had been old friends, and we saw things very much 
alike."17
Having a minister other than Diefenbaker did not solve all of DEA's 
problems. Smith's lack of political experience made him a weak spokesman for
15
Robinson, Diefenbaker*s World, pp. 211-7.
16 Ibid. p 97.
17Interview with Howard Green in: Peter Stursberg, Diefenbaker: 
Leadership Gained 1956-62. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1975) p. 168.
One of the areas Green and Diefenbaker agreed on was the need for close ties 
with Britain. Indeed, when Green was named SSEA, Garner described him in a 
report to the CRO as "almost pathetically well disposed towards Britain" 
(Inward CRO Telegram 649 from United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada, 4 
June, 1959. PRO DO 35/7011 Canadian Ministerial Appointments 1952-60 [file 
WES 24/1/3].)
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DEA in cabinet. Green, a seasoned politician, was much more effective in
presenting DEA’s views and the department once again became more 
IBinfluential. His longstanding acquaintance and family links with
Robertson made for a substantially different relationship between the USSEA
and SSEA than existed with Diefenbaker. In addition, although Diefenbaker
relied most heavily on Robinson and Bryce for policy advice, he recognized
that he could not master all the details of issues and so relied on officials
10
for technical details. Finally, although the influence of the mandarins 
was waning, DEA could still exert some influence through other departments 
and their ministers. Of the two departments otherwise most often involved in
Commonwealth relations, Gordon Churchill, minister of industry and trade, was
20nearly as suspicious of officials as Diefenbaker, especially after initial
difficulties in preparing trade proposals for the 1957 Commonwealth Prime
21Ministers’ Meetings immediately after the government assumed power. Over 
at Finance, however, Donald Fleming got along very well for the most part 
with his officials and, so long as new spending was not involved, Finance and 
DEA officials tended to agree on most issues, especially those dealing with 
the maintenance and expansion of the multilateral trading system.
Although there was not a cabinet committee dealing with external 
affairs, ministerial committees were sometimes created for special purposes, 
such as that dealing with the 1958 Commonwealth trade conference. These 
provided secondary conduits for DEA’s input to Cabinet. In general, Cabinet 
was much more involved in foreign policy making under Diefenbaker than had 
been the case under Mackenzie King or St.Laurent, especially if Diefenbaker
^Hilliker, The Politicians and the ’’Pearsonalities”. pp.6-7.
19Ibid. p. 3.
2ftuGranatstein, The Ottawa Men, pp. 266-7.
^Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs. 1957-1959. (Toronto: Oxford 
University for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968) p. 65.
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needed re-assurance about the domestic implications of policy. Previously, 
cabinet had merely signalled its concurrence with the policy DEA and Pearson 
had developed. Now, ministers’ advice was solicited and even if Diefenbaker, 
depending on his mood, could take umbrage at criticism, ministers could state 
reservations about new initiatives and other departures from past practices 
in Commonwealth affairs, reservations DEA generally shared.
Thus, during the course of the Diefenbaker government, a modus vivendi 
emerged. Nevertheless, Diefenbaker never entirely lost his suspicion of DEA. 
Late in his tenure, in a matter unrelated to Commonwealth issues, for 
example, officials at DEA advised him against pushing for a resolution 
condemning ’Soviet colonialisn’ at the United Nations which both Britain and 
the United States opposed. Feeling that DEA’s advice betrayed a lack of 
support, Diefenbaker complained that had the resolution been proposed by Paul 
Martin, at the time the Liberal 'shadow minister’ for external affairs, the 
department would have given its full support.^ A telling point was that 
despite Diefenbaker’s close involvement with external affairs, by one
account, he formally consulted Robertson, the USSEA from 1958 onwards, only
2
twice. Regardless as to the precision of this number, at the very least it 
conveys an idea of the prevailing atmosphere in DEA’s relations with the 
prime minister. Nothing could conceal the general relief in DEA with the 
return of a Liberal government in 1963 and the prospect of greater 
receptiveness to the department’s ideas.
^PAC MG 30 E163 vol 18. Norman Robertson Papers. Personal Correspondence 
1962. Memorandum from OWD (?) to Robertson, 3 July, 1962.
2
Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years. (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1963) p. 252.
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The distrust Diefenbaker had towards DEA was all the more ironical given 
his desire to orient Canadian external policy towards Britain and the 
Commonwealth. The officials whom Diefenbaker distrusted so much were 
exceptionally well prepared to work with their British counterparts. In 
addition to the British and the protestant background of many senior foreign 
service officers, most had extensive experience of working closely with 
British officials. Robertson, for example, had spent much of his career 
alternating between being high commissioner in London and USSEA in Ottawa.
If his opposition to British policy over Suez ended his effectiveness as high 
commissioner at that time, the assessment of him contained in biographical 
notes prepared by the Commonwealth Relations Office for the British briefs 
for the 1960 CPMM indicate that British officials’ high opinion of him was 
soon restored. Other officials at the assistant-USSEA level in the late 
1950s, such as John Holmes, had also served in London. In the post-war 
period, the tendency was increasingly towards sending the best and the 
brightest to Washington and the UN, but, London was still a key post and DEA 
had an impressive reservoir of contacts there which helped DEA develop its 
positions regarding Britain and the Commonwealth.
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CHAPTER 2: CANADIAN APPROACHES TO THE COMMONWEALTH 1944 - 1956
The underlying pattern of Canadian relations with the Commonwealth and 
its role in Canadian foreign policy in the decades following the Second World 
War was established in the first five years following the war. William Lyon 
Mackenzie King's resolute resistance to Commonwealth centralization and 
institutionalized cooperation to facilitate this in the mid-1940s differed in 
tone from the more accommodative stance Louis St.Laurent's government adopted 
in 1950 and stands in stark contrast to John Diefenbaker's avowed objective 
of more closely aligning Canadian policy with Britain's in the late 1950s and 
Lester Pearson's acceptance of a central Commonwealth secretariat in the mid- 
1960s. Nevertheless, a common thread links the Canadian government attitudes 
from the premiership of Mackenzie King, through that of St.Laurent, to 
Diefenbaker and Pearson. Canadian governments desired a flexible 
Commonwealth which Canada could use when and how it wanted without being 
constrained in other areas of external activity.
Mackenzie King holds the distinction of being the longest serving prime 
minister in Commonwealth history. As such, he took part in guiding the 
Commonwealth through several critical transitions. His efforts to achieve 
the type of Commonwealth that he believed Canada required seemed at times 
like a struggle against British governments' efforts to promote a more 
centralized conception of the Commonwealth. Some writers see Mackenzie 
King's suspicion of British motives and of any effort at extending or 
formalizing cooperation as unwarranted paranoia, battles of his own devising 
against British governments which conceded the match in the 1920s1. Others
^or examples E Judith Adams, Commonwealth collaboration in foreign 
affairs. 1939-1947: the British perspective. (Unpublished PhD thesis, Leeds 
University, 1981); Denis Judd and Peter Slinn, The Evolution of the Modem 
Commonwealth 1902 - 80. (Londons MacMillan, 1982) and Philip G. Wigley,
Canada and the Transition to Commonwealths British-Canadian Relations 
1917-1926. (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1977).
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more readily accept that even if the Canadian government persisted in some of
2
its concerns until they become irrelevant, in the late 1940s they were 
warranted as Canada strove to ensure that the principles established in the 
inter-war period were not eroded in practice. In the 1940s, the 
Commonwealth was, after all, experiencing substantial changes in its 
composition, operation, and in the international environment in which it 
functioned. There was no way of knowing how it would look once the dust 
settled. In this context, old battles had to be fought again for old 
victories to be preserved.
The essence of the struggle remained, before, during and after the war, 
about where Canadian external policy should be determined. In this, the 
Commonwealth's principle pre-war role for Mackenzie King was not as an 
instrument to conduct foreign policy but as a constitutional forum to assert 
the fact that Canada could indeed have a foreign policy. The most 
significant milestones were the 1926 Balfour Declaration and the 1931 Statute 
of Westminster which established the complete independence of the Dominions 
in practice and in law respectively. Mackenzie King was pro-British, but he 
was emphatically anti-imperial. He believed that the only way that the 
British Empire and Commonwealth could continue to exist was as a community of 
independent states, and to this end was anxious to have Canada's complete and 
total independence universally recognized. To achieve this, he tenaciously 
pursued narrowly defined Canadian interests, dismissing any thought of the 
Commonwealth as an actor the world. His main preoccupation in international 
affairs was that Canada should be left alone to develop. As a result.
2
John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace? Canada and the Search for World 
Order 1943-1957. Volume 2. (Toronto* University of Toronto, 1982) p. 165.
3
For example* JL Granatstein, A Man of Influence* Norman A. Robertson 
and Canadian Statecraft 1929-68. (Toronto* Deneau, 1981) pp. 229-33; and John 
Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume I* The Early Years. 
1909-1946. (Montreal and Kingston* McGill-Queen's University and Institute of 
Public Administration of Canada, 1990) p. 302.
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Canada's inter-war external policy, inasmuch as there was such a thing, was 
quasi-isolationist.
Total isolation was impracticable. Canada relied on trade and Mackenzie 
King saw participation in the League of Nations as a means to both establish 
Canada's 'international personality' and to avoid international commitments. 
As far it could, however, his government minded its own business. A cardinal 
aim of Canada's inter-war external policy was to avoid international 
commitments, including those stemming from Canada's Commonwealth 
relationship. Developing Canada as a nation and preserving national unity 
were Mackenzie King's overriding policy concerns. Anything which might 
jeopardize national unity, as he felt an active foreign policy might in the 
absence of a national consensus bridging both the English and French-speaking 
populations of Canada, had no place on his policy agenda.
Having gained the point that Commonwealth members were fully 
independent, Mackenzie King assiduously protected it against any erosion. He 
continued his inter-war role as the most "awkward fly in the imperial 
ointment"4 through the war and into the mid-1940s. He was not struggling 
against the Commonwealth tie, but against a particular formulation of it.
The outcome of this round, his last, set the pattern for Canadian 
participation in the Commonwealth under the prime ministers who followed him 
and guided Canadian involvement in the Commonwealth as it evolved over the 
next twenty years.
4Peter Lyon, "Introduction" in. Lyon, Peter (ed). Britain and Canada. 
Survey of a Changing Relationship. (London: Frank Cass, 1976) p. xvii.
The Halifax Imbroglio
Mackenzie King, having duly consulted the Canadian Parliament to assert 
Canadian independence as he moved to support Britain, succeeded in bringing a 
united Canada into the Second World War a week after Britain. Despite the 
equality of status enshrined in the Statute of Westminster, the substance of 
the relationship showed itself to be otherwise - Britain was still the 
unquestioned leader. The war brought Anglo-Canadian cooperation to new 
heights, but created situations where Canadian sensitivities could be pricked 
and suspicions aroused about British intentions. Although the statutory form 
of the Commonwealth was settled, the manner in which it would operate in the 
post-war world was not. Mackenzie King, suspecting plots in London to 
reassert control, remained on guard against the possibility of any 
encroachment by those advocating a 'common policy' Commonwealth.
A speech in Toronto by Lord Halifax, Britain's ambassador to the United 
States, on 24 January, 1944, brought these suspicions to a head. In it, even 
as Halifax asserted that Dominions were free to choose their own paths in 
international affairs, he left no doubt as to what he considered the 
responsible courses coordinated Commonwealth foreign and defence policies so 
that the 'British Commonwealth and Empire' could act as a fourth major power 
in the post-war world, alongside the United States, the Soviet Union and 
China.5 The speech was a thinly disguised exhortation for the Dominions to 
subordinate their foreign policies to British leadership in the name of 
Commonwealth unity. Mackenzie King's reaction to this speech encapsulated 
his attitude towards the Commonwealth and Canada's place in it. Reading 
about the speech the following morning, he immediately sensed a 'Tory plot'
5Lord Halifax, Speech at the Toronto Board of Trade, Toronto, Ontario, 
January 24, 1944 (British Information Services, Washington, January 24,
1944). PRO DO 35/1204/75/9 Lord Halifax: Speech at Toronto on 24 January, 
1944.
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to restore British prestige. With dismay, he resigned himself to "this 
perpetual struggle to save the Empire despite all that Tories' policies will 
do...”6
His concerns arose not from realistic fears of constitutional regression 
but from differences over the shape of the modem Commonwealth and the degree 
of centralization it would have. It was clear where Mackenzie King stood on 
such issues. He had been expressing the same themes since first assuming the 
premiership in the 1920s and had an opportunity to express himself on 
Commonwealth centralization little more than a month earlier following a 
speech by John Curtin, the Australian prime minister. In a speech on 14 
December, 1943, Curtin had called for new mechanisms for greater Commonwealth 
coordination, including a secretariat of the Imperial Conference in London. 
Such proposals were anathema to Mackenzie King's concept of Commonwealth. 
Halifax's speech, while less blatant and detailed than Curtin's, was more 
provocative. Calling for Commonwealth centralization in Mackenzie King's own 
backyard was unconscionable.
What he considered Tory imperialism, whether British or Canadian, had 
always provided Mackenzie King ammunition to wage politics. He was 
determined to make good use of this opportunity to fight the centralized, 
'common policy' concept of the Commonwealth. His first public reaction to 
Halifax's speech was on 31 January in the House of Commons in the Address in 
Reply to the Speech from the Throne. In it, he acknowledged the importance
7
of close consultation between Commonwealth members; he always supported 
cooperation so long as sovereignty was not infringed. His favourite 
description of Commonwealth consultation was as a "continuous conference of
^William Lyon Mackenzie King Diaries (Transcript), January 25, 1944. PAC 
MG 26 J13 William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, fiche T-197 p. 70.
7
Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 82, No. 1 (January 
31. 1944) pp. 39-42.
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cabinets". With this in mind, he pointed out the difficulty of making 
decisions at Commonwealth Prime Ministers7 Meetings (CPMMs) in London where 
Dominion prime ministers were separated from their cabinets. Cooperation, he 
believed, was best achieved through existing informal means rather than 
efforts at creating new formal central machinery. He went on to criticize 
the underlying premise of a world dominated by four great powers and urged 
that all peace-loving nations of whatever size should join together after the 
war to preserve peace. Ruminating on this theme in his diary, he commented:
It opens up the great broad division between centralized and 
decentralized organization, not only of Empire activities but the 
larger question of power politics by a few great nations leading 
inevitably to war against the conception of world co-operation of 
nations great and small.
His Commonwealth policy, then, was an extension of his views on the 
organization of the international system. He was anxious that in both there 
be room for Canada to act (or not act) on its own.
The British government quickly dissociated itself from Halifax's 
0
remarks. It did not, however, consider them to be overly controversial 
because Halifax had not said anything novel.10 Churchill even described the 
speech as "a valuable contribution to study and discussion."11 The mixed 
signals from London did little to ease Mackenzie King's latent suspicions of 
Britain. If there was any doubt before, the groundwork was now set for a
0
William Lyon Mackenzie King Diaries (Transcript), February 2, 1944.
PAC MG 26 J13, WLMK Papers, fiche T-197.
Q
Extract from Ministry of Information Press Conference, 27 January, 
1944. PRO DO 35/1204/75/9.
10Extract from Press Conference with Brenden Macken, Minister of 
Information, 27 January, 1944. PRO DO 35/1204/75/9.
^Hansard extract from 1 February, 1944 accompanying Telegram 298 from 
Massey to Mackenzie King, 2 February, 1944. PAC MG 26 J1 WLMK Papers: 
Primary Correspondence Series. Vol 366, Reel C-7053, p. 316795.
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showdown between advocates of the 'common policy Commonwealth' and those of 
the 'consultative Commonwealth'.
Towards the Post-War Commonwealth
Halifax's comments about the Commonwealth occurred within the context of 
discussions in the Commonwealth about its post-war role and structure. 
Coincidentally, as the tempest over the Halifax speech was subsiding,
Canadian officials were discussing a British memorandum on the subject, a 
copy of which had been passed to Charles Ritchie, the First Secretary at 
Canada House, the Canadian High Commission in London. This promoted what 
could be called the 'Canadian Commonwealth', in contrast with "certain public
pronouncements"; Ritchie judged it "a pretty shrewd appraisal of the
12realities of the situation from the United Kingdom point of view. It 
conceded that formalizing the Commonwealth was impractical. Britain, 
therefore, should regard Commonwealth members as fellow states and United 
Nations members rather than as offspring, let them develop their own
policies, and rely on Britain's position as a great power to give it
13leadership in the Commonwealth. Ritchie's letter and the British 
memorandum were widely distributed to DEA officials for comment. The 
memorandum, of course, centred on British perspectives and policy options, 
but Canadian officials saw the 'attitude on paper' as indicative that Britain 
was coming to see things as Canada did.
12Charles Ritchie, First Secretary, High Commission in Great Britain to 
Hume Wrong, Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs, February 2, 1944. 
PAC RG 25 ACC 89-90/029 vol 39 file 62-A(S) part 1. The British Commonwealth 
(1943-49).
13Ibid. Enclosures Memorandum by Foreign Office on British Commonwealth 
Relations, 30 November, 1943.
31
The memorandum was, however, just that. Canadian officials, although 
considerably less suspicious of British intentions than their prime minister, 
could only wish that the its ideas were always put into practice.14 Perhaps 
the biggest difference between Mackenzie King and his officials was that 
while he became anxious, officials found British attitudes "irritating".15 
A major irritation was the British assumption of the necessity of British 
predominance. From the Canadian perspective:
A relative decline in the strength of the U.K. and a relative 
increase in strength on the part of the Dominions would make 
equality of function as much a reality as equality of status. Such 
a situation might render collaboration easier than at present, as 
there would be less fear in the Dominions that Commonwealth 
consultation would mean domination from London.
This was a significant difference between Britain's 'enlightened' declaratory 
policy and the Canadian view of Commonwealth. Such differences helped 
maintain apprehension about Commonwealth machinery among Canadian decision 
makers.
Concurrent with discussions about Canada's relationship with the 
Commonwealth, within DEA there was a free-wheeling policy debate to define 
Canada's place in the post-war international order. The emerging consensus 
saw Canada as the potential leader of a group of 'middle powers': "states 
which are important enough to be necessary to the Big Four but not important 
enough to be accepted as one of the quartet."17 These 'big little powers'
14Wrong to Robertson, February 7, 1944. PAC RG 25 ACC 89-90/029 vol 39 
file 62-A(S) part 1.
15Pearson to Wrong, 21 March, 1944. PAC MG 26 Nl. LB Pearson Papers. Pre- 
1958 Correspondence, vol 23. File Commonwealth Relations 1933-48.
16John W. Holmes, Assistant, Department of External Affairs, to Wrong, 
February 19, 1944. PAC RG 25 ACC 89-90/029 vol 39 file 62-A(S) part 1.
17Lester Pearson, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy in United States to Norman 
Robertson, USSEA, February 1, 1944. PAC MG 26 Nl. Lester B. Pearson Papers, 
Pre-1958 Correspondence Series, vol. 23, Commonwealth Relations (1933-48) 
file.
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or 'little big powers', countries like Canada, would need to look to each 
other for support. Unlike big powers with responsibility and control or 
little powers with neither, being in between could produce the worst of 
both - responsibility with no control. Canada had long opposed this 
formulation of power relationships in the Commonwealth and wanted to minimize 
the chance of it being replicated in the international system. To this end, 
Canada sought an effective voice in post-war international affairs.
This, ultimately, was what Curtin sought for Australia as well. Whereas
his proposals implied that an effective voice in the policy of a united
Commonwealth was the best means to attain this, the Canadian preference was
to secure international order via international organization rather than by
creating another superpower. From this difference sprang radically different
views of the Commonwealth, one a 'consultative' Commonwealth, and the other a
'common policy' Commonwealth. The 'show down' between these competing views
of Commonwealth was to be in May, 1944, at the CPMM in London. Although not
reflected in the meeting's agenda, Curtin's speeches were still fresh in the
minds of Commonwealth leaders. The Canadian government knew that the only
reason that the British government had not requested the subject of an
Imperial Conference Secretariat be included on the agenda was the assumption
isthat Curtin himself would raise it. The British government was well aware
of the Canadian hesitancy to get involved in any "imperial as opposed to an
19international organisation," but was very interested in securing greater 
Commonwealth cooperation in the post-war world.
10
Telegram 506 from Frederic Hudd, Acting Canadian High Commissioner in 
Britain to Robertson, 29 February, 1944. PAC MG 26 13J WLMK Papers, vol 366, 
reel C-7053, p. 316975.
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War Cabinet Committee on Preparations for the Meeting with the Dominion 
Prime Ministers, Minutes(44) 3rd Meeting, 12 April, 1944. PRO DO 35/1474 
Ministerial Committee on Preparations for the Meeting with he Dominion Prime 
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Gaining Canadian agreement to new machinery was a major concern of the 
British government as it prepared for the meeting. As the Canadians had been 
confidentially informed, the British government found Curtin's idea about a
Commonwealth secretariat attractive but intended to let Curtin raise the
20issue. Once the issue was raised, if a consensus seemed possible. Lord 
Cranbome, the Dominions Secretary, would present British proposals,
including one for a strictly administrative secretariat to organize meetings
21and facilitate information exchanges between members. The British 
government hoped that Mackenzie King could reconcile himself to a formal 
organization with such a narrow mandate. Failing this, the British hoped to 
modify Curtin's suggestions and have Dominion governments attach liaison 
officials to their high commissions in London to maintain a close contact 
with British departments. This would provide them with a means of keeping 
informed of defence and foreign policy during its formative stage.
This proposal assumed that British policy would remain preeminent in the 
Commonwealth. It did not reflect any notion of equality of function to go 
along with the equality of constitutional status and was exactly what the 
Canadians were on guard against. Perhaps the best policy suggestion was 
contained in a minute to Cranbome from the committee preparing British 
policy for the CPMM: "We would be wise, particularly in view of Canadian 
idiosyncracies, not to fly too high."^
Once the meetings convened, Mackenzie King's 'idiosyncracies' in the 
area of Commonwealth machinery were well displayed. The value of a
20Secretaries notes for the Chairman, [n.d.] PRO DO 35/1474.
21Lord Cranboume, Memorandum "Co-operation in the British Commonwealth" 
W.P.(44) 210, 18 April, 1944. PRO DO 35/1488, Brief for United Kingdom 
Ministers in preparation for meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers on Co­
operation in the British Commonwealth [file WC 75/32]
22Committee on Preparing for the Dominions Prime Ministers Meeting,
Minute to Lord Cranboume, 12 February, 1944. PRO DO 35/1474.
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'continuing conference of cabinets' was his mantra from the start, especially
following a suggestion by Churchill for annual CPMMs. For Mackenzie King,
23"behind the machinery there was always the assumption of commitments."
Since there were none, it was better not to create a misleading facade. 
Emphasizing regular meetings, he feared, would generate suspicions about 
commitments and risk having appearances kill the reality. He was, of course, 
ambivalent about CPMMs because British ministers were in a more advantageous 
position being near to their officials and being able to consult their 
cabinet. He constantly stressed that he was unable to make any commitment 
without conferring with his cabinet, hence his preference for ongoing 
informal consultation - the 'conference of cabinets'.
Curtin made his anticipated proposal at a session on defence cooperation 
on 15 May. Earlier that day, Cranbome had made several proposals, including 
the establishment of a Standing Committee on Strategy and Defence to provide 
continuity between CPMMs; regular exchanges of staff officers; meetings
94
between staffs; and meetings between ministers of defence. Taking his cue 
from this, Curtin reiterated the ideas from his earlier speech for more
centralization in the Commonwealth and institutional machinery to facilitate
25this. He also suggested that the British prime minister meet with 
Dominion high commissioners once a month, and called for more frequent CPMMs 
and the initiation of ministerial and official meetings to supplement 
existing machinery for regular consultation. New Zealand's Peter Fraser and 
the British ministers present supported the idea, but Mackenzie King stood 
firm. The meeting only agreed that there be monthly meetings between the 
British prime minister and the high commissioners. On the rest, Dominion
23William Lyon Mackenzie King Diaries (Transcript), May 2, 1944. PAC MG
26 J13 N I M  Papers, fiche T-201. p. 416.
94
Summary of subjects raised at Prime Ministers Conference, 14th 
meeting - 15th May, 1944, 3 p.m., John W.Holmes Papers D/I/4 "Commonwealth".
prime ministers undertook to consult their respective cabinets and 
communicate the results to the British government.
For all intents and purposes, the issue of centralizing institutions had 
been laid to rest. The key issue, common policy, remained. The British 
government was especially keen on defence policy coordination. The Canadian 
government's response to this was indicative of its approach to Commonwealth 
policy in general. Its Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Planning 
considered Canada's post-war defence relations with Britain and the
Commonwealth and came out solidly against the types of pan-Commonwealth
26solutions advocated by proponents of the 'common policy' Commonwealth.
The Canadian government wanted to maintain defence ties with Britain, but on 
a bilateral basis, not through the Commonwealth. It, therefore, rejected all 
the British proposals from the 1944 CPMM except where they advocated 
continuation of existing practices. The Canadian government deemed these 
sufficient to ensure necessary consultation between Britain and Canada. 
Anything else could give outsiders (or insiders) the impression that a power 
bloc was being created. Canada's most important defence relationship was now 
with the United States. Britain had a key role in Canadian conceptions of 
Western defence, but Anglo-American cooperation was much more important for 
the Canadian government than participation in a Commonwealth defence scheme,
which while attractive to Australia, for example, would be most significant
27in areas far removed from Canada's principle interests.
26Draft Report by Joint Drafting Group, Working Committee on Post- 
Hostilities Planning, "Post-War Canadian Defence Relations with the British 
Commonwealth", January 29, 1945. PAC ACC 89-90/029 vol 19 file 7-CM(s). 
Defence Cooperation within the Commonwealth - Post-hostilities.
27The Canadian position with respect to defence relationships should not 
be viewed as incipient continentalism on the part of the Liberal government, 
as conservative Canadian historians, for example, Donald Creighton have 
argued. Strategic reliance on the United States reflected both geographic 
realities and the relative capabilities of possible defence relationships.
The Commonwealth could not satisfy Canadian security needs while the United 
States could. The Canadian government was also reluctant to institutionalize 
its relationship with the Americans any more than absolutely necessary.
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Mackenzie King soon found that British predilections for Commonwealth 
cohesion were not all a Tory plot. At the next CPMM in 1946, he found 
himself fighting much the same battles with Clement Attlee's Labour 
government. The British government was still eager to improve defence 
consultation and the Canadian government to avoid it. But, unlike at past 
meetings, Mackenzie King found general agreement with his position, even from 
the Australians and New Zealanders, who traditionally supported centralized 
machinery. The British government's quest for enhanced defence cooperation
achieved apparent results with an agreed statement of principles on defence
28policy coordination. Yet, the final communique of May 23, 1946, was a 
triumph for the Canadian concept of Commonwealth, endorsing existing 
institutions and practices. The British government, still ready to embark on 
centralization if a consensus emerged, had to accept this. The issue was not 
by any means settled and mechanisms for consultation were again a major 
subject at the 1948 CPMM.
Although the Permanent Joint Board of Defence remained, most bodies created 
during the war were allowed to lapse and American desires for a comprehensive 
defence co-ordination agreement had to be satisfied with a more limited 
'executive agreement', the Joint Statement on Defence Co-operation on 12 
February, 1947. Even Australia and New Zealand, those most loyal of 
Commonwealth members, had felt it necessary to reach a much more formal 
treaty agreement with the United States.
28By the time the next CPMM was coming up, the hollowness of these 
undertakings was becoming evident and beginning to irk those on the British 
side who had hoped for more. The 1946 meeting established machinery for 
defence co-operation along agreed principles: (i) to ensure co-ordination on 
defence policy; (ii) provide the maximum degree of co-ordination which the 
sovereign status of members allowed; (iii) since a centralized system was 
unacceptable, it was to be based on a looser model. The method chosen was 
the posting of liaison officers at high commissions. Commonwealth members 
duly exchanged liaison officers, but to the British government's chagrin, 
there was little for them to do because there was no political co-ordination 
on objectives and therefore no basis to start joint planning.
Memorandum "Commonwealth Defence Co-operation", Report by the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee Joint Planning Staff, 3 July, 1948. PRO DO 35/2204 Dominion Prime 
Ministers' Conference: Machinery for Commonwealth Consultation [file 
C2610/19].
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The New Commonwealth
The attendance of India, Pakistan and Ceylon as full members made the 
1948 CPMM the first meeting of the 'new# multiracial Commonwealth. It was
also Mackenzie King's last CPMM, although because of his health, Louis
29St.Laurent took his place at most sessions. Some things, however, 
remained unchanged: the British desire to extend cooperative mechanisms and 
the Canadian desire to avoid this.
Prior to the meetings, St.Laurent briefed Cabinet on the difficulties 
that the Canadian delegation expected. Foremost was the support of some 
Commonwealth members for centralization in the belief that a third great 
power was needed in the international system and that the Commonwealth could 
serve this function if consultative institutions were in place to formulate a 
common foreign policy.30 St.Laurent expected the main advocacy for new 
central institutions to come from either Australia or New Zealand. In the 
area of defence relations, however, the British government was still 
advocating measures totally unacceptable to Canada so that too had to be 
watched.
29St.Laurent had de facto authority far beyond his recently resigned 
ministerial portfolio (SSEA) for representing Canada at the meetings. He had 
been Mackenzie King's designated successor for some time. Mackenzie King 
first asked him to be the next leader of the ruling Liberal Party in October 
1945, from which point onwards he acted as Acting Prime Minister in Mackenzie 
King's absence when he was not himself accompanying the Prime Minister. At 
the time of the Commonwealth meetings, he was already the leader of the 
Liberal Party having been elected as Mackenzie King's successor on 7 August, 
1948, and was only awaiting Mackenzie King's retirement as prime minister.
His replacement as Secretary of State for External Affairs, effective 
September 10, 1948, was Lester Pearson. At the time of the London meetings, 
Pearson was campaigning for a parliamentary seat in a by-election.
St.Laurent had been assisting him, but flew to London when Mackenzie King 
fell ill.
30PAC RG 2 vol 2642, reel T-2366. Cabinet Conclusions. 12 October, 1948.
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St.Laurent was correct about the British government's yearning for 
greater institutionalization of Commonwealth defence cooperation but 
underestimated its attachment to wider policy coordination. The British 
government wanted to supplement existing consultative mechanisms, especially 
in economic matters. The CPMMs could promote understanding of common 
purposes even if few decisions were taken at them, but more was required to 
ensure "common understanding of common interests or a sense of sustained 
collaboration in pursuit of common aims."31 In other words, more contact, 
if not supervision, was needed if the Dominions were to decide on their own 
to behave as the British government thought they ought.
To this end, Attlee introduced a series of proposals to increase 
consultation and functional cooperation at the 1948 CPMM. These included 
instituting issue-specific functional meetings to supplement existing
32practices and having CPMMs at fixed intervals every two or three years. 
Between CPMMs, ministerial meetings and regional conferences would maintain 
close contacts between governments. To bridge the interval between these 
meetings, he suggested holding more meetings between Commonwealth 
representatives in London and British officials and instituting similar 
procedures in other Commonwealth capitals. He concluded by suggesting the
establishment of a standing body of officials attached to high commissions in
33London for regular exchanges of information about economic policy. Attlee 
emphasized that such a body would not formulate a common policy or take 
decisions. He argued that it would be analogous to existing bodies such as 
the Sterling Area Statistical Committee which met to review dollar
31Memorandum, "Arrangements for Consultations between Commonwealth 
Governments". PRO DO 35/2204.
32P.M.M.(48)7th Meeting. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting, London, 18 
October, 1948 p. 3. PRO CAB 133/88 Meeting of Prime Ministers, October 1948. 
Full record of minutes of meeting and memoranda.
33Ibid. p. 4.
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expenditure of Sterling Area members. St.Laurent delivered the Canadian 
response, but regardless of who was at the table, the response was the same, 
opposition to anything to formalize consultation. The response of other 
Commonwealth representatives ranged from Fraser, who agreed with the 
proposals, to Eric Louw, the South African Minister of Mines and Economic 
Affairs, who bluntly rejected anything that might develop into a permanent 
organization for Commonwealth cooperation and imply that the Commonwealth was 
an economic unit. As a compromise, the British proposals, which became known 
as the 'London proposals', were submitted to the member governments for 
further consideration before being made public.
If the Canadian delegation had felt constrained to limit its 
reservations so as not to appear obstructionist in London, the Canadian 
government quickly set the record straight about the Canadian position. In 
early November, Cabinet agreed on the substance of a circular telegram to 
Commonwealth governments giving the Canadian response to the London 
Proposals. This made clear the government's satisfaction with the existing 
flexible system of consultation. While conceding that most of the proposals 
restated existing practices, Canada expressed apprehension that 'the fact of 
their being stated formally might create the impression in some quarters that 
they represented something new or different."35 In particular, regarding 
the proposals for foreign and defence ministers' meetings, the Canadian 
government considered it undesirable to fix timetables for foreign ministers 
because of the impression it might give that the Commonwealth was being
organized to speak with a unified voice in a manner totally unacceptable to
36Canada. A more practical alternative, the Canadian government believed,
34P.M.M.(48)13th Meeting, Minutes of the thirteenth meeting, London, 21 
October, 1948. Annex. PRO CAB 133/88.
PAC RG 2 vol 2642, reel T-2366. Cabinet Conclusions. 5 November, 1948. 
Annexed text of circular telegram.
36 Ibid.
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would be to hold meetings as needed. As for meetings of defence ministers, 
in the Canadian government's view, anything which went beyond existing 
practices was totally unrealistic. Defence planning was impossible without a 
political framework and such a framework was unacceptable to Canada.
The Canadian response to the London Proposals was as blunt and 
unequivocal as it was predictable. The objections that were not raised in 
London were firmly stated, but doing so created another problem: "if Canada
withheld her agreement and merely stated her reservations, the division would
37become known." Not wanting a public split within the Commonwealth, the 
Canadian government contemplated alternative proposals it could make, such as 
holding informal meetings of foreign ministers during the United Nations 
General Assembly. The Canadian government wanted Commonwealth cooperation to 
remain informal and centred on individual relationships rather than formal 
and collective ones. Too many conferences would be detrimental in the long 
run because they did not reflect the reality of the Commonwealth and would 
only expose this fact. The addition of the newly independent Asian members 
and the prospect of more members in the future made this point more salient. 
Mackenzie King believed that as membership expanded and became more 
heterogeneous, it would become more difficult to forge common Commonwealth 
policies, and indeed, attempts to do so would only achieve the opposite by 
generating friction between governments.38
This view of the positive impact, from Mackenzie King's perspective, of 
more diverse membership was also reflected in his approach to another issue 
dealt with at the 1948 meetings but not reflected in the final communique. 
This was the continued relationship of Ireland and India to the Commonwealth 
in the absence of an allegiance to the Crown. In the event, Ireland wanted
37PAC RG 2 vol 2643, reel T-2366. Cabinet Conclusions. 17 February, 1949.
38Ibid. October 23, 1948, fiche 261 p. 1057.
all the way out, but the Indian government of Jawaharlal Nehru was anxious to 
retain India's membership as a republic. St.Laurent and Mackenzie King had 
at first differed on the importance of common allegiance, but by the time the 
meeting came, St.Laurent had been converted to Mackenzie King's position. 
Mackenzie King saw the symbol as secondary to the substance - the 
Commonwealth was a community of free and independent nations held together by 
kindred ideas with the Crown simply as an outward symbol. Even if Britain 
wanted a more united Commonwealth with common foreign and defence policies, 
no such united entity, in his view, could exist. Forcing symbolic issues 
endangered the Commonwealth at the expense of a wider vision Mackenzie King 
was beginning to see for it. This was the need to enable all those once 
associated with the British Empire to continue to cooperate among themselves 
in the manichaistic struggle against communism.
From the beginning of consultation on India's continued membership, 
Mackenzie King was willing to be flexible.40 This reflected his 'larger 
vision' and his belief in a Commonwealth of individual relationships. 
Commonwealth ties, especially those with Britain, were important to Canada, 
and Mackenzie King and the Canadian government did not want these diluted. 
Therefore, they accepted that a common pattern in Commonwealth relationships, 
as had previously theoretically existed, might not be possible.41 Instead, 
each member would build specific bilateral links from the Commonwealth 
connection. Insofar as the Crown was concerned, each member could choose the 
relationship it deemed appropriate while retaining its Commonwealth
39Ibid. September 8, 1948, fiche 259, p. 862.
40Minute by Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet, 14 August, 1948 
"Commonwealth Relationships Notes of Points raised by Mr. Mackenzie King".
PRO CAB 21/1818 Commonwealth Relations (Official) Committee. Future 
Development of the Commonwealth Relationship (Miscellaneous Papers) 1948-51 
(file 10/4/47 part I).
41Paper X: Considerations on the Nature of the Commonwealth, 6 October,
1948. PAC RG 25 vol 2285 file S/29/1. Canadian Papers for the Meeting of the 
Prime Ministers, October, 1948.
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membership. In this way, the Crown could be kept out political squabbles and 
membership would be more likely to grow, reducing the possibility of a 
British controlled organization.
The modalities of India's continued membership were discussed between 
Commonwealth governments and were the subject of a special CPMM in April,
1949. At this meeting, a formula was worked out similar to the approach 
Mackenzie King had advocated. St.Laurent, by then prime minister, and his 
officials were anxious find a way to accommodate a Indian republic in the 
Commonwealth while retaining Canada's link to the Crown. They recognized 
that the independence of the Indian Empire foreshadowed future developments. 
If a way could be found to keep India in, the chances were much greater that 
other Asian, and eventually even African, colonies would join on attaining 
independence. India remaining would also avoid creating the impression that 
the Commonwealth was a spent, shrinking entity and would inject a new dynamic 
to it, demonstrating Commonwealth statecraft in the process. Indeed, it 
affirmed a new purpose for the Commonwealth as a link between the West and 
the developing countries of Asia.
The Canadian government saw the Indian government's decision to remain 
in the Commonwealth as a vindication of the Canadian concept of Commonwealth. 
Commenting on the final outcome in the Canadian House of Commons, Pearson, 
who had been recruited from the bureacracy into Cabinet and was now now SSEA, 
said:
Once again, the commonwealth has proven its ability to adapt to 
these changing conditions, something I venture to think - there may 
be disagreement over this - it could not have done if it had, in 
earlier times, decided to organize its activities in a fixed, 
formal and centralized manner.
A9
Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (1st Session, 21st 
Parliament, Volume II, November 16, 1949).
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The long-standing Canadian approach to Commonwealth organization emerged not 
as one of two opposing views - a centralized Commonwealth versus a 
decentralized Commonwealth - but as an intermediate position. The real 
choices were between centralization and dissolution. The Canadian approach 
reflected the fact that the government was not prepared to yield control over 
its foreign or defence policies by committing itself to coordinating them 
with its Commonwealth partners, under any circumstances, but especially 
because the Commonwealth was now secondary to the United Nations in Canadian 
foreign policy, and Canada was much more dependent on the United States than 
on Britain for economic and military security. It was nonetheless also true 
that the Commonwealth that was best for Canada was the Commonwealth that was 
best for the Commonwealth.
Using the New Commonwealth
The activist foreign policy germinating in DEA during the war flowered 
in the post-war period as Canada's wartime contributions, strong economy and 
lack of damage or disruption gave it an unprecedented importance in the 
world. Some wistful backward glances to quasi-isolationism by Mackenzie King 
notwithstanding, by the mid-1940s greater internal cohesion allowed the 
government to consider that Canada had reached a "more mature stage where 
foreign policy [could] be formulated as result primarily of a dispassionate 
analysis of the foreign situation."^ The change in foreign policy outlook 
was accentuated first by Mackenzie King's replacement as SSEA by St.Laurent 
in 1946, and then*his replacement as Prime Minister by St.Laurent in 
November, 1948.
Lester Pearson, "Some Thoughts on Canadian External Relations", 
Statements and Speeches 54/31. (Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, 1954)
p. 6.
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The new outlook to international involvement meant that as the Cold War 
developed, there was little question as to whether Canada would take an 
active role. Even before the Cold War was a reality, its possibility 
influenced the course of Canadian foreign policy. Apprehensions about, and 
hopes to forestall, future geopolitical competition partly underlay the 
Canadian government's strong support for building an effective international 
security organization throughout the 1940s. In the face of great power 
competition, however, the United Nations was not up to this task.
Henceforth, the Cold War had to be considered in all foreign policy 
undertakings.44
The Canadian government's attitude towards the Commonwealth after 
Mackenzie King remained the same: unformalized cooperation so long as no 
constraints were thereby created for the wider realm of Canadian foreign 
policy. But even if the basic attitude towards the Commonwealth had not 
changed, other changes, such as the Cold War and the new Canadian foreign 
policy, were reflected in Canada's Commonwealth relations. The Commonwealth 
had a role to play in the conduct of the Cold War and this required the 
maintenance and extension of Commonwealth relationships. The Canadian 
government was no more prepared to have the Commonwealth act as a unit than 
it had ever been, particularly if that meant the Commonwealth acting as a 
buttress for Britain's participation in great power politics. Instead, as 
prime minister, St.Laurent stated "the building of a new bridge of 
understanding between the east and the west is of the utmost importance not 
only for the Commonwealth but for the whole world...,,4S to thwart the aims
44For a more complete discussion of Canada and the coming of the Cold War 
than is appropriate here, see: James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking 
and Deterrence. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1972) and John W. Holmes,
The Shaping of the Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957 
Volume 1 and 2. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1979 and 1982).
45Louis St.Laurent, "Text of broadcast from London on January 10, 1951. 
Statements and Speeches 51/1. (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1951).
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of world communism. In one giant step, then, not only had the Commonwealth 
gained a positive role in Canadian foreign policy, but the interests Canada 
pursued were recast from Mackenzie King's narrow parochial concerns to those 
of the Western world.
The bridge between 'East' and 'West'46 soon became a Commonwealth 
platitude. 'Bridgemanship' was, nevertheless, important. It gave the 
Western members the opportunity to work as partners with the Asian members 
and keep them, if not allied, then at least out of the Soviet bloc. From the 
Canadian perspective, Canada was ideally situated to preserve this bridge. 
Britain was saddled with its imperial past and established habits in dealing 
with Asians. South Africa's racial policies precluded it from playing any 
role. Australia had to operate under the cloud of its 'White Australia' 
immigration policy. It was, therefore, for Canada to make the new 
Commonwealth work. The Canadian government, in turn, benefited from the 
international education that the contact with Asian members provided. Even 
in the late 1940s, the Canadian government was still very much a neophyte in 
international matters. Frequent interaction with their Asian counterparts, 
gave Canadian leaders and officials a more nuanced perspective on world 
affairs than would have been the case had they only been in close contact 
with their Western allies.
The Commonwealth's function as a bridge was implicitly linked to the 
question of membership. The importance of accommodating recent and 
anticipated future members in order to make the new Commonwealth work made 
Canadian officials advocates of flexibility in accommodating new members. In
46The use of the 'East' and 'West' reflects the terminology of the 
imperial past rather than those of the Cold War. Nowadays one would speak of 
the 'South' and the 'North' when discussing relations between developing 
countries and industrialized countries. At this time, however, the newly 
independent countries were in Asia - the 'East' - and the terminology of 
Kipling and the Empire was only beginning to yield to that of the Cold War.
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the one instance where Canadian officials had expressed doubts about a 
country's suitability for membership, these reflected reservations about its 
independence rather than the country itself. The Canadian government had 
initially hesitated over Ceylon's membership because of doubts as to whether 
Ceylon was truly independent given the terms of its post-independence defence 
treaty with Britain, not because of a desire to exclude small countries. It 
feared that this would "cheapen the currency with respect to Commonwealth 
membership"48 and both cast possible doubts on other members complete 
independence in the eyes of other members of the international community and 
make the attainment of Commonwealth membership less valued. The desire not 
to alienate the Ceylonese government helped persuade the Canadian government 
to put aside any concerns. The Commonwealth could not, after all, serve 
Western interests as a bridge to the developing countries of Asia if they 
were not given membership.
The need not to alienate non-Westem members and potential members 
showed in other aspects of Canada's approach to Commonwealth membership. It 
led the Canadian government to reject the notion of tiered membership 
whenever the subject arose. Such a structure would divide the Commonwealth 
into levels of membership with some countries allowed to participate fully in 
all aspects of the Commonwealth while others would participate only in 
specific areas of activity. Canada had opposed this in 1948-9 during 
discussions about India's status and it did so again in 1953-5 when the
A7
Mackenzie King wanted no part of talks about Indian or Pakistani 
membership, seeing it as a British responsibility and any discussions an 
implicit acceptance of shared responsibility. Privately, however, before 
they joined, he had reservations about the affect the new members might have 
on the Commonwealth's character. In any case, Canadian officials engaged in 
talks with the British behind his back.
^Memorandums Admission of Ceylon to the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
28 October, 1947. PAC RG 25 vol 3440, Notes on Commonwealth and 
International Affairs - Commonwealth Conference 1947.
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British government conducted a study of the future of Commonwealth 
membership.
The British cabinet committee studying the matter, and the committee of 
officials working alongside, began with a bias towards a two tiered 
Commonwealth. Ultimately, however, they accepted the necessity of 
maintaining the existing convention of progression to independence and full 
membership in the Commonwealth.49 To do otherwise left the Commonwealth 
vulnerable to 'hostile', that is communist, exploitation.50 It was, 
nevertheless, a reluctant acceptance. British statesmen already bemoaned the 
reduced intimacy brought about by the introduction of the three Asian members 
to the various Commonwealth meetings.51 Further erosion of the intimacy of 
the Commonwealth relationship with increased membership seemed unavoidable. 
When they saw the report, the Australian and New Zealand prime ministers
shared this concern. But, like the British government, both realized it was
52the only practical route. The Canadian government was much more positive. 
Not being as enthusiastic about Commonwealth unity, the prospect of less 
cohesion because of growing numbers was not as threatening to Canada. The 
Commonwealth, no matter how large, would provide a framework for the intimate 
bilateral relations preferred by Canadian governments. An association of 
equals had always been central to the Canadian government's conception of the 
Commonwealth. To serve as a link between the developed and developing world, 
this would have to continue.
49C.(54)307 Commonwealth Membership: Memorandum by Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs, 11 October, 1954. PRO CAB 129/71.
50CC(54)83, Commonwealth Relation,s 7 December, 1954. PRO CAB 128/27 part
2.
51Lord Salisbury, Lord President of the Council, Comments on draft paper 
on 'Colonial Territories and Commonwealth Membership;, March, 1953. PRO DO 
35/5056 Future Admission of Colonial Territories to Full Membership of the 
Commonwealth (1952-4) [file CON 32/40/6 part A].
52C.(55) 43 Commonwealth Membership. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations, 16 February, 1955. PRO CAB 129/73.
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Equality of membership did not mean equality of relationship. All 
Commonwealth members were theoretically equal to one another, but the 
intimacy of relations between them varied substantially. Canada, like 
Britain, differentiated between Commonwealth members in such vital aspects of 
the working Commonwealth as information exchange. For the Canadian 
government, it was only naturally that its ties with Britain should be of a 
different character than with other members. The bilateral relationship in 
defence and trade were much stronger than Canada's other Commonwealth 
relationships, much more intimate, for example, than those of the 'Indo- 
Canadian entente' of the 1950s.53 The Anglo-Canadian relationship was such 
that Lord Swinton, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 
reported Pearson telling him during a visit to Ottawa in October, 1954, that 
in information exchanges Canada treated Britain "as if we were one of 
them.”54 Growing membership, then, would simply mean having to further 
develop the existing practice of treating individual members on the merits of 
the importance and intimacy of the particular bilateral relationship.
Bridgemanship lay at the heart of the evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of Commonwealth membership contained in a review of Canadian policy 
towards the Commonwealth by DEA in 1951. In this assessment:
the principal advantage to be derived from Commonwealth membership 
is the broader grasp of world movements which results from constant 
intercourse with the other members. The close contact with the 
Asian members is particularly valuable, both in counteracting any 
tendency to insularity on the part of the Western members and in 
enabling them to explain their points of view to the Eastern 
members. Further, the Commonwealth is useful under present 
circumstances in providing a loose skein which enables Australia 
and New Zealand to add their strength, in a sense, to the North 
Atlantic Alliance, even though they are not signatories of the
For a description of this relationship from both the Indian and 
Canadian perspective see: MS Rajan, "The Indo-Canadian Entente",
International Journal. (17:4, Autumn 1962) pp. 358-84; and Escott Reid, Envoy 
to Nehru. (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981).
54C.(54)327 Anglo-Canadian Relations. Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations, 28 October, 1954. PRO CAB 129/71.
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North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, the Commonwealth organization 
introduces a modification or shading between the United States on 
the one hand and the rest of the non-Communist world on the other.
United States policy at times displays a disturbing tendency to try 
to break down all links throughout the non-Communist world except 
those that have their centre in Washington; the United States 
attitude, on various occasions in the past, towards the sterling 
area might be taken as an example of this.
The report also expanded on the role of Commonwealth could have vis-A-vis the 
United States. It described "the Commonwealth connection... as a useful 
counterpoise to the one-sided pressure exerted on Canada by the United 
States".56 Canada insisted on handling its bilateral relations with the 
United States alone, but in the face of a preponderant United States, the 
Commonwealth could serve as alternate venue for international activity or 
even a means to influence the United States in matters outside the bilateral 
relationship when a unilateral effort might fail. In some instances, DEA 
believed, this was more likely to exert a moderating influence on American 
behaviour than separate approaches by individual members. The more Canada 
worked through the Commonwealth, the more valuable it would be in this 
respect. Because of this, Canada was more willing to collaborate in foreign 
policy with its Commonwealth partners.
To maximize the Commonwealth's potential as an instrument of foreign 
policy for Canada - as bridge to the developing world and, if possible, a 
counterweight to the United States - it had to be a dynamic and influential 
organization whose activities were seen by those inside and outside it as a 
meaningful contribution to international affairs. To further this, the 
Commonwealth would have to be the locus of more activity, including more 
Canadian activity. More activity meant more cooperation which held the 
possibility of tighter organization. The Canadian government remained wary
55"Canadian Policy with Respect to the Commonwealth", July 26, 1951. PAC 
RG 25 volume 3441, file 1-1951/3-3A.
56 Ibid.
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of too much coordination, especially any indication that the British 
government might try to subordinate other members to its policies. Canada 
continued to reject any effort to create any form of Commonwealth 
secretariat, council of ministers, or more formal defence commitments, 
proposals for which still came foreword, although less frequently than 
previously. It was a matter of the Canadian government being more supportive 
of efforts at harmonizing independent voices rather than speaking with a 
single voice. Even this would become more difficult as the already diverse 
interests and perspectives of Commonwealth members took them in different 
policy directions. The Canadian government did not oppose this or try to 
increase pulls towards the Commonwealth to counteract it. Instead, Canada 
was willing to accept initiatives to 'countervail' its effects. These 
compensated for it by means which maintained the Commonwealth's relevance to 
members without hindering their freedom of action. In this way, the new 
activist foreign policy brought a more positive interpretation to what was
an almost identical declaratory policy with respect to Commonwealth
57cooperation on foreign policy in the 1940s.
Patterns of Commonwealth Institutional Relationships
An effective Commonwealth required linkages beyond the ties of history 
and sentiment. Thus, despite Canadian resistance to formal Commonwealth 
organization, the Commonwealth of the early 1950s possessed an intricate 
institutional network. This consisted of formal and informal patterns of 
interaction, including regular contacts between both leaders and 
bureaucracies, and permanent organizational structures. When used, these 
could produce extremely close consultation between the various members.
57For a more extensive discussion of British and Canadian consultation 
and co-operation on foreign policy, see: Adams, Commonwealth collaboration in 
foreign affairs. 1939-1947.
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There was a long-standing principle that Commonwealth membership carried with 
it the obligation to consider each others' interests in developing policy and 
to give advance notice of any action which would affect other members so as
CO
to allow them to give their views. This was done informally through 
constant exchanges of telegrams between governments and the exchange of high 
commissioners. High commissioners met regularly, especially in London, to 
exchange information and enable their governments to keep abreast of one 
another's views on issues of mutual concern.
cq
The Commonwealth also possessed a more formal organizational network.
The Commonwealth itself formed an organization. It lacked a formal charter 
except, perhaps, in the manner of 'common law' built on precedent and 
practice, but it possessed the key functional attributes of any other 
international organization. Most critically, it had identifiable members and 
a system of regular, established interaction between them. It also had a 
network of institutions: structures through which the system's functions were 
performed. The most important of these institutions were the CPMMs, 
inaugurated in 1944, superceding the Imperial Conferences held between 1911 
and 1937 and their antecedent Colonial Conferences. These were informal 
meetings held periodically with no formal agenda; although there was prior 
agreement as to the topics to be discussed. Not intended to make decisions, 
CPMMs offered an opportunity for the prime ministers of independent 
Commonwealth members to discuss matters of common concern and seek what 
agreement they could.
cq
Memorandum W6717G: Present Nature of Commonwealth Relationship - 1947. 
PRO FO 371/65588 Consideration of the Future Structure of the British 
Commonwealth.
cq
For a contemporary description of Commonwealth institutions, see: J. 
Heather Harvey, Consultation and Co-operation in the British Commonwealth. 
Part I. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949).
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In addition to the CPMMs( there was a range of specialist conferences. 
Among these were: the Commonwealth Forestry Conference, the Commonwealth 
Scientific Official Conference, the Commonwealth Survey Officers' Conference; 
the Commonwealth Conference of Meteorologists; the Conference of Commonwealth 
Statisticians, the Commonwealth Defence Science Conference, and the 
Commonwealth Conference on Clothing and General Stores. Many of these had 
standing bodies associated with them to provide continuity between 
conferences. These included: the Standing Committee on Commonwealth 
Forestry, the Commonwealth Joint Services Committee, and the Commonwealth 
Advisory Committee on Defence Science. From time to time a Commonwealth 
conference or CPMM would authorize the establishment of functional bodies to 
fulfill specific needs. The years between 1911 and the early 1930s were 
especially prolific in this regard. Among the bodies established in this 
period were those which became60: the Commonwealth Shipping Committee, the 
Commonwealth Economic Committee (CEC), the Commonwealth Communications 
Council, the Commonwealth Institute, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, 
and the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux (CAB). This last encompassed 
eleven bureaux, all but one pre-dating the Second World War, and two 
institutes.
During the war more bodies were added in anticipation of needs for post­
war cooperation. The Commonwealth Air Transport Council (CATC) and the 
Commonwealth and Empire Radio for Civil Aviation organization were 
established in 1944; although the former absorbed the latter in 1947. In 
1945, the CATC spawned the Committee for Air Navigation and Ground 
Organization and in 1946 a regional South Pacific Air Transport Council was 
formed. Canada did not join this last body until 1948. Another post-war 
body was the Sterling Area Statistical Committee. It was formed in 1947 by
60All started out as 'Imperial' committees, councils, etc. but at some 
time or another in the post-war era became 'Commonwealth' bodies. Some had 
other elements of their names modernized to reflect the changing world.
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the British Treasury as a forum for Sterling Area Commonwealth countries to 
exchange information on financial developments affecting their countries. 
Canada was not a member but participated as an observer. Finally, although 
not considering them a 'Commonwealth organization' because no authority had 
been given their establishment, Canada cooperated in the Commonwealth 
Scientific Liaison Offices.61
The Canadian government did not, then, rule out participation in formal 
Commonwealth organizations. Several of them even had secretariats. However, 
participation was restricted to functional bodies of a technical nature.
Even here there was a marked preference for wider multilateral cooperation 
and Canada was careful to ensure that Commonwealth bodies were used only 
where appropriate. In civil aeronautics, for example, the Commonwealth 
organizations dealt with routes that were very important to Commonwealth 
countries, but of relatively minor importance to international civil aviation 
in general. The Commonwealth bodies, in this way, complemented the work of 
the International Civil Aviation Organization, the counterpart body in the 
United Nations system, but did not duplicate its activities. The Canadian 
government vigilantly ensured that Commonwealth bodies did not encroach on 
the functions of broader multilateral agencies.
Extending technical cooperation to policy, particularly in areas such as 
defence, foreign, or economic policy remained unacceptable to the Canadian 
government. When attempts were made to extend functional technical 
cooperation into policy coordination, the Canadian government dug in its 
heels. This resistance to 'creeping policy discussions' can be seen in the 
evolution of the Commonwealth Liaison Committee (CLC) in the late 1940s. The
Memorandum: Canadian Participation in Commonwealth Organizations of an 
Economic, Social, or Cultural Nature. PAC RG 25 86-7/159 vol 30, file 6133-F-
40 part 1. Canadian Participation in Commonwealth Organizations of an 
Economic, Social, or Cultural Nature.
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CLC was established at the May, 1948, CPMM under the name European Recovery 
Programme Commonwealth Liaison Committee to supplement existing information 
channels to keep Commonwealth governments in touch with developments in the 
European Recovery Programme. Although the Canadian government was more 
deeply involved in the developments in Europe than other Commonwealth 
governments, and thus less in need of the additional information conduit, 
this development was not itself objectionable. The Commonwealth finance 
ministers meeting in July, 1949, shortened the Committee's name and expanded 
its mandate to allow it to serve as a forum to discuss other economic 
problems as well. As it was limited to information exchange and primarily 
involved with trying to solve the problems of the Sterling Area, which the 
Canadian government was anxious to help sort out since it hoped this would 
result in fewer trade restrictions on dollar area imports, Canada 
countenanced this change.
Problems arose when the CLC, acting on its new mandate, circulated a 
questionnaire requesting detailed information on Canada's balance of 
payments. Canada was a creditor of the Sterling Area, not a member, and DEA 
balked at divulging the information. There was some merit to the exercise 
since statistics showing the overall current account position of Sterling 
Area members might encourage more discipline among its members. If providing 
Canadian information could help this, that was desirable. But there was a 
danger that providing such detailed information on Canada's balance of 
payments could be used as a handle for future attempts to seek Canadian
CJ
financial assistance for the Sterling Area. Moreover, some of the 
specific information requested was so confidential that it had not yet even 
been shown to the British government with whom the Canadian government had 
particularly intimate bilateral channels. Preferring to remain in the CLC
fi2USSEA to Deputy Minister of Finance, 15 December, 1949. PAC RG 25 ACC 
86-7/159 vol 16 file 4901-M-40 part 2. Commonwealth Liaison Committee - 
Correspondence (1949-50).
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because of its utility as an information source on the Sterling Area, as a 
compromise, Canadian officials allowed the CLC to receive statistics for past 
years, but not forecasts. Obviously, there was a level of discussion 
beyond which the Canadian government was unprepared to go. At a certain 
point, the revelation of extremely detailed information led naturally to 
policy discussions which could easily lead to policy coordination.
The Canadian government was determined to ensure that institutional 
accretion did not provide the cohesion to turn the Commonwealth or Sterling 
Area into an economic bloc. Canada wanted Sterling Area countries, 
especially Britain, to participate fully in the multilateral trading system 
and not insultate itself behind currency restrictions and exchange controls. 
Intra-Commonwealth trade also made use of preferences based on the 1932 
Ottawa Agreements. The Canadian government was prepared to assist 
Commonwealth members resist American efforts in international trade 
negotiations to eliminate preferences, but rather than wanting them protected 
entirely, urged fellow members to consider preferential margins negotiable at 
the trade talks.64 As late as the 1952 Commonwealth Economic Conference, 
however, the British government, still seemed to retain some interest in 
developing Commonwealth trade as the solution to Britain's economic problems. 
To the Canadian government's alarm, Britain even flirted with the idea of an 
Empire or Commonwealth Customs Union in the autumn of 1947 in preference to a 
European trading arrangement.65 For Canada this was unthinkable. The 
Canadian government remained firmly committed to freeing multilateral trade, 
not to revamping Commonwealth trade.
63JE Coyne, Deputy Governor, Bank of Canada, to AFW Plumptre, Economic 
Advisor, DEA, 23 February, 1950. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/159 vol 16 file 4901-H-40 
part 2.
64PAC RG 2 vol 2640 reel T-2365. Cabinet Conclusions. 13 February, 1947.
65Memorandum: European Customs Union, October 20, 1947. PAC RG 25 vol 
3440 file 1-1947/10. Notes on Commonwealth and International Affairs - 
Commonwealth Conferences 1947.
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The Canadian government was willing to do what it could to help the 
British economy. Canada's post-war loans to Britain were proportionally 
larger than those from the United States. Canada also voluntarily 
relinquished its Commonwealth preferences in the British markets in 1948.
The Canadian government was even prepared to take institutional action. To 
encourage Canada-Britain trade and otherwise smooth over bumps in the 
economic relationship that Britain's currency restrictions produced, the 
Canadian government went along with British requests to create bilateral 
machinery in the form of the United Kingdom-Canada Continuing Committee on 
Trade and Economic Affairs (UKCCC). Sir Stafford Cripps, the British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed the UKCCC during a visit to Ottawa in 
September, 1948. The Canadian government was at first unenthusiastic about 
the idea. Bilateral machinery was preferable to Commonwealth machinery, but 
there the possibility existed that the British government wanted to tie 
Canada more closely to British economic policy. On the other hand, the 
Canadian government could not reasonably refuse the British suggestion, 
especially in view of the numerous joint bodies with the United States that 
had been created since the end of the war, including an analogous economic 
body at the ministerial level.66 The Canadian government feared that the 
British government expected too much from such a committee, but concluded 
that it could do no harm and might even do some good.
The two sides quickly agreed on the terms of reference for the 
committee. It was to be composed of senior officials from each party, 
meeting alternately in the capital of one with the sessions chaired by the 
high commissioner of the other. The British government was still the more 
eager partner and pressed for an early meeting. The first meeting was held
66Memorandum by Arnold Heeney, Secretary to the Cabinet for Acting Prime 
Minister St.Laurent Res Proposals for Joint U.K.-Canada Committee on Trade 
Matters, 23 September, 1948. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/159 box 54 file 10364-40 part 
1. United Kingdom-Canada Continuing Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs 
(1948-1951).
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at the end of January, 1949, In London. To their surprise, the Canadian 
officials found it a useful exercise. Far from being only a conduit to 
transmit British requests for assistance or suggestions to modify Canadian 
policy to harmonize it with British policy, they felt that the meeting had 
left British officials with a better appreciation of the Canadian point of 
view.67 The British remained more committed to the meetings than the 
Canadians, but at least the Canadians were willing to sit down in a regular 
forum. Commonwealth meetings were noted for being open and frank, but in the 
bilateral setting, the Canadians would be worrying less about form and more 
about the business at hand.
Although it was a British initiative, the UKCCC epitomized the Canadian 
view of Commonwealth. The UKCCC was not a Commonwealth body itself, but it 
focused on an individual bilateral relationship which the Canadian government 
saw as the core of the Commonwealth. These individual relationships held the 
Commonwealth together, not collective policy which was increasingly difficult 
to attain in the new multi-racial Commonwealth of independently acting 
members, even if it was desirable.
The Early 1950s; A More Accommodative Canada
Structure was needed if Canada or any other member was to effectively 
employ the Commonwealth as an instrument of foreign policy. Some already 
existed, and if more was appropriate, it would be judged on practical, 
functional grounds. The reverse was also true. Any consideration of new 
machinery, would have to include reassessing the utility of retaining the old 
where it existed. The evolution of the Canadian government's attitude to the
67RP Bower, Commercial Secretary, High Commission in London, to Max 
Mackenzie, Deputy Minister, Department of Trade and Commerce, 25 January, 
1949. PAC RG 20 vol 1938 file 20-117-1 part 1. United Kingdom-Canada Joint 
Committee on Trade. General.
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Commonwealth inevitably was reflected in its approach to Commonwealth 
institutions whether creating Commonwealth organizations or calling of 
conferences. The change was not radical. It merely brought the same 
approach to Commonwealth machinery that was applied to other international 
organizations. The Commonwealth, then, had become more like 'just another' 
international organization, an instrument in the Canadian government's 
repertoire for addressing the variety of foreign policy issues it now faced 
as it took an active role in the international community.
The Canadian government remained opposed to Commonwealth machinery for
CO
its own sake or to anything that would duplicate machinery elsewhere.
Some Commonwealth bodies seemed suitable targets in terms of limiting the 
proliferation of international institutions, thereby limiting Canadian 
expenditure on them and reflecting the Commonwealths specialized role in 
Canadian foreign policy. One such institution was the CEC, It seemed 
expendable because of the many other international economic bodies and the 
fact that it focused on economic issues which were of secondary importance to 
Canada in its Commonwealth relations. But there were other factors to 
consider, especially the political significance which might be attached to a
eg
Canadian withdrawal from the Committee. It would be the first time Canada 
would have refused to participate in a Commonwealth body not confined to the 
Sterling Area and could be interpreted as coolness towards the Commonwealth. 
The consensus among officials from the federal departments most concerned
CO
Despite Canada's enthusiasm for joining international bodies, this 
attitude to superfluous institutionalization was not just in respect to the 
Commonwealth. It was also evident in Canada's attitude to funding the UN 
Children's Emergency Fund in 1952 and the creation of the NATO secretariat in 
1953. For example see: PAC RG 2 Series A5a vol 2650. Cabinet Conclusions. 28 
May, 1952; and Memorandum by Defence Liaison (I) Division, "Some Recent 
Developments in NATO", February 4, 1953. PAC RG 25 ACC 90-1/008 file 50030- 
40 part 5, NATO General File (October 1951-September 1953).
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Dispatch 4008 from Dana Wilgress, Canadian High Commissioner in Britain 
to Pearson, September 28, 1951. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/159 Box 37 file 8490-40 
part 1. Commonwealth Economic Committee - Reports and Activities (1945-1951).
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with the CEC's activities, excluding the Department of Finance, was that the 
political difficulties and the usefulness of the reports to the Department of 
Agriculture justified continued membership.70 Finance saw the CEC as a 
waste of money. DEA hoped a general CEC review would solve the problems of a 
unilateral Canadian withdrawal from the CEC getting the agreement of the
Commonwealth countries to abolish it - or failing that, "to restrict its
71activities to what [was] really useful." Unfortunately, far from finding 
that the CEC duplicated activities of other organizations, the review 
recommended expanding its work. Despite having, along with Britain, to pay
the bulk of the CEC's new costs, Canada decided that if other Commonwealth
72governments were going to support the proposals it would not object.
The Canadians found themselves compelled to support a measure for which 
on its intrinsic merit they would have preferred an alternative. Financial 
expediency was not allowed to drive policy when other considerations spoke 
against it. The need to make do with what was necessary for the greater 
peace of the Commonwealth was old hat for the British but was a novelty for 
Canada. It was a natural outgrowth of the increasing tendency to see the 
Commonwealth as a positive, if specialized, instrument of foreign policy. 
Mackenzie King sought primarily to keep the Commonwealth from assuming a form 
which would obstruct Canada's freedom of action. Now, the Canadian 
government wanted to use the Commonwealth to pursue Canadian policy. As 
demonstrated by the CEC review, doing this required tolerance for others' 
aspirations to use the Commonwealth, even if that meant at times accepting 
more formal organizations.
70Telegram 1851 from Pearson to Wilgress, October 24, 1951. PAC RG 25 
ACC 86-7/159 Box 37 file 8490-40 part 1.
71Telegram 1944 from Pearson to Wilgress, October 31, 1951. PAC RG 25 ACC 
86-7/159 Box 37 file 8490-40 part 1.
72Letter 939 from Robertson to Wilgress, June 16, 1953. PAC RG 19 vol 
4921 file 8265-03-1 part 2. Commonwealth Organizations: Commonwealth 
Economic Committee - General.
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In the early 1950s, proposals for Increased Commonwealth cooperation and 
institutions to accomplish this continued to come forward from members. The 
new, multi-racial Commonwealth introduced a new element to these suggestions. 
Previously, proposals for increased cooperation or new institutions had come 
from those seeking greater unity. Now suggestions also started coming 
forward for mechanisms to assist the economic development of the newer 
members. At the July, 1949, meeting of Commonwealth finance Ministers, the 
Pakistani delegation circulated a memorandum on economic development for 
consideration at the official level. This was passed on to the CLC for 
study. In essence, the paper was a plea for developed countries of the 
Commonwealth to assist underdeveloped members. It proposed that a central 
Commonwealth organization be established to help underdeveloped members 
prepare plans, set priorities, and translate plans into specific projects.
It did not say where the capital for these projects would come from, but the 
implication was clear that it would come from the developed members.
The Canadian government responded unfavourably to the Pakistani 
proposal. The most important element of any development scheme was the 
provision of capital, and Commonwealth countries alone could not adequately 
do this. A particular objection in this area was that such a scheme would
inevitably result in additional pressure on Canada to supply foreign aid
73funds. Without American participation, there was a danger that the 
developed members of the Commonwealth would over strain themselves trying to 
assist other members. The result, the Canadian government feared, would 
further unbalance the disequilibrium between the dollar and sterling areas 
and magnify the sterling area's reliance on trade restrictions that Canada 
was already trying to overcome. Finally, much of the scheme, especially its 
technical assistance provisions, overlapped with United Nations machinery.
^Deputy Minster of Finance to Heeney, 15 December, 1949. PAC RG 25 
ACC86-7/159 vol 16, file 4801-M-40 part 2. Commonwealth Liaison Committee - 
Correspondence (1949-50).
One of the recommendations of the meeting of Commonwealth foreign
ministers in Colombo in January, 1950, was to establish a Commonwealth
consultative committee to consider the possibility of some form of
Commonwealth cooperation in the economic development of South and Southeast
Asia. Pearson had to work hard to overcome his cabinet colleagues'
reluctance to give money away. Even he and DEA, however, had the same
misgivings about what might come out of this exercise as they had over the
Pakistani memorandum. At the first meeting of the new Commonwealth
Consultative Committee for South and South East Asia in Sydney in May, 1950,
for example, the Australians proposed a Commonwealth technical assistance
programme. The Canadian delegation had not expected this and asked for
instructions. In its response, Cabinet "made it clear that before
considering any contribution the Government would wish to have information
concerning the way the programme would fit in with U.N. technical 
74assistance." Thus, with Australian leadership and Canadian foot dragging, 
the Colombo Plan technical and capital assistance programmes were bom.
With both a formal structure and pattern of regular procedures and 
behaviour, the Plan was a major new 'Commonwealth' institution in an entirely 
new field of activity. But it was, in the Canadian view, to be a temporary 
programme. In agreeing to fund the Canadian commitment to the technical 
assistance aspect of the programme for an initial three years. Cabinet 
directed that:
Canadian representatives endeavour to have measures taken to ensure 
that there be no duplication between the work of the Commonwealth 
Consultative Committee's technical assistance programme and that 
established by the United Nations and that everything possible be 
done to merge the two schemes.
74PAC RG 2 vol 2645 reel T-2367. Cabinet Conclusions. 18 May, 1950.
75PAC RG 2 vol 2645 reel T-2368. Cabinet Conclusions. 12 June, 1950.
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By the time of the second meeting of the Consultative Committee in London in 
September, the Canadian perspective had changed completely. What had changed 
in the interim was the world; specifically the outbreak of the Korean War on 
25 June, 1950. The Cold War was getting hotter, and with it the Commonwealth 
took on a new importance in Canadian foreign policy.
The Korean War accentuated the need to improve economic, political and 
social conditions in Asia. This had always been implicit in the 'bridge' but 
the Canadian government now placed great importance on devising a development 
plan specifically for Asia, and the Commonwealth provided the ideal mechanism 
to accomplish this with the Colombo Plan initiative. In the new 
international environment, the Plan's strategic benefits were considerable. 
The Canadian government considered an important immediate effect would be 
strengthening 'morale', the will and ability to resist communism, in South 
and Southeast Asia. It would, St.Laurent thought, be important evidence of a 
sympathetic attitude towards the countries of the region on the part of the 
West.76
The American participation in the Colombo Plan and its extension to non- 
Commonwealth countries took it beyond being solely a Commonwealth endeavour 
but did not bring it any closer to amalgamation with United Nations 
programmes. Canada's reservations, especially with respect to the Plan's 
relationship with UN programmes, resurfaced whenever participants considered 
extending or expanding it. Nevertheless, the Canadian government, desiring 
good relations with Asian Commonwealth members, invariably agreed to extend 
funding. The Canadian government was finding that whatever its hesitation 
over the development and growth of Commonwealth institutions, the importance 
it attributed to the Commonwealth as an institution itself meant that Canada 
had to go along if others insisted. What could be called 'negative
7 c
PAC RG 2 vol 2646, reel T-2368. Cabinet Conclusions. 29 December, 1950.
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concurrence' - agreeing so as not to have to disagree - was a shift from 
Mackenzie King's steadfast avoidance of new or expanded institutions if it 
was at all possible. Even in Mackenzie King's time it was not always 
possible and 'institutional-economy' - finding the minimum institutional 
structure to solve any problem - was still a feature of Canadian policy.
Canadian attitudes towards Commonwealth institutional development could 
still be more 'negative' than 'concurrent' when proposals went beyond 
countervailing cooperation to efforts at greater centralization.
St.Laurent's response to a British suggestion at the 1951 CPMM to establish a 
Commonwealth organization to deal with raw materials shortages arising from 
the Korean War illustrates the determination not to obstruct, but to find a 
positive compromise and affirm the importance of Asian members. He indicated 
that Canada was concerned to secure proper coordination of the production and 
distribution of raw materials for purposes not only of defence but also for
the raising of living standards in the underdeveloped countries. This, he
77described as the other aspect of the ideological war. The Canadian 
government feared, however, that if still more international bodies were 
created, there would more risk of inconsistency in their decisions. It gave 
priority to its NATO commitments and wanted to avoid further commitments 
which might hamper implementation of NATO policy in the same area. If the 
proposed new Commonwealth organization were to be set up, the Canadian 
government hoped it could absorb the remaining functions of several existing 
Commonwealth committees on economic subjects.
With the Canadian reluctance to accept a new institution, the task of 
handling raw material supply issues was allocated to the CLC. The British 
government, still eager to increase the mandate of the CLC, was willing to
77P.M.M.(51)8th Meeting, Minutes January 10, 1951. PRO CAB 133/90 Meeting 
of Prime Ministers, January, 1951. Minutes of Meetings and Memoranda.
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settle for this compromise. But rather than coordinating raw materials 
policy and usage as the British government had contemplated, at Canadian 
insistence, the CLC would serve only as a forum to exchange information on 
raw materials. Having successfully restricted the new CLC mandate, the
Canadian government warned Canada House to guard against any effort by
78Britain to use the Committee for more positive functions. The Canadian
government may have acquired a more relaxed attitude to the use of 
institutional mechanisms in the Commonwealth, but it was not about to let 
them run rampant and its resistance to broadening the scope of the CLC 
remained intact. Some compromise was necessary: if Canada was to use the 
Commonwealth in its foreign policy repertoire, it could not play only a 
negative role in Commonwealth councils. Nevertheless, the Canadian 
government remained ready to impose checks on what it saw as efforts to 
employ the Commonwealth in ways that ran contrary to what Canada saw as 
appropriate.
This was also evident in another noteworthy example of Commonwealth
cooperative action occasioned by the Korean War: the formation of the
Commonwealth Division. Its establishment, at the suggestion of the United
Kingdom, was formally agreed to on 1 May, 1951. Canadian participation,
however, was preconditioned by a higher commitment to both the United States
and the United Nations. Cabinet's decision that Canada accept the British
79proposal if the Unified Command thought it militarily desirable 
essentially meant that Canadian participation in the Commonwealth Division 
was predicated on American acquiescence even though the Canadian military 
considered that the Canadian brigade in Korea would be safer and more 
efficient in a Commonwealth Division than if it were placed in an American
78Telegram 327 from Pearson to Wilgress, February 14, 1951. PAC RG 25 ACC 
86-7/160 vol. 40, file 4901-M-40 part 4. Commonwealth Liaison Committee - 
Correspondence (1950-8).
79PAC RG 2 vol 2646, reel T-2368. Cabinet Conclusions. 8 December, 1950.
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on
division. The experience of cooperative military action did not presage 
further defence cooperation. The Canadian government considered the 
Commonwealth Brigade an administrative convenience only. It rejected 
outright a British suggestion in August, 1951, for staff talks aimed at 
eventually redeploying the Commonwealth forces in Korea as a strategic 
reserve in either South East Asia or the Middle East. The Canadian 
government did not participate in subsequent talks on the matter between 
British, Australian and New Zealand representatives.
Successful cooperation in Korea had been facilitated by the similar
training and organization of the various elements of the division. However,
at the same time that the Canadian government was considering the British
proposal to establish the Commonwealth Division, it was also making plans to
sell stores of equipment for a British-style division and replace it with
01
equipment for an American-style division. This did not prevent the 
Canadian army from acquiring British Centurion tanks for the three Canadian 
divisions being established under the general NATO rearmament stimulated by 
the Korean War, but the Canadian government clearly did not consider 
'Commonwealth-compatibility' the central requirement in recasting its armed 
forces. Even in the midst of a resurgence of the more cooperative tendency 
in Canadian policy towards the Commonwealth, some areas of Commonwealth 
cooperation remained as off-limits as ever.
The evolution in the relative emphasis accorded the conflicting 
tendencies in the Canadian approach to the Commonwealth that followed the 
start of the Korean War can also be seen in the response to other proposals 
for Commonwealth conferences and changes to Commonwealth institutions in the 
five years before 1956. Such diverse episodes as the Commonwealth Economic
80PAC RG 2 vol 2647, reel T-2386. Cabinet Conclusions. 11 April, 1951.
81PAC RG 2 vol 2647 reel T-2386. Cabinet Conclusions. 21 March, 1951.
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Conference in London, in November, 1952, ongoing British efforts to expand 
the CLC, and the Fifth Commonwealth Conference on General Stores, originally 
scheduled for January, 1955, but held in February, 1956, show a much more 
accommodating pattern of behaviour.
In June, 1952, St.Laurent received a message from Churchill suggesting 
the need for a Commonwealth Economic Conference because of Sterling Area 
balance of payments difficulties. Balance of payments difficulties had been 
the subject of a Commonwealth finance ministers meeting in January, 1952, but 
now, Churchill proposed broadening the discussions to include the whole field 
of financial and economic policy, including questions relating to 
international economic institutions such as the IMF, IBRD and GATT. The 
initial Canadian reaction to the British proposal was unfavourable. The 
British draft placed too much emphasis on matters outside the Commonwealth 
and Sterling Area and not enough on developing the internal policies which 
the Canadian government thought to be of primary importance to finding any 
real solutions to the problems of the Sterling Area. Worse still, in the 
Canadian view, it seemed to imply that the conference should aim at creating
agreed Commonwealth policies on a range of economic and commercial
82matters. The Canadian government also believed it probable that the 
British government would suggest an increase in Commonwealth and imperial
preferences and at least a partial withdrawal from the principles and
83obligations of the GATT. On top of everything else, the British proposal 
foresaw the participation of colonial territories on what the Canadian 
government perceived as too equal terms with full Commonwealth members. The 
combination of full colonial representation with the anticipated objectives
telegram 1796, Norman Robertson, Canadian High Commissioner in Britain 
to Pearson, 20 August, 1952,"Canadian amendments to draft agenda for 
Commonwealth Economic Conference". PAC RG 25 ACC 90-1/008 file 50123-40 part 
1. Commonwealth Economic Conference, London, November, 1952.
83PAC RG 2 Series A5a, vol 2651, Cabinet Conclusions, 14 August, 1952.
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of creating common policy and increasing discriminatory trade practices, led 
the Canadian government to fear that such a conference would be contrary to 
Canada's own trading interests and would both "create a poor reaction in the 
United States, and would look to many Canadians like a revival of the old
Q J
lion-cub theory of Empire." In sum, the British proposal appeared to be a 
retrograde step in terms of the Canadian government's vision of the 
Commonwealth.
Since the Conference would focus almost exclusively on the problems of
the Sterling Area, as a 'dollar' country, Canada, had little incentive to
attend. But not attending would create the impression within the
Commonwealth and in Canada that Canada's commitment to the Commonwealth was
weak. It would also preclude any chance of Canada influencing the outcome.
Canadian participation, on the other hand, could help prevent the
Commonwealth becoming a trading bloc and direct the discussions towards
developing a common, constructive approach to the United States on reforming
international economic institutions. By attending, the Canadian government
hoped to emulate Canada's performance at the recent finance ministers'
meeting, where it helped guide the direction of what were essentially
85discussions between Sterling Area countries. The Canadian government 
sought to portray the economic conference as a development from the finance 
ministers' meeting, but embracing a wider range of Commonwealth economic 
problems, including those of trade. This made it less like a new effort at 
producing a common policy and more amenable to the Canadian objectives of 
encouraging internal reform within the Sterling Area to provide the basis for 
eventual convertibility. The underlying Canadian objective was achieving 
movement towards freer world trade, and the Conference report reflected a
Aj
Telegram 1477, Pearson to Robertson, 25 July, 1952. PAC RG 25 ACC 90- 
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meeting that owed more to Canadian aims than to the initial British message. 
The idea of creating an economic bloc was disavowed at the beginning of the
Of
final communique. Instead, the main focus was on internal measures and 
there was agreement on the goal of removing trade and exchange restrictions 
as soon as possible.
The one area where Canada had to compromise was regarding the incessant 
British desire to expand the scope of the CLC. The Conference agreed to 
amend the CLC mandate to enable it to serve as a forum for exchanging 
information on development proposals. Faced with a development oriented 
proposal which would cost very little, the Canadian government did not want 
to alienate Asian members simply to block a potential avenue whereby policy 
discussions might be introduced at the CLC. Even with this minor concession, 
the Conference demonstrated that the Commonwealth could be used to advance 
Canadian interests even when Canada's 'Commonwealth' interests, as in trade, 
were not compelling reasons to participate. Receiving this benefit, however, 
required participation, even if that participation was predicated on 
thwarting the objectives of common policy Commonwealth enthusiasts rather 
than a more positive
The Canadian concession on the CLC turned out to be insignificant.
Neither the 1951 effort to expand the CLC's mandate to deal with raw
materials, nor the 1952 one had much effect. Thus, in December, 1954, the
British government again proposed expanding the CLC's role to include
87discussion of major policy questions. At the same time, it suggested 
wrapping up the Sterling Area Statistical Committee since the gradual 
relaxing of import controls had made studying trends more important than the
oc
Commonwealth Economic Conference Final Communique. Cmd 8717 (Londons 
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1952) p. 2
87Outward CRO Telegram 174 to British High Commissions, 6 December, 1954. 
PRO DO 35/8346.
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exact figures. The remaining statistical functions could be transferred to 
the CLC which already did similar work.
The Canadian government was not enthusiastic about the proposals,
believing that the CLC was an inappropriate body to discuss major economic
and financial policy questions. The Canadian government felt that policy
questions were better discussed elsewhere where all concerned had recourse to 
00
expert advice. A compromise was worked out whereby the Canadian
government would not object if, periodically, individual subjects were
89suggested for inclusion on the agenda. Each government would decide the 
extent of their representative's participation. The Canadians were sanguine 
about the utility of this, but would not obstruct the committee. Indeed, as 
convenient, appropriate experts, for example, from the Canadian delegation to 
GATT, were allowed to attend the CLC if interested. But, if subjects 
considered inappropriate were discussed, the Canadian representatives, while
trying to make as helpful a contribution as possible, were "to ensure that
90the discussion did not get out of bounds."
The Sterling Area Statistical Committee merged with the CLC in April, 
1955, but little else came out of the proposals. Other members, South Africa 
especially, shared Canada's concerns and were reluctant to have officials 
regularly discuss policy questions. On another front, however, the first of 
what were to become an annual series of meetings of Commonwealth finance 
ministers in conjunction with the yearly meetings of the IMF and IBRD was
88Jules Leger, USSEA, to Sir Archibald Nye, High Commissioner to Canada, 
30 December, 1954. PRO DO 35/8348.
89Nye to Leger, 11 January, 1955. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/160 vol 40 file 
4901-M part 4.
90Paper XXs Economic Questions. PAC RG 25 vol 2286 file S/29/1. Canadian 
Papers Prepared for Meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 1955.
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held In the autumn of 1954 In Washington. If policy questions were to be 
discussed, it was to be the politicians who did it.
Compromise with respect to economic policy was much more forthcoming 
than with respect to defence policy. Canadian defence policy remained an 
area almost untouched by Commonwealth ties despite the increased tendencies 
towards Commonwealth cooperation in other areas of Canadian policy. The 
Canadian government yielded only in minor areas such agreeing to host two 
defence related Commonwealth conferences in 1956. However, this was 
specifically calculated to "restore Canada's prestige which [had] suffered in
qi
this field by previous refusals". The government continued to reject more 
substantive military cooperation such as participation in a Commonwealth 
strategic reserve for Southeast Asia.
The Canadian government was by no means unconcerned with security in 
Asia. Canadian participation in the Korean War, the 1954 Geneva Conference, 
and the International Control Commission (ICC) in Indochina all bore 
testament to this. Neither was it, a founding member of NATO, unwilling to 
participate in the Cold War alliance system. Instead, it was a matter of 
fitting the appropriate institutional response, whether it be the UN, ICC or 
the Commonwealth, to a specific problem, all ultimately directed towards the 
furtherance of the international order required for Canadian security and 
prosperity. Although confronting the Soviet Union militarily in Europe, 
Canada had no historical security involvement in Asia aside from its brief, 
quixotic experience in Hong Kong in 1941. It therefore avoided the security 
fixation of others of the old Commonwealth and focused on the issues of the 
new Commonwealth. This new Commonwealth experience had taught the Canadian 
government that social and economic institutions respecting the sovereignty
qi
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of all participants were more appropriate than military alliances or other 
institutional responses within the Commonwealth.
Canadian readiness to participate actively in Commonwealth activities, 
was still tempered by a lingering sense that some elements of the British 
government (or rather of the Conservative Party) wanted to mis-use the 
institution. Wariness of British motives, while greatly diminished in the 
multiracial Commonwealth of the mid-1950s, never disappeared entirely. There 
was always something to keep residual suspicions from dying away completely
whether it be a "silly idea" from Churchill to have the Duke of Edinburgh
92given the title 'Prince of the Commonwealth', or more substantive, such as 
the continuing British desire for Canadian participation in a Commonwealth 
Southeast Asia strategic reserve. Both arose in conjunction with the 1955 
CPMM and both illustrate how small, even trivial episodes, kept arising to 
remind Canadian statesmen that Mackenzie King's paranoia had not been 
entirely unprovoked.
Such proposals suggested that sometimes British leaders were inclined to 
view the Commonwealth as a more traditional instrument of international 
order, and as a successor to the Empire, not as a new experiment in 
international relations springing historically from the British Empire. It 
was, perhaps, easier for the Canadian government to accommodate itself to the 
new role the Commonwealth could play in its foreign relations. Britain had 
not received independence from anyone and despite other changes, remained the 
hub of Commonwealth relations. For Britain, the Commonwealth was still a 
matter of managing relationships between Britain and Canada, Britain and 
Australia, Britain and India, just as in the days of Empire and 'Commonwealth 
and Empire'. It was different, but sometimes not different enough.
92Diary entry, 2 February, 1955. PAC MG 26 N1 Lester B. Pearson Papers. 
Pre-1958 Series Correspondence, vol. 23. Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference 1955 file.
Along with its composition, the Commonwealth's most valuable role for 
the Canadian government had been transformed during the post-war period. It 
was no longer primarily a vehicle to manage Canada's relations with Britain. 
These were now managed through other channels? their security aspect through 
NATO and their economic aspect via bilateral mechanisms such as the UKCCC.
The Commonwealth's main role for Canada was as a cooperative framework for 
like-minded Western powers with a shared history to use as a bridge to the 
developing world. While neither intended nor wielded as an escape from 
American influence, it was also a useful vehicle to move beyond the North 
American continent and the friendly, if overwhelming, presence of the United 
States. But first and foremost, cooperating in the Commonwealth allowed 
Canada to demonstrate sympathy for the aspirations of new members with the 
hope that the non-intrusive proximity afforded by broad, regular contacts 
would keep these countries more favourably disposed towards the West than 
would otherwise be the case. It was a narrow and specialized role, but in 
this way, it was integrated into broader Canadian foreign policy objectives 
at the height of the Cold War and given a use without which the Canadian 
government would have been less willing to agree to anything which tended to 
increase the scope its of activities.
Mackenzie King may have left his successor an unconstraining 
Commonwealth, but there was still a need to develop the modalities, such as 
the Colombo Plan and limited institutional frameworks, to provide some 
cohesion. The need for some cohesion to maintain the Commonwealth's utility 
did not mean that the Canadian government opposed the loosening of ties 
between members brought about by greater cultural and political diversity 
among the membership. Instead, it cooperated in maintaining functional links 
among members and in fostering countervailing institutions and initiatives. 
These accepted the loosening of ties, but gave members a reason for 
maintaining the Commonwealth. This pattern, rejecting centralization and
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accommodating developments which tended to loosen ties while mitigating this 
with countervailing actions, characterized Canadian policy in the first 
decade after the Second World War. When followed, it was to be the key to 
providing Canadian governments with the flexibility to adapt to the changes 
in the Commonwealth over the next decade and maintain the Commonwealth as a 
specialized, if secondary, foreign policy instrument.
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CHAPTER 3s 1956
In August, 1955, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden sent a personal 
note to the prime ministers of Canada, India and Australia about the 
possibility of holding a CPMM in the spring of 1956. He begans "We may well 
be approaching an important turning point in international affairs, at which 
it would be useful for us to take counsel together."1 The changes to which 
he alluded were in the realm of super power relations, but he could easily 
have been talking about the Commonwealth. The year 1956 is invariably 
portrayed as a pivotal one in Commonwealth history marking the end of one era 
and the beginning of another. The Suez Crisis is identified as the 
watershed: it "nearly wrecked the Commonwealth". While the Commonwealth 
structure was salvaged, Suez marked a suspension of the principle of 
consultation3; resulted in a re-evaluation and reduction of the role of the 
Commonwealth in British policy;4 or hastened the process of de-colonization 
and Britain's decline as a global actor,5 making a turn to Europe and away 
from the Commonwealth inevitable. These evaluations of the importance of 
Suez range from simply describing its immediate impact to ascribing to it 
principle causative responsibility for all that went after it. Assessments 
like the first, do not, however, lead inevitably to those which follow. The
Minute from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to the Prime Minister, 
19 August, 1955, cover for: Draft telegram from Prime Minister to United 
Kingdom High Commissioners in Canada, India and Australia. PRO CAB 21/3084 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 1956. General Arrangements [file 
9/126].
Margaret Doxey, "Canada and the Commonwealth 1945-1980", in Paul 
Painchaud (ed), From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau: Forty Years of 
Canadian Diplomacy. (Quebec: University Laval, 1989) p. 199.
3W. David McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact 
1869-1971. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1977).
4B. Vivekanandan, The Shrinking Circle: The Commonwealth in British 
Foreign Policy 1945-1974. (Bombay: Somaiya, 1983).
5Brian Lapping, End of Empire. (London: Palladin, 1989).
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fractures within the Commonwealth brought about by Suez may instead be more 
properly seen as a reflection rather than a cause of changes in the 
Commonwealth relationship.6
Between 1945 and 1956, the Commonwealth had changed beyond recognition. 
The process of change had proceeded remarkably smoothly and without being 
subjected to major 'stress tests' along the way. It had weathered changes in 
membership and structure, including the sensitive issue of the role of the 
monarchy. Even conflict between members, both armed (India and Pakistan over 
Kashmir) and political (India and South Africa over South Africa's racist 
internal policies), had not threatened its survival. In 1956, however, 
British military intervention in Egypt shook the Commonwealth to its 
foundations. For the first time it was so profoundly divided over an issue 
as to bring the continued membership of some its members into question. The 
strength and direction of the reactions of the various Commonwealth members 
to Suez would have come as no revelation to British or Canadian decision­
makers who had dealt with their Commonwealth counterparts as the new 
Commonwealth developed. The Suez Crisis did, however, show the dynamics of 
the Commonwealth relationship under stress at a time when the Commonwealth 
was about to undergo a series of dramatic changes.
The 'new' Commonwealth had proven both its ability to change and the 
need for members to preserve this flexibility. By 1956, its membership, 
structures and role had changed markedly, but the process of change was not 
yet complete. The Commonwealth's members faced new, and perhaps even greater, 
challenges to their cohesion. These came from looming changes in the 
Commonwealth itself and in Britain, still the leading member. The pending 
admission of two new members, Malaya and Ghana, signalled the beginning of a
^Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience. (London: Wiedenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1969) p. 348.
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new round of membership expansion that resurrected the same questions of 
membership, structure and role that had been dealt with in the recent past.
To this would now be added what was beginning to be, with the advantage of 
hindsight, a stronger inclination among British policy makers to look towards 
Europe rather than the Commonwealth. These changes made the Commonwealth 
less susceptible to British manipulation and the British government less 
interested in manipulating it. For the Canadian government, they meant that 
future policy have to give more consideration to ensuring that the 
Commonwealth did not become so insubstantial as to make it incapable of 
serving Canadian interests than to guarding against British efforts to direct 
its development.
Building towards the Future: Next Phase of the Commonwealth - Africa
The ultimate rejection of tiered membership by the British cabinet 
committee which had recently studied the issue of Commonwealth membership 
prepared the way for more change within the Commonwealth. Of the two 
memberships pending in 1956, Malaya's, did not present much novelty. Asian 
states had been accommodated previously and ongoing military operations by 
Commonwealth members to suppress a communist insurgency in Malaya was a 
strong Commonwealth bond. The other anticipated member would add a new 
dimension to the Commonwealth. The Gold Coast, destined to become 
independent as Ghana, would be the first Black African member of the 
Commonwealth.
Apprehensions about negative consequences for the Commonwealth's 
effectiveness from expanded membership had always been present amongst those 
who saw the Commonwealth's influence and importance in terms of united
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action. Larger and more diverse membership made public demonstrations of 
solidarity and cohesion difficult. Admitting African states would include 
much poorer and weaker, hence less important, states in Commonwealth 
meetings, with vastly different perspectives on economic, political and 
social issues and different priorities for action. This 'dilution' of the 
Commonwealth had concerned the British Cabinet when it considered membership 
questions in 1954. Despite the conclusion by the older Commonwealth members 
that there was no alternative but to allow newly independent states to join 
as full members, misgivings remained.
South Africa's attitude towards Black African members raised obvious
questions. Its racist domestic polices were already the source of tension
within the Commonwealth. Having African states as full members could add to
this, either from the South African government objecting to the presence of
African representatives or from African representatives condemning the South
African government. These considerations had been in the fore when JJB Hunt,
an official at Eamscliff, the British high commission in Ottawa, had
discussed the implications of African members with Paul Bridle, the head of
the DEA's Commonwealth Division, in early 1954. The question of an African
member was then hypothetical, but Hunt received the impression that it would
be out of the question for Canada to side with South Africa against admitting 
0
an African state. Given a choice between retaining South Africa as a
For example? Memorandum CDC(51)10. The Constitutional Development of 
Colonial Territories. Report of the Joint Colonial Office/Commonwealth 
Relations Office Working Party, 29 March, 1951. PRO DO 35/2217 Constitutional 
Development in the Commonwealth: Constitutional Development of Colonial 
Territories - Their Relations with the Members of the Commonwealth, [file 
C2535/5].
8CC(54)83 "Commonwealth Relations”, 7 December, 1954. PRO CAB 128/27 
part 2.
a
Letter 1044/66, JJB Hunt, Secretary, United Kingdom High Commission in 
Canada, to RC Omerod, CRO, 11 March, 1954. PRO DO 35/5056 Future Admission of 
Colonial Territories to Full Membership of the Commonwealth [file CON 32/40/6 
part A].
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member or loosing a new aspirant, the Canadian government would probably be 
prepared to see South Africa leave. This was consistent with the Canadian 
view of the Commonwealth as a bridge between the developed and developing 
world. The Canadian government was not, however, eager to take proactive 
measures to address the issue. Characteristically, seeing the Commonwealth 
in a stage of flux, and any analysis of future developments as being no more 
than a guess, the Canadian government preferred to await developments.10
Canadian governments were rarely inclined to ponder future Commonwealth 
development. Doing so gave too much emphasis to formal structure rather than 
functional utility - the Commonwealth which worked best was the one which 
evolved spontaneously according to the needs of the situation and vice-versa. 
Elsewhere, advocates of more Commonwealth structure remained, and not only 
within the British government. Prior to the 1956 CPMM, Australia's Menzies, 
in an article contemplating the Commonwealth's future direction, concluded 
that central machinery was needed to ensure greater cohesion as the 
Commonwealth changed.11 Such ideas found support within the CRO, but given
the realities of the Commonwealth, there was no inclination to formally raise
12the matter.
Dealing with change as it came rather than trying to anticipate or 
direct it had always produced satisfactory results for the Canadian 
government. Proposals for planned development had tended to envision the 
Commonwealth moving directions Canada did not wish to follow. That is, 
towards establishing formal defence commitments or a common foreign policy as
10 Ibid.
^Robert Menzies, "The Ever Changing Commonwealth: II Need for New Forms 
of Consultation", Times. 12 June, 1956.
12Minute from Sir Saville Gamer, Deputy Under-Secretary, CRO to IMR 
Maclennan, Assistant Under-Secretary, CRO, 21 June, 1956. PRO DO 35/5012 The 
Nature of the Commonwealth: Discussions on Commonwealth Expansion (1955-7) 
[file CON 18/4 part A].
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opposed to the tendency to de-emphasize the links between members as a 
collectivity and come together only as functionally appropriate. As the Gold 
Coast's independence approached, the Canadian government moved neither from 
this attitude towards Commonwealth development, nor from its willingness to 
accept the new member.
Something that enabled the Canadian government to persist in its 
laissez-faire approach to the Commonwealth's future direction was the 
attention that the British government was willing to give it. Because 
British prestige and power were more closely linked to the Commonwealth than 
Canada's, British governments were more attentive to the Commonwealth's form 
and structure. Moreover, Britain's responsibility for the constitutional 
development of its colonial territories gave it more reason to consider what 
would happen to them after independence. The Canadian government was adamant 
that issues of colonial constitutional development, even as they affected 
potential Commonwealth membership, were entirely a British affair.
British officials agreed that matters concerning dependent territories 
were exclusively their concern, but they did not always agree that this 
should be extended to matters concerning the Commonwealth's future form. In 
March, 1954, in the midst of the British study of the post-independence 
status in the Commonwealth of colonies, Sir Norman Brook expressed the view 
that Commonwealth members, especially Canada should accept more 
responsibility for the Commonwealth. With a hint of exasperation, he 
commented: "I think we shall have to try to make the Canadians realise that 
this problem is theirs as well as ours and that they have a duty to give us a 
hand in getting some solution acceptable by all members of the 
Commonwealth.”13 The Canadian government did not change its position on
13Minute from Brook to Sir Percival Liesching, Permanent Under-Secretary, 
CRO, 4 March, 1954. PRO DO 35/5056.
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this, but was willing to help find informal arrangements if problems 
arose.14 Without active assistance from the Canadian government, whom the 
British saw as the most flexible of the 'old' members on issues of form and 
structure such as membership,15 definitive consideration of the impact of 
African membership would have to await the event.
The issue of the Gold Coast's membership arose while the British 
government was organizing the 1956 CPMM. The Commonwealth, even before its 
anticipated 'dilution' through expansion was not so cohesive as to handle 
sharp disagreements between members easily and openly. Anxious not to have a 
potentially divisive issue discussed at the meeting, the British government 
wanted it settled beforehand. It first approached the South African 
government, the most likely source of opposition.16 There was considerably 
less opposition from South Africa than expected. With independence
inevitable, the South African government agreed that Africa's stability was
17better served by having the Gold Coast in the Commonwealth. Despite the 
unexpectedly accommodative South African position, the issue was not settled 
before the CPMM.
Gold Coast's membership was not included on the CPMM's informal agenda, 
but it was discussed privately. Eden brought each prime minister up-to-date 
on the constitutional situation in the Gold Coast and gave the British 
government's view that upon attaining independence it should be admitted to
14Hunt to Omerod, 11 March, 1954. PRO DO 35/5056.
15C.C.M.(54)7 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, 16 June, 1954. PRO CAB 134/786 Cabinet Committee on Commonwealth 
Membership 1953-1954.
16C.M.(55) 44(5), "Commonwealth Membership", 1 December, 1955.
PRO CAB 128/29.
17Record of a discussion held in the Prime Minister's room in the House 
of Commons, Ottawa between Anthony Eden and Louis St.Laurent, on Tuesday, 7th 
February, 1956. PRO CAB 21/3085 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, June 
1956.
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the Commonwealth. The Canadian government supported this position* but
St.Laurent and Pearson, present both because of the meetings' emphasis on
international affairs and because St.Laurent was showing signs of age, did
not formally reply while they were in London. Instead, they let their hosts
know Canada's response would await Cabinet consideration so that the reply
10
would be authoritative and final. Accordingly, on July 26, the Canadian
10
Cabinet agreed to support the admission of the Gold Coast. When, in 
January, 1957, the prime minister of the Gold Coast formally requested that
as Ghana the country be recognized as a Commonwealth member after
20independence on 6 March, 1957, this too was accepted.
Ghana's membership raised two important issues for Commonwealth members. 
These were: the procedure whereby the Commonwealth decided on expansion and 
the Commonwealth's future character resulting from changes in its 
composition. Canadian policy, though not based on a plan of how the 
Commonwealth should develop, flowed logically from the government's view of 
the Commonwealth. There was never any question of Canada opposing the
application even if it did raise the question as to whether the Commonwealth
21needed a more formal procedure for admitting new members. The government 
realized that to refuse admission would be seen by countries in and outside 
the Commonwealth as a 'colour-bar'. The result would be a disruptive split
between 'old' and 'new' members. The Commonwealth's moral stature would
22suffer as would its effectiveness as a bridge to the developing world.
Minute from Brook to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Under-Secretary, 
Commonwealth Relations Office, 6 July, 1956. PRO CAB 21/3084 Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Conference 1956. General Arrangements [file 9/126].
19PAC RG 2 vol 5775. Cabinet Conclusions, 26 July, 1956.
20PAC RG 2 vol 1892. Cabinet Conclusions, 31 January, 1957.
21Briefing Paper: Admission to Commonwealth Membership - Gold Coast 
(Ghana), 6 June, 1956. PAC RG 25 ACC 85-6/551 vol 3444 file 1-1956/3.
22Ibid.
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The Canadian government also believed that Commonwealth membership would
provide a stabilizing influence on the new state through the guidance older
23members would be in a position to give, even if only by example. As for 
the desirability of a more formal admissions procedure, the Canadian 
government, always reluctant to introduce formal procedure to the 
Commonwealth relationship, preferred to treat the Ghana as a test case, while 
reserving the right to treat future cases on their individual merit.
It was unlikely that a Canadian government would ever object to the 
membership of a former Commonwealth dependency that wished to join. Unlike 
those in Britain and elsewhere who but a few years previously had accepted 
the inevitability of expanded membership as an undesirable necessity, the 
Canadian government saw it as the only course of action consistent with the 
Commonwealth's continuation as a factor in international relations. Canadian 
policy, then, sought to maintain the Commonwealth 'bridge' to keep developing 
states, if not aligned with the West in the Cold War, then assured of the 
West's benevolence to them.
Building towards the Future in the Caribbean
Africa was not the only part of the world where British colonies were 
being prepared for independence. Decolonization was incomplete in Asia and 
had not yet begun in the Caribbean. Here too, in 1956, change loomed. In 
Asia, Malaya was scheduled for independence in 1957. In the Caribbean, the 
British West Indies (BWI) were coming together with the objective of 
collective independence. Prior to independence, Malaya was the locus of one 
form of Commonwealth cooperation, when Britain, Australia and New Zealand 
worked together to suppress communist insurgents, and the beneficiary of
23 Ibid.
24Ibid.
another, the Colombo Plan. The BWI would need only an assistance scheme. 
Plans begun in 1956 and 1957 for such a scheme demonstrated a new willingness 
by the Canadian government to take on Commonwealth responsibilities even if 
resistance to formal structure remained.
At the British Caribbean Federation Conference in London in February, 
1956, the Jamaican delegation circulated a memorandum on regional economic 
development. The premise of the document was that federation by itself would
not prepare the region for independence and that the BWI required an economic
25development scheme like the Colombo Plan. It identified Canada and 
Britain as the Commonwealth countries with whom talks on the subject should 
be initiated. Not surprisingly, the Jamaican proposal found general favour 
at the conference.
The British government was receptive to the idea of a Colombo-type plan 
for the Caribbean. Since the BWI required post-independence aid beyond what 
Britain could provide, it made sense to invite Commonwealth and American 
participation in a regional assistance plan. To this end, the British 
government sent an aide memoire to the Canadian government early in June,
1956, to ask if Canada would consider "associating" itself with Britain in an
26assistance programme for the BWI. Although the proposal was made first to 
Canada, the British government hoped eventually to include Australia, New 
Zealand, and possibly India. However, with the low salience of the region 
for other Commonwealth countries, it expected that their contributions would 
be much smaller than for the Colombo Plan.
25British Caribbean Federation Conferences Economic Development in the 
Caribbean. Memorandum Prepared by the Jamaica Delegation, 9 February, 1956. 
PRO DO 35/5369 Canadian Development Aid Assistance to the British Caribbean 
(1956-7) [file CON 262/351/1 part A]
26Aide Memoire from the United Kingdom Government, "Economic Assistance 
for Caribbean Federation", 7 June, 1956. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 box 229 file 
10420-W1-40 part 1, Canadian Foreign Aid to Other Countries - West Indies 
(1956).
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Jamaica's identification of Canada as the other Commonwealth member most 
likely to extend significant aid was not based only on economic strength.
The region had long-standing ties with Canada's maritime provinces, with whom 
a trading relationship had thrived for two centuries. Indeed, in a 
memorandum to Cabinet, Pearson observed that the Caribbean was probably the
area within the Commonwealth, aside from Britain, with whom Canada had the
27strongest ties. These ties, in fact, included development assistance.
Canada already provided a limited amount of bilateral technical assistance to 
the Caribbean region, including the BWI, and more via the United Nations. 
Nevertheless, this was not on anywhere near the scale envisioned by the 
Jamaican proposal.
Before receiving the British aide memoire, the Canadian government, 
while aware of the Jamaican proposal, had not acted on the matter. Receipt 
of the more concrete formulation of the idea stirred the Canadian government 
to action, prompting the establishment of an interdepartmental working group 
to study Canada-BWI relations. It covered political and economic relations 
in general, but the main focus was aid. From the beginning, officials felt 
that even though it was desirable to increase Canadian aid to the Caribbean 
region, it should not be done within a Colombo-style framework. An important 
factor behind this was that DEA was concurrently considering whether to make 
more use of the UN to channel future Canadian aid. Some officials thought it
best, therefore, not to commit to another long-term regional aid programme,
28especially one directed at a single recipient. Canadian officials also 
hesitated because a Colombo-style structure would be cumbersome to create for 
a lone recipient. Moreover, a programme directed only at the BWI was thought
27Memorandum to Cabinet from the SSEAs "Economic Assistance by Canada to 
the West Indies Federation", 10 April, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 box 229 
file 14020-W1-40 part 2. Canadian Foreign Aid to Other Countries - West 
Indies (1957).
28Telegram 964 from the Canadian High Commissioner in Britain, 19 July, 
1956. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 box 229 file 14020-W1-40 part 1.
29unlikely to attract American participation. Indeed, it would probably
produce the negative result of creating an adverse reaction among states in
30the region who would be excluded. For this reason, the Canadian study 
broadened its scope to include other British dependencies in the region and 
Caribbean states, such as the Dominican Republic and Haiti, with significant 
links to Canada. These links were often via Catholic orders in Quebec, a 
reminder that Canadian foreign policy had to engage the interests and 
attachments of all Canadians, not just the relatively pro-Commonwealth ones 
of those of British decent.
Canadian officials were also unhappy about the multilateral structure 
implied by the British proposal. Such a structure suggested a long-term 
commitment of a great deal of money.31 More positively, a bilateral 
programme, would give the Canadian government greater flexibility and control
in allocating the type of aid and determining the recipients and yield higher
32returns with respect to any goodwill generated by the aid. Associating 
the Canadian programme too closely with a British effort held danger that the 
Canadian contribution would be overshadowed by the British one.33
Visibility was an important consideration in Canadian evaluations of 
various options for extending aid. This ruled out such things as making a 
contribution to the Federation budget and inclined against joint efforts such 
as a development fund or Colombo-style plan. In early 1957, the balance of
29Ibid.
30Amold Heeney, Ambassador to the United States to Leger, 31 August, 
1956. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 box 229 file 14020-W1-40 part 1.
31Memorandum from Leger to Pearson, 12 March, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-
7/414 box 229 file 14020-W1-40 part 2.
32Telegram 964 from Canadian High Commissioner to Britain, 19 July, 1956. 
PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 box 229 file 14020-W1-40 part 1.
33Memorandum from Leger to Pearson, 12 March, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-
7/414 box 229 file 14020-W1-40 part 2.
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official opinion tended towards recommending a bilateral programme of finite 
capital assistance such as the provision of Canadian-made cargo ships for 
inter-island transportation. Canadian officials considered it unlikely 
that other Commonwealth members would participate in a scheme even it the 
British government were to approach other them. However, should the unlikely 
happen, it would be difficult for Canada not to join - negative concurrence 
still characterized Canadian receptiveness to new Commonwealth institutions. 
So much more attractive were the benefits of a bilateral programme that even 
if Canada were to find itself compelled to participate in a joint scheme, it 
would likely have been on the basis of superficial enthusiasm for a limited
programme of technical assistance with the added bonus for all concerned that
35Canada would also extend a bilateral programme in parallel.
Other Commonwealth members, as Canadian officials had anticipated, had 
little enthusiasm for participating in a project which, although laudable, 
was far removed from their key interests. The absence of wider Commonwealth 
involvement removed a major source of potential political embarrassment for 
the Canadian government's desired bilateral route. Canada and Britain, 
separately, were to be the agents of Commonwealth assistance in the 
Caribbean. In Hay, 1957, almost a year after the British request, the 
Canadian government formally responded, informing the British government that
Canada would work directly with the Federation government in establishing a
35development assistance programme. The Canadian government was willing to 
exchange information in order to facilitate coordination and avoid 
duplication of effort, but the Canadian programme would be Canadian.
34Ibid.
35Ibid.
35Aide Memoire from the Department of External Affairs: Economic 
Assistance for the West Indies Federation, 2 May, 1957. PRO DO 35/5369. Also 
in Aide Memoire to the United Kingdom Government: Economic Assistance for the 
West Indies Federation, 2 May, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 box 229 file 
14020-W1-40 part 2.
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The preference for extending development assistance to the BWI 
bilaterally did not reflect a reluctance to participate in Commonwealth 
activities. Unlike Canada's initial reluctance to participate in the Colombo 
Plan, there was never any question that it would extend some form of 
assistance to the BWI. Pearson and his senior officials believed that Canada 
had to play a larger role in the area as the islands moved towards
independence to enhance post-independence stability and to reduce the chance
37that the United States would fill the vacuum left by Britain. Failure to 
provide economic assistance would, they felt, create the erroneous impression 
that Canada was indifferent to the BWI and other potential Commonwealth 
members. The Canadian government was committed to developing the 
Commonwealth, but not as Britain's understudy. The Canadian programme would, 
therefore, be within the Commonwealth, but would not be a Commonwealth 
programme. Even though the British government preferred a more explicitly 
Commonwealth co-operative solution to BWI aid, the Canadian willingness to 
accept responsibility was a step towards Brook's wish that the Canadian 
government see Commonwealth problems as its own and take it upon itself to 
help find solutions.
The Commonwealth and Keeping Britain Great: 1956
Despite the many changes that had occurred in the constitutional 
structure of the British Empire and in the Commonwealth, in 1956, Britain 
remained the keystone of the Commonwealth. With a few exceptions, such as 
the strong bilateral links between Australia and New Zealand and, to a lesser 
extent, the ties between Canada and the BWI, the web of Commonwealth 
relationships existed almost entirely of a series of bilateral relationships 
between Britain and each of the other member countries. Britain was the only
37Memorandum from Leger to Pearson, 1 April, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 
box 229 file 14020-W1-40 part 2. Pearson's concurrence is contained in a pen 
note in the margin.
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member to have a high commission in every other Commonwealth country and was 
also the only one with a separate bureaucratic structure, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office (CRO), devoted solely to conducting relations with other 
members. Notwithstanding the absence of formal distinction between members, 
as the progenitor of the organization, Britain had a different role in it. 
This role was not only one history had bequeathed to it, but also one which 
British governments had helped create for themselves.
Faith in the Commonwealth's value to Britain meant that British 
governments had always been among the most fervent advocates of Commonwealth. 
While Canadian governments in the post-war period had spent a great deal of 
effort trying to curb what they saw as excessive and unrealistic British 
expectations for the Commonwealth, British governments never tired of trying 
to develop the Commonwealth into a more cohesive force in world affairs. 
Despite the undoubted foreign policy success that keeping the Commonwealth 
together constituted, by 1956, the political value to Britain of its de facto 
leadership of the Commonwealth was increasingly difficult to assess. 
Nevertheless, within the British government, a tendency persisted to see the 
Commonwealth, while different from the Empire, as a replacement for the 
Empire rather than a development from it.
Attachment to the Commonwealth's importance for Britain's world status 
was particularly evident within the CRO. A memorandum on the Commonwealth's 
future prepared by the CRO for the 1956 CPMM stressed its importance, even as 
it changed, to Britain's role in the world, stating:
that while for a long period to come the United Kingdom can, in its 
own right, exercise a great influence as a Power in the world, its 
authority and influence will continue, in an increasing degree as 
its rivals grow in strength and power, to derive from its headship
89
of, or association with, the world-wide group of States that 
compose the Commonwealth.
Later that same summer as part of a more general review of Britain's 
international position in the coming decade, the Commonwealth's role in 
maintaining Britain's status as a world power was just as emphatically 
stated:
The position of influence which the U.K seeks to maintain in the 
world is to a very large extent dependent on the Commonwealth 
association and the U.K's influence within this association. If 
our special position in the Commonwealth ceased to exist, our 
stature in world affairs would be seriously reduced, our economic 
strength would be greatly weakened and our effective influence 
would thereafter approximate that of one of the poorer second-class 
powers.
The CRO naturally stressed the Commonwealth's importance, but the fact that 
the British government still considered the Commonwealth worthy of a separate 
bureaucracy reflected its perceived importance and special character.
Keeping Britain great was an expensive proposition. Maintaining the 
status of a world power required the economic strength and stability to 
support all the commitments the status entailed. The British economy had 
been under constant strain throughout much of the post-war period, facing 
periodic balance of payments crises, yet governments persisted in bearing the 
strain of maintaining major defence burdens and acting as a source of capital 
for the Sterling Area. Even with these efforts, gross investment in Britain 
had doubled between 1946 and 1954, but by 1956, it was becoming apparent to 
some within the British government that Britain had to reduce its external
Memorandum: The Probable Development of the Commonwealth Over the Next 
Ten or Fifteen Years, and the General Political And Economic World Pattern 
Into Which The Commonwealth Would Most Satisfactorily Fit, June 1956 (pages 
25-6). PRO CAB 21/3085 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, June, 1956. 
Preparation of Documents for. [file 9/126/4]
39Minute from TJ O'Brien, CRO, 28 August, 1956. PRO DO 35/8346 Future of 
the Commonwealth in the Next Decade.
[file EC 49/1]
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commitments and focus more attention on its domestic economy.*0 Moreover, 
by 1956, American and Canadian post-war economic aid had ended and some would 
soon have to be repaid. Beyond this looming strain on the balance of 
payments, an even greater one was in the offing. Britain had commitments to 
GATT, the IMF, the OEEC and the Commonwealth to end dollar discrimination and 
make sterling convertible. The British economy, then, would require more 
trade and an even higher level of domestic investment in the future to 
maintain Britain's status.
The Commonwealth, through its rough congruency with the Sterling Area, 
was seen by the government as an important economic asset for Britain. In 
1956, it remained the basis of significant trading relationships conducted in 
sterling rather than dollars. Even though dollar spending by India and South 
Africa had exacerbated balance of payments crises in the early 1950s, dollar 
earnings of countries such as Malaya and the Gold Coast remained important to 
the British economy.*1 The post-1950 strengthening in the British economy 
relative to its performance between 1947 and 1950 made the Sterling Area's
JA
contribution to sterling's position less important, but the Commonwealth 
was perceived as an important link in this respect which supported sterling 
and the British economy.
Something the Commonwealth could not provide was an expanding market for 
British exports. Although the total population of Commonwealth countries 
exceeded Western Europe's, much of the potential for trade was illusory.
Most of the population was in developing members and many members wanted to
*°Memorandums The Future of Britain in World Affairs, April, 1956.
PRO CAB 21/3085.
41 Ibid.
i A
Peter M. Oppenheimer, "Monetary Movements and the International 
Position of Sterling", in D.J. Robertson and L.C. Hunter (eds). The British 
Balance of Payments. (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1966) pp. 113-4.
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develop their own industries. Canada, the richest and most developed member 
after Britain was a dollar country. Most of the other members were dependent 
on trade in commodities which had experienced sagging prices since a brief 
boom during the Korean War. They could not, therefore, provide the same 
growth potential that was occurring in the increasingly robust and dynamic 
industrial economies of Western Europe. Much of the Commonwealth's economic 
importance for Britain, then, was derived from past ties rather than future 
prospects.
Britain's obvious alternative trading partner was Western Europe. 
Geographic proximity and the region's comparative wealth suggested a plethora 
of trading opportunities awaited British industry. With American Marshall 
Plan assistance, the economies of Western Europe had rapidly recovered from 
wartime devastation. European governments then set about creating 
institutions to consolidate and expand trade within the region. In 1952, six 
members of the OEEC, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg, formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Then, 
after months of negotiations starting in January, 1955, at a conference in 
Messina, Italy in June, 1955, they formally agreed to begin talks towards 
establishing economic and atomic energy communities. British governments had 
partaken in some parts of these post-war developments, but Britain remained 
outside the main drive to European integration, economic or otherwise, and 
faced the possible danger of being excluded from sharing in its benefits 
should it succeed. That it would succeed, however, was not assured, the 
Messina proposals were ambitious, and only the year before, four years of 
effort at creating a European Defence Community had died on the floor of the 
French National Assembly. Nevertheless, the spring of 1956 found the British
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government needing some way to counter the Messina trade initiative with a
41
constructive proposal of its own.
The British government considered a number of responses to the European 
challenge and decided on one dubbed 'Plan G'. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, presented this Plan to the British Cabinet on 11 
September, 1956, and communicated its contents to Commonwealth finance 
ministers on 15 September, 1956. The Plan proposed a limited free trade 
agreement among those OEEC countries wishing to join.44 The agreement would 
cover all commodities except agricultural products. Agriculture's exclusion 
was deemed essential both for the sake of domestic agricultural interests and 
for 'Commonwealth' reasons.45 Trade barriers between participants would 
gradually be eliminated, but members would retain freedom of action over 
external tariffs, thereby allowing Britain to give free entry to Commonwealth 
goods and maintain preferences with respect to countries outside Europe. The 
British government portrayed it as an outward looking trading bloc and a step
towards reducing trade barriers globally. That it may have been, but it
was also a superhuman effort to reconcile the conflicting demands of Europe
and the Commonwealth, albeit to Britain's advantage.
Satisfying two such diverse sets of requirements was not easy. The 
British government argued that an economically strong and politically stable 
Europe was in Commonwealth members' interest and that Britain's participation
43Minute from DJC Crawley, Assistant Secretary, CRO, to Rumbold, 21 
March, 1956. PRO DO 35/7126.
44C.P.(56) 208, Plan G. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 11 
September, 1956. Annex I: Summary of Plan G. PRO CAB 129/83
45Aide Memoire: Summary of Tentative Proposals Her Majesty's Government 
has Been Considering for a Free Trade Area with Europe, September, 1956. PRO 
DO 35/5637 Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting, Washington, 1956: Minutes 
and Records of Meetings [file EC 537/88/10].
46 Ibid.
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in Europe would ensure both this and continued prosperity for Britain. This 
in turn would mean more money for the purchase of Commonwealth goods and 
investment in Commonwealth countries. The contrary position was, however, 
equally sustainable on the basis that where trade goes, capital investment 
follows and political interest tends to lean. Even before Commonwealth 
governments were informed of the Plan's contents, Home warned his cabinet 
colleagues that Commonwealth countries would likely interpret it as a 
decision by the British government to identify Britain's future with Europe 
regardless of what it might say of its desire to maintain strong Commonwealth
47
links. Getting Commonwealth support for Plan G would, then, be difficult.
To ignore the effect of the Plan on the Commonwealth, he believed would have 
dire results for Britain. He warned his cabinet colleagues:
Plan G could lead to a permanent loosening of the Commonwealth 
bonds and through that to a weakening of the United Kingdom as a 
world power, and this is an important consideration we must take 
into account even if Commonwealth governments do not press it upon 
us at this stage.
Because of these Commonwealth concerns. Home argued that unless adequate 
protection for Commonwealth producers and compensation for any lost markets 
could be arranged so as to gain the support of Commonwealth governments, the 
Plan should be dropped.
Home's argument against increasing British economic links with Europe 
rested on two assumptions. These were: that intimate Commonwealth and 
European links were incompatible; and that British power and importance 
rested on maintaining the Commonwealth relationship. Countering this 
argument needed only to deal with one of these: if the first proposition were 
untrue, then the second would not be affected by ties with Europe; if the
47
CP(56) 207, Plan G and the Commonwealth. Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations. 7 September, 1956. PRO CAB 129/83
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second were untrue, then reducing Commonwealth ties would not harm Britain's 
world status. Significantly, it was the first proposition that Macmillan 
choose to undermine, asking rhetorically:
Can we retain the leadership of the Commonwealth world and at the 
same time seize the leadership of Europe? Would it help us create 
a new period of British strength and Rower, or should we be 
foolishly throwing away what we have?
The answers to the questions were, of course, that European involvement would 
benefit Britain and was not likely to harm the Commonwealth, although the 
political and economic impact on the Commonwealth would be difficult to 
predict.50
Even for an advocate of the European option, seemingly, there was no 
questioning the Commonwealth's value. As if attacking the Commonwealth's 
value was akin to urging a republican constitution or disestablishing the 
Church of England, it remained an article of faith. The attention devoted to 
Commonwealth considerations in the elucidation of major policy proposals, 
such as Plan G, demonstrated the Commonwealth's perceived importance to 
British decision makers. Even so, Commonwealth concerns could not block the 
pursuit of British interests as the government saw them. There was still a 
danger that Commonwealth objections could make things uncomfortable. Even if 
they did not, the Commonwealth retained a strong resonance within segments of 
British society, especially the Conservative Party. There even existed a 
small group of Conservative parliamentary backbenchers organized as a pro- 
Commonwealth lobby.51 The cries of such groups and their allies in the
49C.P.(56) 208, Plan G. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 11 
September, 1956. PRO CAB 129/83.
50 Ibid.
51This body was the "Expanding Commonwealth", a group of about 16 
Conservative Members of Parliament headed by Patrick Maitland. It sought to 
develop the Commonwealth as a third force between the United States and 
Soviet Union and even went so far as to advocate expanding membership to 
include middle powers with what they considered compatible policies such as
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popular press, even if not fatal to the government, were an embarrassment 
which, like any government, it could do without. To forestall protests from 
Commonwealth governments that might feed such outbursts, the British 
government sought to convince Commonwealth members that there was no danger 
to their economies.
The British government's first opportunity to discuss Plan G with other 
Commonwealth governments was the September, 1956, meeting of Commonwealth 
finance ministers in conjunction with the World Bank and IMF meetings. If 
the discussion within the British government about Plan G's effect on the 
Commonwealth had reflected the Commonwealth's importance to Britain, then the 
reaction of the other Commonwealth members conveyed their perceptions of 
Britain's role in the Commonwealth. The anticipated apprehensions of 
Commonwealth members about the possible loss of British markets manifested 
themselves. Britain remained the centre of the Commonwealth in the eyes of 
most of its members and trade was an important element of that position. The 
meetings did not, therefore, succeed in getting support for Plan G. They 
did, however, as the British government had hoped, mute public criticism in 
Britain.52
For its part, the Canadian government was not particularly alarmed at 
the prospect of more British involvement in Europe. The Canadian government,
the Scandinavian countries.
"The Expanding Commonwealth", minute, March, 1957. PRO DO 35/5012 The Nature 
of the Commonwealth: Discussions on Commonwealth Expansion (1955-7) [file CON 
18/4 part A]. See also The Expanding Commonwealth. (London: Conservative 
Political Centre, October, 1956).
52Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy. Minutes of 
Meeting Held on October 4, 1956. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 171 file 12447-40 
part 1. European Common Market (Customs Union) and Free Trade Area.
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53
as it had in 1954 when Britain became associated with the E C S C , 
appreciated the broad strategic benefit to the West of an economically strong 
and united Western Europe, especially if in the process the multilateral 
trading and payments system could thereby be strengthened.54 Like other 
Commonwealth governments, the Canadians wanted time to study the Plan's 
effects. Even though the Canadian government was not predisposed to oppose 
the British Plan, it did have some concerns about it. These concerns fell 
into two main areas. The first was, naturally, that future export 
opportunities to Britain and Europe might either be reduced or, probably a 
greater problem, that many people in Canada might fear that they would be 
reduced.55 A corollary to this was that by cutting Canadian exports across 
the Atlantic, Plan G would bring about increased Canadian dependence on the 
American market.56 The second area of concern was that if the Canadian 
government appeared too encouraging in its response to the British proposal, 
many in Canada and Britain might feel that the Canadian government did not 
care if Britain 'left' the Commonwealth.57 That these concerns were 
essentially domestic and political rather than economic or diplomatic 
underscores the fact that as far as the Canadian government was concerned, 
Plan G did not seriously jeopardize key Canadian or Commonwealth interests.
53C.(54)132 United Kingdom Association with the European Coal and Steel 
Community: Consultations with the Commonwealth, 6 April, 1954.
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Ultimately much of the Plan was compatible with Canadian objectives for 
Western solidarity and building the international trading system. Moreover, 
the Canadian government could hardly deny the British government the same 
freedom from restrictive Commonwealth ties that it had always asserted.
The initial draft of the Canadian statement on the British proposal said 
that though the plan would create some problems for Canadian trade, these 
were not insurmountable so long as the effort to reduce trade barriers did
CO
not stop with Europe. It was not pessimistic, but even so, Pearson 
advised St.Laurent to ensure the tone would not frighten supporters of Plan G 
in Britain and "avoid undue alarm" among Canadians who might have "an
CO
exaggerated impression" of the scheme's adverse effects. Pearson's main 
economic concern was not to say anything to weaken Canada's negotiating 
position in discussions on the Plan's effect on Canada.60 The final text of 
the Canadian statement contained the same reservations as the first but still 
welcomed the development.61
Canada, being less reliant on trade with Britain than any other 
Commonwealth member, might have been expected to be less apprehensive. The 
Canadian government, therefore, should have been less likely to confuse 
national economic concerns with wider Commonwealth ones. Nevertheless, even 
though Canada's trade with Britain was secondary to that with the United
68PAC RG 2 vol 5775. Cabinet Conclusions 1956. 18 October, 1956.
59Pearson to St.Laurent, 26 October, 1956. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 
file 12447-40 part 1.
6QIbid.
61Memorandum for the Cabinet by RB Bryce, Cabinet Secretary. Revision of 
proposed statement on European Free Trade Area. Draft proposed statement 
which might be issued after it has been shown to the U.K. authorities, 31 
October, 1956. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 171 file 12447-40 part 1.
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62States, the government was sensitive to a body of popular opinion that 
focused the Commonwealth relationship on Britain. The Commonwealth issues 
raised by the British proposal were twofold: first, how integral were trading 
relationships to the Commonwealth relationship? And second, how critical to 
the Commonwealth was it that Britain be its centre and it be central to 
Britain? As the Canadian example demonstrated, trade ties were bilateral 
affairs building on, but ancillary to, the Commonwealth relationship.
Indeed, Canada's trade with most members was negligible in terms of Canada's 
total trade, but the Canadian government valued the Commonwealth nonetheless. 
More important, it seemed, was the perception of Britain. The balance of 
assumptions on which rested perceptions of Britain's world influence and the 
Commonwealth's role in it was always precarious and shifting: just as the 
Commonwealth was changing, Britain was changing. The Commonwealth could 
neither restrict Britain any more than members such as Canada would allow it 
to restrict them; nor, as Britain sought to find a long-term remedy to 
chronic economic difficulties, could the old relationship offer the solutions 
it once did.
Testing the Commonwealth: The Suez Crisis
At the same time that Commonwealth governments were digesting the 
implications of Plan G, another, more dramatic, series of events was 
unfolding in the Middle East. Although the Suez Crisis of October and 
November, 1956, was not itself a Commonwealth matter, it had a profound 
effect on the relations between Commonwealth members. The contradictory
62In 1956, for example, 17% by value of all Canadian exports went to 
Britain, only a portion of which were manufactured goods. This compared with 
59% to the United States. The rest of the Commonwealth accounted for about 
5% of Canadian exports. Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, External 
Trade Division. Trade of Canada Volume I: Summary and Analytical Tables - 
Calendar Years 1966-1968. (Information Canada: Ottawa, April, 1971),"Table 5. 
Summary of the Trade of Canada with Commonwealth Countries and Other 
Countries, Fiscal Years 1886-1921 and Calendar Years 1926-1968". p. 26.
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tenets of an Anglo-centric Commonwealth and an non-restricting, politically 
and racially heterogeneous association collided. The result nearly split the 
Commonwealth between the old members and the new. An exception to this 
pattern of alignment was Canada which found itself having to work hard to 
preserve its vision of the Commonwealth.
The Canadian government's opposition to Britain's use of force is 
sometimes cited as evidence that the Liberal government cared less for 
British and Commonwealth ties than it did for those with the United 
States.6^ Indeed, it was so accused at the time by the Conservative 
opposition in Parliament.64 Contrary to such charges, the Liberal 
government cared a great deal about the Commonwealth. Its actions embodied 
the cooperative tendencies of Canadian policy that sought to employ the 
Commonwealth as an effective foreign policy instrument. These actions marked 
it as the only old Commonwealth member worried about the "survival of general 
Commonwealth goodwill."65 Indeed, the Suez Crisis can be seen as the first 
instance of the Canadian government taking the lead and acting in the best 
interests of the Commonwealth as a whole,66 although Mackenzie King would 
undoubtedly take issue with this point. More than anything, however, it 
highlighted, even to the Canadian government, the growing distinction between 
relations with Britain and relations with the Commonwealth
63Donald Creighton, The Forked Road; Canada 1939-1957. (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1976)
64This was a constant refrain during the special parliamentary session in 
November 1956. It was included in the motion proposed by Earle Rowe, interim 
leader of the Progressive Conservative Party in response to the opening 
address which accused the government of: "gratuitous condemnation of the 
action of the United Kingdom and France" and "have meekly followed the 
unrealistic policies of the United States". Canada. Parliament. House of 
Commons Debates. 4th (Special) Session, 22nd Parliament. Volume 1, November 
26, 1956, p.18.
65JDB Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions. (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1966) p. 254.
66Lord Gamer of Chiddingly, "Britain and Canada in the 1940s and 1950s" 
in Lyon (ed) Britain and Canada, p. 98.
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67The Suez Canal had long been of strategic interest to Britain. Thus, 
when Egyptian President Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the 
nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Canal, the canal's 
operator, on 26 July, 1956, thereby taking control of the canal, the British 
government viewed the matter extremely seriously. The morning after Nasser's 
announcement, the British Cabinet resolved "that the government should seek
to secure, by the use of force if necessary, the reversal of the decision of
68the Egyptian government to nationalise the Suez Canal." Concomitant with 
its efforts to secure this objective, the British government initiated a 
process of consultation with other Commonwealth governments to keep them 
informed of the matter thereby accentuating whatever link existed between the 
Commonwealth and the Suez question.
There was little chance of a united Commonwealth position emerging from 
the consultation. It was clear from the outset that not all members shared 
the British government's sense of outrage. The governments of both Australia 
and New Zealand shared Britain's concerns over the future of the Suez Canal. 
The South African government too expressed concern but viewed the matter as 
being removed from its immediate interests. Among the Asian members, there 
was considerable sympathy for the nationalist aspirations of the Egyptian 
government. Sensitivity for the perspective of another developing country 
meant that the governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon hesitated to 
criticize Nasser's action. The stage was set for an old/new split within the 
Commonwealth.
For background to the crisis and detailed treatment of the crisis 
itself, sees David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis. (Londons Basil 
Blackwell, 1988); James Eayrs, The Commonwealth and Suezs A Documentary 
Survey. (Londons Oxford University, 1964); Keith Kyle, Suez. (Londons 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991); Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair. Second Edition 
(Londons Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988).
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The first public reaction by the Canadian government was an answer to a 
question from the press by Pearson on 27 July. In a guarded reply he said:
While Canada has no share in the ownership of the Suez Canal 
Company, as a trading nation we have a very real interest in the 
efficient and non-discriminatory operation of this waterway... We 
would regret and be concerned about any action which interfered 
with such operations.
The Progressive Conservative opposition in Parliament denounced this apparent 
reluctance to condemn Egypt and stand with Britain in a show of 'Commonwealth 
unity'.70 The government, however, had other notions of Commonwealth unity. 
Pearson was well aware of the sentiment among Asian Commonwealth members and 
used this to justify the government's measured response.71 But even more 
than not wanting to offend the Asian Commonwealth, the Canadian government 
did not want to inflame the situation. Above all else, it wanted the issue 
settled peacefully and expeditiously.
Though the Canadian government did not align itself with Britain, it 
supported British efforts to settle the affair through negotiations. These 
began with trilateral talks convened in London on 29 July between 
representatives of the United States, Britain and France. The result of 
these talks was the decision to hold an international conference between 16 
and 23 August in London to discuss means of ensuring the international 
operation of the Suez Canal. Twenty-four governments were invited to 
participate of which twenty-two accepted. Of the eight Commonwealth members 
Canada and South Africa were the only ones not invited. The reason for this 
was simple: neither was a major user of the canal. The Canadian government
09Quoted in The Globe and Mail. (Toronto), 28 July, 1956.
70Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. 3rd Session, 22nd 
Parliament, Volume VII, July 28, 1956, p. 6607.
71Ibid. 1 August, 1956, p. 6831.
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72accepted this without complaint. The matter was remote from Canadian 
interests, and the government's main concern was preventing the issue 
becoming something about which it had to worry.
The British and Canadian governments exchanged information and views 
constantly. The British government would have liked to have Canadian backing 
for its tough position towards Nasser, but there was one critical area where
the two governments' views diverged significantly. Even before Eden publicly
73announced on 2 August that "certain precautions of a military nature" had 
been taken, differences on this subject were beginning. The possible use of 
force lay too near to the surface even in Eden's first communication to 
St.Laurent for Pearson's liking. Were Britain to use force, even as a last 
resort, Pearson feared that it would only result in Egypt taking the issue to 
the UN and "that would be bringing the UN into the matter with a vengeance 
and by the wrong party."74 The British government was aware of this 
divergence. In early August, Sydney Pierce, the Canadian Deputy High 
Commissioner in London, told Sir Saville Gamer, then Deputy Under-Secretary 
of State in the CRO but soon to go to Canada as high commissioner, privately 
and personally, but of course duly recorded and reported, that the Canadian 
government was directly concerned about the use of force as a member of the 
Commonwealth, NATO and the United Nations, and was worried that any 
precipitous use of force could split all three organizations.75 Such 
informal discussions about the possible use of force continued through mid- 
August. Norman Robertson, the Canadian High Commissioner, who was on close
72Inward CRO Telegram 77 from High Commission in Canada, 3 August, 1956. 
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73Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. Volume 557, coll. 
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71
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and easy terms both with his minister, Pearson, and with senior British
officials, was a vital conduit in these. His opinion, given considerable
weight by the CRO, was that Canadian support for the use of force was very 
76unlikely. Accordingly, the British decided against seeking "a precise
definition" of the Canadian government's attitude towards the use of force
77until Nasser did something which would make Canadian support more likely.
The Canadian government never explicitly ruled out the use of force. In
his public statements on the situation, Pearson always called for a peaceful
settlement without specifically dealing with the issue of force. This was
part of a general reservation of the Canadian position. As the idea for some
form of international control of the Canal took shape during the August
conference in London, the Canadian government shied away from endorsing that
as well. It was not that the idea was antithetical to the Canadian
government. Throughout the crisis, it had consistently supported the
principle that international institutions were the preferred way of dealing
with the problem. Canadian hesitations about the London Conference proposals
reflected a preference for: (i) a United Nations solution (ii) that Asian
Commonwealth members could support. Just before the London Conference
convened, Robertson and Pierce informed the CRO of Canadian inclinations.
They argued that Asian countries would feel freer to support some form of
international control for the Canal at the United Nations than at a
conference in London, boycotted by Egypt, held specifically to secure
78international control. The importance with which the Canadian government 
viewed Asian support was reiterated a few days later when Jules Leger, the
76Minute to Prime Minister (serial 84/56), 17 August, 1956. PRO DO 
35/6314.
77Ibid.
78Minute from Rumbold to Home, 15 August, 1956. PRO DO 35/6314.
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USSEA, told an official from Eamscliff that the Canadian government would be
79extremely reluctant to support anything that India opposed. This was put 
to the test when, at the conference's conclusion, neither India nor Ceylon 
endorsed the majority proposals (supported by eighteen of twenty-two 
participants) calling for the creation of an international operating board 
for the Canal to be established under the terms of a new Suez Canal 
Convention.®0
It was impossible to avoid making a statement on the conference's 
proposals. After waiting a week, Pearson finally made a public statement.
In it he stressed the rights of both the Canal users and Egypt. He did, 
however, endorse the Conference proposals saying that: "we feel that these
proposals are reasonable and satisfactory and deserve our support as the
81basis for negotiation." Six days later in a secret speech before the 
North Atlantic Council in Paris, Pearson reiterated this position but also 
dealt with the issue of force directly. He called for force to be ruled out
except as a last resort and then only to be used in accordance with the
82principles of the United Nations and NATO. He did not rule force out, but 
the conditions he set on its use would be difficult to meet.
Almost as soon as the Canadian government finally endorsed the majority 
proposals of the conference, they were superceded. On 4 September, the 
American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, revealed a new proposal to 
the British ambassador in Washington entailing the creation of a Suez Canal
79Telegram 789 from United Kingdom High Commission in Canada to CRO, 20 
August, 1956. PRO DO 35/6314.
80Great Britain. The Suez Canal Conference: London. August 2-24. Selected 
Documents. Cmd 9853 (London: HMSO, 1956) pp. 11-12.
81Text of Statement by Lester Pearson, 30 August, 1956. PRO DO 35/6314.
82Text of Speech by Lester Pearson to the North Atlantic Council, Paris,
5 September. 1956. PRO DO 35/6314.
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Users' Association to operate the canal under the existing Suez Canal 
Convention of 1888. Eight days later, the same day that he publicly 
announced Britain's acceptance of this idea, Eden sent a message to 
St.Laurent asking for Canadian support. This the Canadian government refused
to do, telling the British government that it was not in a position to
83comment but was studying the proposal. Privately, however, it felt that 
the new proposal would be less palatable to Nasser than the first and, by 
extension, no more likely to gain support from the Asian Commonwealth.
A second conference was held in London from 19 to 21 September for the 
eighteen countries supporting the original conference proposals to consider 
the new plan. Pakistan, the only Asian Commonwealth member endorsing the 
original scheme, refused to associate itself with the new one. The division 
among Commonwealth members between old and new was now clearer than ever. 
Australia and New Zealand were the only Commonwealth members supporting the 
British government's position. None of the three Asian members endorsed 
British policy. The South African government was trying to steer clear of 
the situation and the Canadian government, although apprehensive that force 
might be used, refused to publicly commit itself either way. It was clear by 
the end of September, however, from both official and unofficial 
communications between the British and Canadian governments that there was a 
growing gulf between them on the issue of how best to handle Suez.
Dispatches from Eamscliff, resigned to the "somewhat unsympathetic Canadian 
attitude",84 sought consolation where they could. At a press conference on 
28 September, St.Laurent responded to a question about the Canadian 
government's view of British military activities in the Mediterranean by 
pointing out that they were not necessarily aggressive in intent but simply
83PAC RG 2 vol 5775. Cabinet Conclusions, 13 September, 1956.
84Robert Belgrave, Office of the British High Commissioner, Ottawa, to CS 
Pickard, Assistant Secretary, CRO, 3 October, 1956. PRO DO 35/6314.
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prudent, defensive precautions to protect British subjects should violence 
erupt. Such was the support the British government's efforts to settle the 
situation were likely to receive. All that the Canadian government could do 
to support Britain, it seemed, was to not publicly oppose it.
The situation exploded on 29 October when Israeli forces attacked Egypt.
oc
On 30 October, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to Israel and
oc
Egypt to cease fighting and withdraw their forces ten miles from either 
side of the Suez Canal. Failure to comply with these terms would result in 
military intervention by Britain and France to occupy Port Said, Ismalia and 
Suez to protect the Canal. The Egyptian government rejected the ultimatum 
and on 31 October, British forces began air operations against Egypt.
The terms of the Anglo-French ultimatum were also communicated to
Commonwealth governments. Commonwealth high commissioners in London were
told shortly before Eden's informed the House of Commons on the afternoon of
30 October. The near-simultaneous notification of the British Parliament and
Commonwealth governments had previously been the consultative norm on major
matters during the crisis. This left no time for Commonwealth governments to
consider the matter, indicative of the state of 'consultation'. Indeed,
Canada House was reduced to having to analyze press content to look for
indications of the direction of British policy in the days immediately before 
87this. In this final instance media technology overtook the consultative
oc
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process. Robertson was informed just after four o'clock in the afternoon in
London (eleven o'clock in the morning in Ottawa). The message reached
St.Laurent at five o'clock that afternoon, Ottawa time. Before it did
00
St.Laurent, heard of the ultimatum from a press report. As Pearson
observed in his memoirs, "he was not very pleased about the state of
89Commonwealth consultations."
More disturbing was the content of the message. The British action was 
certain to have far reaching effects. It exacerbated an already dangerous 
crisis in a way which affected Canadian foreign policy interests directly.
If the situation in the Middle East had seemed somewhat remote from key 
Canadian interests at the beginning, it now touched on what were the three 
most important areas of Canadian foreign policy: the ability of the United 
Nations to function effectively; the survival of the Commonwealth; and the 
cohesion of the Anglo-American partnership, and by extension of the Western 
alliance.
The immediate reaction of the Canadian government was dismay over the
90British action. Pearson instructed Robertson over the telephone to convey
91this and urge the ultimatum's postponement. This first, informal Canadian
00
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response was delivered at a meeting between the Commonwealth Secretary and
92Commonwealth high commissioners in London on the evening of 30 October.
The formal, written response was delayed as Pearson, St.Laurent and their
92officials carefully drafted an alternative to the "pretty vigorous answer" 
an angry St.Laurent had produced. When Neil Pritchard, the Acting British 
High Commissioner went to see Pearson late in the afternoon of 31 October, 
the response was still not ready, but Pearson conveyed the gist of it to him. 
Pritchard passed this on to London, reporting the Canadian government's 
worries as:
(a) Franco-British action had been launched at a time when the 
Security Council was seized of the matter.
(b) The Commonwealth was divided. Canada was alarmed that this 
situation may decisively divide the Asian Commonwealth and 
especially India from the rest. And [Pearson] could not even say 
that Britain has Canada's support.
94(c) The effect on United Kingdom-United States relations...
Nevertheless, while the Canadian government opposed British actions and 
regretted that they diverted attention from Soviet actions in Hungary,
Pearson indicated that they were not angry at the British government for what 
it had done. France was another matter. The Canadian government felt that
the French had secretly arranged things with Israel and taken the rest of the
99world, including Britain, by surprise. Of course, if France had tricked 
Britain into a bad policy decision, it was only possible because of joint 
military cooperation beforehand. Nevertheless, the Canadian government's 
attitude all along seems to have been one of wanting to help Britain out of 
an unfortunate mistake.
92Outward CRO Telegram W.426 to High Commissioners, 31 October, 1956.
PRO FO 371/121788.
93Pearson, Hike. Volume 2. p. 238.
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The Canadian Cabinet met the next morning to give final agreement to the 
text of the Canadian reply to Eden's message of 30 October. The content 
corresponded with what Pearson said to Pritchard the previous evening and 
Robertson had communicated informally to British officials in London. While 
the breach between Britain and the United States was of paramount importance, 
St.Laurent was also emphatic about the danger to the Commonwealth, saying:
There is also the danger - and I am sure that you are even more 
conscious of this than we are here - of a serious division within 
the Commonwealth in regard to your action, which will prejudice the 
unity of our association. The statement which the government of 
India issued this morning is significant evidence of this 
danger/6
The meeting also discussed reports from Canada House that British officials 
were increasingly alarmed at the direction of events. That being the case:
it might be that the U.K. government would soon welcome a proposal 
calling for the cessation of hostilities, the convening of a 
widely-based conference on Middle Eastern matters and, in the 
interim, the provision of substantial police forces stationed on 
the Israeli-Arab borders to keep peace.
Accordingly, Pearson left for the United Nations in New York that afternoon. 
There, the Canadian objective of finding "a workable solution of Middle- 
Eastern affairs with a minimum of damage to the unity of the Commonwealth and
go
Western Alliance”, ran into the problem that the British government seemed 
not to want help. To the Canadian government's dismay, Anglo-French ground 
operations began on 5 November. The depth of this feeling was evident when 
Pritchard presented Eden's message informing St.Laurent of the impending 
landings late in the evening of 4 November. He reported that St.Laurent:
gc
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read it carefully and then spoke under obviously great emotion and 
indeed anger. He said that the Canadian Government had been hoping 
that the British and French Governments would decide that their 
ground forces should not go in... He spoke gravely about the effect 
on the Commonwealth. He feared greatly that Asian members may 
decide to leave. That would be disastrous.
When St.Laurent reiterated these concerns in his message to Eden, he could 
only add that given the strong reactions of the Asian members, he at least 
hoped events would come to show that it had been worth while.100
The reactions of other Commonwealth members were predictable from the 
positions each had adopted in the previous months. The South African 
government remained uninvolved, with the minister of external affairs, Eric 
Louw, apparently more concerned by the lack of consultation. Australia's 
Henzies supported British actions, but had concerns about the Anglo-American 
rift.101 These were shared by of New Zealand's prime minister, Sidney 
Holland who was also disturbed about the lack of prior consultation and by
the fact that in supporting Britain, New Zealand would find itself split from
102much of the Commonwealth and open to condemnation at the United Nations.
The fact that even New Zealand only reluctantly supported Britain indicated 
the potential for division within the Commonwealth.
The real opposition to the British action within the Commonwealth came 
from the three Asian members. Of the three, the Indian government had 
consistently opposed British policy throughout the lead-up to the British
qq
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ultimatum. While both Pakistan's103 and Ceylon's104 prime ministers 
refrained from making comments on the Anglo-French ultimatum pending further 
study, India's government immediately issued a statement on 31 October 
condemning it.103 The following day, Nehru severely criticized British 
actions, privately in a courteous message to Eden100 and publicly in a more 
vehement speech in Hyderabad.107 He did not, however, say that the
Commonwealth connection was thereby endangered. Parts of the Indian press,
108in contrast, questioned continued Commonwealth membership.
Notwithstanding these and other public calls such as by former Indian 
Governor-General Shri Rajagopalachari urging withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth, as the crisis developed over the next few days, the real damage
appeared to be to Britain's prestige and reputation rather than to the
109Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the speed and strength of the Indian 
government's public reactions left no doubt that there had been a serious 
difference of opinion between two key Commonwealth governments.
Relations between the Canadian and Indian governments remained, for the 
most part, firm and constructive. The Canadian and Indian delegations to the 
United Nations worked together to find a solution to the crisis, although
103Telegram 1748 from United Kingdom High Commission in Pakistan, 1 
November, 1956. PRO PREM 11/1096.
104Telegram 544 from NE Costar, Acting United Kingdom High Commissioner 
in Ceylon, 1 November, 1956. PRO PREM 11/1096.
109Telegram 633 from Escott Reid, Canadian High Commissioner in India.
PAC RG 25 ACC 91-2/109 box 175 file 50372-40 part 9.
100Telegram 1428 from Malcolm Macdonald, United Kingdom High Commissioner 
in India, 1 November, 1956. PRO PREM 11/1096.
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from different perspectives and not without problems. The contrast between 
Krishna Menon's moralizing on the Middle East and wavering on Hungary 
exasperated Pearson and destroyed Pearson's confidence in his erstwhile 
Indian collaborator.110 Their cooperation had, in the past, been a key 
element of the 'Indo-Canadian entente' and now there seemed little hope of 
resurrecting it. On the other hand, the Canadian High Commissioner to India, 
Escott Reid,111 retained good access to Nehru, and Canadian officials passed
on what was said and heard to the British. In the course of events, Canadian
efforts were not restricted to ensuring that British actions did not entirely 
isolate it from India. Indian actions too, held the possibility of isolating 
it from Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth. The perception of a 
Commonwealth fissure was made all the more real by the Indian government's 
slowness in condemning the Soviet invasion of Hungary that was taking place 
at the same time. The Canadians, realizing that any comparison between the 
Indian reactions to Suez and Hungary was likely to exacerbate ill feeling 
within the Commonwealth, worked hard to convince Nehru of this. Just as
important, Canadian officials in Ottawa told Pritchard about these
112efforts. The Canadians did not want the gulf between Britain and India 
to become too great, whatever their public differences.
The reaction to British policy in Ceylon was similar to that in India.
After hesitating briefly, the government condemned British actions. The 
opposition urged more forceful condemnation, including the closure of British 
bases on Ceylon, but in general, the reaction was against Britain, not the
110Pearson to Reid, 8 March, 1957. Quoted in Escott Reid, Envoy to 
Nehru.(Oxford: Oxford University, 1981) p. 182.
^Reid has written several detailed accounts of Indo-Canadian relations 
during the crisis ins Envoy to Nehru: Hungary and Suez: A View from New 
Delhi. (Oakvill, Ontario: Mosaic, 1986); and Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of 
Escott Reid. (Toronto: University of Toronto).
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371/121788
113
Commonwealth. At a press conference on 7 November, Prime Minister SW 
Bandaranike said that the matter of withdrawal from the Commonwealth had 
never even been considered by the government.113 That the Ceylonese 
government evidently identified the British actions with Eden rather than 
with Britain weighed heavily in this reluctance to consider leaving the 
Commonwealth.
Pakistan reacted most strongly of the Asian members. Of the three, it 
had supported British diplomatic efforts the longest and was most closely 
tied to the Western security system but it was also an Islamic country whose 
population sympathized with Egypt. For its part, the government was not 
particularly outraged over Britain's use of force. President Iskander Mirza, 
confided to the Acting British High Commissioner, Maurice James, on 31 
October, that he had felt all along that the only way to get Nasser to 
negotiate was through the use of force. The Pakistani government would have 
to make some form of statement critical of Britain to assuage public opinion, 
but he hoped that the British government would understand.114 Soon 
afterwards, the President left for Iran, leaving Prime Minister HS Suhrawardy 
to deal with the situation. Suhrawardy was less sympathetic to Britain than 
the president. In a meeting with James the next day, he conceded that he 
could accept some of what the British government said.11^ The public, 
however, especially the Muslim League would not, and he nevertheless saw the 
ultimatum as fundamentally aggressive. The government, therefore, planned to 
issue a statement condemning it.116 From this point, the situation in 
Pakistan rapidly deteriorated in the face of anti-British public unrest which
113Telegram 572 from Costar, 7 November, 1956. PRO PREM 11/1096.
114Telegram 1747 from Maurice James, Acting United Kingdom High
Commissioner in Pakistan, 31 October, 1956. PRO FO 371/121788.
115Telegram 1760 from James, 1 November, 1956. PRO FO 371/121788.
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included calls for Pakistan to leave the Commonwealth. In the early hours of
3 November (Is30 am), the Pakistani foreign minister passed James a letter
from Suhrawardy containing the precursor of a threat to leave the
Commonwealth: "Our position too within the Commonwealth is becoming
increasingly difficult as well as our association in the Baghdad Pact."1*7
This reflected growing domestic pressure which the government felt would
110
force its hands within 2 days if the situation did not change.
Domestic pressure in Pakistan did mount. The next day, Sunday 4 
November, the chief minister of East Pakistan, addressing a crowd of students 
in Dacca, proclaimed that his government would recommend to the central 
government that Pakistan should leave the Commonwealth because of the British 
actions. The possibility that Pakistan's government might be forced to leave 
the Commonwealth was growing. Recognizing the bridging role that the 
Canadians had tried to play in the previous days as the crisis exploded, the 
CRO's permanent under-Secretary, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, had already 
suggested to James that if delaying arguments with Suhrawardy about the
Commonwealth failed, he should suggest that the Pakistani prime minister
119consult Canada before taking any final decision. James reported back
that this point "as regards consultation with Canada before anything
120irretrievable were said or done clearly sank in." He informed the acting
121Canadian high Commissioner of his talk with Suhrawardy. However, later 
that day, Suhrawardy and his foreign minister flew to Teheran for a hastily
117Telegram 1770 from James, 3 November, 1956. PRO FO 371/121788.
118Telegram 1769 from James, 3 November, 1956. PRO FO 371/121788.
119Outward CRO Telegram 2075 to James, 4 November, 1956. PRO PREM 11/
1096.
120Inward CRO Telegram 1786 from James, 4 November, 1956. PRO PREM 
11/1096.
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called meeting of the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact so when the next 
day, 5 November, Pritchard in Ottawa inquired of Leger as to whether the
122Pakistanis had said anything to the Canadians, he had nothing to report.
On that same day, 5 November, the Commonwealth's Suez Crisis approached 
its climax with the landing of British and French troops. Speaking in the
Canadian House of Commons afterwards, Pearson described the Commonwealth at
123that point as "on the verge of dissolution." Certainly, though neither 
the Indian nor Ceylonese governments had indicated that they were considering 
withdrawal, the situation in Pakistan had the associated danger that should 
the government be compelled to leave the Commonwealth, the governments of 
India and Ceylon might then face mounting pressure to follow, By this point, 
however, Suhrawardy was more insulated both from the effects of the unrest in 
Pakistan and from efforts to stave off Pakistan's withdrawal. But regardless 
of the efforts to dissuade Pakistan from leaving the Commonwealth, the key 
factor in preventing this from happening was the British government's 
acceptance of the United Nations ceasefire. Pearson played an important part 
in brokering the arrangement at the General Assembly, for which he was to win 
the Nobel Peace Prize. In so doing his and Canada's lack of support for 
British policy was much more valuable to Britain and the Commonwealth than 
Australia's public support.
If Pearson's work at the UN had helped Britain and the Commonwealth 
through the crisis, the Commonwealth returned the favour by facilitating his 
efforts. Indo-Canadian cooperation fostered by the Commonwealth was critical 
to the successful outcome of Pearson's manoeuvering. It was true, 
nevertheless, that the Commonwealth alone could not have provided a solution
122Inward CRO Telegram From Pritchard, 5 November, 1956. PRO DO 35/5008.
123Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (4th (Special) Session, 
22nd Parliament, vol 1, 27 November, 1956) p. 55.
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to the crisis within its ranks. Although Robertson had suggested to Pearson
1
on 1 November that a CPMM be called to salvage the situation, the 
Commonwealth was not the appropriate body even to provide a face-saving 
mechanism for Britain. Within the Commonwealth, divisive issues, as this 
assuredly was, had to be skirted, for as the intractable Kashmir dispute and 
South Africa's racial policies demonstrated, it was not capable of conflict 
resolution. The Commonwealth, especially for the newer members, rested on 
calculations of interest derived from its cooperative activities. Having a 
limited base, both in terms of resources available and interests served, the 
bonds holding the it together were a fragile mix of history, trade, and 
common purposes. The United Nations, in contrast, was more explicitly 
political, and thus while no one ever spoke of 'UN bonds', was more robust in 
terms of its capacity to absorb conflict among members, which, after all, was 
its purpose.
What the Commonwealth could do, however, was to lay the groundwork for 
more diplomatic cooperation elsewhere, especially at the UN. Notwithstanding
the fact that voting patterns in the General Assembly showed the
125'Commonwealth bloc' there to be very loose indeed , the Canadian government 
hoped for a good working relationship with Asian Commonwealth members, if not 
on the substance or direction of policy, then in the tenor in which it was 
expressed. On issues, such as anti-colonialism, which might create a split 
between the West and the Afro-Asian countries, this might mean urging Asian 
Commonwealth members to exert a 'moderating influence' on other developing 
countries to make the language of resolutions less likely to cause umbrage
17 A
Robertson to Pearson, 1 November, 1956. PAC MG 26 N1 vol 39.
125Such an analysis is contained in: Thomas Hovat, Bloc Politics in the 
United Nations. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1960) pp. 69-73.
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126umbrage among the colonial powers. The Commonwealth and the UN remained, 
as the Canadian government had always wanted, two very different, if 
compatible and even complementary institutions. Suez had shaken much, but it 
did not shake the Canadian government's faith in this pattern. If anything, 
it had reaffirmed the importance of having an informal political institution 
distinct from the more formal diplomatic one dealing directly with matters of 
'high politics'.127
The Aftermath of Suez
The immediate end to the crisis did not signal the end to suspicion and 
ill-feeling between Commonwealth governments. The Commonwealth had not split 
apart, but members had to be brought back into a cooperative partnership.
For the Canadian government, the task was twofold. Anglo-Canadian relations 
had been strained, at least temporarily, and so needed attention. More 
generally, however, relations within the Commonwealth, especially between 
Britain and the Asian members, required smoothing over. Canada being 
directly involved, the first was more easily accomplished, but both were 
essential to the functioning of the Commonwealth.
Unlike Anglo-Asian relations, there had never been any question of a 
break between Canada and Britain. Despite their differences, both 
governments had done their utmost to avoid an actual breach. The British 
government's behaviour had angered St.Laurent, but not so badly as to
126Memorandum for the Ministers The Anti-Colonialism Issue, 7 June, 1956. 
PAC RG 25 ACC 90-1/008 vol 205 file 50085-F-40. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
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127In the aftermath of the Crisis, John Holmes of the Canadian UN 
delegation reportedly told Britain's UN ambassador: "on the afternoon of the 
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loose by a break-up of the Commonwealth..." [Lord Lothian, United Kingdom 
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preclude the Canadian government devoting its energy to extricating Britain 
from the situation in which it had placed itself. The British government 
recognized the effort which St.Laurent, Pearson and the Canadian government 
had taken to downplay the split between Canada and Britain. As the crisis 
was beginning to subside, Pritchard's assessment of the Canadian government's 
response to the crisis, notwithstanding its basic opposition to British 
policy, was that:
So far as action was concerned, however, the Canadian government 
moved immediately to exercise a calming and steadying influence in 
Canada... They were genuinely anxious to keep open criticism to a 
minimum and confined themselves in public to a very few carefully 
chosen words of regret. They also moved quickly to take up a 
constructive position in the United Nations and in the 
Commonwealth.
Nevertheless, even if at the height of the crisis Eden himself had expressed
129his appreciation to Robertson for Canada's "steadying influence," in the 
immediate aftermath, the general feeling towards Canada and Robertson 
personally was such that he considered his usefulness as Canadian high 
commissioner ended and requested an early transfer.130 Declaratory
appreciation and Canadian desires to carry on relations as usual, not least
131for domestic political reasons, could not obscure the personal coolness 
confronting Robertson and other Canadian officials. This required time and
128Inward CRO Telegram from Pritchard, 9 November, 1956. PRO DO 35/5008.
125Telegram 1531 from Robertson, 6 November, 1956. PAC RG 25 ACC 91-2/109 
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130Granatstein, A Man of Influence, p. 299.
131These combined, for example, to ensure that the Canadian government 
did not refuse a British request for the waiving of interest on the post-war 
loan because of the sterling crisis precipitated by Suez. [PAC RG 2 vol 5775. 
Cabinet Conclusions, 4 December, 1956.]
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working together for shared purposes as much as anything else to 
132overcome.
One of the areas of shared purpose between Canadian and British 
officials was the need to re-affirm the Commonwealth relationship, especially 
among the Asian members. Both governments were eager for this to happen, 
but, British officials such as Lord Lothian, the British ambassador to the 
UN, felt "there were many things in relations with the three "new"
133Commonwealth countries which the Canadians could handle far more easily.” 
Fortuitously, a trip to the Asian and Pacific Commonwealth in late November, 
1956, by a senior Canadian cabinet minister, Paul Martin, the minister of 
health, had been planned prior to the crisis. He did not have a mandate to 
do any more than observe conditions, but the trip offered a chance for a 
Commonwealth exchange that a Canadian could more appropriately provide at 
that stage. In the same period. Cabinet departed from standard procedures 
and approved a Canadian cash grant in conjunction with similar grants by 
Australia and New Zealand for a project in Singapore under the Colombo Plan
nj
precisely because of the need to show Commonwealth unity. As well, a 
visit to Ottawa by Nehru in December provided a high profile visible reminder 
of the Commonwealth's importance as a link to Asia and how well it had been 
preserved. The need to underscore the Commonwealth's continuation as dynamic 
association was a key consideration in the Cabinet's discussion of the 
appropriate Canadian representative at the upcoming independence ceremonies 
for Ghana in mid-January, 1957. St.Laurent had been invited to attend, but 
with the pressure of other duties and the distance, had absolutely no 
intention of going. Cabinet nevertheless felt that it was important,
132Despite the personal coolness Robertson following Suez, subsequent CRO 
biographical notes prepared for CPMMs spoke of him in glowing terms and as 
someone whom the British could place complete faith.
133Lothian to Home, 23 November, 1956. PRO DO 35/5422
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135"particulary at this time", for Canada to suitably recognize the new 
addition to the Commonwealth. The decision was no different from what it 
would have been at any other time, but the rationale behind it had more 
substance than expediency.
There was little hope that the combination of American criticism of 
Britain and France over Suez and the brutal Soviet invasion of Hungary might 
reduce the susceptibility of developing countries to communist cultivation.
As Canadian officials saw it, the United States had shown "more energy than
13Gsubtlety" in its efforts to counter communist activity. This still left 
the Commonwealth, in the Canadian government's view, as the best instrument 
to overcome extreme nationalism in new states and preserve Western 
interests.137 Suez made it more important than ever for older members 
besides Britain to intensify their relations with new members. Prior to 
Suez, the Canadian government had resisted British government suggestions 
that it open a mission in the Gold Coast in recognition of its impending 
admission to the Commonwealth. The Canadian government was considering 
opening new missions in Africa, but was giving higher priority to French 
North Africa, where, in addition to being more important to NATO in the
Canadian view, French colonists had expressed interest in emigrating to
138Canada. But in the wake of Suez, Canadian officials became more 
concerned that too much hesitation might jeopardize Ghana's pro-Western
135PAC RG 2 series A5a vol 1892. Cabinet Conclusions, 17 January, 1957.
136The Present and Future Character of the Commonwealth, 4 June, 1957. 
PAC RG 25 vol 3445 file 1-1957/3A Brief for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
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137ibia.
138Neil Pritchard, Deputy United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada to 
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139orientation. It therefore behooved Canada, a senior member of the 
Commonwealth, to open a mission and provide development assistance.
The Canadian government had contributed much towards preventing a 
complete isolation of the old members from the new during the Suez Crisis, 
but there was only so much that it could do to actually bring Britain and the 
Asian members together afterwards in a constructive relationship. It was not 
simply that bilateral relationships must ultimately be settled between the 
parties concerned. There was also the enduring paradox that despite the 
independence and diversity of its members, and the fact that in this instance 
the breach in Commonwealth relations had been sparked by British actions, the 
Commonwealth still relied on British leadership.
The British government was eager to re-affirm the Commonwealth 
relationship and its leadership of the association. It was anxious to shake 
off the effects of Suez and salvage Britain's key international 
relationships. Almost three months after the events of early November the 
domestic political pressure to demonstrate continued leadership in the 
Commonwealth was such that, less than three weeks into his premiership as 
Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan was contemplating a CPMM with "something a 
little unusual" to silence his critics and assert British leadership.140 
The desire for the unusual reflected both the domestic need to demonstrate 
the government's critics wrong and the Commonwealth need to ensure that 
leaders would come. The urgency of the timing, however, was mostly a 
reflection of the domestic pressure. Home was more cautious; he supported
139Memorandums Ghana: Notes on Political and Economic Problems - 
Suggestions for Canadian Policy, 27 March, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 file 
12304-40 part 2 Canada-Ghana Relations (1957-8).
140Prime Minister's Personal Minute M14/57 to Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, 28 January, 1957. PRO DO 35/5173 Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Conference, London June-July 1957: Organisation, Administration 
and Press Communique [file CON 93/11(1)].
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the idea of a CPMM to consider economic and aid issues but felt "Suez 
undoubtedly gave the Commonwealth a shake up and some might think the dust 
should be given longer to settle."141
The British government faced a threefold task. It had to justify 
holding a meeting, induce Commonwealth leaders to come and satisfy domestic 
critics in Parliament. Devising a rationale for the meeting which would 
ensure Asian participation, especially by India, was the key. Nothing would 
ruin the domestic impact of a CPMM more than the refusal of Nehru to attend 
or send a representative.142 In the absence of an economic crisis 
warranting a meeting on this basis so soon after the 1956 CPMM, the best 
inducement was thought to be an initiative in the area of development 
assistance. The anticipated cost ruled out Britain launching a large 
initiative on its own. Instead, it would seek agreement on a common effort 
"which might not be very costly but would be a demonstration of political 
solidarity. ”143
The British government's preference for a low-cost option was clear. 
Political pressure required that it actively consider a grandiose scheme for 
Commonwealth development assistance - for a Commonwealth development bank - 
even as the bureaucracy struggled to come up with something more practical. 
This idea for a Commonwealth development bank was not new. The Commonwealth 
finance ministers' meetings in January and December, 1952, had considered the 
idea without making a decision. In December, 1956, however, a detailed 
proposal had been made for such an institution during a British parliamentary
141Serial No. 4/57. Minute from Home to Macmillan, 31 January, 1957. PRO 
DO 35/5173.
142Memorandum* Should We Try to Hold a Meeting of Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers in Mid-1957, by AW Snelling, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 
CRO, 18 February, 1957. PRO DO 35/5173.
143Minute from Sir Henry Lintott, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, CRO,to 
Home. 8 February, 1957. PRO DO 35/5173.
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debate on Commonwealth development.144 When the British government polled 
other Commonwealth governments on their attitudes towards the establishment 
of a Commonwealth development agency or bank, it could not even bring itself 
to identify itself with the proposal. Instead the British memorandum merely 
stated that there was considerable interest in Britain for mobilizing more 
resources for Commonwealth development and that one of the proposals before 
ministers was for a Commonwealth development agency or bank.145 Indeed, 
while sympathizing with the motives, it even recommended against it because 
it would not generate any new funds for development purposes.
Not surprisingly, every Commonwealth government rejected the idea for a 
development agency and bank.146 All agreed that it would not produce new 
capital. Furthermore, a development agency like the one proposed would set 
development priorities as well as survey development needs and potential.147 
Centralized policy-making had always been unacceptable to countries like 
Canada and the prospect of having development policy set by an outside body 
now proved no more popular with the newer members. Commonwealth economic 
cooperation was, and would remain, primarily a question ensuring that 
economic policies took due account of other members' interests. Thus, any
new initiatives on the British government's part would have to be confined to
148consultation and perhaps advice. This immediately suggested the CEC, a
144C.(57)129 Commonwealth Economic Development. Note by the Secretary of 
the Cabinet, 29 May, 1957. PRO CAB 129/87.
145United Kingdom Aide Memoire: Commonwealth Development, 5 February, 
1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 485 file 12546-40 part 1. Commonwealth 
Development Agency and Bank.
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consultative body which the British memorandum suggested could undertake some 
of the information functions of a development agency. Therein lay the kernel 
of an idea which was to produce results.
Circulating the idea of the development agency and bank had served the 
domestic purpose of proving it would not work, but the government still 
required a practical proposal that would produce visible results. The search 
for an appropriate idea to present at the CPMM soon merged with the 
activities of the Cabinet Committee on Commonwealth Economic Development that 
had been established before Suez to consider ways to provide adequate 
assistance for African colonies after independence. At the same time that 
Home had promised Macmillan that he would look into the possibilities of 
expanding the CEC's activities to better coordinate Commonwealth development
assistance, this committee was also considering expanding the CEC. Its
149report to Cabinet at the end of May, less than two months before the 
CPMM, recommended expanding the CEC and gave Macmillan the proposal he needed 
without spending money that the British government did not have.150
Preserving the Commonwealth as a link to the developing world was 
important in the evaluation of the numerous options for development 
assistance in the Commonwealth. The British development proposals for the 
CPMM arrived in Ottawa while the government was still considering its BWI aid 
package. There was agreement throughout the Canadian bureaucracy that the 
idea of the development bank was impractical and that British reservations 
were justified. Canada would not, therefore, encourage further exploration
C.(57)129 Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet, 29 May, 1957. Annex: 
Committee on Commonwealth Development: Report on Technical Assistance. PRO 
CAB 129/87.
150C.(57)131 Sterling and Commonwealth Economic Development. Memorandum
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 30 May, 1957. PRO CAB 129/87.
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of the issue.151 Neither was there any inclination to accede to British 
preferences for a Colombo-style plan for the Caribbean as an alternative
expression of Commonwealth solidarity. Nevertheless, officials recognized
152that Canada would have to go beyond "pious expressions of interest.
The Canadian government could not forever talk about being a senior 
Commonwealth member if it were not prepared to take a more active role in
helping newly independent Commonwealth members. This same thinking underlay
153the emerging plan for the BWI and Pearson's support for it. Developing a 
plan for economic assistance, however, was considerably more complex than 
arriving at a position on the development bank idea. The former took an 
entire year, the latter less than three weeks. Nevertheless, even though 
St.Laurent was prepared to give the broad outlines of the Canadian response 
to the development bank idea to Macmillan at their meeting on Bermuda in 
March154, the formal responses to British enquiries on both this and BWI 
development assistance were delivered within one day of each other at the 
beginning of May.155 Neither accepted new Commonwealth institutions, but 
the latter marked a Canadian Commonwealth initiative. The post-Suez 
environment was not one in which negative responses were best sent alone.
AWF Plumptre, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance, to Louis 
Couillard, USSEA, 19 February, 195; Louis Rasminsky, Deputy Governor of the 
Bank of Canada to Couillard, 22 February, 1957; and Frederick Bull, Deputy 
Minister of Trade and Commerce to Couillard, 22 February, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 
86-7/414 vol 12546-40 part 1.
1 Memorandum on Commonwealth Development, 28 February, 1957. PAC RG 25 
ACC 86-7/414 vol 485 file 12546-40 part 1.
153See pages 18-19.
154Brief 31s Proposed Commonwealth Development Agency and Bank, 18 March, 
1957. PAC RG 25 vol 3524 file 19-1-AB-BER-1957/1. Meeting Between Mr.
St.Laurent and Mr. Macmillan in Bermuda on March 25 and 26, 1957.
155Aide Memoire to the United Kingdom Governments Commonwealth 
Development. 1 May, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC86-7/414 vol 485 file 12546-40 part 1. 
and Aide Memoire to the United Kingdom Governments Economic Assistance for 
the West Indies Federation, 2 May, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 box 229 file 
14020-W1-40 part 2.
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It was not only for the sake of maintaining the interest of new and 
potential members in the Commonwealth that the Canadian government sought to 
demonstrate its receptiveness to new Commonwealth developments. The Canadian 
government also wanted to secure the other side of Commonwealth relations, 
Britain. Suez had underscored Britain's special role in the Commonwealth, 
but following so closely on the announcement of Plan G, the evident British 
preference to align with France rather than with Commonwealth members, 
suggested that despite the continuing focus of Commonwealth relations on 
Britain, the British government might be beginning to put less emphasis on 
the Commonwealth than it had in the past. There was no obligation on the 
British government to consult over non-Commonwealth matters such as Suez, but 
Canadian officials felt that the decision at key points not to, suggested a 
new British attitude.156
Even more significant was what to the Canadian government seemed a turn 
to Europe by Britain. The Canadian government anticipated that the result of 
Macmillan's stated intention to review British foreign policy in the light of 
the available political, economic and military resources would be at least a 
partial withdrawal from Britain's global position, with a possible 
consequence being a lower priority for the Commonwealth. Thus, at a time 
when the Commonwealth was headed towards further decolonization and greater 
diversity, but still dependent on links to Britain, Britain seemed less 
willing to play the central role. The result was consideration that Canadian 
interests might best be served by an effort "to revive the attachment of the 
United Kingdom to what were once its colonies and dependencies."157 This 
did not mean abandoning the idea of the Commonwealth as a series of bilateral
156The Present and Future Character of the Commonwealth, 4 June, 1957.
PAC RG 25 vol 3445 file 1-1957/3A.
1S7ibid.
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relationships within a multilateral framework, only re-emphasizing the 
importance of working closely with Britain.
The Commonwealth's importance to Canadian foreign policy remained 
preserving constructive relations between the West and the developing world. 
Working more closely with Britain would not change this. Too great a 
dissolution of links between members had to be avoided for the Commonwealth 
to continue functioning. Canada and Britain, NATO allies as well as 
Commonwealth partners, had a shared interest in this. The events of Suez 
meant that the forces operating within the Commonwealth had to be seriously 
examined. External Affairs even went so far as to take the unusual step, for 
the Canadians anyway, of producing a briefing paper on the Commonwealth's
ICO
future character in preparation for the 1957 CPMM. It foresaw no 
significant development of Commonwealth institutions, merely intensification 
of existing practices to provide further cement to the bridge. On 10 June, 
1957, only days before the meeting, however, the Canadian federal election, 
produced an unanticipated result. John Diefenbaker's Progressive 
Conservatives narrowly defeated St.Laurent's Liberals. Canada's 
representative at the 1957 CPMM would bring a vastly different conception of 
the Commonwealth than that of his predecessor.
158Ibid.
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CHAPTER 4: THE DIEFENBAKER REVOLUTION COMES TO THE COMMONWEALTH
John Diefenbaker's supporters labelled his march to power 'the 
Diefenbaker revolution'. This 'revolution' revitalized a Progressive 
Conservative party mired in opposition and set it on the road to power for 
the first time since 1935.1 He may have swept aside an established 'old 
guard' within the party, but one aspect of traditional Canadian Toryism he 
did not seek to change was the party's devotion to Britain and the Crown. 
Diefenbaker had always had "a deep and abiding emotional attachment to the 
Commonwealth". As prime minister he was determined to redress what he saw 
as the lack of attention paid to the Commonwealth by the Liberal governments 
that had, excepting a interlude between 1930-5, ruled Canada since 1921.
The election, then, foreshadowed a period of intensive Canadian engagement in 
Commonwealth affairs with a strong commitment to Commonwealth cooperation.
The Suez Crisis had been only the latest of a number of occasions over 
the years where the Tories accused the Liberals of seeking to erode ties with 
Britain and the Crown. The Progressive Conservative victory meant that 
Members of Parliament, such as Gordon Churchill, Donald Fleming, Howard 
Green, and Diefenbaker himself, who figured prominently in these attacks on 
the Liberals, became the government.4 It was "a Commonwealth-minded
*See: John Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto, 1962) pp. 18-33.
2
John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John
G. Diefenbaker. The Years of Achievement: 1957-1962. (Toronto: Macmillan, 
1976) p. 187.
3Ibid. p. 197.
4Their cabinet portfolios were respectively: trade and commerce, 
finance, public works and subsequently external affairs, and, of course, 
prime minister.
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government [that] saw the Commonwealth as a balance wheel politically and 
economically in world affairs."5 How far the new government could actually 
pursue its Commonwealth commitment remained to be seen.
Diefenbaker's perceptions of the Commonwealth, like those of his cabinet 
colleagues, had not been shaped with direct experience of the workings of the 
modem Commonwealth. Over the years they had all preached the importance of 
ties with Britain and the Commonwealth, now they had to translate these 
beliefs into policy. One clue as to what the new government might do was the 
fact that since 1955, Diefenbaker had led a personal crusade urging Canada to 
take the lead in calling a Commonwealth economic conference. In this way, he 
hoped that the Commonwealth could act as a counter-weight to Canada's 
economic ties with the United States. This was a well trodden path for 
Canada's Conservatives. The previous Conservative government under the prime 
ministership of RB Bennett had been a moving force behind the 1932 Ottawa 
Imperial Economic Conference which spawned Commonwealth preferences.
How the new government would deal with the new Commonwealth was a 
different matter. One aspect of Diefenbaker's background suggested that he 
might deal very effectively with it. In his career as a defence lawyer in 
his home province of Saskatchewan, he had built an impressive reputation as a 
defender of minorities and as a civil rights advocate. He might, then, prove 
just as sensitive to the needs of new Commonwealth members. At times, 
however, he could sound like the Expanding Commonwealth group of 
parliamentarians that existed on the fringe of Britain's Conservative party.
5Record of Canadian Finance Minister Donald Fleming's Address. F.M.(C)57 
Third Meeting. Meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers. Minutes of a 
Meeting Held on 30 September, 1957. PRO DO 35/5642 Proceedings of 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, 1957. [file 
EC 537/88/16]
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In a speech to the Empire Club of Canada in Toronto in February, 1957, for 
example, he predicted that one day other like-minded middle powers such as 
Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Greece, West Germany and France 
might become members of the Commonwealth.6 Eamscliff and the CRO took note 
of this but like everyone else could only wait and see.
Diefenbaker's views on foreign policy and the Commonwealth were to be 
particularly important because it was an area over which he was to keep a 
tight reign. Prior to becoming prime minister, Diefenbaker had few 
opportunities to amass the wealth of experience of his predecessors at the 
helm of Canadian foreign policy. International affairs had, however, long 
been an area of interest to him. Before becoming leader of the opposition, 
he was the Conservative foreign affairs critic in which capacity he
7
demonstrated strong opinions on most issues. The Commonwealth was central 
to his world view. So too was a commitment to 'freedom' and distrust of the
Soviet Union. His view of the United States, Canada's most important
partner, was mixed. He had great personal respect for President Eisenhower,
but he feared that American domination of the Canadian economy would
eventually lead to American political domination of Canada. One other factor 
that would colour his foreign policy activity was his relationship with the 
DEA and its 'Pearsonalities'.
Reuter teletype, Toronto, 9 February, 1956. PRO DO 35/5012 "The Nature 
of the Commonwealth": Discussions on Commonwealth Expansion (1955-7) [file 
CON 18/4 part A].
7
A good and brief summary of Diefenbaker's views and perspective on 
foreign policy issues as he assumed office is contained in an account of 
Diefenbaker's foreign policy written by Basil Robinson, his External Affairs 
liaison officer - See: Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, pp. 3-9.
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Mr. Diefenbaker Goes to London; The 1957 CPMM
The new prime minister had the opportunity to demonstrate his strong
commitment to the Commonwealth immediately. Days after assuming the
premiership on 21 June, he was on his way to London to attend the CPMM that
Macmillan had planned to affirm the Commonwealth's soundness following Suez.
In Diefenbaker, Macmillan had an enthusiastic partner, perhaps even more
enthusiastic than he wanted. At the new Cabinet's first meeting, Diefenbaker
set out his objectives for the London meetings. His first objective was to
improve Commonwealth relations in general; his second, to increase trade
0
between Commonwealth members. To accomplish these, he wanted the other 
Commonwealth leaders to agree to a Commonwealth conference on trade and 
economic issues. While Diefenbaker was in London, Fleming and Churchill, his 
key economic ministers, met with their officials and those from DEA to find 
ways to achieve this. Officials foresaw many obstacles, but eventually 
developed a strategy to gain acceptance for the idea. The government would 
first invite Commonwealth finance ministers to Canada for their annual autumn
g
meeting in conjunction with the meetings of the World Bank and IMF. The 
idea of a larger conference could be discussed then. When the secretary to 
the cabinet, Robert Bryce, communicated this idea to Diefenbaker, he readily 
agreed.
Diefenbaker raised this idea with Macmillan on 25 June, the day before 
the CPMM formally convened. Macmillan did not raise any objections to the 
principle of holding the regular meeting of finance ministers in Canada. 
However, privately, he was unenthusiastic about Diefenbaker's zeal for
g
PAC RG 2 series A5a, vol 1892, Cabinet Conclusions, 21 June, 1957.
9PAC RG 2 series A5a vol 1892, Cabinet Conclusions, 25 June, 1957.
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Commonwealth meetings and conferences. In his minute to Home describing his 
meeting with Diefenbaker, Macmillan commented that the idea of holding the 
finance ministers' meeting in Canada would "at any rate be less disturbing 
than a Commonwealth Trade Conference of Prime Ministers."10 A larger 
meeting posed several problems, the main ones being that the preparations 
would take a lot of work and there was little prospect that it could meet 
expectations for success. A failed conference would be worse for both 
Diefenbaker and Macmillan than not having tried at all. For Diefenbaker and 
his minority government, it would mean the collapse of a major part of his 
economic and foreign policy. For Macmillan, Britain's bargaining position in 
European trade talks would be weakened if something that could be perceived 
as an alternative revealed itself not to be one and domestic critics of both 
his Commonwealth commitment and European policy would eagerly latch on to it.
When the Commonwealth prime ministers discussed Commonwealth economic 
relations, Diefenbaker's idea of a trade conference was not their primary 
concern. Instead, it was Britain's trade relations with Western Europe and 
the effect of any changes in these on its Commonwealth trading partners.
The other Commonwealth leaders wanted access to British markets for their 
countries' exports ensured. Macmillan wanted to reassure them on this point 
and avoid public criticism of his European policy because such criticism 
could undermine his government's efforts at demonstrating its commitment to 
the Commonwealth. Many of the prime ministers were wary, but Diefenbaker 
came away convinced that Britain needed to secure closer economic ties with
Extract from Minute No. M297/57 from the Prime Minister to the 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 25 June, 1957. PRO DO 35/5638 
General Correspondence Covering IBRD/IMF Meetings in Washington and 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting in Canada, 1957 [file EC 537/88/11].
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Europe and assured that Canadian interests would be safeguarded. In his 
report to Cabinet he observed that:
It was clear that the United Kingdom had to become a member of the 
proposed European Free Trade Area, as otherwise Germany might 
eventually dominate Europe from the economic point of view and 
displace Britain in many of her foreign markets.
He was more concerned that his Commonwealth colleagues' preoccupation with 
Europe placed added obstacles in the way of convening an economic conference 
than that the British plan would harm either Canada or the Commonwealth.
In the absence of any effort by Macmillan at their meeting before the 
CPMM to actually dissuade him from bringing up the idea of a Commonwealth 
economic conference, Diefenbaker had gone right ahead. He raised the subject
at a session attended only by the prime ministers or their deputies with no
12 13secretary or minutes. He found little support for the idea. Menzies
offered support initially, but withdrew it fearing a repetition of the 1932
Ottawa Conference which he felt in the long run had restricted Australia. He
also felt that the best way to increase living standards in the Pacific
region was to increase trade with Japan. Macmillan was the only leader to
offer any support, but only for the 'less bothersome' idea of holding the
finance ministers' meeting in Canada.1* That, at least, offered Diefenbaker
some hope. He came away disappointed but not discouraged. He and his
^PAC RG 2 series A5a vol 1892, Cabinet Conclusions, 6 July, 1957.
12Rumbold to James Thomson, Deputy United Kingdom High Commissioner in 
Canada. 12 July, 1957. PRO DO 35/5638.
13PAC RG 2 series A5a vol 1892, Cabinet Conclusions, 6 July, 1957. 
^Rumbold to Thomson, 12 July, 1957. PRO DO 35/5638.
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government would make every effort to ensure that at the September meeting 
discussions about a larger trade meeting would figure prominently.
There was more than one obstacle to Diefenbaker's cherished Commonwealth 
economic and trade conference. The other leaders' focus on other issues 
reflected the largest: Diefenbaker was out of step with the rest of the
Commonwealth. Some members, Australia, for example, still supported 
centralized Commonwealth machinery to promote Commonwealth political 
cohesion,15 but not the idea of a trade conference. Clearly there were some 
areas where Commonwealth cooperation was more feasible than others. 
Diefenbaker and his ministers had much catching up to do about the nature and 
workings of the modem Commonwealth. His basic perspective on Commonwealth 
relations and their importance to him was epitomized by the fact that he led 
off his report to Cabinet with a description of his audience with the 
Queen.15 He was impressed by the fact that representatives from different 
races could work together, but parts of his report suggested that he had some 
distance to go in coming to grips with the new Commonwealth. He described 
past reluctance to admit non-white members, for example, as "natural enough 
if one considered that a trend of this kind might eventually result in these 
nations having a majority".17 The new Commonwealth would take some getting 
used to, but he and his colleagues remained committed to it.
The Commonwealth leaders had discussed strengthening Commonwealth 
economic links and institutions, but not as Diefenbaker might have wished.
15Inward CRO Telegram 564 from Lord Carrington, United Kingdom High 
Commissioner in Australia, 3 July, 1957. PRO DO 35/5421 Australian Attitudes 
to Commonwealth Consultation and Co-operation, [file CON 344/1]
15PAC RG 2 Series A5a vol 1892, Cabinet Conclusions, 6 July, 1957.
17Ibid.
135
When the British government launched the idea of holding the 1957 meetings,
it expected that British proposals on development assistance would dominate
18the discussions. Britain's limited financial resources quickly ruled this
out, and in its stead the British government presented a more modest, two-
part proposal to develop the CEC. The first part was outlined in a memorandum
circulated to Commonwealth prime ministers at the beginning of the meetings.
It was presented ostensibly as a more practical alternative for furthering
common objectives in economic development than the previously circulated idea
19of a Commonwealth development bank. The memorandum suggested expanding 
some of the CEC's existing activities but the principal elements of this 
aspect of the British proposal were to expand the scope of the CEC's 
information gathering and disseminating activities "so as to better throw
light upon and spread knowledge of economic problems of common interest to
20Commonwealth countries."
The second element of the British CEC proposal addressed its 
institutional structure rather than the substance of its activities. The 
British government suggested having a permanent, full-time, paid, chairman 
for the committee, preferably from another Commonwealth country. This would 
replace the existing practice of rotating the position annually among the
10
Ministerial Committee on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting. 
Minutes of a Meeting Held on 20 June, 1957. PRO CAB 130/129 Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Meeting (June 1957).
19Memorandums The Commonwealth Economic Committee, June 1957. PRO DO 
35/8361 Development of Activities of the Commonwealth Economic Committee 
1957-1958 (file EC 131/6 part A).
^Memorandum from Home to Diefenbaker, 28 June, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86- 
7/160 vol 99 file 8490-40 part 3. Commonwealth Economic Committee: Reports 
and Activities (1953-7).
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21Commonwealth high commissioners who comprised the committee. Having a 
permanent chairman was supposed to make the CEC more effective in two ways. 
First, high commissioners had many other duties so that very often the CEC's 
chairman could not devote much attention to the job. This looked to be a 
growing impediment to the committee's effectiveness as the turn of smaller 
and newer members such as Ceylon, Malaya and Ghana came to take the chair. A 
second factor was that CRO officials hoped that having someone from outside 
Britain at its head would make the CEC seem more of a Commonwealth 
institution and thus more likely to become a focus of activity, especially by 
newer members, than if it were perceived as a British dominated body. This 
would also reduce any negative political repercussions from ending the 
rotation after all the white members had taken a turn chairing the Committee 
when only India of the non-white members had.
The first part of the proposals was mentioned in the final
22communique. The second part was not even in the minutes. Canadian 
officials examining Home's memorandum containing the first part commented: 
"The proposal is rather innocuous and its usefulness questionable. It is 
not, however, objectionable." The United Nations, at Canada's 
instigation, was already preparing reports on what was being done by and for 
countries in the field of development assistance, the Colombo Plan 
Consultative Committee published such information in its annual report and 
the OEEC had done similar work in the past. The principal feature of the
^Serial No. 65/57, Minute from Home to Macmillan, 27 June, 1957. PRO DO 
35/8561. The British representative was a senior CRO official.
92 Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1957. Final Communique", The 
Commonwealth at the Summit, p.56.
23Couillard to Leger, 1 July, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/160 vol 99 file 
8490-40 part 3.
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initiative so far as they could see was that it was a Commonwealth exercise 
which the British government needed and which would make the new Canadian 
government happy without causing too many complications. The second aspect 
would be an even greater demonstration of Commonwealth institution-building, 
but would therefore be more controversial. Unlike the first, it remained a 
matter between the prime ministers themselves pending a decision on expanding 
the CEC. Diefenbaker kept it strictly between prime ministers and did not 
solicit advice from DEA on the issue. It was a relatively small matter, but 
it foreshadowed more serious differences between the prime minister and his 
foreign policy advisors.
Commonwealth Trade: Canada-Britain Trade Initiatives
Diefenbaker's planned initiative on Commonwealth trade had not had the 
impact he had wished, but he inadvertently rectified this with an even more 
dramatic unplanned initiative. At a press conference in Ottawa on 7 July, 
the day after returning from London, Diefenbaker announced the government's 
intention to divert fifteen percent of Canadian imports from the United 
States to Britain. The statement took officials and ministers on both sides 
of the Atlantic completely by surprise. The implications were immense.
Diefenbaker describes it in his memoirs as an effort "to help solve 
Canada's adverse balance of trade with the United States [and that it] served 
to focus the attention of the entire Commonwealth and the world at large on 
Commonwealth questions. It was also a direct challenge to British industry 
and initiative..." [Diefenbaker, One Canada. The Years of Achievement, p. 
197. The general consensus, however, is that, unused to the constraints of 
office, he made the mistake of speaking without thinking. [Robinson, 
Diefenbaker's World, p. 14. and GL Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967? The Years 
of Uncertainty and Innovation. (The Canadian Centenary Series 19) (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1986) p. 44.]
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25It would require diverting over C$600 million of Canadian imports from 
American suppliers to British ones. Because many imports could not be
supplied by British producers, imports of American goods that Britain could
26supply would have to be cut much more than fifteen percent. In the 
process, the value of Canadian imports from Britain would more than 
double.27
Canadian officials quickly convened emergency meetings in Ottawa and 
Washington, where several key officials were attending talks with the 
Americans, to find ways to implement Diefenbaker's offer. They faced no easy 
task. Using tariffs to achieve the objective invited American retaliation. 
Moreover, any solution had to maintain the integrity of GATT trade rules for 
there to be any hope of using GATT to encourage an outward looking European 
trade arrangement. There was also a danger to Canada's economy from blocking 
American imports where American suppliers were the lowest cost producers. In 
areas such as capital goods imports, switching away from low cost American 
suppliers could impair Canadian competitiveness. The Canadian government, 
then, needed a way to accomplish a huge trade diversion which would not 
encourage American protectionists; would be acceptable to Britain; and would 
maintain free choice for Canadian importers.
25The Canadian dollar floated against the American dollar. In the mid- 
and late 1950's the two traded near parity with a slight premium on the 
Canadian dollar which fluctuated between US$1.01 and US$1.05.
26CG Cruickshank, Senior United Kingdom Trade Commissioner in Canada, to
H.Levine, Board of Trade, 10 July, 1957. PRO DO 35/8730 Canadian Proposed 15% 
Diversion of Trade from the United States to the United Kingdom.
[file EC 2632/11/6]
27Figures derived from "Table 5s Summary of the Trade of Canada with 
Commonwealth and Other Countries, Fiscal Years 1886-1921 and Calendar Years 
1926-1968”, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Trade of Canada. Calendar Years 
1966-1968. pp. 26-7.
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Canadian officials considered a number of courses of action, none of 
which seemed promising. These included having the prime minister and cabinet 
ministers take advantage of their prestige and new mandate to launch a 
vigorous programme, in conjunction with partners in the private sector, to 
encourage Canadians to buy from British exporters by reminding them of the 
national interest thereby served. A second possibility for reducing Canadian 
imports from the United States in the face of American agricultural 
protection and planned American increases to tariffs on lead and zinc, and 
possible increases on copper, was to use GATT rules and withdraw equivalent 
tariff concessions on capital goods. But this was contrary to the broader
interests of Canada's economy and so was unappealing. Officials reviewing
28these option were not very happy about Diefenbaker's announcement.
Substantive measures to accomplish the diversion would produce more problems 
than they would solve. Officials' one hope was that once ministers 
understood the implications of what Diefenbaker had said. Cabinet would
settle for an easy package that looked good on paper but meant little in
29practice. In the meantime, Canadian officials presented a helpful face to 
their new boss, but made little secret of their unhappiness to their British 
counterparts. 20
In contrast to the Canadian officials' dismay, the British government 
eagerly examined the possibilities of Diefenbaker's offer. The potential 
opportunities were too great to ignore and any reappraisal of the British
28Telex 1700 from Canadian Embassy in Washington. Couillard, Claude 
Isbister, Assistant Deputy Minister, Trade and Commerce, and AFW Plumptre, 
Assistant Deputy Minister, Finance, to Leger, 8 July, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 90- 
1/008 vol 294 file 50123-B-40 part 1. Commonwealth Trade and Economic 
Conference (1957-8).
29Cruickshank to Levine. 12 July, 1957. PRO DO 35/8730.
^Cruickshank to Levine, 10 July, 1957. PRO DO 35/8730.
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31trade relations with Europe had to consider this offer. If the British 
government failed to act and the proposal died, the blame for its failure 
might fall on the British government. Not only could this damage Anglo- 
Canadian relations, but more importantly, it would mean entering into the
European talks with British advocates of closer Commonwealth ties feeling
32that the government had failed to do everything possible in that area.
Beyond this defensive aspect of the British government's response to 
Diefenbaker's offer, the need to respond quickly was exacerbated by the 
certainty that Canadian officials would be briefing Diefenbaker on the 
difficulties posed by his suggestion.
Like those in Canada, British officials immediately began examining how 
to accomplish the trade diversion. Diefenbaker's advocacy of new 
Commonwealth trade arrangements notwithstanding, British officials felt that 
a bilateral arrangement was more likely to be productive than a broader 
Commonwealth deal. They did not reject the notion of a Commonwealth 
initiative so as to have that to fall back on and to avoid alienating 
Diefenbaker, but they concentrated on developing proposals for increasing 
bilateral trade. Some of these corresponded with those which Canadian 
officials were considering, such as a campaign by the Canadian government to 
encourage private importers to 'buy British', a new government purchasing 
directive in favour of British sources, and the use of tariffs, especially 
through the re-establishment of preferential margins removed in 1947.33
31C.C. (57)50(1). Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 9 July, 1957. 
PRO CAB 128/31 part 2, Cabinet Conclusions.
32. C.(57)164 Anglo-Canadian Trade. Note by the President of the Board of 
Trade, 17 July, 1957. PRO CAB 129/88 Cabinet Memoranda 1957.
33Under the terms of the 1947 Exchange of Letters, Canada and Britain 
renounced their preference agreement, giving each the right to reduce or 
eliminate preferences without consultation. In return, each granted most
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Other ideas went far beyond these to include import licensing and 
quantitative restrictions on American imports.34 The problem with these 
proposals was the anticipated negative American reaction to discriminatory 
actions. To overcome this, the idea of a free trade agreement between Canada
and Britain emerged as the cornerstone of the British response to
Diefenbaker's proposal. This would "make respectable" discrimination against 
the United States by both Canada and Britain. As Britain had almost no 
duties on Canadian imports and Canada had virtually no non-tariff 
restrictions on British imports, what would have to be modified were British 
import restrictions on Canadian goods and Canadian tariffs on British goods. 
The only way for Britain to remove restrictions on Canadian goods while 
maintaining them against other dollar imports and for Canada to avoid 
difficulties with the United States was a free trade area. The question was,
would Diefenbaker accept the idea?
The British government proceeded cautiously. From the outset those 
dealing with the issue made every effort not to place the Canadian prime 
minister in an awkward situation by either appearing too keen or too 
disinterested.36 They knew the difficulties that free trade would pose for
favoured nation (MFN) status to the other. In the late 1950s, about 90% of 
Canadian exports to Britain were primary products, and most (approximately 
55%) entered free of duty from any source. Nevertheless, almost 40% 
continued to enjoy some from of non-contractual preference ranging from less 
than 1% to over 30%. As British exports to Canada were manufactured or semi­
manufactured goods, and these were sectors Canadian governments wished to 
encourage, British goods enjoyed fewer preferences entering Canada. Where 
some margins remained, cost and delivery problems still put British industry 
at a competitive disadvantage to American producers.
34Cruickshank to Levine, 12 July, 1957. PRO DO 35/8730.
35Minute from HE Davies, Assistant Secretary, CRO, to Snelling, 17 July, 
1957. PRO DO 35/8730.
36Outward Telegram 55 from the Board of Trade to United Kingdom High 
Commissioner in Canada, 9 July, 1957. PRO DO 35/8730.
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Diefenbaker, not least because the balance of advantage would tilt heavily 
towards Britain. For these reasons British ministers, more so than 
officials, were at first reluctant to press the free trade idea as they
appreciated the precariousness of a minority government and did not wish to
37do anything to damage Diefenbaker's pro-British government. Eventually
it became clear that nothing short of a free trade agreement would produce
38the target trade diversion. British officials felt that Diefenbaker's 
apprehensions about the level of American investment in Canada could be used 
to overcome some of his expected reservations by offering the prospect of 
more British investment. Even so, it would be a hard sell. A crucial aspect 
of any proposal, however, was that it would have to be launched during 
ministerial discussions. The proposals, if communicated to Canadian
39officials first, would certainly be subject to destructive criticism.
The proposal for a free trade agreement between Canada and Britain was 
first raised with Canadian ministers by Heathcoate Amory, the British 
minister of agriculture, fisheries, and food, in Ottawa on 9 September,
1957. In a meeting with Diefenbaker and Fleming, Amory asked them to 
consider participating in a free trade agreement covering both agricultural 
and industrial products. Diefenbaker's first reaction, after he had 
ascertained that it would not require Canada joining the proposed European 
free trade area, was negative even without official advice. He could see how 
it would benefit British exporters, but did not see what advantage there 
would be for Canadian producers. Diefenbaker said that, under the
37Minute from Gamer to Snelling, 26 July, 1957. PRO DO 35/8730.
38C.(57) 187 Note by Sir Roger Makins, Joint Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, 23 August, 1957. PRO CAB 129/88 Cabinet Memoranda 1957.
39C.C.(57) 62(2) Commonwealth Affairs, 27 August. 1957. PRO CAB 128/31 
part 2. Cabinet Conclusions.
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circumstances, he was prepared to look sympathetically at a proposal where 
the balance of advantage lay with Britain, perhaps to the extent of a 60:40 
ratio, but he did not think that the British proposal offered anything at all 
to Canada. He was also beginning to back away from his fifteen percent offer 
even as a target and wondered how a bilateral agreement between Canada and 
Britain would look in terms of the broader goal of strengthening Commonwealth 
trade generally which he maintained was the context within which he had 
suggested the trade diversion.40 Later in a meeting with Fleming and his 
officials, British officials tried to sweeten the deal by offering to remove 
British quantitative restrictions on Canadian imports even before concluding 
a free trade agreement.41 The realities of office proved stronger than 
ministers' sentimental attachments and the Canadian reaction remained 
negative.
The British proposal was discussed further at bilateral ministerial 
meetings in conjunction with the September finance ministers' meeting. The 
Canadian position remained unchanged, although at one point, Diefenbaker told 
Gamer that were another election to return a Conservative majority, he could
AO
reconsider the idea. Meanwhile, the issue threatened to damage relations 
between Canada and Britain. Diefenbaker had little support for his original 
offer within Cabinet, and ministers feared that the issue might arise in the 
election that could come at any time. Word of the British proposal leaked to
40Plumptre to Taylor, 9 September, 1957. PAC RG 19 vol 4192 file 
8627/C212/U57. Free Trade Areas: Canada-United Kingdom (1957-1961).
41Minutes of a Meeting to Discuss Certain United Kingdom Proposals to 
Increase the Level of Exchanges Between Canada and the United Kingdom, held 
on 9 September, 1957. PAC RG 19 vol 4192 file 8627/C212/U57.
A*)
Gamer to Laithwaite, CRO, 7 October, 1957. Enclosure - Discussions 
between United Kingdom and Canadian Ministers, 3 October, 1957. PRO DO 
35/8731 United Kingdom Proposals for a Free Trade Area with Canada, [file EC 
2632/11/10 part A]
144
the Canadian press, and Fleming, who was unhappy with Diefenbaker's offer, 
publicly discounted the idea. So sensitive were Canadian ministers to their
embarrassing position - having to reconcile their public proclamations
favouring closer Commonwealth ties and less reliance on the United States 
with their party's traditional support for the protection of Canadian 
industry - that at the end of the ministerial trade talks, the communique 
outlined the British proposal but made no mention of any Canadian response. 
Although mindful of the importance of not allowing the trade issue to 
"imperil the fundamental goodwill towards the United Kingdom"43 of the new 
Canadian government because of the possible importance of this in other 
areas, this reticence began to exasperate the British, especially when
Fleming and Churchill denied that there was a formal offer to consider in the
Canadian House of Commons in late October and early December.44
Faced with Canadian refusal to consider free trade, three more limited 
measures would have to accomplish the trade diversion. The Canadian 
government agreed to revise its purchasing policies to encourage more federal 
government purchases from British sources. It also promised to review 
Canadian tariff exemptions for Canadian tourists returning from Britain and 
both governments undertook to arrange visits by high level trade 
delegations.45 The results of all this were rather meager. The most 
significant of these measures was the Canadian undertaking on government
43Dispatch 25 From United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada to 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 18 October, 1957. CRO 
Confidential Print, 8 November, 1957. PRO DO 35/7136 Canada: External Policy 
1957-60. [file WES 177/1/6]
44Minute from Lintott to Laithwait, 31 October, 1957. PRO DO 35/8731; and 
Minute from Rumbold to Lintott, 13 December, 1957, PRO DO 35/8471 
Commonwealth Economic Conference 1958. [file EC 763/2 part A]
45Memorandum: Anglo-Canadian Trade [n.d.], PRO DO 35/8730.
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purchases. These were governed by a 1950 directive giving Canadian producers 
a ten percent preference over those from 'hard' currency countries, that is 
the United States, but on an equal basis with those from 'soft' currency 
countries such as Britain, West Europe and Japan. In August, 1958, Cabinet 
agreed to a new purchasing directive which replaced the 'hard' and 'soft' 
currency distinction with a 'Commonwealth' and 'non-Commonwealth' one. 
Commonwealth producers were put on an equal basis as Canadian producers, all 
others were put at a ten percent discount.46 Shortly afterwards, however, 
this directive had to be suspended because of fears it might jeopardize the 
Canada-US defence production sharing arrangements then being negotiated.47 
The Canadian government did try to increase the number of Canadian tourists 
and students going to Britain and it dutifully dispatched a fifty-eight 
member trade delegation headed by the trade minister, Churchill, in late 
November, 1957. As the trade mission departed, Diefenbaker publicly 
reiterated his goal of a fifteen percent trade diversion, despite having 
backed away from it at the meeting with Amory. He maintained: "I would never 
have enunciated such a principle last July if I had not thought it 
possible.”48 To the relief of Canadian officials and many of Diefenbaker's 
cabinet colleagues, his actions never matched his rhetoric. The domestic 
economic and political ramifications were too great for it to be otherwise. 
Diefenbaker remained committed to the idea of increasing Commonwealth trade 
but the British government would have to make do with whatever resulted from 
the other element of his July trade initiative.
46PAC RG 2 series A5a vol 1899, Cabinet Conclusions, 29 August, 1959.
A7
Memorandum to Cabinet by Minister of Finance. Government Purchasing 
Policy. PAC RG 24 ACC 86-7/414 vol 11 file 10364-40 part 3. United Kingdom - 
Canada Continuing Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.
48Extracts from the Montreal Gazette dated 22 November, 1957.
PRO DO 35/8730.
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The Road to the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference; Getting Agreement
The 1957 CPMM's final communique noted the Canadian government's 
invitation to hold that year's post-IMF/World Bank meeting of Commonwealth 
finance ministers in Canada. The acceptance of this invitation represented 
only a partial success for Diefenbaker. The Commonwealth leaders had not 
agreed that plans for a larger Commonwealth economic conference would be 
developed there, only that the concept of such a conference would be 
discussed. Getting agreement for the larger meeting remained a key part of 
the new government's trade agenda. As far as Diefenbaker and his colleagues 
were concerned, the purpose of the finance minister's meeting, scheduled for 
the end of September at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, was to gain this agreement.
The Commonwealth trade conference was an article of faith for the new 
Canadian government and had formed part of the Progressive Conservative 
party's election platform. Although Cabinet knew that it wanted a trade 
conference and knew what the conference was supposed to accomplish, it was 
unclear as to how this was to be accomplished. The discussions within the 
Canadian government and between the British and Canadian governments 
resulting from Diefenbaker's offer demonstrated that the new Canadian 
government was just as committed to the principles of GATT and non­
discrimination in trade as was its predecessor. This limited the scope of 
measures that the Canadian government was prepared to contemplate to increase 
the level of intra-Commonwealth trade.
The negative reaction to the idea of an economic and trade conference 
from Diefenbaker's Commonwealth colleagues, in turn, underscored the limited 
prospects for increasing Commonwealth trade. For the same reasons
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Commonwealth leaders had supported the idea of an outward looking European 
trading system, they would not support an inward looking Commonwealth trading 
system. Diefenbaker's apprehension about high levels of American trade and 
investment as a rationale for the conference was not a convincing argument 
for a trade conference. Most other Commonwealth governments would have been 
happy to have more American trade and investment. The new Canadian 
government, then, faced an up-hill struggle to convince its Commonwealth 
partners of the utility of a Commonwealth conference dedicated to economic 
and trade issues.
In an effort to win other Commonwealth governments' agreement for a
larger trade conference, Fleming circulated a memorandum to Commonwealth
finance ministers on Canadian ideas to increase intra-Commonwealth trade for
discussion at Mont Tremblant. It covered a vast array of topics and included
something for everyone. The memorandum stressed that the Canadian government
did not want to establish a new system of Commonwealth preferences, but
rather, believed "that the expansion of Commonwealth Trade is consistent in
general with the maintenance and improvement of trade between Commonwealth
49countries and other countries", and wanted to increase Commonwealth trade 
by other means. The two important Canadian objectives were given as removing
quantitative restrictions on trade and Britain moving to full convertibility
50of sterling. To assist in these and the general objective of increasing 
Commonwealth trade the memorandum suggested devising government procurement 
policies to encourage bids from other Commonwealth countries, cooperating on 
wider trade questions, and increasing Commonwealth investment. To emphasize
49Memorandum for Discussion by Commonwealth Finance Ministers, 9 August,
1957. PAC RG 2 vol 1891 file C-20-5 Cabinet Documents 1957.
50 Ibid.
148
the Canadian government's commitment to maintaining global trade relations, 
but within a Commonwealth framework, other topics suggested for discussion at 
Mont Tremblant included cooperative approaches to managing relations with 
Europe and the United States, and improved consultative mechanisms to let 
members know what would be said in any bilateral talks with the Americans.
In the area of aid, the memorandum suggested reviewing the Colombo Plan to 
ensure it worked effectively. Another suggestion under the rubric of 
development - that Canadian wheat surpluses be used as assistance under the 
Colombo Plan - had more to do with helping Conservative supporters among 
Canada's wheat farmers than meeting the needs of developing countries. The 
list of possible supplementary topics for discussion at Mont Tremblant 
included improving Commonwealth communications and transportation by 
modernizing cable links and reducing shipping rates between members; 
increasing tourism by increasing travel allowances; the need to negotiate tax 
treaties between members and measures to coordinate Commonwealth gold and 
uranium production. Rather ingenuously, it concluded by observing that many 
of the topics suggested were more suitable for discussion at a larger 
conference at a later date with the upcoming meeting setting the date for 
that conference rather than dealing directly with the issues.
The plethora of topics suggested in the Canadian memorandum could not 
disguise the fact that there was little substance to the proposal. The 
memorandum contained much to talk about, but few concrete measures to 
actually increase intra-Commonwealth trade. This was certainly the opinion 
of the British government. Sir Roger Makins, the joint permanent secretary 
to the Treasury, in a note to Cabinet on the Canadian memorandum observed 
that despite all the topics offered for discussion, or rather because of all 
them, there was not really adequate material for a successful Commonwealth
149
economic conference.51 The Cabinet agreed with this assessment, "experience 
suggested that to be successful, a full-scale Conference of the nature
proposed should concentrate on a single major issue, not the miscellany
52suggested." Nevertheless, the British government did not want to alienate 
the new Canadian government during the bilateral talks following-up 
Diefenbaker's trade diversion offer by rejecting the conference proposal.
There were other reasons for the British government not to block the 
dubious Canadian proposal. A Commonwealth economic conference would provide 
a hedge against the possible failure of the bilateral talks and it would 
serve British interests in European talks by presenting another option.
There were also the same domestic political pressures which had made a quick 
response to Diefenbaker's trade diversion offer important. Furthermore, by 
1958, the European negotiations might have reached a point where a 
Commonwealth meeting was necessary. The British reservations about the 
proposals contained in the Canadian memorandum were not, therefore, 
communicated to the Canadian government, although Canadian officials were 
apprised of them informally.
Despite its reservations, at Mont Tremblant, the British government took 
a positive view of the Canadian proposals for an economic conference. The 
British delegation even had a face-saving idea ready for the Canadians if 
other Commonwealth members did not support the idea. This was a suggestion 
for a meeting of senior officials in 1958 to discuss developments in European
51C.(57) 187 Note by Sir Roger Makins, 23 August, 1957. PRO CAB 129/88 
Cabinet Memoranda 1957.
52C.C.(57) 62(2) Commonwealth Affairs, 27 August, 1957. PRO CAB 128/31 
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trade negotiations. The reluctance to block the Canadian proposal, 
though, did not alter the fact that the British government's main 
objectives - to secure dollar reinforcements for Britain's foreign exchange 
reserves and reductions in Canadian tariffs against imports from Britain54 - 
were purely bilateral. Regardless of the outcome of the conference proposal, 
the British government's preference for, and emphasis on, remained the 
bilateral trade talks.
The stated Canadian objectives for the proposed Commonwealth conference 
as set out in the Canadian memorandum were also essentially bilateral. One 
of them, the convertibility of sterling was explicitly so, and the other, the 
removal of quantitative restrictions, implicitly so. Trade with Britain 
accounted for the preponderance of Canadian trade with Commonwealth 
countries. Notwithstanding Canadian desires for the lifting of restrictions 
on specific products and commodities by other Commonwealth members and 
dependencies, most of the benefits for Canadian producers from lifting 
restrictions would come from increased access to British markets. Even with 
political difficulties associated with the British free trade proposals in 
their original form, bilateral avenues would logically have been the most 
appropriate means to pursue these goals. The government's Commonwealth- 
oriented ideology, Anglo-centric as it was, and its desire to forge tighter 
Commonwealth links, obscured this and so the pursuit of bilateral economic 
objectives was bound up with its Commonwealth euphoria.
53C.(57)200 Proposed Commonwealth Economic Conference. Memorandum by the 
Prime Minister, 9 September, 1957. PRO CAB 129/88 Cabinet Memoranda 1957.
54Minute from Brook to Macmillan, 26 August, 1957. PRO CAB 21/3102.
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In his opening speech at Mont Tremblant, Fleming stated that the 
Canadian government wanted the Commonwealth to change Canada's economic
cc
relationship with the world. Fundamentally, the Canadian government was 
dissatisfied that two thirds of Canada's external trade was with the United 
States and it saw the Commonwealth as the means to balance this. Although 
Diefenbaker's trade diversion offer, unplanned as it was, targeted the one 
market capable of making a significant difference to this, the government 
continued to think in broader terms. Similarly, despite the fact that in 
most economic matters, Britain was Canada's key interlocutor, Diefenbaker and 
Fleming both stressed the importance of increasing Commonwealth consultation. 
They also called for more cooperation to help the Commonwealth's developing 
members. Notwithstanding the fact that it was Canada that they most wanted 
the Commonwealth to help, the prospect of more aid together with the need to 
further discuss Britain's European trade negotiations, meant that the 
Canadian campaign for a larger conference succeeded.
The conference, like the original Canadian memorandum, would attempt to 
cover a great deal of ground. The meeting proposed no fewer than eight main 
areas of discussion for the conference. These included: the significance to 
Commonwealth countries of changes in the world trading system; measures to 
increase Commonwealth trade; progress to freer trade and payments; the state 
of economic growth in less developed members; how to find new sources of 
capital and development assistance for these members; agricultural trade; the 
implications to Commonwealth members of European trade negotiations; and
cc
F.M.(C)57 Third Meeting. Meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers. 
Minutes of a Meeting Held on 30 September, 1957. PRO DO 35/5642. Proceedings 
of Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, 1957 
[file EC 537/88/16].
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arrangements for Commonwealth economic consultation.*6 Whether the 
conference succeeded in meeting the Canadian government's objectives would 
depend on which of these received the greatest emphasis. The answer to this 
would await the arrival of delegates to Montreal, the site selected by the 
Canadian government for the conference. Between September, 195,7 and the 15 
September, 1958, opening of the conference, both the Canadian and British 
governments devoted a great deal of effort to ensuring that what ever 
happened, the conference did not fail.
The Anglo-Canadian Effort to Make the Conference Work
The Canadian and British governments were moving on parallel and largely 
complementary paths. Both had launched Commonwealth initiatives in 1957 for 
domestic political purposes, albeit with different prompting. The British 
proposals at the CPMM for expanding the CEC's role were defensive, motivated 
by a desire to placate restless backbenchers who wanted more visibility for 
the Commonwealth in British policy. The Canadian government's desire for a 
Commonwealth economic conference was a more positive policy objective and 
formed part of the Progressive Conservative Party's platform. The agreement 
to convene the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference (CTEC) was a major, 
if fleeting, success for the Canadian government. Having the conference 
called would count for nothing if it failed. Some of the immediate political 
pressure was removed via the Progressive Conservative's massive election 
victory on 31 March, 1958, which gave them 208 of 265 seats. Pressure from 
the risk of immediate defeat in the House of Commons was now gone, but it was 
replaced by the fact that there was now nothing preventing the decisive
56Meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers, Mont Tremblant, Quebec. 
Communique. PRO DO 35/5642.
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implementation of the government's declared policies. The British government 
also had an important stake in a successful conference for political reasons 
at home and because of the possible effect failure could have on its European 
negotiations. Once the CTEC had been agreed to, then, it was important to 
both the Canadian and British governments that it be perceived as a success.
The most obvious measure of success would be substantive measures to 
increase intra-Commonwealth trade. Failing that, however, there were other 
avenues for success. The two which received the most attention from the 
Canadian and British governments were institution building and development
assistance. Both could increase economic cooperation even if they had only
an indirect impact on trade. But both were, in a sense, admissions of the 
impracticality of the conference's trade objectives.
The British and Canadian governments worked closely, but they did not
work together. Each had its own emphasis which became apparent at the CTEC
preparatory meeting of officials held in London between 11-13 February, 1958. 
There, officials tried to develop a more concrete conference agenda. Part of 
this included allocating responsibility for preparing papers for discussion 
at a second preparatory meeting. The Canadian delegation, notwithstanding 
their dearth of ideas, but reflecting their government's desire for some form 
of trade initiative to come from the Montreal conference sought 
responsibility for the paper on Commonwealth trade. British officials wanted 
to do the paper on Commonwealth consultation.57 The British government was, 
for the most part, satisfied with existing procedures for consultation, but
Minute by AW France, Treasury, 10 February, 1958. PRO CAB 21/3104 
Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, 1958. Preparatory Meetings of 
Officials, [file 9/137/1 part 1]
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this provided an opportunity to formally put forward and elaborate ideas
CQ
already being developed.
(i) Trade Initiatives
In keeping with the government's objectives in calling the CTEC, trade
matters started out as the main Canadian emphasis for the conference. The
Diefenbaker trade diversion offer and the British free trade proposal meant
that Canadian officials were already searching for methods to increase
Commonwealth trade even before Commonwealth finance ministers agreed to hold
the Montreal conference. Try as they might, Canadian officials could not
overcome the conference's lack of economic substance. The proposals they
presented at the CTEC preparatory meetings were neither particularly
impressive nor very different from those already presented to the British
government. They included enacting government purchasing policies giving
Commonwealth producers preferential treatment over other non-domestic
sources; enhancing government trade promotion activities like trade missions,
trade fairs and trade commissions; revising customs procedures to ease
59tourist and business travel; and developing facilities for tourism. The 
paucity of viable measures to increase Commonwealth trade was exemplified by 
the fact that the meager suggestions contained in the Canadian paper prepared 
for the second preparatory meeting emerged basically unchanged and
^Minute from RC Griffiths to Sir D. Rickett, 14 February, 1958.
PRO CAB 21/3104.
53CO(J)(58)25. CETC. Second Preparatory Meeting of Officials.
Commonwealth Trade - Past, Present and Future. Memorandum by the Government 
of Canada, April, 1958. PRO CAB 133/193. CETC. Second Preparatory Meeting of 
Officials. Reports, Proceedings and Memoranda. [C0(J)(58)]
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unaugmented in the final report of Commonwealth officials that served as the 
basis for conference discussions.6®
Canada's primary Commonwealth trade objective was the removal of export 
restrictions. Canadian ministers and officials badgered their British 
counterparts on this up until the conference started, even suggesting 
specific commodities where restrictions could be lifted to maximize the 
benefit to Canada.61 Their ending had been the declaratory policy of the 
Commonwealth as a whole since the 1952 Commonwealth Economic Conference, and 
since then the British government had eliminated restrictions on more than 
half its dollar imports as had Australia, which had recently announced a 
further freeing of ten percent of its imports to dollar area suppliers. The 
issue, however, underscored the difficulty of finding effective means 
specifically to develop intra-Commonwealth trade. This important Canadian 
objective was seen by proponents of closer Commonwealth trade links 
elsewhere, especially in Britain, as catering mainly to American interests at
CJ
the expense of Commonwealth trade interests.
Conspicuously absent from the Canadian objectives for the CTEC were 
proposals for Commonwealth cooperation to counter American dominance of the 
international trading system. The 1952 economic conference had agreed to
6®Measures to Expand Trade Between Commonwealth Countries. Report by 
Officials, September, 1958. PAC RG 20 series A-3 vol 1942 file 20-118-13C-8 
Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference. Brief for Canadian Delegation.
61Fleming to Amory, 22 August, 1958, appended to GEN 650/36. Ministerial 
Committee on the CTEC. Non-Discrimination: Canadian Finance Minister's Letter 
to Chancellor of the Exchequer. Note by the Secretaries, 29 August, 1958. PRO 
CAB 130/149. Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference (May-October, 1958). 
[file GEN 650]
62Telegram 2121 from George Drew, Canadian High Commissioner in Britain 
to Leger 5 July, 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 90-1/008 vol 294 file 50123-B-40.
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make joint Commonwealth approaches to other governments, especially the 
United States, to press common concerns. In the spring of the 1958, however, 
senior American officials bluntly informed Canadian officials that joint 
Commonwealth action coming from or appearing to come from the CTEC would not 
be appreciated in either Congress or the administration. It would look too 
much like pushing the United States to save sterling from its chronic 
difficulties and the American adminstration was already predisposed to 
assist. A unilateral Canadian approach would be less suspect and even 
helpful because Canadian and American trading interests were so similar. 
Ironically, just when Canada had a government filled with enthusiasm for 
Commonwealth cooperation, an avenue for visibly pursuing this was blocked.
The prospects for the conference succeeding solely on the basis its 
trade outcomes were not promising. This reflected the Commonwealth's, and 
thus the conference's, rather nebulous economic foundation. The report of 
the June preparatory meeting of officials, which was to serve as conference's 
main document, stated:
The principal economic objective of the Commonwealth is easy to 
identify and simple to state. It is to foster economic expansion 
throughout the Commonwealth... This can only come about in an 
expanding world economy and only if sterling, which is the currency 
in which the greater part of Commonwealth trade is conducted, is 
strong. From these conditions it follows that Commonwealth 
countries must be concerned not only with their own development, 
trade and currencies but also to encourage expansion of trade 
throughout the world, to reduce trade barriers and to promote a 
continued strengthening of sterling.
^Memorandum from Rasminsky, to Fleming, 23 May, 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 90- 
1/008 vol 294 file 50123-B-40 part 4.
64Report of the Preparatory Meeting of Officials, June 1958.
PRO CAB 21/3105.
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The difficulty, assuming that reducing trade barriers and strengthening 
sterling were always compatible, was identifying means, agreeable to all, by 
which Commonwealth members could do this. No one had been able to come up 
with much to supplement the Canadian trade proposals at the preparatory 
meetings. All generally subscribed to the idea of free multilateral trade 
and none were advocating the establishment of a discriminatory Commonwealth 
bloc. Indeed, the remnants of the 1932 Ottawa Agreements were fast crumbling 
as even Australia and New Zealand had shown desires to reduce or eliminate 
British preferences. As a gesture to the Canadian emphasis on non­
discrimination and convertibility, just before the CTEC the British decided 
to announce a planned reduction in import restrictions on dollar area 
machinery at the Montreal conference.66 Because of the Canadian 
government's reluctance to make any concessions to Britain, even to advance 
Diefenbaker's own trade diversion offer, there was no inclination to go 
beyond this.66 The European trade negotiations could be relied upon to 
generate some economic discussions, but there was little of substance other 
than the development needs which the Commonwealth's newer members would 
press. The British government most emphatically did not want development to 
be the dominating theme at Montreal.67 That would entail requests for money 
which the British government did not have, leaving open the possibility of no 
positive results for the conference. The problem that British officials had 
identified in the initial Canadian memorandum before Mont Tremblant
65C.(58)178 Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Report by the 
Ministerial Committee on the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, 5 
September, 1958. PRO CAB 129/94 Cabinet Memoranda 1958.
66GEN 650/36. Ministerial Committee on the CTEC. Non-Discrimination: 
Canadian Finance Minister's Letter to Chancellor of the Exchequer. Note by 
the Secretaries, 29 August, 1958. PRO CAB 130/149.
67C.(58)178 Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Report by the 
Ministerial Committee on the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, 5 
September, 1958. PRO CAB 129/94 Cabinet Memoranda 1958.
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remained - the agenda of the conference offered little scope for major 
innovations in Commonwealth economic relations.
Like their British counterparts, Canadian officials harboured grave
go
doubts in this regard. The Canadian ministerial committee preparing for 
the Montreal conference also bemoaned the failure of other Commonwealth 
members besides Canada to come up with ideas to increase trade. In the final 
week before the conference convened Cabinet considered and quickly discarded 
radical measures to generate increased Commonwealth trade such as restoring 
preferences - impossible under GATT - and forging a trade agreement with the
eg
British West Indies - too dangerous because immigration might follow.
Canadian ministers had to admit that, on the trade side, the prospects for 
the conference were depressing. There were some possible areas of progress 
such as a report from the Commonwealth Telecommunications Board on a round- 
the-world Commonwealth telephone cable, but in the absence of any major 
economic initiatives, much would depend on British proposals for consultative 
machinery and a series of mostly Canadian aid proposals.
(ii) Institutions for Cooperation and Consultation
At Mont Tremblant, the finance ministers had agreed that Commonwealth 
consultative machinery needed improvement. This meshed well with the need to 
ensure a successful outcome of the CTEC. Finding effective economic measures 
proved elusive but creating new institutions or reforming old ones would be 
visible accomplishments. As a result, in the lead-up to the Montreal
go
Gamer to Laithwaite, 29 September, 1958. PRO CAB 21/3103 Commonwealth 
Trade and Economic Conference, 1958. [file 9/137]
gg
PAC RG 2 series A5a vol 1899, Cabinet Conclusions, 7 September, 1958.
159
conference, Canadian officials, propelled by political necessity, submerged 
their traditional skepticism about Commonwealth institutions and joined with 
their ministers and British counterparts in generating a flurry of proposals 
to develop and use Commonwealth institutions.
To prepare for the CTEC, the Mont Tremblant meeting had ordered a review 
of Commonwealth economic bodies. Quite separately the CEC was embarking on a 
review as a result of the public undertakings of the 1957 CPMM and this, at 
Canadian insistence, was eventually incorporated into the CTEC process 
thereby increasing the number of possible successful outcomes. The most 
conspicuous institutional initiatives, however, came from British proposals. 
These reflected a combination of British domestic political requirements, the 
related need for a successful CTEC, and even substantive policy objectives. 
Canadian support for them reflected the Diefenbaker government's activist 
attitude towards the Commonwealth, but was mostly a result of wanting 
something to show for the CTEC. The result was, like the trade initiatives, 
a great deal of smoke and mirrors, but little that was actually new.
The first British idea to improve consultation was not for a new 
institution but to formalize existing practices. Meetings between senior 
Commonwealth officials had grown more frequent since the last Commonwealth 
Economic Conference in 1952. Annual meetings of finance ministers, with 
associated meetings of officials some months before, had taken place each 
autumn since 1954. The British government now sought to institute regular 
meetings of senior Commonwealth officials concerned with economic questions 
in the spring. Existing consultative institutions such as the CLC and the 
CEC relied on personnel from Commonwealth high commissions in London. The 
British were concerned that the unevenness of representation among the high
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commissions, especially from the newer members, meant that discussions were
in
not as productive as they might otherwise be. Issues of great importance 
to Britain, such as the maintenance of sterling balance levels, were best 
considered by senior officials from the various capitals. Having meetings 
regularly instead of calling them on an ad hoc basis would avoid giving cause 
for speculation about an impending sterling crisis whenever the meetings were 
announced. It was a limited, but probably achievable, objective.
In the spring of 1958, a Malayan paper further spurred discussions on 
Commonwealth economic consultation and cooperation. This paper contained 
several ambitious institutional suggestions.71 It resurrected the idea of a 
Commonwealth development bank, but conceded that it might not be feasible.
It did, however, advocate closer economic cooperation to help less developed 
members. Since finance ministers could not be expected to meet more than 
once a year, the Malayan paper suggested, like the British, instituting 
regular meetings of senior officials. To make these meetings more effective 
it proposed joint preparation via a Commonwealth economic secretariat 
controlled by Commonwealth governments through a standing Commonwealth 
Council. The secretariat would have no executive functions, but would help 
members whose resources did not allow them to independently monitor matters 
of current interest, especially those affecting sterling. The Malayan 
government had also noticed the unevenness of representation in London and, 
indeed, in the human resources available to newer members. More importantly, 
however, it felt that as a member of the Sterling Area with considerable
70Minute from Simmons to Davies, 12 November 1957. PRO DO 35/8488 
Commonwealth Consultation 1957-9. [file EC 763/645/1]
71CTEC. Paper by the Federation of Malaya. Commonwealth Consultation and 
Co-operation on Economic Matters, [n.d.]. PRO DO 35/8488.
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sterling balances, it ought to be warned in advance of any move which might
72affect their value.
The British government was unwilling to consider anything like the 
Malayan secretariat proposal. There was no question of giving British 
secrets to a body outside of the British government's control and it deciding 
when and to what extent to transmit them to Commonwealth governments. A 
secretariat would not, therefore, have material on which to make independent 
judgements on matters such as the stability of sterling. The British view
was that it would duplicate existing machinery, give British departments
73additional work and confuse lines of communication. British officials, 
though confident that members would reject the Malayan proposals, were 
determined to push their own ideas on consultation.
The second preparatory meeting of officials for the CTEC took place in 
mid-June, 1958, again in London. There, a wide range of views on improving 
Commonwealth consultation was evident. Ghana joined Malaya in supporting the 
idea of a Commonwealth economic secretariat and Commonwealth council. At the 
other extreme. South Africa saw no need for anything new and India was only 
slightly more forthcoming.74 The response to the less radical British idea 
of regular meetings of senior officials was more positive but still
72Commonwealth Consultation. Country Positions. September 1958. PAC RG 
20 series A-3 vol 1942 file 20-118-13C-8. Commonwealth Trade and Economic 
Conference, 1958. Brief for Canadian Delegation.
73Minute from Rumbold to Crawley, 22 May, 1958. PRO DO 35/8488. See 
also: GEN 650/31 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Commonwealth Trade and 
Economic Conference. Commonwealth Economic Consultation, 29 August, 1958. PRO 
CAB 130/149 Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, [file GEN 650]; and 
Brief for the United Kingdom Delegation. Item VIII of the Agenda: Proposals 
for Improving Commonwealth Consultation, September, 1958. PRO DO 35/8488.
74Cabinet Committee on the Commonwealth Conference. Minutes of a Meeting 
Held 9 July, 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 90-1/008 vol 294 file 50123-B-40 part 5.
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unenthusiastic. Indian and South African, and to a lesser extent Pakistani,
representatives were apprehensive that regular meetings with little to do
would gradually extend the scope of their activities. The Ceylonese,
Ghanaian, and Malayan representatives were supportive; the Australian, New
Zealand and Canadian delegations only cautiously so. Before the meeting the
head of the Canadian delegation had told Makins that the Canadians, having
given a great deal of thought to Commonwealth institutions, sympathized with
British objectives, but were not inclined to formalize existing practices
75unless there was a demonstrable advantage in doing so. At the meeting, 
Malayan pressure for even more formal institutions created an incentive to 
accept the less dramatic proposal.
Faced with calls for more institutions on one side and no more on the
other, British officials promoted a compromise which gave the appearance of
greater structure without producing it. The periodic meetings of
Commonwealth finance ministers would itself constitute a 'council' of sorts,
with the name Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council (CECC), and other
Commonwealth economic bodies, including the proposed meetings of senior
76officials would nominally report to this body. British officials realized 
that agreement on regular meetings of officials might not be possible, so the 
council idea, even though not creating new consultative channels, would show 
some progress. Meetings of senior officials could be called under the guise 
of preparing for the ministerial meetings. At a weekend meeting of the
75GEN 630/7th Meeting. United Kingdom Delegation to Preparatory Meetings 
of Officials. Record of Meeting 2 June, 1958. PRO CAB 130/143 Commonwealth 
Trade and Economic Conference. United Kingdom Delegation to the First 
Preparatory Meeting of Officials (February-June, 1958). [file GEN 630]
^GEN 650/16 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Commonwealth Trade and 
Economic Conference. Commonwealth Consultation. 23 July, 1958.
PRO CAB 130/148.
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British cabinet committee at Home's country estate, Domeywood, to review
preparations for the CTEC in late July, 1958, the ministers considered the
77best strategy to gain agreement for the idea. They decided to make 
preliminary approaches to the Canadian and South African governments, to 
ensure the support of the former and in the hope of persuading the latter not 
to actively oppose the idea.
At Domeywood British ministers also accepted an idea to establish a 
Commonwealth centre in London. This would accommodate the various 
Commonwealth institutions and any Commonwealth meetings held in London, and 
provide a visible focus for the Commonwealth without creating new 
institutions. The headquarters idea, however, was purely secondary to 
getting agreement for the CECC. When Makins mentioned the CECC idea to 
Canadian officials in discussions on 1 August he stressed this point. The 
Canadians received both ideas favourably and undertook to bring them to the 
attention of Canadian ministers but thought the ideas needed more elaboration 
before being presented at the CTEC. The headquarters was the perfect 
complement to the other British proposals, such as the CECC, which the 
Canadians supported. Neither government wanted anything ambitious like the 
Malayan proposal. The British proposals, like the CTEC itself, as Amory, now 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, told his cabinet colleagues at the final
cabinet meeting to review British policy on the conference, would be mainly
78 79political and psychological. The "presentational advantages" of
proposals such as the CECC would try to hide their lack of substance.
77Record of an Informal Meeting Held at Domeywood on Saturday, 26 July,
1958. PRO CAB 21/3106.
78C.C.(58)70(3) Commonwealth Affairs: Conference at Montreal - U.K. 
Policy, 8 September, 1958. PRO CAB 128/32 part 2 Cabinet Conclusions.
79 Ibid.
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(iii) Development Assistance Initiatives
Soon after the Mont Tremblant meetings, DEA officials identified one 
area where Canadian initiatives could make an impact. Both Diefenbaker and 
Fleming had made strong statements there about the importance of providing 
assistance for the Commonwealth's developing members. Aid proposals had the 
added advantage that they could be justified by more than merely reference to
the CTEC but as part of a coherent external policy for combatting communism
80and contributing to political and economic stability in Asia and Africa.
Officials, therefore, compiled a review of Canadian assistance programmes for
01
the newly installed SSEA, Sidney Smith. It showed that Canadian aid 
programmes were overwhelmingly concentrated on Commonwealth recipients. In 
1957, Canada contributed US$2 million to United Nations technical assistance 
programmes compared with C$34 million to Commonwealth countries, most of it 
through the Colombo Plan. There were also plans underway to extend new 
assistance programmes to the BWI and Ghana. The Liberal government had 
fallen before final approval had been granted to these so they could serve as 
'new' proposals for the CTEC. As bilateral programmes, they would maximize 
goodwill for Canada and strengthen economic links between the recipients and 
Canada while at the same time indirectly fostering goodwill for the 
Commonwealth. They were, in other words, ideal vehicles for promoting 
Western interests through the Commonwealth in a way which would assist in 
drawing on Commonwealth relationships by Canadian diplomats elsewhere, while
80Memorandum to Cabinet: Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, 4 
September, 1958. PAC RG 2 vol 2741 file C-20-5 Cabinet Documents 1958.
81Draft Memorandum for the Minister. Commonwealth Economic Aid, 19 
December, 1957. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 539 file 14020-W1-40 part 3. 
Canadian Foreign Aid to Other Countries - West Indies (1957-8).
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at the same time giving some prospect of economic benefit for both Canada and 
the recipients.
Because the aid plans were already developed, speedy Cabinet approval
82was easy. Smith presented them to Cabinet in January, 1958, and by the
beginning of March the largest single element in the package, the ship worth
83C$2.5 million for the BWI had been approved. Diefenbaker announced this 
in the House of Commons on 10 March, 1958, as an indication of Canada's 
commitment to Commonwealth development before the CTEC. The BWI programme 
was just one part of a three-pronged Canadian aid package for the Montreal 
meeting in place as the May, as the second preparatory meeting of officials 
approached.84 Canadian ministers would also announce increased 
contributions to the Colombo Plan and the extension of aid to other 
developing members not included in the first two elements.
Officials at DEA had also reviewed the idea of a Commonwealth 
development bank which the Malayan paper had recently resurrected. The 
Canadian objections articulated in the spring of 1957 had not changed, nor 
had their preference for bilateral aid. Accordingly they advised the 
minister that agreement was unlikely so Canada need not support the idea, 
although they would monitor developments. Smith concurred with this 
assessment but as it turned out, the idea was far from dead.
82Memorandum to Cabinet by the SSEA, Interim Arrangements for Technical 
Assistance for the West Indies and Ghana, 16 January, 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 86- 
7/414 vol 529 file 14020-W1-40 part 3.
83PAC RG 2 series A5a vol 1892 Cabinet Conclusions, 4 March, 1958.
84Sidney Smith. SSEA to Fleming, 21 May. 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 90-1/008 vol 
294 file 50123-B-40 part 4.
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For the Macmillan government, the Malayan suggestion was rather 
fortuitous. The British government was wrestling with the problem of its 
role in Commonwealth development. In view of Commonwealth governments' 
previous rejection of the idea of a Commonwealth development bank, the 
British government had identified the Colonial Development Finance 
Corporation, a quasi-public British body, as the best means to meet 
continuing British obligations to former dependencies under the new name
OC
Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation (CDFC). The problem was 
getting sufficient funds for the endeavour. A British ministerial committee 
studying the issue had arrived at two possible schemes. The first was to 
refloat the idea of a Commonwealth development bank capitalized through
OC
subscriptions from Commonwealth governments. The other was for the CDFC
to receive an injection of British government funds with other Commonwealth
87governments, particularly the Canadian government, approached as well.
Most of the members of the committee felt that the bank idea would require 
more funds from Britain, but was more likely to appeal to Commonwealth 
members. The British government decided to have officials at the second
preparatory meeting sound out the Canadians first, then to offer the idea not
88as a firm proposal but as a topic for discussion. The Malayan paper 
provided a cover under which the topic could be raised without identifying it 
with the British government. The June preparatory meeting dealt with the
85Great Britain. The United Kingdom's Role in Commonwealth Development. 
Cmnd 237. (London: HMSO, July 1957). p. 17.
8GGEN 650/3 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Commonwealth Trade and 
Economic Conference. Commonwealth Development Bank. Memorandum by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 21 May, 1958. PRO CAB 130/148
87GEN 650/5 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Commonwealth Trade and 
Economic Conference. Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation. Memorandum 
by the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, May, 1958. PRO CAB 130/148
88Minute to Prime Minister, Commonwealth Development Bank, May 1958.
PRO CAB 130/148
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concept of a Commonwealth development bank informally in a special group. 
There, the Canadians took a prominent part in raising objections to the
eg
idea. The problem was left open for the politicians to address.
Yet unbeknownst to Canadian officials at the time of the preparatory
meeting, this had already happened. While visiting Ottawa earlier that June,
90Macmillan had raised the subject with Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker, once 
again out of step with both is officials and his ministers, had agreed on the 
desirability of some form of Commonwealth financial institution. The general 
attitude in the Commonwealth remained that a Commonwealth development bank 
served no useful purpose, but the British government followed-up 
Diefenbaker's positive response to the idea of a financial institution like a 
bank by suggesting that Canada help fund an expanded CDFC. The Canadian 
ministerial committee preparing for the CTEC noted both officials' 
reservations about a Commonwealth financial institution and the prime 
minister's enthusiasm for one. Officials warned that splitting Canadian 
contributions between a joint fund and the other initiatives would make each
portion appear small. This struck a chord among ministers who appreciated
91the publicity value of aid expenditures. Revamping the CDFC was even less 
enthusiastically than creating a new joint institution. The CDFC was not 
really an aid agency. Its loans were on a commercial basis and thus for 
projects which could presumably raise funds on the open market. As an 
alternative to the expected British proposal for some form of Commonwealth
89Aide Memoire: Commonwealth Officials Conference. Note by the Chairman 
Sir Roger Makins, 23 June, 1958. PRO CAB 21/3105.
90GEN 630/18th Meeting. United Kingdom Delegation to Preparatory Meeting 
of Officials. Record of Meeting Held 17 June, 1958. PRO CAB 130/143.
91Cabinet Committee on the Commonwealth Conference. Minutes of Meeting 28 
July, 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 90-1/008 vol 294 file 50123-B-40 part 5.
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financial institution, the Canadian ministers considered the idea of a 'soft' 
loan fund on the same lines as a contemporaneous American proposal for an 
International Development Association (IDA) associated with the World Bank. 
The fund would make loans, repayable in local currency, on easy terms 
approaching those of a grant. It would require annual contributions from
donors but would not compete with the World Bank, reducing the danger of that
92body withdrawing from Commonwealth countries. Canadian officials explored
this idea with their British counterparts but received no support. Without
British participation, the fund was not viable and Canadian officials did not 
93pursue the matter.
The British proposal, when it did come in August, was to expand the CDFC
through capital subscriptions from either Commonwealth governments or central
banks. Diefenbaker was extremely disappointed by this apparent British
change of heart over a Commonwealth development bank despite Fleming's
94efforts to explain the difficulties of such a proposal. Cabinet rejected 
Canadian participation in the CDFC scheme but remained open to the slim hope 
of a Commonwealth development fund. The ministers, despite officials' advice 
officials, were prepared to divert the proposed increase in the Canadian 
contribution to the Colombo Plan to a Commonwealth development institution 
should other governments agree. In the absence of this, there were the other
92Memorandum: Canadian Aid to Commonwealth Countries. Proposals for 
Montreal Conference, July, 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 90-1/008 vol 294 file 50123-B- 
40 part 5.
93Brief prepared by the Department of Finance for the Canadian Delegation 
to the Canada-U.K. Continuing Committee, Ottawa, 2-3 July, 1959. Item 5: 
Overseas Investment and Aid. Commonwealth Development Advisory Group, 26 
June. 1959. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 485 file 12546-40 part 1. Commonwealth 
Development Agency and Bank.
54PAC RG 2 series A5a vol 1899, Cabinet Conclusions, 7 September, 1958.
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Canadian aid initiatives and a planned Canadian increased contributions to
qc
the World Bank and IMF which could be announced.
The month before the CTEC, a scholarship scheme, to be proposed jointly 
with Britain, joined the list of Canadian aid proposals. At the Domeywood 
meeting which adopted the CECC idea, there was also a report advocating 
positioning Britain as a centre for scientific and technical training for
qc
Commonwealth students. This reflected ideas emanating from a recently 
concluded study97 on Britain's future in world affairs prepared in the 
Foreign Office, the CRO and the Treasury. The CRO emphasized the importance 
of maintaining Commonwealth cohesion throughout this exercise, and one 
relatively inexpensive method they had identified for doing so was by
promoting educational, cultural and scientific exchanges and encouraging the
98continued use of English in former British dependencies. As part of
this, ministers agreed that at Montreal Britain propose a Commonwealth
99education conference. As Britain already made substantial contributions 
to the training and education of Commonwealth students, the initiative was 
able to draw attention to this, thereby reducing the need for additional
98Memorandum to Cabinet: Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, 4 
September, 1958. PAC RG 2 vol 2741 file C-20-5 Cabinet Documents 1958.
9GGEN 650/10 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Commonwealth Trade and 
Economic Conference. The United Kingdom as a Training Centre for Commonwealth 
and Overseas Students, 23 July, 1958. PRO CAB 130/148.
97The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs. Report by 
Officials, July 1958. PRO CAB 130/153 The Position of the United Kingdom in 
World Affairs, [file GEN 659]
98ZP 9/9/G Future Policy. Brief for a meeting on February 4, 3 February, 
1958. PRO FO 371/135625 Future of the United Kingdom in World Affairs.
99Record of an Informal Meeting Held at Domeywood on Saturday, 26 July, 
1958. PRO CAB 21/3106.
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expenditure. Like the CECC, the education proposals would neatly re-wrap the 
old with the new to produce a greater impact for little effort.
The Canadians responded to the British education proposal with one of 
their own. On 25 August, Canada House passed the CRO a telegram advising the 
British that the Canadian government wanted to propose a scholarship and 
fellowship programme.100 In view of the British government's own education 
proposals, the Canadian government suggested they co-sponsor the scholarship 
scheme. This idea had the merits of contributing to continuing Commonwealth 
cohesion via shared educational experiences and assisting in economic 
development while at the same time making use of surplus educational 
opportunities in Canada which were more easily made available than surplus 
capital.101 Thus, the crowning touch on Anglo-Canadian cooperation at 
Montreal would be a joint proposal.
The package of aid proposals which the Canadian government had devised 
for the CTEC meant that there was now substantial 'progress' possible at the 
conference. Together with the anticipated British proposals on consultation,
which the Canadian delegation would support in preference to the more
102elaborate Malayan alternative, and the recommendations on the CEC, there 
would be much coming out of the Montreal conference, but very little to do 
with trade.
100Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Commonwealth Trade and Economic 
Conference. Training of Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 4 
September, 1958. Annex A: Telegram from DEA to Canadian High Commission in 
Britain, 21 August, 1958. PRO CAB 130/149.
10Special Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on External Aid 
Policy. Minutes, 17 April, 1959. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/360 vol 27 file 8260-13- 
40 par 1. Commonwealth Scholarship Programme.
102Commonwealth Consultation. Canadian Position. September, 1958. PAC RG 
20 Series A-3 vol 1942 file 20-118-13C-8.
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The Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference and its Results
The CTEC met in Montreal for two weeks at the end of September, 1958. 
Forebodings about its economic and trade results proved accurate. The 
conference's theme of an expanding Commonwealth in an expanding world, taken 
from the report of officials, recognized that members' economic growth 
largely depended on factors outside the Commonwealth. The small advances in 
some areas did little to justify a trade conference. The Canadian proposals 
on trade promotion and government procurement were accepted, but for the most 
part, the discussion simply reviewed current economic conditions. British 
representatives reviewed the progress of the European negotiations for other 
members and all concerned reiterated the need for ongoing consultation on the 
subject. The Canadian and British governments announced their intentions to 
maintain current preferences, the Canadians for British goods and Australian 
and New Zealand lamb, and the British for nearly all Commonwealth goods. As 
well, several countries undertook to review mutual trading agreements. 
Australia, which had recently reviewed its agreements with Britain, Ceylon 
and Malaya, agreed with Canada to review their agreement, and began talks to 
this end with New Zealand and some of the dependent territories. New Zealand 
and Britain informed the conference of the review of their agreement.
Canadian representatives had preliminary discussions with British and West 
Indian representatives over a freer trade agreement with the BWI, but wanted 
to wait for progress towards a customs union in the Federation of the West 
Indies before proceeding. Canada also agreed to begin preliminary talks with 
India and Pakistan towards reciprocal agreements on avoiding double taxation. 
On the big issue as the Canadian government saw things, most of CTEC 
participants insisted that they still required import restrictions and dollar 
area discrimination to protect their balance of payments. The one bright
172
spot was the announcement by Sir David Eccles, the President of the Board of
Trade, of Britain's intention to free additional imports from restrictions.
While short of Canadian demands, Gamer could report afterwards that Fleming
and Diefenbaker seized it gratefully as proof of the conference's 
103success.
The conference's real successes came in areas other than trade. The 
delegates "agreed that development [was] vital not only to the economic 
expansion of the Commonwealth but to the whole structure of relationships 
within the Commonwealth."104 Development was also vital to providing the 
Commonwealth with visible signs of a successful conference. The topic of 
Commonwealth financial institutions met with no more success than in the 
past. No one denied that the idea of a Commonwealth development bank was 
attractive in principle, but the same practical problems remained. Rather 
than dismiss the idea entirely, however, delegates agreed that it should be 
studied further at a meeting of senior officials in May, 1959. Britain 
announced the availability of loan facilities through both the government and 
the CDFC, but only India, South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland indicated any willingness to participate in the British proposal 
for the CDFC.
The big successes, however, came with the Canadian proposals. These 
were unveiled by Fleming on 22 September, in the wake of the delegates'
103Gamer to Laithwaite, 29 September, 1958. PRO CAB 21/3103.
104Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference. Report of the Conference. 
Cmnd 539. (London: HMSO, October, 1958) p. 12.
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decision to defer consideration of a Commonwealth development bank.105 
Fleming acknowledged the difficulties of creating a development bank but 
recalled Diefenbaker's desire that the conference should nevertheless try to 
encourage development. To that end the Canadian government, proceeding 
bilaterally pending the final decision on a bank, would increase the Canadian 
contribution to the World Bank by C$325 million and double its IMF quota to 
C$300 million. He also announced that the Canadian government would allocate 
an initial sum of C$500,000 to African aid, ask Parliament to raise Canada's 
Colombo Plan contributions by half in the coming three years from a planned 
C$35 million to C$50 million and extend C$10 million over five years to the 
BWI. Notwithstanding the fact that the Canadian government would now require 
Colombo Plan recipients to take one quarter of the Canadian contribution in 
the form of wheat so as to help prairie wheat farmers market their surplus 
production, the Canadian assistance package was a tremendous lift to the 
conference.
The British and Canadian proposals on education constituted other 
significant development initiatives. In his address on Canadian aid, Fleming 
announced that the Canadian government would underwrite one quarter of the 
new Commonwealth scholarship scheme (worth approximately C$1 million). The 
British government undertook to cover half of it and to host a Commonwealth 
meeting on education the following year. This meeting would formulate the 
details of the Commonwealth scholarship and fellowship programmes as well as 
review existing arrangements for cooperation between Commonwealth countries 
in education and make recommendations for improving or expanding them.
Telegram from the Canadian Delegation to the Commonwealth Trade and 
Economic Conference to the Department of External Affairs, 22 September, 
1956. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 486 file 12546-40 part 1.
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The other British initiatives also met with approval. The conference 
adopted the report of officials on economic consultation including suggestion 
for creating a Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council. As British 
officials had anticipated, the suggestion for regular meetings of senior 
officials did not gain agreement for anything more than the principle of 
holding meetings of senior officials to prepare for the ministerial meetings. 
The conference adopted the report of the CEC on the British inspired 
expansion of its activities and accepted the British offer to provide a 
Commonwealth House in London for Commonwealth meetings and to house 
Commonwealth bodies. To this modest list of accomplishments promoting 
Commonwealth cooperation could be added the conference's approval of the 
recommendations of the 1958 Commonwealth Telecommunications Conference. This 
called for a modernization of existing communications links through the 
construction of a new round-the-world telephone cable system. That such an 
ancillary development constituted a noteworthy accomplishment of an economic 
and trade conference further testified to the paucity of substantive measures 
in the areas which were to have been the conference's main focus.
Perhaps the most astonishing outcome of the Montreal CTEC was that in 
the end, it was deemed an "outstanding success"106. It was, however, "a 
success more in terms of the general atmosphere and of the formulation of an 
attitude of mind than in any striking practical results achieved."107 The 
painstaking Canadian and British efforts beforehand had provided enough 
positive visible accomplishments to overcome the lack of economic substance. 
At the conference itself, Canadian ministers, especially Fleming, went to 
great lengths to ensure that any positive aspect was played up and developed.
106Gamer to Laithwaite, 29 September, 1958. PRO CAB 21/3103.
107Ibid.
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The British statement on the relaxation of dollar discrimination in some 
areas did not come anywhere near Canadian demands in this area, but both 
Diefenbaker and Fleming, for domestic political purposes, made the most of 
it. Notwithstanding any other developments, this help to ensure that 
Canadian political objectives were met. When Diefenbaker spoke to the 
Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association in London at the beginning of 
November, he identified trade as the area where the conference had its
greatest successes and highlighted the progress towards freer trade and
108payments contained in the British announcements.
For the British government, the efforts of British officials before the 
conference and especially the political importance to the Canadian government 
of the British announcement on import restrictions had added benefits beyond 
ensuring that the conference did not fail. In his immediate assessment 
following the end of the conference. Gamer observed that "one of the most
significant results of the Conference is that it has substantially sweetened
109Anglo-Canadian relations.” How this would translate into new co­
operation between the British and Canadian governments remained to be seen.
Certainly the improved Anglo-Canadian relationship had no affect over 
the next year in areas such as the Canadian government's receptiveness to 
British proposals with respect to either the CDFC or Anglo-Canadian free 
trade. At the end of October and early November, 1958, the British 
government again approached the Canadian government to enquire if, in the
1Q8John G. Diefenbaker, "Canada and the Commonwealth". Excerpts from a 
Speech to the Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association at the Royal 
Albert Hall in London, on November 4, 1958. Statements and Speeches 58/44. 
(Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1958). p. 5.
109 Ibid.
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wake of the Montreal conference, it would be willing to join other 
Commonwealth members which had indicated a willingness to contribute to the 
CDFC.110 The Canadian government once more declined. The Canadian 
government promised that the Canadian representative on the World Bank's 
Executive Board would take a sympathetic attitude towards any request from 
the CDFC for a line of credit, but that was all.111 The British government
raised the issue again several times over the next year and each time the
112Canadian government declined to participate.
In the related issue of a Commonwealth development bank, Diefenbaker's 
lingering support for the idea did not stop Cabinet from supporting the 
American idea for the creation of an International Development Association 
(IDA) alongside the World Bank. The Canadian government had no wish to block 
the idea of a Commonwealth bank, but it wanted to delay discussion to await 
the outcome of the IDA proposal.113 Despite this Canadian (and Australian) 
preference for waiting, a meeting of senior Commonwealth officials mandated 
by the Montreal conference to study the bank idea convened in May, 1959, and 
agreed to meet again in July, under the title Commonwealth Development 
Advisory Group, to consider the issue. At that meeting, the idea of a 
Commonwealth development bank was all but buried by talk of the new IDA.
Outward CRO Telegram W.No.475 to Commonwealth High Commissions. 
Commonwealth Development Finance Company, 31 October, 1958. PRO DO 35/8481. 
Report and Follow-up Action on the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference
1958. [file EC 763/39/1]
^Kenneth Goldschlag, Department of External Affairs, to Geoffrey 
Lamarque, First Secretary, United Kingdom High Commission in Canada, 25 
November. 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 485 file 12546-40 part 1.
112PAC RG 2 vol 2745 Cabinet Conclusions, 3 December, 1959.
113Rumbold to Makins, 5 March, 1959. PRO DO 35/8459. Commonwealth 
Consultations Meetings of Senior Officials 1958-1959. [file EC 645/28/1]
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Only Malaya and Ghana supported the idea.114 Finally, the annual meeting of 
Commonwealth finance ministers, now the CECC, met prior to the World Bank/IMF 
meetings and accepted in principle of the IDA over a Commonwealth bank. The 
Commonwealth development bank was now dead. With the Canadian Cabinet's 
acceptance, pending Parliamentary approval, in March, 1960, of Canadian 
membership of the IDA115, any prospect of Canadian participation in the CDFC 
was also dead.
The Canadian government was similarly unforthcoming to British overtures 
on trade matters. The Canadian government never proceeded beyond studying 
the idea of a free trade agreement with the BWI. Even more frustrating for 
the British government, following the Churchill trade mission, no new efforts 
to increase bilateral trade had been forthcoming from the Canadian 
government. The changes in the government's procurement directive announced 
just before the Montreal conference were suspended shortly afterwards for 
reasons associated with defence production arrangements with the United 
States even though the new directive explicitly exempted defence equipment. 
Macmillan raised the subject of defence purchases with Diefenbaker personally 
in early November when the Canadian prime minister visited London as part of 
a tour of European and Commonwealth countries. He suggested eliminating 
American specifications for Canadian defence purchases as a means to increase 
bilateral trade.116 Diefenbaker, basking in the glow of the successful 
Montreal conference and the grateful recipient of the timely British
114PAC RG 2 vol 2745 Cabinet Conclusions, 22 July, 1959.
115PAC RG 2 vol 2746 Cabinet Conclusions, 3 March, 1960.
116Conversation between Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Prime Minister 
Macmillan, 10 Downing Street, London, 3 November, 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 25/2/88
vol 3523 file 12687-M-1-40. Prime Minister's Tour 1958: Discussions with
Foreign and Commonwealth Leaders.
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announcement on easing trade restrictions, politely turned the request
117aside. On the other hand, the Canadian government continued, for the
118time being, its quiet acquiescence to British policy on Europe.
Six months after Gamer's optimistic assessment of the state of Anglo- 
Canadian relations following the CTEC, Canadian hesitancy and foot dragging 
forced him to reconsider. At the beginning of March, he informed Home,
I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that in the foreseeable 
future it would not be wise to pin any hopes on the present 
Diefenbaker administration playing a broad and constructive role in 
our affairs.
After eighteen months in power, including almost a year with its astonishing 
majority, the Diefenbaker government had shown little ability to grasp the 
complexities of dealing with policy in the long term. The Anglo-Canadian 
trade initiative was going no where and even Diefenbaker's fervent attachment 
to the Commonwealth seemed to be abating. Gamer observed that the 
Commonwealth seemed to have lost much of its appeal following Diefenbaker's
Despite charges made against previous Liberal governments by members 
of the Progressive Conservative Party since the end of the Second World War, 
Canadian defence relations with United States consolidated considerably under 
Diefenbaker. Almost immediately after assuming office, Diefenbaker approved 
the North American Air Defence Command Agreement with the United States which 
created a unified command for continental air defence. The Liberals had 
negotiated the treaty but hesitated to finalize it before the election for 
fear of being criticized over it. While the government was new and 
inexperienced at this point, in 1958 it further cemented the institutional 
links in defence through a Joint Ministerial Committee on Defence. Canada was 
also in the process of negotiating, in effect, a free trade area in military 
equipment via the Canada-United States Defence Production Sharing Agreement. 
Most notable, of course, was the cancellation of the 'Arrow' fighter 
programme and concomitant reliance on American made alternatives which 
culminated with Canadian acceptance of American nuclear weapons.
*18See chapter 6.
115Gamer to Home, Dispatch 6, 6 March, 1959. PRO DO 35/10792. Canadian 
Political Scene 1958-9. [file WES 24/1/1]
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tour of it in late 1958. Diefenbaker, although he was never to have a 
good personal rapport with the likes of Nehru that St.Laurent had enjoyed, 
valued personal relationships, so the chance to meet again with Commonwealth 
leaders was very important to him. Overall, however, his tour was something 
of a disillusioning experience. Coming so soon after the announcement of 
huge increases in Canadian aid, he was put off by what he saw as a "gimmie
151
complex’ in most Colombo Plan recipients he visited. His own 
government's exhibited an analogous fixation with its own interests, but the 
realities of the modem Commonwealth were educative in a perturbing way for a 
leader yearning for a golden age that never really existed.
As with his Commonwealth economic goals, Diefenbaker had not thought 
through his objective of how to increase Commonwealth cohesion either. He 
and his Cabinet found themselves balking at following through with 
Commonwealth commitments. The simple matter of announcing details of the new 
Commonwealth House in London sent the government into paroxysms of anxiety 
reminiscent of Mackenzie King. On 11 February, 1959, the British government 
informed other Commonwealth governments that the Queen had offered to make 
available Marlborough House for use as the Commonwealth centre agreed to at 
the CTEC. The British government wished to make an announcement to this 
effect in a week and wanted to coordinate the timing and content of its 
announcement with those which other Commonwealth governments might wish to 
make. Diefenbaker presented the matter to Cabinet for advice on whether he 
should make a similar statement in the Canadian House of Commons. Some
120 Ibid.
For more details on the tour itself see: Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, pp. 
54-83. Diefenbaker also discusses it in One Canada Volume II, of special 
note is his detailed account of conversations with Nehru pp. 104-5.
1?1
PAC RG 2 vol 2744 Cabinet Conclusions, 4 June, 1959.
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ministers agreed that it would be singularly appropriate to acknowledge the 
Queen's generous gift in view of what it might mean for strengthening 
Commonwealth ties. Others felt that the action might be regarded as a move 
towards centralizing the Commonwealth and a reversion to colonialism. It 
would be better, then, not to draw attention to it. The Cabinet, of which
sixteen out of seventeen members present were anglophones, decided against
122making an announcement. The British government announced the 
establishment of a Commonwealth centre; the Canadian government, despite the 
favourable reception it had given the idea before and during the Montreal 
conference, remained quiet.
Soon afterwards, the CECC became an even bigger problem for the Canadian
Cabinet. The Montreal conference had agreed to establish the CECC to
coordinate existing economic consultative machinery, but did not specify
which of the many Commonwealth bodies should be subsumed within the new
framework. In December, 1958, with the British government wanting to
demonstrate the success of its Commonwealth policy in the face of domestic
pressure, the CRO began consulting other Commonwealth governments as to which
121bodies should be included. By April, 1959, there was agreement on: 
meetings of Commonwealth finance ministers, meetings of senior economic 
officials, the CLC, the CEC, and meetings of Commonwealth statisticians to 
review the Sterling Area's balance of payments. Members were still 
considering the inclusion of others, but the British government wanted to 
announce an upcoming meeting of senior economic officials within the context
122PAC RG 2 vol 2744 Cabinet Conclusions, 17 February, 1959.
121Memorandum from the Commonwealth Relations Office: Composition of the 
Commonwealth Economic Council, 10 December, 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/360 vol
29 file 8490-B-40 part 1. Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council.
181
of the CECC.124 It proposed that a public announcement be made to this 
effect on 16 April, 1959, and circulated a draft statement for approval by 
other governments.
On 14 April, Diefenbaker informed Cabinet of the proposed British 
statement on the CECC. Unlike the Marlborough House announcement in 
February, the prime minister, who ordinarily relished publicity, did not come 
to Cabinet thinking about whether he too should make a statement. Instead, 
he proceeded from where the earlier discussion had left off. At a time when 
his public speeches were becoming increasingly critical of the United States, 
he showed astonishing apprehension over being seen as too close to Britain, 
previously held out as a necessary balance to the United States. He told his 
colleagues that he thought many people in Canada would see the statement as 
an effort to centralize the Commonwealth with strong colonial overtones. He 
was convinced that anything giving the appearance of unifying the
Commonwealth would be unacceptable and would weaken rather than strengthen
125Commonwealth ties.
Fleming, who had worked so hard to make the Montreal conference a 
success, disagreed. The finance minister argued that there was no new 
institutional machinery involved in the CECC and that all of the bodies 
concerned would still be purely advisory and consultative. He had seen the
proposed announcement and from his perspective, the substance was
12fisatisfactory, even if the wording was "dull and uninteresting."
1
Commonwealth Economic Consultation. Note by Commonwealth Relations 
Office, 14 April, 1959. PRO DO 35/8448. Commonwealth Economic Consultation, 
[file EC 645/3]
125PAC RG 2 vol 2744. Cabinet Conclusions, 14 April, 1959.
126Ibid.
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Nevertheless, for the second time in little over two months, the staunchly 
pro-Commonwealth, pro-British, Progressive Conservative government yielded to 
fears that it might be perceived as acceding to Commonwealth centralization. 
Cabinet, of which seventeen of twenty members present were anglophone, agreed 
to ask the British government to defer its announcement and asked Fleming to 
re-draft the statement. Mackenzie King's ghost, it seemed, had yet to be 
thoroughly exorcised.
The finance minister duly produced a revised statement acceptable to his 
cabinet colleagues. Canadian officials passed it to Eamscliff for 
consideration by the British and other Commonwealth governments. The revised
Canadian text of the announcement met with approval and so on 21 April, 1959,
127with a week's delay, the birth of the CECC was formally announced. The 
new statement, which also announced the meeting of senior Commonwealth 
economic officials, did not remove anything from the original; it added new 
emphasis. The focus shifted from the launch of a new Commonwealth 
cooperative endeavour to the fact it incorporated existing bodies in a new 
framework rather than creating any new ones. To reinforce this, the
statement stressed that the existing bodies served extremely well and had no
128need to change. Whether or not this was attributable to the redrafting, 
no outcry followed. Pearson, now the Leader of the Opposition, was well 
aware of how Commonwealth consultation worked and in the absence of new 
machinery observed:
127Memorandum from Robertson, USSEA, to Diefenbaker, 21 April, 1959. PAC 
RG 25 ACC 86-7/360 vol 29 file 8490-B-40 part 1.
128Ibid. Attachment: Statement to be Made in the House of Commons on 
April 21: Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council and Meeting of Senior 
Economic Officials.
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I do not think we should attach too great importance to the fact 
that this decision has been taken and has been implemented because 
commonwealth (sic) economic consultation is going on effectively 
now and has been for a good many years.
The government's instinctive recoiling from anything which might be construed 
as subordinating Canada to greater Commonwealth integration, highlighted the 
fact that in many areas there was considerably more continuity with Liberal 
Commonwealth policy than the Progressive Conservatives might have admitted.
After being discreetly understated in the preparations for the CTEC, 
traditional patterns of behaviour re-emerged in Canadian approaches to the 
Commonwealth. This was especially evident in the follow through on the 
Montreal conference's recommendations on education. The Canadian government 
had taken a leading role, along with Britain, in developing the initiatives 
presented to the CTEC. The scholarship proposal in particular had been seen 
as a way to create lasting Commonwealth bonds through pan-Commonwealth 
action; the details as to how it would be implemented, however, had been left 
for future discussion. The meeting at which this was to be done was 
organized by the British government and was convened at Oxford between 15-28 
July, 1959.
The Canadian position on the education conference as drafted by DEA and 
accepted by Cabinet was indistinguishable from what might have come from the 
St.Laurent government. Regarding administrative arrangements for the 
scholarship scheme, DEA envisioned the need for a small secretariat to 
administer the programme in Canada, but assumed that the scheme would operate
129Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (2nd Session, 24th 
Parliament, vol III, April 21, 1959) p. 2878.
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on an essentially bilateral basis.130 That being the case, there was no 
need to establish a central coordinating agency specifically to administer 
the scholarship scheme. As DEA and Cabinet saw things, only minimal 
coordinating functions might be required, such as, putting applicants in 
touch with the various facilities throughout the Commonwealth and keeping 
records of awards made under the programme. If necessary, thought could be 
given to designating an existing body, such as the non-governmental 
Association of Universities of the British Commonwealth (AUBC), to look after 
the arrangements. The Canadian delegation would not, however, go to Oxford 
without something to offer. In the area of teacher training, the Canadian 
delegation would offer to organize teams of teachers to assist teacher 
training institutions and to send Canadian specialists in subjects such as 
mathematics and the sciences to conduct courses for teachers in other 
Commonwealth countries which required assistance.
The Canadian delegation was only partially successful in achieving its 
objectives at Oxford. The recommendations which emerged from discussion 
stated that since the initiatives agreed at Montreal would require the 
expenditure of at least £10 million over the first five years, about half of 
which would be for the scholarship scheme, some form of administrative 
machinery was needed. When it became evident that avoiding machinery was 
impossible, Canadian efforts turned to minimizing it.131 The Canadian 
delegation succeeded in gaining agreement that arrangements for the 
scholarship plan would ordinarily be made through bilateral contacts between
130Memorandum to Cabinet: Commonwealth Scholarship Scheme, 25 March,
1959. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/360 vol 27 file 8260-13-40 part 1. Commonwealth 
Scholarships Program.
131Memorandum from D Hudon, DEA, to Plumptre, 23 November, 1959. PAC RG 
19 vol 4921 file 8265-04. Commonwealth Organizations: Commonwealth Education 
Liaison Unit (1959-66).
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Commonwealth governments or bodies nominated by Commonwealth governments to 
administer the scheme. The AUBC would perform any coordination needed so no 
new organization was needed. Thus, the largest programme considered by the 
conference would be administered autonomously, but the conference also 
considered cooperation in teacher training and technical education. The 
Canadian proposals could operate bilaterally, and an elaborate New Zealand 
proposal for a teacher training organization was rejected. But, outside of 
the Canadian delegation, there was general support for the position that in
other areas discussed at the conference, more institutional machinery was
132required. Accordingly, a new committee would be established, based in 
London and composed of a representative from each Commonwealth member with a 
small secretariat associated with it. This new body would assist, not 
replace, the bilateral contacts favoured by Canadian delegation. The 
scholarships scheme was administered separately, but the AUBC was directed to 
report annually to the new organization on the programme's progress.
The details of the new institutions were not finalized at Oxford. Yet 
another meeting was planned for October in London for this. At this meeting, 
Canada was represented by George Drew, the high commissioner to Britain. The 
former leader of the Progressive Conservative Party was a long-time advocate 
of closer ties with Britain and the Commonwealth whose appointment as high 
commissioner in 1957 was part of the new government's initial outburst of 
Commonwealth enthusiasm. Drew still supported strengthening Commonwealth 
ties and while in Ottawa just prior to the London meeting had discussed the 
course of action to take with Green, now SSEA. Both agreed that the new 
institution needed a clear definition of responsibility and all appropriate
132Commonwealth Education Conference, Report of the Conference. 
(Cmnd 841) (Londons HMSO, August, 1959) p. 13.
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machinery. Canada would have to continue to take the initiative, not only 
because important parts of the new Commonwealth programme in education were
Canadian ideas, but also because the Canadian government wanted as much say
133as possible in how the Canadian contribution would be administered.
Despite Canadian resistance to a new education institution, other 
Commonwealth governments recalled the record of Canadian initiatives in 
education. At the October meeting which finalized the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Education Liaison Committee (CELC) and Commonwealth Education 
Liaison Unit (CELU), the British government suggested that the Canadian 
government nominate a candidate to head the institution. Officials in DEA, 
conscious of Canada's initial resistance to the new institution were not 
inclined to do so,134 but Diefenbaker had no such hesitation. A 
Commonwealth organization possibly being perceived as having control over 
Canadian policy was one thing; a Canadian heading a Commonwealth organization 
was quite another. Acceding to this pressure, officials investigated the 
matter, but found no qualified candidate willing to go to London for the 
specified term and salary.135 The prime minister, however, still extracted 
positive publicity out of the education plan. In the Speech from the Throne 
to open Parliament on 14 January, 1960, the Commonwealth scholarship scheme
133Telegram 3246 from Drew to Robertson, 23 October, 1959. PAC RG 25 ACC 
86-7/414 vol 227 file 14020-C14-6-40 part 1. Commonwealth Education Liaison 
Committee and Commonwealth Education Liaison Unit - Organization and 
Activities.
1Oil
Memorandum from Hudon to Plumptre, 23 November, 1959.
PAC RG 19 vol 4921 file 8265-04.
135Note to file, 26 February, 1960. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 227 file 
14020-C14-6-40 part 1.
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figured prominently as an example of Canadian aid to the under-developed
136members of the Commonwealth.
Diefenbaker did well to take positive publicity where he could from his 
initial spree of Commonwealth activity. The aid programmes were the only 
lasting success to come out of what overall was a failed policy. The 
Progressive Conservative government had come into office in June, 1957, 
resolved to reverse what it saw as its Liberal predecessor's pernicious 
complicity in reducing the Commonwealth's role in the world. But despite its 
determination to effect a fundamental change in Canada's relations with the 
Commonwealth, remarkably little had changed after three years. The Canadian 
government retained a marked preference for working bilaterally within the 
Commonwealth framework, especially in the area of development assistance, and 
a strong resistance to anything hinting of policy coordinating institutions 
or any form of limitation on Canada's and Canadians' freedom of action 
through Commonwealth commitments. The reluctance to really change the 
direction of Canadian trade policy, for example, torpedoed any chance of 
success there. The government could point to some growth in Canada's trade 
with Britain and the fact that between 1958 and 1960 it grew at a slightly 
faster rate than Canada's trade with the United States. Nevertheless, this
did not approach the magnitude desired by the government and did not alter
137the long term trend of Canadian trade patterns. Indeed, other factors 
such as the coincidental relaxation of British exchange controls make it 
difficult to attribute even this small change to the government's policy.
136"Intra-Commonwealth Scholarships: Canadian Idea for Aid Programme," 
The Times. (London) 15 January, 1960.
137See Appendix I "Canadian Trade Patterns".
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The cherished goal of increasing Canada's trade with the Commonwealth and 
reducing economic dependence on the United States had failed completely.
For all practical purposes, Canada was just as reliant on the United 
States as before. Indeed, despite growing friction in Canada-US relations 
from the same sort of erratic behaviour by Diefenbaker which frustrated the 
British government, Canada was even more tightly tied to the United States 
than before. The NORAD agreement, the defence production agreement, and a 
new ministerial defence coordinating committee all testified to Canada's 
growing policy engagement with the United States. Conservative policy had 
set out to reverse this, but it failed.
A variety of factors underlay this failure. The enthusiasm for the 
Commonwealth was not accompanied by a matching effort to think the policy 
through and analyze its implications. Diefenbaker's reckless trade diversion 
offer was just the most blatant example of this. More generally, the 
Commonwealth trade initiative and the appropriate role for the Commonwealth 
in Canadian policy had not been analyzed beyond its normative desirability to 
ministers. Problems arose because the ministers in the new government knew 
that they wanted the Commonwealth to address what they saw as Canada's 
economic problems, but they did not know how it was supposed to accomplish 
this. The package officials patched together in response to Diefenbaker's 
trade diversion offer did not materially differ from the proposals that the 
Canadian government was able to offer at the Montreal conference. Under the 
circumstances, given the Canadian interest in continuing to build the 
international trading system and not antagonize the United States or 
sacrifice Canada's economic development, there was little alternative. 
Fortunately for official sensibilities, the government's ideological drive to
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convene the CTEC, was not enough to overcome these. The government had not 
thought beyond its promise to have a trade conference to thinking about what 
the conference would do. The result was a conference long on trade 
generalities but short on concrete outcomes.
For a 'Commonwealth-minded' government, Diefenbaker and his colleagues 
showed little in the way of Commonwealth vision. The primacy of domestic 
politics which at all times characterized their efforts, even after their 
resounding electoral victory in March, 1958, differed little from other 
Commonwealth governments. Certainly, contemporaneous British initiatives 
were made with an eye to domestic politics. But, in the Canadian 
government's case, its single-minded fixation on, and pursuit of, domestic 
concerns reached the level where it interfered with Commonwealth relations. 
For domestic reasons, the government, overriding official advice and past 
Canadian practice, dragged the entire Commonwealth to a trade and economic 
conference. Having done so, it failed to present any bold trade measures 
there because to do so would have seriously risked damaging the Canadian 
economy. So too, any hope that something positive could have been salvaged 
from the British trade initiatives, such as a limited trade deal with 
Britain, was dashed by the Canadian government's anxieties over possible 
domestic reaction. Consequently, the only outcome of a process which risked 
antagonizing Canada's primary trading partner was to frustrate a government 
with which the Canadian government was allegedly seeking closer ties. Even 
when wrestling with decisions as trivial announcing the previously and 
publicly agreed establishment of a Commonwealth centre and the CECC, the 
government was paralyzed by political anxiety. This may have been 
exaggerated, but the government did well to worry over the political and 
economic effects of actually implementing its declared Commonwealth policy.
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Behind the Diefenbaker government's inability to develop workable 
economic proposals and unwillingness to act on what measures were there for 
consideration was the simple fact that the Commonwealth with which they had 
to work simply was not capable of solving such trade problems. If it were, 
they would have had less difficulty in developing proposals. Moreover, there 
would have been few political problems in having them implemented. Nothing 
succeeds like success, and finding new and expanded markets, or even the 
realistic prospect of them, is invariably popular. The government had 
unrealistic expectations of how Canada could use the Commonwealth bred from 
being too long in opposition. Important trade relationships still existed in 
the Commonwealth but they were not the product of recent history. As shown 
by Diefenbaker's colleagues' preoccupation at the 1957 CPMM with Britain's 
European trade arrangements showed, adjusting existing trading relations to 
changes in the global trading system was more salient to the modem 
Commonwealth than dramatic new endeavours to increase intra-Commonwealth 
trade.
The new Canadian policy objectives suffered from more than not being 
well conceived, they were not conceived with reference to the contemporary 
Commonwealth. The original Progressive Conservative trade policy had little 
prospect of success even had the government been willing to take enormous 
political risks. To have refocused Canadian trade towards the Commonwealth 
would have been a revolution to match the government's rhetoric. The 
government's conduct of this aspect of Commonwealth relations showed it to be 
anything but revolutionary, and with good reason.
The new government had some successes, but few innovations, in 
Commonwealth affairs. The idea of Commonwealth trade as a counterweight to
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Canadian trade with the United States, and the Commonwealth as a general 
counterweight to the United State for Canada existed previously. They were 
historically secondary policy tendencies, but Diefenbaker made them key parts 
of his platform. In his governments efforts to win support for its economic 
objectives, it initiated more programmes than had its Liberal predecessor, 
but it ended up doing more of the same things. Like its predecessor, its 
generous Commonwealth aid contributions acknowledged the reality of the 
modem Commonwealth and the role it could be expected to play in Canadian 
policy. Even if Diefenbaker seemed unduly impressed at first by the presence 
of non-white leaders at a CPMM, he and his ministerial colleagues quickly 
grasped the importance of the newer members to the Commonwealth.
Nevertheless, the fact that this "Commonwealth-minded government" had found 
it necessary to resist ambitious proposals for development institutions and 
generally preferred bilateral aid programmes within the Commonwealth 
demonstrated the essential continuity in Canadian policy. Diefenbaker's 
stubborn attachment to things like a Commonwealth development fund could not 
avoid the realities which were more easily overlooked in opposition. The 
Diefenbaker government devoted a great deal of attention to Commonwealth 
trade but its efforts were plagued by inconsistencies. The government's 
stated policy objectives were too far removed from the economic and political 
realities. Officials readily appreciated this, but ministers, especially the 
prime minister, grasped it only as efforts to implement policies ran up 
against their political interests. Invariably, when trying to reconcile 
Commonwealth dreams with electoral politics, politics won. The result was a 
policy of dead-end dreams which did not appreciably alter the nature of 
Canada's Commonwealth relations.
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CHAPTER 5: THE HINDS OF CHANGE: THE COMING OF THE THIRD COMMONWEALTH
In Macmillan's famous "winds of change" speech to South Africa's 
Parliament on 3 February, I960,1 he was referring specifically to Africa, but 
the same winds were sweeping through the Commonwealth. They were bringing a 
new Commonwealth, the 'third' Commonwealth. The first consisted of Britain 
and independent states dominated by persons of European origin, sharing 
similar cultural and institutional backgrounds. The second began with the 
admission of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. It was multiracial and more 
diverse, but the new members had large populations and sophisticated civil 
and political structures. The next stage in Commonwealth development would 
come as the inexorable progress of decolonization transformed its membership 
structure. This had been discussed by the 'old' members in the mid-1950s and 
anticipated by Ghana's membership in 1957. Then, it was seen in terms of 
membership of poorer, less sophisticated, but sizeable, African states. As 
the third Commonwealth unfolded another element became apparent. To states, 
such as Nigeria, with much in common with the new members of the second 
Commonwealth, were added much smaller and weaker states. The challenge this 
poised for older members such as Canada was to ensure that the Commonwealth 
remained useful to them amidst this transformation.
Between 1959 and 1961 several issues arose which helped define the 
Commonwealth's future character and direction. These included how its 
membership structure would deal with new members and how it cope with their 
needs once in. In the third Commonwealth, new members not only continued to
Although the phrase is most famous for its use on this occasion, 
Macmillan had used it previously on his African tour of January and February,
1960. Harold Macmillan. Pointing the Wav 1959-1961. (London: Macmillan,
1972) p. 124.
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push for more aid, but, as the issue of South African membership showed, 
insisted on a greater role in shaping the Commonwealth's structure as well. 
The Canadian response to these changes demonstrated emphatically that the 
Commonwealth's most important function for Canadian policy was as a link to 
developing countries.
Determining The Nature of the Third Commonwealth: Membership and Structure
After a period between 1955 and 1957 when Commonwealth prime ministers 
met annually, there followed a lull with no CPMM until May, 1960. Thus, when 
Macmillan suggested a CPMM for 1960, his comment "that there are many 
important matters which could fruitfully be discussed"2 was an 
understatement. Among the many issues, none had more importance for the 
Commonwealth's future than how to accommodate new members. Two countries 
were expected to seek membership in 1960s Nigeria and Cyprus. Nigeria posed 
little problem. Its independence had been anticipated since the mid-1950s 
and its size, population and resources recommended it as a significant 
addition to the Commonwealth. Cyprus was another matter.
Before Cyprus' prospective membership, Commonwealth governments 
anticipated that membership would grow in accordance with assumptions made in 
the mid-1950s. That is, by small numbers via the accession of large units. 
Indeed, a 1955 CRO memorandum on Commonwealth membership lumped Cyprus into a 
category of dependencies capable of internal self-government but which could
Macmillan to Diefenbaker, 14 October, 1959. PRO DO 35/7949. 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, 1960. Issue of Invitations, 
[file CON 93/16(1)]
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not "aspire to the status of full Commonwealth membership. The British
government, as the principle metropolitan power within the Commonwealth, 
could in most respects play the role of Commonwealth architect. It expected
an independent Commonwealth of sixteen members - all of them 
significant countries which could expect to exercise some influence 
in world counsels, to be viable economically, and to be worth-while 
partners in some regional defence system. So constituted the 
Commonwealth could continue to exert a powerful influence in the 
world.
The Commonwealth prime ministers would continue to meet as equals, and 
together would possess considerable authority. Britain, the Commonwealth's 
leader, would be the major beneficiary of its influence. This model assumed 
small dependencies would remain that way. Cyprus, whose leaders refused to 
accept anything short of complete independence with full Commonwealth 
membership, called this into question.
Cyprus was a source of controversy for British governments long before 
its membership in the Commonwealth became an issue. In 1955, elements of the 
majority Greek population started a guerrilla campaign in support of union 
with Greece. In 1956, several Greek Cypriot leaders, including the Orthodox 
Archbishop, Makarios III, were exiled briefly. After Makarios' controversial 
return in 1957, the British government resumed its search for a compromise 
settlement which would meet the aspirations of the Greek population, protect 
the rights of the Turkish minority, and secure British strategic interests.
By the autumn of 1959, a settlement was almost in place.
3
Memorandum: Future Membership of the Commonwealth, December, 1955. 
PRO DO 35/5060. Commonwealth Membership, [file CON 32/40/14]
^Memorandum Brook to Macmillan, 26 April, 1960. PRO CAB 21/3160. 
Commonwealth Study Group: General, 1960. [file 10/4/83/1]
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The Canadian government had followed events in Cyprus, but had not taken 
an active role. Administering colonies'was entirely a British matter. But 
its approaching independence with possible Commonwealth membership made it a 
Commonwealth matter.5 In September, 1959, the British government sent 
Diefenbaker a memorandum setting out its view of Cyprus' future in the 
Commonwealth. It argued that with such a small area and population, Cyprus 
would have only a minor role in world affairs. Moreover, planned treaty 
arrangements with Turkey and Greece for what amounted to overseeing powers, 
implied Cyprus would not be fully sovereign. This could pose security 
problems for CPMMs because outside states might become privy to the 
discussions. Therefore, the British government recommended Cyprus be offered 
an association with the Commonwealth short of full membership.6 This status 
was not to set a precedent, but to reflect Cyprus' unique situation. This 
proposal did not surprise Diefenbaker or his officials. Indeed, Diefenbaker 
had indicated limited agreement with it before.7 He had done so, however, on 
the basis that it be used only as a starting point for preliminary talks.
Like his Liberal predecessors, Diefenbaker had severe misgivings about tiered 
membership.
The formal presentation of the idea sparked more serious consideration 
of its implications. To the frustration of British officials, who objected 
that if the idea was suitable as a basis for preliminary talks the Canadians
A more detailed account of Canadian policy towards the issue of Cypriot 
membership is contained ins Rory MacLeod, "Canadian Attitudes towards Cyprus 
Joining the Commonwealth", The Round Table. (October, 1993) pp. 391-6.
Earner to Diefenbaker, 15 September, 1959. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 
205 file 12833-40. Cyprus: Commonwealth Relations (1959-60).
7Note to file by D. Stansfield, Commonwealth Division, DEA, 30 November, 
1959. PAC ACC 86-7/414 vol 205 file 12833-40.
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could hardly complain if it was reflected in the final outcome,
Diefenbaker's initial misgivings were strengthened by the advice of his 
officials. This acknowledged that a Cypriot prime minister would have little 
influence in the world, but considered that it might still be instructive for 
other Commonwealth leaders to sit down with him, and that by so doing would
g
increase his ability to influence others. Anyway, CPMMs were already 
diluted in terms of the numbers present and subjects discussed compared with 
those of the late 1940s. Even then, in deference to India's nonalignment, 
members wishing to discuss defence arrangements met separately. Now, given 
the presence of a country like Ghana which Canadian officials considered a 
questionable security risk, there could be no reason for excluding Cyprus. 
Whether or not the British intended to set a precedent, it would. On balance 
there was more advantage to maintaining the Commonwealth's open character and 
not making distinctions on size any more than on colour or race.
Not seeing a valid reason for excluding Cyprus, Canadian officials 
suspected other factors behind the British preference for tiered membership. 
The controversial Makarios had been elected to head the post-independence 
government. Canadian officials believed that dislike for Makarios within the 
British government contributed to the effort to exclude him from CPMMs. When 
a DEA official mentioned this theory to an official at Eamscliff, he 
received the assurance that personal dislike did not influence officials.
But the British official conceded that ministerial views might very well be 
affected.10
8Ibid.
g
Memorandum to Prime Minister. Cyprus and the Commonwealth, 25 
September, 1959. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 205 file 12833-40.
10Minute to File from S Morley Scott, Commonwealth Division, DEA, 7 
January, 1960. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 205 file 12833-40.
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The re-emergence of the idea of tiered membership reflected more than 
personal likes and dislikes of British minsters. Both the Canadian and 
British positions sought to maintain the Commonwealth's existing character. 
Where they differed was in defining what constituted the Commonwealth's most 
important characteristics. The British stress on the role of members in 
world affairs emphasized the Commonwealth as a political body and source of 
(British) influence. The Canadian stress on inclusivity, emphasized the 
Commonwealth as a functional body primarily for building relations with the 
developing world. Both sought influence, but the British sought a direct 
benefit from the Commonwealth itself, while the Canadians wanted to develop 
relationships through the Commonwealth, but for use elsewhere, such as at the 
United Nations.
Paradoxically, these divergent views manifested themselves in the 
opposite ways regarding the membership of Commonwealth agencies. At the same 
time as the British government was suggesting limits on which countries be 
accorded the privileges of full membership, it was advocating unlimited 
membership in all Commonwealth organizations.11 There had never been any 
need before to have every Commonwealth member active in every subsidiary body 
but the British government saw it as a means of promoting greater 
identification with the Commonwealth among members.
Most Commonwealth bodies engaged primarily in information sharing so 
membership entailed little responsibility. But some, such as the 
Commonwealth Telecommunications Board (CTB), performed specialized technical 
activities and so membership was on a more formal basis. Under the terms of
^Lamarque to OG Stoner, Economic Division, DEA, 6 January, 1960. PAC RG 
25 ACC 86-7/336 vol 193 file 6231-40 part 14. Commonwealth Communications 
Council - Activities and Reports (1959-60).
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the 1948 Commonwealth Telegraphs Agreement, for example, CTB membership was 
open only to those Commonwealth members with control over their own 
telecommunications. As a result, Pakistan, Malaya and Ghana were not 
members. Ghana was in the process of seeking associate membership pending 
the assumption of the required control and Malaya and Singapore, the latter 
not yet independent, had expressed reluctance to join until they had full 
control. The British government, anxious to achieve maximum participation in 
Commonwealth bodies, suggested that control over external telecommunications 
no longer be required and all Commonwealth members be allowed to join.
The Canadian government's response contrasted with its position on 
Commonwealth membership. While sympathetic to the idea of having as many 
Commonwealth members as possible participating in the CTB, Canadian officials 
questioned it on two points. Both stemmed from the fact that the Board had a 
defined function and controlled important assets. They queried:
(a) is it desirable to have an indefinite number of such countries, 
as and when they become independent, members of the Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Board with full power and voting rights on all 
matters pertaining to the successful management and operation of 
the entire Commonwealth telecommunications system in which they 
would have no financial investment?
(b) what effect, financial or otherwise, would nationalization of 
the facilities referred to in (a) have on the Commonwealth 
Telecommunications System?
These objections came from the operational department concerned, the 
Department of Transport, and whereas the British proposals were political, 
the objections were functional. Canadian attitudes to Commonwealth and 
international organizations since 1945 consistently reflected this functional 
approach. The Canadian government agreed to join or revive Commonwealth
12JR Baldwin Deputy Minister, Department of Transport, to Robertson, 28 
March, 1960. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/336 vol 193 file 6231-40 part 14.
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bodies when they fulfilled a function best pursued in a Commonwealth milieu. 
Canadian governments rejected Commonwealth institutions where issues were 
best managed elsewhere. The fact that the Commonwealth was secondary to 
institutions such as NATO and the United Nations in Canadian foreign policy, 
it did not mean that the functions performed by Commonwealth organs were 
unimportant. These activities were either not done by other bodies, or were 
best done on a Commonwealth basis. For the Canadian government. Commonwealth 
bodies each had an activity defined function, not the political purpose of 
binding the Commonwealth together. Canada had, in keeping with the 
Diefenbaker government's initial exuberance for all things Commonwealth, 
accepted British tinkering with the CEC in 1957. Now the traditional 
Canadian attitude preferring the substance and function of a workable 
Commonwealth over procedural and institutional illusions asserted itself to 
preserve the character of functional relationships within the Commonwealth 
framework.
The Canadian government's principal interest in the Commonwealth as a 
whole was its 'bridging' role. Its main interest in Commonwealth subsidiary 
bodies was the functional task for which the body had been created. Broad 
membership facilitated the one, but gave authority with no responsibility or 
contribution in the other, possibly endangering the pursuit of the objectives 
that the Canadian government sought to achieve through the organization. 
Unlike the British view, the interests pursued in one part of the 
Commonwealth were not used to support those in another part. The 
differentiation of Canadian interests underscored the fact that Canada was 
not so much interested in the Commonwealth itself as it was in the tasks it 
fulfilled.
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As the 1960 CPMM approached, the Canadian government devoted an 
uncharacteristic amount of attention to the Commonwealth's future. That 
there would be a third stage in the Commonwealth's development, the Canadian 
government had little doubt, but its form remained unknown.13 The 
transition to the third stage posed the same two questions as that from the 
first to the seconds would new states want to remain associated with their 
formal colonial master and if so, how would this be achieved? The third 
Commonwealth's defining characteristic looked to be the addition of a 
considerable, but unpredictable, number of sovereign states "notably inferior 
in size, maturity and influence"14 to existing members. In 1960, aside from 
Cyprus and Nigeria, approximately fifteen other British dependencies were 
near the threshold of independence. Their populations ranged from the nine 
million of Tanganyika to the one hundred thousand of Western Samoa. There 
were an even greater number of smaller dependencies which might also 
eventually seek membership. The question for Canada and the other 
Commonwealth members at the time was: "How far [was] the maintenance within 
the Commonwealth fold of all existing territory reason for conceding equality 
of status? Or [were] there alternative forms of association?"15
Despite its reservations about membership restrictions, even the 
Canadian government had difficulty conceiving of a Commonwealth in which the 
smallest island state assumed the same position as existing members. The 
alternative, however, would be for the Commonwealth to leave some new states, 
with full voting rights in the United Nations General Assembly, outside. The
13Brief VI: The Commonwealth as an Institution, 22 March, 1960. PAC RG 25 
vol 3446 file 1-1960/3 part 2. Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers: 
London, May, 1960 - Briefs.
14Ibid. p. 4.
15Ibid. p. 3.
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animosity they might hold for the Commonwealth could facilitate the spread of 
communist influence among developing countries, contrary to one of the 
purposes Canada saw for the Commonwealth. The question of membership, then, 
could not be separated from the purpose for which the Canadian government 
wished to use the Commonwealth.
Accommodating every possible member in the Commonwealth required an 
appropriate membership formula. This would have to reconcile anticipated 
trends in demand for membership with the Commonwealth's efficient operation 
as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy. The Canadian government saw 
four possible solutions to this. One would be to stop the growth of new 
members with Nigeria and possibly Cyprus. This would leave a Commonwealth 
which was demonstrably useful and which its members knew how to manage. 
Alternatively, new members could each be assessed on their individual merits: 
"the test would be the willingness and the ability of the candidate to assist 
the Commonwealth and its objectives."16 Finally, there was the idea 
circulating in the British government to have a multi-tiered Commonwealth. 
Each of these options risked antagonizing countries denied full membership. 
Each also presented individual difficulties: the first, the risk that a 
static Commonwealth might become stagnant; the second, the political 
difficulties of establishing standards; and the third, the dubious premise
that candidates would accept a limited membership. The Canadian government,
17therefore, preferred "the simplest solution" - to continue admitting 
former dependencies following independence, on the recommendation of the 
former colonial administrator (so far, always Britain). This would avoid
16Brief VI-D-1: Admission of New Members, 19 April, 1960. PAC RG 25 vol 
3446 file 1-1960/3 part 2. p. 5.
17Ibid. p. 4.
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creating hostile, rejected members, for there would be none, and preclude 
having to find a means to deal with 'orphans'. It would, officials hoped, 
keep newly independent countries oriented towards the West, stimulate the 
older members by giving them a fresh challenge and provide the Canadian 
government with a base on which to build contacts with the new states.
Canadian officials accepted that an enlarged Commonwealth might present 
problems, in areas such as cooperation, consultation and economic assistance. 
They could not even be certain that a larger, more heterogeneous,
Commonwealth would hold together. If it did, its prestige and usefulness to 
current members might suffer. These problems did not seem insurmountable.
The same fears had arisen before, but the Commonwealth had accommodated a 
doubling of its membership since 1945. The modalities of consultation might 
require adjustment, but "various groupings - what might be called 'circles' -
already exist[ed] for the exchange of information and the cultivation of
18policies." Canada, for example, worked much more closely with Britain 
than with Australia and New Zealand or South Africa, and more closely with 
India than with Pakistan, Ceylon or Malaya. Canadian officials anticipated 
that with more members, this device would spontaneously adapt to the new 
situation.
The Canadian government saw no need for an immediate decision on 
membership structure. It preferred a review of the subject by nominees from 
each Commonwealth country, aiming at a set of general principles in time for
IQ
the following CPMM. Meanwhile, Diefenbaker and his officials would
18Brief VI* The Commonwealth as an Institution, 22 March, 1960. PAC RG 25 
vol 3446 file 1-1960/3 part 2.
19Ibid. p. 9.
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promote the 'simplest solution'. Concerning Cyprus, the cause of the current 
debate, the Canadian government, in keeping with its attitude towards 
membership, had no difficulties with the prospect of full membership. But 
just as Canada had no reason to exclude Cyprus from the Commonwealth, neither 
did it have any compelling national interest in pressing for Cypriot 
membership in the face of opposition. Notwithstanding a NATO aspect from 
having Greece and Turkey, mutually hostile, interested in the formula for
Cypriot independence, the Canada's principle interest at stake was its
20Commonwealth interest. Cyprus was the first small dependency to apply and 
others would inevitably follow. Were Cyprus to be rejected, the old members 
from the 'first' Commonwealth would surely be blamed, especially by 
dependencies which aspired to membership, and other states in the region 
which might ascribe the rejection to factors other than Cyprus' size. In 
either case, the Commonwealth's image would be adversely affected and thus 
its utility as a bridge to promote Western interests in the developing world.
Some Canadian ministers were reluctant to concede equal status to each 
and every dependency. They shared what they believed were British
apprehensions about being swamped by a deluge of mini-members, turning the
21Commonwealth into a "glorified United Nations." Most, however, agreed 
with Diefenbaker and DEA officials that establishing classes within the 
Commonwealth would weaken its moral authority. Canada derived a measure of 
moral authority of its own from its Commonwealth activities and the relations 
with members of a 'glorified' United Nations were a good start for dealing 
with them at the real one. Thus, when Diefenbaker reported from London that
20Brief VI-C-1: Cyprus and the Commonwealth, 21 April, 1960. PAC RG 25 
vol 3446 file 1-1960/3 part 2.
21PAC RG 2 vol 2746. Cabinet Conclusions, 28 April, 1960.
204
the CPMM had decided against membership categories. Cabinet concurred. The 
CPMM, however, did not formally address Cypriot membership. While Makarios 
had rejected any possibility of accepting less than complete membership in 
January, 1960, Cyprus had not yet made a formal application.
The CPMM settled one aspect of the membership question, but others 
remained. The prime ministers realized that the general issue of membership 
required more consideration. Therefore, as the Canadian government had 
hoped, the meeting requested that a group of senior officials from 
Commonwealth countries study future Commonwealth development with special 
consideration to the situation of small territories. The group of officials, 
or Commonwealth Study Group (CSG) as it was known, consisted of six 
officials, headed by Sir Norman Brook. Canada's representative was Robert 
Bryce, the other members came from Australia, New Zealand, India and Ghana.
Once constituted, Canadian officials had to ensure the study did not go 
off in directions they had not intended. Officials at Canada House reported 
that the British government saw the CSG as creating shared responsibility, 
extricating the British government from the "lonely position of sole 
responsibility for determining timetables for independence and the nature of
constitutional relationships to existing members and to each other of future
22potential members." The Canadian government was aghast at the prospect 
of sharing this 'lonely' role. Diefenbaker would only accept "joint 
participation of Commonwealth countries in decisions relating to full
22Extract from Telegram 1593 from Canadian High Commission in Britain, 24 
May, 1960 in Minute from Scott to Robertson, 26 May, 1960. PAC RG 25 ACC 86- 
7/414 vol 207 file 12852-50. Commonwealth Study Group.
205
23membership of the Commonwealth." Beyond that, he was no more willing than 
Mackenzie King share responsibility. The Canadian government informed the 
British government that any reference to the committee considering timetables 
for independence or constitutional relationships was out of the question. 
These matters, so far as the Canadian government was concerned, were wholely 
within the domain of the administering power. The Canadian government was 
not indifferent to the constitutional development of Commonwealth 
dependencies, but there could be no question of abandoning the link between 
the responsibility for a decision and the authority to enact it by allowing 
the Commonwealth to delve into a matter of policy to be exercised by a member 
state. The Canadian government no more wanted responsibility for any facet 
of British policy than it would accept interference in its own policies.
Flexibility, like policy independence, had been central to the 
Commonwealth's development since 1947. The Canadian view of the CSG sought 
to preserve both of these. At Bryce's request, DEA prepared an analysis of 
the type of Commonwealth that might result by projecting current membership 
conventions; it also contained observations and commentary on the parallel 
British papers being produced in connection with the study group. The 
British papers assumed the number of potential candidates for membership in 
the coming ten years would be limited because some small dependencies would 
attain independence within federations and others were either not suitable 
for, or desirous of, international status. By this reasoning, aside from
Memorandum for George Glazebrook, Commonwealth Division, from HB 
Robinson, DEA Liaison Officer, Prime Minister's Office. Assessment of Prime 
Ministers' Meeting in London Telegram 1593 of 24 May, 1960, 26 May, 1960. PAC 
RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 207 file 12852-40.
* J
Telegram K-185 from Department of External Affairs to Canadian High 
Commission in Britain, 30 May, 1960. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 207 file 
12852-40.
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numbers, the Commonwealth's basic make-up would not dramatically change 
because new members would still be relatively large states. The Canadian 
paper, while extrapolating an increase of between ten and fourteen members 
over ten years, concluded that such projections were dangerous and should be 
avoided because "they are governed, unless most drastically inhibited, by
7 5
immense margins of error." Almost any total could be arrived at depending 
on the assumptions or attitudes of those making the projection. Canadian 
officials suspected that the analysis contained in the British papers was 
"conditioned by a reluctance in some sections of United Kingdom public
opinion to accept the implications from several standpoints of Cypriot
2Gmembership." This, like the projection of the Commonwealth's future it 
conditioned, was subject to change. In the meantime, a Canadian objective 
with respect to the CSG would be to ensure that while the
Cyprus negotiations should be helped towards an internationally 
beneficial conclusion, the principles of Commonwealth membership 
should not be damaged in the process so as to prejudice the future 
value of the Commonwealth for Canada and other members.
Future changes in the Commonwealth's membership, mostly from Africa, but also 
from the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, had the possibility of being 
important in relation to the international system as a whole. Accommodating 
them in the Commonwealth had importance beyond the traditional constitutional 
egalitarianism among Commonwealth members.
75
Memorandum: A Projection of the Present Conventions Governing 
Commonwealth Membership. Prepared for Mr. Bryce by John Hadwin, Commonwealth 
Division, DEA, 25 June, 1960. PAC RG 25 ACC 90-1/008 vol 204 file 50085-1-40 
part 1. Commonwealth Conferences - General (1952-1963).
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
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After studying various memoranda generated by the CSG process, Bryce 
concluded that Canada's traditional position was the most appropriate. In 
early July, 1960, before leaving for the CSG meeting in London, he set out 
his views in a memorandum for Diefenbaker. He rejected options limiting or 
otherwise restricting membership in favour of allowing all former 
dependencies to join. He acknowledged that this might yield a large total 
membership and require more formal CPMMs. Believing the Commonwealth's 
greatest importance was as a bridge between the West and the developing
world, he felt it must provide a "friendly welcome, dignified status and a
28source of informal advice and assistance" to new states. His only 
variation from both Diefenbaker and the balance of Canadian official opinion
was over Cyprus. Bryce believed that Cyprus should be excluded from the
29Commonwealth unless Britain was deeply committed to its inclusion. This 
had nothing to do with its size; he was unconvinced, given the strong pulls
towards Greece and Turkey, that the new state would be able to pursue
Commonwealth ties in a meaningful way. Since evaluating the admissability of 
particular candidates was not within the CSG's mandate, this was not 
critical. The general Canadian position remained consistent, both with 
respect to Cyprus and the line to take within the Study Group.
Rather than examining specific details of the Commonwealth relationship, 
the CSG approached it more theoretically. Before looking at the
Commonwealth's future structure, it examined such basic issues as the nature
of Commonwealth obligations. In the process, little new was said. The 1960
Memorandum for the Prime Minister from Robert Bryce, Secretary to the
Cabinet and Clerk of the Privy Council, 30 June, 1960. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414
vol 207 file 12852-40.
29Ibid.
208
study differed little from previous formulations of the question.30 The 
obligations and marks of membership were not codified, but it summarized them 
as:
(a) members will not normally intervene or comment on the domestic 
policies of others members;
(b) members will consult or inform other members in advance of any 
action which may affect the interests of others;
(c) independent members may attend meetings of prime ministers;
(d) members may participate in Commonwealth educational schemes;
(e) members may take part in economic consultation through the CECC 
and its subsidiary bodies;
(f) members have special access to the London capital market, co­
operate in the sterling area and have preferential access to 
Commonwealth markets arising from the Ottawa Agreements.
Of these, only participation by right at CPMMs and the CECC were exclusive to 
independent members. The CSG identified intangible benefits from 
Commonwealth membership such as enhanced world standing, and benefits from 
the personal, professional and official contacts within the Commonwealth.
For all the changes in the Commonwealth since 1947, a list of the basic 
benefits and obligations of membership prepared then would have differed 
little.
This was not the only area where the CSG went over well trodden ground. 
For example, the representative from Ghana, the newest member included in the 
group, advocated formalizing Commonwealth practices, including reserving the 
description 'Commonwealth' for independent countries of the Commonwealth.
30For example: Memorandum CDC(51)10: The Constitutional Development of 
Colonial Territories. Report of Joint Colonial Office/Commonwealth Relations 
Office Working Party, 29 March, 1951. PRO DO 35/2217 Constitutional 
Development in the Commonwealth: Constitutional Development of Colonial 
Territories - Their Relations with the Members of the Commonwealth, [file 
C2535/5]
31 Commonwealth Working Group. Membership of the Commonwealth, Annex: What 
Membership of the Commonwealth Implies, 7 July, 1960. PRO DO 35/7877 
Commonwealth Study Group: Meaning of the Word Commonwealth, 1960. [file CON 
32/40/32]
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The distinction between dependencies and independent members had once been 
made via the term 'Dominion'. With its demise in the late 1940s, terminology 
become less evident, but the distinction remained. Independent states were 
Commonwealth members, but dependencies were considered within the 
Commonwealth for trade, citizenship and related matters. This satisfied 
other CSG members, none of whom was inclined to support this incipient 
formalization.
The Ghanaian proposal illustrated a growing trend. Newer members had a 
predilection towards formalizing Commonwealth relations. Prior to the 1960 
CPMM, Nkrumah had objected to the traditional invitation to the Federation
Rhodesia and Nyasaland's prime minister because it implied that not fully
32sovereign members could participate. Similarly, he had objected to the 
possible Nigerian representation in anticipation of its independence later in 
the year. More portentously, Nkrumah's position on Cyprus was that, although 
reluctant to include a country with treaty arrangements of the nature Cyprus 
would have with Greece and Turkey, he would not 'veto' it in the face of 
other members' support. At the same meeting, the prime minister of Malaya 
had also referred to a unanimity rule at CPMMs,33 implying that voting or 
decision-making procedures existed in the Commonwealth. Existing practice 
regarding issues such as membership operated on a unanimity principle of 
sorts, but this took the form of consensus and quiet acquiescence on the part 
of members with doubts about a development, not a positive vote. Formalizing
32See exchange of telegrams: Inward Telegram 472 to CRO from High 
Commissioner in Ghana, 19 October, 1959; and Outward CRO Telegram 710 to High 
Commissioner in Ghana, 22 October, 1959 in PRO DO 35/7949.
33Minute from Brook to Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, Permanent Under­
secretary, CRO, 14 May, 1960. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, 1960. 
Procedure at Prime Ministers' Meetings (The Unanimity Rule), [file CON 
93/16(39)]
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Commonwealth procedures would make the Commonwealth more like other 
international organizations and distance its activities from its imperial 
past, but would erode its characteristic informality and flexibility. In the 
past, Canada, South Africa, and India had resisted anything hinting at 
formalization because of fears that Britain would dominate the outcome or 
that sensitive national issues, such as race relations for South Africa and 
Kashmir for India, might be subject to a Commonwealth vote. Now, even 
Britain, previously resigned to the necessity of a strictly informal 
Commonwealth, made its preservation a priority.34
The CSG wanted to preserve the Commonwealth's character not only in the 
face of expanding membership, including the admission of small members, but 
also with respect to procedure. Its recommendations in this respect focused 
on CPMMs on the assumption that other forms of information exchange and 
consultation would not experience any significant alteration to their 
character as a result in changes in membership, and because CPMMs were the 
Commonwealth's centre-piece. The CSG considered several options but 
ultimately rejected limiting the privileges of smaller members. Using the 
same reasoning as the Canadian government, it concluded, that anything else 
would create two tiers, and "be a frustration of much of what the 
Commonwealth stands for".36 Inclusivity had the benefit of enabling 
'guidance' of new members by the old and avoided making the Commonwealth's 
membership requirements more restrictive than the United Nations. The CSG
n j
Commonwealth Study Group. The Commonwealth Unanimity Rule. Note for the 
United Kingdom Delegation [n.d. June, I960]. PRO DO 35/7961.
35The Constitutional Development of the Commonwealth. Report by a Group 
of Commonwealth Officials, July 23, 1960. PRO CAB 21/3160. Commonwealth Study 
Group: General 1960. [file 10/4/83/1]
36Ibid. p. 11.
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also rejected introducing greater formality and rules of procedure, although 
with larger numbers attending, CPMMs might need to be modified to maintain 
their informal character. To do this, the Study Group suggested that there 
be fewer plenary sessions, more plenary sessions without advisors, or more 
informal, 'free' time.
In coming together, the CSG dissipated the immediate pressures which 
gave rise to it. Its report was distributed to Commonwealth governments 
during the summer of 1960. The British Cabinet received the report in
August, but held off making any judgement on it until other Commonwealth
37governments commented on it. Three months later none had. Although the 
Canadian government had not found it necessary to communicate its acceptance, 
the report encapsulated its views on Commonwealth structure. However, if in 
recommending to allow the Commonwealth to develop as the flow of events took 
it, the Canadian view of substance and function overcame initial British 
preferences for procedure and institutional form, the Ghanaian position 
bespoke a growing challenge. Newer members wanted to change existing 
conventions to suit their needs. The Canadian government had insisted on 
maintaining existing informal practices so as to accommodate anticipated new 
members. This best served the functional objective of the Commonwealth 
supporting Canada's relations with developing countries. But for this to 
continue, this new pressure for change would have to be accommodated.
37C.(60)159 Future Expansion of the Commonwealth. Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 2 November, 1960. PRO CAB 
129/102. Cabinet Memoranda 1960.
South African Membership; Round I - 1960
The growing pressure for procedural change from new members was felt in 
another controversial issue considered at the 1960 CPMM. Even more 
contentious than small state membership was the possibility of a request from 
South Africa to remain in the Commonwealth as a republic. While other 
members had already made similar changes, or in the case of Ceylon, had 
received confirmation that should they do so they would be able to continue 
their Commonwealth membership, the possibility of a South African request 
raised issues beyond the specific constitutional question. South Africa's 
policy of apartheid represented the antithesis of the modem multiracial 
Commonwealth. Still, the Commonwealth could only exist on the basis of 
respect for the sovereignty of its members and its corollary, the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of other members. Resolving the 
contradiction between the two presented a dilemma for older members such as 
Canada and Britain and would test their responsiveness to the 'winds of 
change'.
South Africa's racist internal policies and the possibility of South 
Africa adopting a republican constitution had long hovered in the background 
of Commonwealth relations. The Indian government had first brought South 
Africa's treatment of people of Indian origin before the United Nations in 
1946. The issue was never formally discussed in the Commonwealth but its 
presence was unmistakable. South Africa and India never exchanged high 
commissioners, nor, indeed, did South Africa exchange representatives with 
any other non-white member. Similarly, a change in South Africa's 
constitution was not surprising. At the 1949 meeting to find a means of 
accommodating India within the Commonwealth as a republic, South African
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Prime Minister Dr. DF Malan had expressed the view that it was "natural that
a gradual relaxation of the common allegiance should accompany the growing
38consciousness of separate nationhood in the Commonwealth." That South 
Africa also proved extremely accommodating with respect to the second request 
of an Asian member to retain Commonwealth membership as a republic, that of
Pakistan in 1955, prompted Pearson to speculate that South Africa too would
39soon become a republic.
The constitutional question remained a matter for conjecture pending an 
initiative from the South African government. The racial question, however, 
was unavoidable even with the Commonwealth convention of non-interference.
The issue was before the United Nations, and before 1960, all Commonwealth 
members,40 except Britain, had voiced their disapproval of South Africa's 
racial policies at the General Assembly.41 British governments did not 
condone the policy, but were reluctant to interfere in South Africa's 
internal affairs or publicly criticize a Commonwealth member.
As South Africa demonstrated, Commonwealth partnerships could be a mixed 
blessing. The Canadian government was aware that South Africa's membership
38P.M.M.(49)lst meeting, Minutes of the first meeting, April 22, 1949.
PRO CAB 133/89 Meeting of Prime Ministers, April 1949. Minutes of Meetings 
and Memoranda.
39Lester Pearson Diary Extract, 4 February, 1955. PAC MG 26 N1 Lester B. 
Pearson Papers. Pre-1956 Series Correspondence, vol 23. Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Conference 1955 file.
40The course of Canadian policy towards South Africa between 1945 and 
1961 is detailed ins Frank Hayes, "South Africa's Departure from the 
Commonwealth, 1960-1961", International History Review. (2s3, July, 1980) pp. 
453-84.
^Memorandums South Africa's Application to Remain a Member of the 
Commonwealth. 4 February. 1961. PAC RG 25 ACC 85-6/551 vol 3447 file 1-1961/1 
part 1. Briefs Prepared for the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
(1961).
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and members' reluctance to confront the issue constituted "a damaging 
talking-point for all detractors of the Commonwealth association, inside the 
Commonwealth and outside."42 The same was true of South Africa's alignment 
with the anti-communist West with respect to uncommitted countries in the 
Cold War. But South Africa was not the only Commonwealth partner with a less 
than pristine record of behaviour towards its own citizens. At one time, 
common institutions such as parliamentary democracy, free judiciaries and 
shared legal and political morality had been regarded as binding forces in 
the Commonwealth.43 Like the link of common allegiance, this had gradually 
been eroded. Ghana violated Canadian ideas of judicial safeguards, but it 
offered an entree for relations with emerging African states. Democracy in 
Pakistan had given way to military rule in 1958, but it remained steadfastly 
anti-communist. India's democracy was in some respects shaky and its human 
rights record imperfect, but the Canadian government saw preserving a 
moderately Westem-orientation in India as the key to Asian stability in the 
Cold War. So too with South Africa, the Canadian government's position was 
that despite its opposition to South Africa's racial policies, there was no 
need to repudiate relations with the government. Indeed, maintaining contact 
could be used to seek improvement in the racial situation. The Canadian 
government was, nevertheless, aware of the balance of interests at play. As
42Notes on South Africa and Its Relations with Canada, 2 March, 1959. PAC 
RG 25 ACC 86-7/360 vol 2 file 7060-40 part 6.
43For example: Memorandum: Considerations on the Nature of the 
Commonwealth, 6 October, 1948. PAC RG 25 vol 2285 file S/29/3; Memorandum: 
Future Membership of the Commonwealth, December, 1955. PRO DO 35/5060 file 
CON 32/40/14 Commonwealth Membership. Diefenbaker remained fond of 
references to this kind of link in public speeches, for example: John G. 
Diefenbaker, "Canada and the Commonwealth". Excerpts from a Speech to the 
Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association, November 4, 1958. Statements 
and Speeches 58/44.; and John G. Diefenbaker, "A New Concept of 
Commonwealth". Speech at a State Banquet at Kuala Lampur, Malaya, 28 
November, 1958. Statements and Speeches 59/13. (Ottawa: Department of 
External Affairs, 1959).
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had been evident in discussions over the possibility that South Africa would 
create obstacles to the membership of Ghana in 1957, given the choice between 
South African membership and a broadly based Commonwealth, the Canadian 
government would probably choose the latter. Prior to 1960, however, there 
had been no need to consider the choice.
The situation in South Africa also had a domestic aspect for the 
Canadian government. Over the years, DEA had received numerous letters from 
concerned members of the public questioning Canadian policy at the United 
Nations and urging stronger measures there. The issue was not at the top of 
the public's agenda, but the numbers were increasing. At the end of January, 
1960, it received a highly public boost. The Canadian Labour Congress 
submitted a brief to Diefenbaker urging the Canadian government to 
unequivocally condemn South African policies at the United Nations and 
elsewhere. Among its recommendations, the brief supported the idea that 
South Africa be excluded from the Commonwealth.
In responding, Diefenbaker summarized the government's attitude towards 
South Africa. Speaking extemporaneously, he told the Congress that
the various members of the Commonwealth are bound to disagree with 
the manner in which other nations within the Commonwealth conduct 
certain courses of action, but the essence of the Commonwealth is 
the independence of each nation.
He stressed that he and the Canadian government disagreed strongly with the 
South African policies, but said that he would not raise the subject at the 
upcoming CPMM in May, 1960. Diefenbaker maintained this position, further
44Diefenbaker's remarks contained in: Outgoing Message K-37 from DEA to 
Canadian High Commission in South Africa, 2 February, 1960. PAC RG 26 ACC 86- 
7/360 vol 2 file 7060-40 part 7.
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refining it in public with the distinction between not initiating discussion 
of South Africa with his fellow prime minsters and being willing to discuss 
it if it did arise. The deaths of sixty-seven blacks and the injury of one 
hundred and sixty seven more through police action in South Africa at 
Sharpville and Langa in late March, 1961, focused world and Commonwealth 
attention on South Africa. This absolved Diefenbaker of the need to raise 
the issue in May - it would come up. On the other hand, it put more pressure 
on the Canadian government to publicly condemn South African policy.
True to the long-standing Canadian policy of not isolating the South 
African government, the Canadian government did not make any formal query or 
complaint to the South African government about the events at Sharpville and 
Lange. In the House of Commons, Diefenbaker responded to calls that it do so 
by re-iterating the traditional themes of distaste for the policy but 
preference for constructive engagements
the government must have one over-riding criterion in mind. The 
important consideration is not whether any action or statement by 
Canada would relieve Canadian feelings, but what practical effect 
such action might have in South Africa itself. In other words, we 
have a responsibility, and a solemn one, to reconcile the natural 
desire in the circumstances to demonstrate by positive action 
Canadian feelings of distress and, on the other hand, the necessity 
of ensuring that any such statement or action would help, and not 
hinder, those people who so strongly merit sympathy and concern.
As universal outrage over the situation in South Africa mounted, conflicting 
elements of Canadian policy towards the Commonwealth grew harder to 
reconcile. On the one hand, there was the principle of non-interference and, 
in keeping with the Commonwealth's tradition of flexible accommodation of 
diversity, the hope of finding some means of keeping South Africa within the
45Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (3rd Session, 24th 
Parliament, Vol III, 25 March, 1960) p. 2448.
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Commonwealth. On the other hand, there was the need to preserve the 
Commonwealth as a bridge. Diefenbaker's advisors had different opinions as 
to which should be stressed more. Officials at DEA, emphasizing the former, 
advocated tempering criticism of South Africa in the hope of maintaining a 
constructive relationship with the government there. On the other side of 
the debate Bryce thought that Canada should take a leading role actively 
criticizing South Africa.46 Bryce, the secretary to the cabinet, was to 
accompany Diefenbaker to the CPMM as the senior official advisor, but in a 
debate in the House of Commons on apartheid and Commonwealth relations just 
before Diefenbaker left for London, the DEA position, supported by the 
opposition Liberals under Pearson, showed itself to be the dominant approach 
in Canadian policy.47
The potential for a serious split or even rupture within the 
Commonwealth was becoming obvious. For example, before leaving for the CPMM, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaya's prime minister, with the unanimous support of 
the Malayan Parliament, had said that he would raise the issue of South 
Africa's racial policies regardless of whether it precipitated that country's 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth.48 Canada and Britain preferred a solution 
which would enable South Africa to remain within the Commonwealth, but that 
would require a compromise of titanic, but not inconceivable, proportions.
As opposed to apartheid as other members were, none wanted the Commonwealth
46The debate between Bryce and officials at DEA can be seen in RG 25 ACC 
86-7/414 file 11827-40. 'Future Relationship Between South Africa and the 
Commonwealth", and is examined in some detail in both Hayes, "South Africa's 
Departure from the Commonwealth", International History Review, pp. 464, 471- 
9 and Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, pp. 123-8, 178-80.
47Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (3rd Session, 24th 
Parliament, vol III, 27 April, 1960) pp. 3319-41.
48Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (3rd Session, 24th 
Parliament, vol III, 27 April, 1960) p. 3323.
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to become a forum to judge members' behaviour and policies or differences 
between members.
The Commonwealth relationship required that members overlook their many, 
and growing, differences. Each of the factors which made Commonwealth 
members less than pure provided a reason for them to exercise restraint in 
setting precedents for Commonwealth intrusions into domestic behaviour. Once 
set, there could be no predicting what havoc it would wreak on Commonwealth 
relationships. Canada would not be immune from the fallout, as Diefenbaker 
warned his cabinet colleagues on his return from London:
If Commonwealth Conferences should once adopt the majority vote as 
a means of reaching its decisions, the non-white majority at the 
next conference would probably support free migration of peoples. 
Such an immigration policy was clearly unacceptable to the Canadian 
people.
The wider implications of a debate for the Commonwealth did not prevent the 
subject from arising. At the opening session on 3 Hay, 1960, the Malayan 
prime minister argued that apartheid and the events in South Africa went 
beyond the limits of domestic concern and required Commonwealth action "to 
preserve its standards of conduct and its moral principles of equality of men 
irrespective of colour, and of justice and fair play.n5°
PAC RG 2 vol 2746. Cabinet Conclusions, 16 May, 1960.
Ironically, despite Diefenbaker's concerns over non-white immigration, 
Canadian immigration regulations were undergoing a gradual evolution under 
the ministry of Helen Fairclough (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
from May, 1958 to August, 1962) which liberalized implementation of Canada's 
immigration laws and started to remove racial discrimination from Canada's 
immigration policy. This was accomplished without legislative changes and so 
without the level of public debate which might have otherwise occurred. It 
was, nevertheless, undertaken during a period of fluctuating, but generally 
low, immigration levels due in large measure to high unemployment in Canada. 
See* David Corbett, "Canada's Immigration Policy, 1957-1962", International 
Journal. (XVII:2, Spring, 1963) pp. 166-80.
S0Diefenbaker, Once Canada. The Years of Achievement, p. 210.
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The issue of South Africa, once raised, placed Macmillan, as meeting 
chairman, in a difficult situation. His solution, in keeping with the 
practice not to discuss internal affairs at the meetings, was to have 
interested parties discuss the subject informally away from the main 
meetings.51 Diefenbaker, in keeping with his stated willingness to discuss 
the issue, even if he did not want to take the lead on it, had several 
private talks with South Africa's representative, Foreign Minister Eric Louw. 
In these, the Canadian prime minister sought not a repudiation of South 
Africa's policies, but only some indication that the South African government 
was prepared to make a gesture to world opinion. Diefenbaker's proposal that 
three out of one hundred and fifty six seats in the South African Parliament 
be allocated to representatives of the black majority did not jeopardize 
white rule in the country and only tried to re-establish an arrangement 
abolished 1948.52
Diefenbaker, although on record as opposing the discrimination of 
apartheid, was not a hostile critic. Indeed, he came away from the talks 
feeling South African's "case was plausible."53 He reported to Cabinet that
[Louw] pointed out, and competent English observers agreed, that 
South Africa had raised the living standard of its native 
population higher that any other state in Africa. He had contended 
that the apartheid policy represented the only possible salvation 
of South Africa... Self-government could not be imposed from above 
on an untrained body of citizens, but already the black population 
was beginning to practice self-government in rural areas where no 
white man could hold office. The registration books should not be 
regarded as instruments of oppression, but were designed to prevent 
the entry of hordes of natives across an undefended frontier to
take all available employment. Mr. Louw said that within his
51C.C.(60)29(2), Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 6 May, 1960.
PRO CAB 128/34. Cabinet Conclusions.
t'j
PAC RG 2 vol 2746, Cabinet Conclusions,
53PAC RG 2 vol 2746. Cabinet Conclusions,
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16 May. 1960.
country neither the black or the white people were generally 
opposed to the government. The principal criticism of his 
government was coming from two communist-led organizations...[and 
the] Anglican Church...
Even with such an accommodating interlocutor as Diefenbaker, the exchange of 
ideas was one way, and Louw remained unyielding. Indeed, having found 
flexibility in the other prime ministers, he pushed on to raise the subject 
of South Africa's continued membership as a republic despite the British 
government's preference to try to avoid the subject by convincing him not to 
raise it.*5
Ordinarily, a request for continuing membership as a republic was a 
formality. There was no question about South Africa's continuing membership 
as a monarchy, even India's Nehru, hardly a friend of the South African 
government, had taken a strong stand against any condemnation of South Africa 
which might have lead either to expulsion or withdrawal.55 But on the 
question of its continued membership as a republic, the Commonwealth prime 
ministers refused to anticipate the results of a South African referendum on 
the subject. The Canadian delegation's brief on the subject of South 
Africa's status had noted that politicians from the governing Nationalist 
Party had been making "pro-Commonwealth" noises, possibly because they felt 
that saying that they intended to withdraw from the Commonwealth would cause 
them to lose the referendum.57 Following this line of reasoning,
Diefenbaker recommended that an anticipatory agreement would constitute
54 Ibid.
55C.C.(60)29(2), Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 6 May, 1960.
PRO CAB 128/34. Cabinet Conclusions.
56Ibid.
57Brief VI-D-2s Possible Status for South Africa, 22 April, 1960. PAC RG 
25 vol 3446 file 1-1960/3 part 2.
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interference in South Africa's internal affairs because it might influence 
the outcome of the referendum. The prime minsters, therefore, postponed 
deciding on South Africa's future membership until after South Africa had
CO
itself decided. The final communique reaffirmed "the traditional practice
that Commonwealth conferences do not discuss the internal affairs of member 
59countries," and "emphasised that the Commonwealth itself [was] a 
multiracial association.”60 It did not, however, say whether this made 
South Africa ineligible for continued membership without at least some small 
effort to modify apartheid.
The Winds Undiverted: African Assistance
The Commonwealth's changing composition focused more of its attention on 
issues of interest to developing members. Starting with Pakistan's 
memorandum at the 1949 finance ministers' meeting, this had invariably meant 
development assistance. The prospect of more African members naturally 
turned attention to their aid requirements. Before the 1960 CPMM, the CRO 
had reviewed the merits of a 'Colombo Plan' for Africa. The motives were 
essentially political.61 It would meet domestic criticism that the 
government was not helping newly independent African countries sufficiently; 
draw other Commonwealth members, especially Canada, to contribute more to 
African aid; and demonstrate the Commonwealth's value to African members. As
58nMeeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1960 (London, 3-13 May).
Final Communique", The Commonwealth at the Summit, p. 63.
59Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61Minute from Lintott to Rumbold, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, CRO, 5 
April, 1960. PRO DO 35/8679. Commonwealth Plan for Africa, [file EC 
182/247/1]
2 2 2
the 1960 CPMM approached, another advantage emerged. Since it was obvious
the issue of South Africa would bedevil the meeting, African aid would be a
62good diversionary tactic. Home told Macmillans
it is largely a facade... My main reason for putting the idea 
forward now is that at a time when our Commonwealth relations are 
overshadowed by the South African situation, it would be valuable 
to launch what will be seen as a constructive and positive action 
in relation to Africa in a non-political field.
Home conceded here were drawbacks to the idea and as other ministers reviewed 
it these came to the fore: broad participation was uncertain, especially by 
Australia and New Zealand; there would be pressure to include non- 
Commonwealth participants, opening the possibility of communist 
participation64 and, the perennial bugbear, it would create demands for more 
money from Britain.65 Cost considerations weighed against a structure 
requiring firm commitments, but those of politics required action. Finding a 
balance was the key to success.
Before the British government could develop a suitable proposal, events 
passed it by. In discussions at the CPMM on the world economic situation, 
Nkrumah suggested Commonwealth countries take the lead in creating a Colombo- 
type plan for Africa.66 Australia's Menzies and New Zealand's Nash
62Lintott to Clutterbuck, 21 April, 1960. PRO DO 35/8378.
63Serial 29/60 from Home to Macmillan, 3 May, 1960. PRO DO 35/8378.
64PM(60)25 Commonwealth Economic Plan for Africa. Iain Macleod, Colonial 
Secretary, to Macmillan, 4 May, 1960. PRO DO 35/8378.
65Heathcoat Amory, Chancellor of the Exchequer, to Macmillan, 4 May, 
1960; and PM/60/47 Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Relations, to 
Macmillan, 5 May, 1960. PRO DO 35/8378.
660utward CRO Telegram 214 to United Kingdom High Commission in Ghana, 5 
May, 1960. PRO DO 35/7956. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, 1960. 
Distribution of Minutes, reports to High Commissions, etc. [file CON 
93/16(18)]
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supported the idea. So too did Diefenbaker, citing the situation in South 
Africa as reason to act expeditiously.^ 7 Not having anticipated the issue,
Diefenbaker spoke without prior cabinet consultation and so hedged his
68support by stressing the need for further study. His colleagues in 
Ottawa, recognizing the sensitivity of the situation, decided that although
"Nkrumah had obviously exploited the situation created by events in South
69Africa...the government should certainly support the proposal." Despite 
agreement from Diefenbaker and others on the need for more African aid, none 
of the leaders committed themselves to providing it.
Nkrumah's initiative took British officials aback. Given the objections 
raised by their own review of the subject, CRO officials were alarmed at the
70
prospect of even studying such a plan. Elsewhere, Brook worried that a
study would inevitably lead to creating a new organization, "with all the
71wrangles which this would involve as to membership etc." His preference 
was to mention the issue no further at the meeting except among officials 
drafting the communique. There he would try to keep details "sufficiently
fluffy to avoid committing [Britain] to a new organisation without further
72thought." Nevertheless, the final communique, while only committing 
Commonwealth governments to considering the possibility of co-operative 
action on African aid, set a definite timeframe for this consideration. The
67 Ibid.
^PAC RG 2 vol 2746. Cabinet Conclusions, 5 Hay, 1960.
69Ibid.
70Minute from Rumbold to NE Costar, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 
CRO, 9 May, 1960. PRO DO 35/7960.
71 Ibid.
72Ibid.
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matter would be first studied by officials and then examined by the CECC at 
its next meeting.
The situation older Commonwealth members such as Canada faced was 
similar to those they had faced over proposals for a Commonwealth development 
bank. No Commonwealth country was able to provide substantial amounts of 
capital. As was the case with a bank, this posed the danger that a scheme 
which produced no new resources would create resentment among recipients.
The Canadian government was better placed to devote new resources to African 
aid than Britain, the largest Commonwealth donor country, but alone could not 
endow a capital assistance fund. Canadian proposals for the CECC, seeking to 
avoid a new Commonwealth institution, mixed bilateral programmes with 
increased funding to international organizations. The hope was that in 
taking the initiative to address what was undeniably a great need, the 
Canadian government would be in a strong position to influence the form and 
magnitude of anything that might emerge from the Commonwealth talks.73 The 
discussions at the CPMM had created high expectations in Africa. The 
Canadian objective was to meet these in a manner which would strengthen the 
Commonwealth tie but at a reasonable cost. Accordingly, the Canadian 
government decided to offer C$3 million for the first year of a three year 
programme, with the contribution growing by C$0.5 million in each of the 
following two years. Parallel Canadian contributions totalling C$4 million 
would go to the United Nations Special Fund and the United Nations Expanded 
Programme of Technical Assistance. Having committed these funds, Canada 
would stand firmly against any new institutions, proposing instead that the 
CECC review African assistance programmes at subsequent meetings.
73PAC RG 2 vol 2747. Cabinet Conclusions, 13 September, 1960.
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The result of the September CECC meeting was as the Canadian government
had hoped. Other donors, such as Britain, shared the Canadian view. Rather
than creating a new organization, the finance ministers agreed to establish
SCAAP, the Special Commonwealth African Aid Plan to fulfill the CPMM's
undertakings. Every Commonwealth member, including South Africa, committed
itself to provide assistance to African members. However, each would decide,
according to the limits of its resources, on the level and allocation of this 
74assistance. Like the Colombo Plan, donor countries would make their own 
arrangements bilaterally with recipients. Unlike the Colombo Plan, there 
would be no joint institution to facilitate cooperation and monitor 
programmes under the plan. Instead, as the Canadian government had wished, 
the CECC would review SCAAP annually.
The creation of SCAAP showed how the countries of the 'old' Commonwealth 
could be responsive to the 'winds of change.' In fact, it showed them 
managing them fairly well. While SCAAP resulted from Nkrumah's initiative, 
it showed the older members in control. However, if anyone had ever 
seriously entertained the notion that progress on African assistance would 
divert attention from the issue of South Africa, they were to be sorely 
disappointed.
South African Membership; Round II - 1961
In the aftermath of the 1960 CPMM, the course of Canadian policy on 
South Africa was far from decided. Diefenbaker, returning as he did 
convinced of South Africa's 'plausible case' and, as he told the House of
71
Memorandum: Special Commonwealth African Aid Programme, 16 February,
1961. PAC RG 25 ACC 85-6/551 vol 3447 file 1-1961/1 part 1. Briefs Prepared
for the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers (1961).
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Commons, believing "more certainly" in the need to preserve the principle of
75non-interference in the internal affairs of members, seemed predisposed to 
finding a compromise. He was not, however, prepared to give the South 
African government a free ride. When Verwoerd told the South African 
Parliament on 2 July, 1960, of his confidence that the combined influence of 
Britain, Australia and Canada within the Commonwealth would ensure that South
African membership would continue, Diefenbaker assured his cabinet
76 77colleagues and the country, via the House of Commons, that he had not
said anything at the CPMM which could be so construed. This, he told
Cabinet, was obviously an attempt to influence the outcome of the yet-to-be
announced South African referendum.
The victory of the republican side in the South African referendum on 5 
October made a final resolution of the South Africa question unavoidable.
Soon after the vote, planning got underway for another CPMM to be held in 
March, 1961. Alongside this planning was a vigorous effort on the part of 
the British government to ensure that South Africa's application for
70
continued membership would be approved. The British position was that in 
the past re-admission for members adopting republican constitutions had been 
automatic and that the South African request for continued membership should 
be treated solely on its constitutional merits as had the others. But
75John G. Diefenbaker, "The Expanding Commonwealth. Speech to the House 
of Commons on 16 May, 1960", Statements and Speeches 60/19. (Ottawa: 
Department of External Affairs, 1960) p. 2.
76PAC RG 2 vol 2747. Cabinet Conclusions, 5 July, 1960.
77Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (3rd Session, 24th 
Parliament, vol V, 5 July, 1960) p. 5725.
78PAC RG 2 vol 2747. Cabinet Conclusions, 10 November, 1960.
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regardless of the precedents, by now it was inconceivable that the issues of 
apartheid and South Africa's continued membership would be disentangled.
Canada now needed a definite policy, but at the official level, DEA and
Bryce, fresh from the CSG exercise, were still proffering divergent opinions.
The Canadian government was still unwilling to take the lead in pushing South
Africa out of the Commonwealth. When Cabinet reconsidered the issue in
February before the March CPMM, there was no support for doing so and much
apprehension that the government would suffer public recrimination in Canada
79were it to take the lead. Green, the SSEA, was one of those most against 
Canada taking a leading role in expelling South Africa. His department 
continued to seek a compromise enabling South Africa to stay, or at least 
ensuring that if South Africa went, it left on its own initiative as might 
happen if the prime ministers endorsed a strong declaration in support or 
racial equality.
The arguments for supporting South Africa's expulsion were also potent, 
if less widely held. Rather than weakening the Commonwealth by dividing it 
and introducing an intrusive aspect, expelling South Africa could strengthen 
it as a multiracial organization. The previous September, when considering 
the Canadian position at the United Nations, public expectations of Canadian 
behaviour in the wake of Diefenbaker's personal initiative in creating a Bill 
of Rights for Canada had weighed heavily in favour of Canada voting for a 
resolution condemning South Africa as had the implications for Canada's
79PAC RG 2 vol 6176. Cabinet Conclusions, 11 February and 25 February,
1961.
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on
relations with developing countries. The same arguments were still valid.
This was very much a minority view in Cabinet where the "the great majority
01
- in fact almost all" - were opposed to it. However, even if the Canadian
government was not actively seeking South Africa's expulsion, Diefenbaker was
not prepared to grant automatic readmission. He was willing to have South
Africa as a Commonwealth member. He said as much in his correspondence with
Verwoerd, much to the South African prime minister's confusion and irritation
when he compared Diefenbaker's public statement's with his private 
01
letters. What Diefenbaker needed was a reason, any reason, to allow South 
Africa to stay.
The gesture towards reform which Diefenbaker had urged at his meetings 
with Louw in 1960 had still not come. A brief prepared by DEA in the lead-up
to the March CPMM discerned some encouraging signs in South African
83society. It cited growing sentiment against apartheid among South African 
churches, including two strong wings of the Dutch Reform Church, the church 
of the dominant white Afrikaners. As well, the still white supremacist 
opposition United Party and the smaller Progressive Party had indicated a 
willingness to offer concessions such as extending the franchise to all on 
the basis of income and education. These examples, however, were isolated
80PAC RG 2 vol 2747. Cabinet Conclusions, 16 September, 1960.
81Interview with Alvin Hamilton [ex-minister of agriculture] in: Peter 
Stursberg, Diefenbaker: Leadership Gained 1956-62. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto, 1975) p. 163.
82Note for the Record. Meeting between Prime Minister and Dr. Verwoerd, 7 
March, 1961. PRO PREM 11/3535. Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers,
1961: Discussions on Continued Membership of South Africa in Commonwealth.
Memorandum: South Africa's Application to Remain a Member of the 
Commonwealth, 4 February, 1961. PAC RG 25 ACC 85-6/551 vol 3447 file 1-1961/1 
part 1. Briefs Prepared for the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers
(1961).
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instances with long tern hope rather than signs of a fundamental realignment 
of South African politics. From the South African government there was 
nothing.
South Africa's government was aware of the potential difficulties it 
faced in continuing the country's Commonwealth membership. Since it was 
unwilling to modify its internal policies, it sought some other means to turn 
the tide of events. In this it had a diligent ally in the British 
government. Verwoerd and Macmillan, consulted frequently in the lead-up to 
the March meeting and met privately just before it. Macmillan's 
determination to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth was obvious and like 
those who saw membership of an apartheid government as incompatible with 
their vision of the Commonwealth, this determination was based on a specific 
conception of the Commonwealth. In his talks with Verwoerd, Macmillan 
touched on this and "argued that it was now a sphere of influence and was not 
an organisation based on a principle."84 The forthcoming CPMM, then, would 
be a proving ground for different ideas of the Commonwealth.
The British government considered various tactics to thwart efforts to 
expel South Africa at the meeting. One was to reverse the unanimity rule 
opponents of South Africa implied and insist on a unanimous expression of
oc
intent to expel South Africa. Another was to suggest excluding the South 
African government from Commonwealth consultation until it abandoned 
apartheid, but allow membership to continue otherwise. There was a risk that 
the South African government might then leave, but at least it would be on
84Note for the Record. Meeting between Prime Minister and Dr. Verwoerd, 7 
March, 1961. PRO PREM 11/3535.
88 Ibid.
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its own initiative. Macmillan preferred, however, to keep the subject of 
apartheid out of the discussion altogether. Since he did not see this as 
practicable, his plan was to try to keep the subjects of apartheid and
continued membership separate. The biggest danger to this plan, he thought,
87came not from a leader from the developing world, but from Diefenbaker.
Should Diefenbaker insist on discussing racial policies with the
constitutional item, all Macmillan could do was try to have that meeting in
private, attended only by prime ministers, with no officials present and thus
no record kept. This assessment of Diefenbaker was, perhaps, more a
reflection of his unpredictability than anything else. Despite many public
statements beforehand opposing racial discrimination, including a speech in
Belfast on 4 March, 1961, in which he went slightly further and pondered the
00
effect of discrimination on the Commonwealth, Diefenbaker had refused to 
commit himself. Little did anyone suspect that once he got to London, 
Diefenbaker would favour more delay and reconsideration of the issue latter.
The much anticipated meeting began 8 March, 1961. The first days were 
occupied with the usual array of international issues. Discussion on South 
Africa did not begin until 13 March. Before then, searching for delay, 
Diefenbaker and Bryce (who still personally advocated actively expelling 
South Africa) discussed the possibility of suggesting that at the next
Commonwealth meeting, a Commonwealth declaration of principles should be
89considered. The idea of a declaration of some sort had been circulating
^Minute from Brook to Macmillan, 6 March, 1961. PRO PREM 11/3535.
87Note for the Record. Meeting between Prime Minister and Dr. Verwoerd, 7 
March. 1961. PRO PREM 11/3535.
83"Commonly Accepted Standards", Globe and Mail. (7 March, 1961).
89Teletype 11 from Bryce to SSEA and USSEA, 10 March, 1961. PAC MG 30 
E163 vol 18. Norman Robertson Papers. Personal Correspondence, 1961 (file 2).
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in Ottawa since January, and Diefenbaker had mentioned it before leaving 
Canada in an address to the prestigious Canadian Club in Toronto and again at 
the airport on his arrival in London. It was the type of thing which 
appealed to Diefenbaker. He had championed the Canadian Bill of Rights and
two years previously had called for a declaration of 'freedom's creed' by
90Western powers to clearly establish the moral basis of the Cold War.
Bryce reported back to Ottawa that Diefenbaker was
presently considering the manner in which this might be related to 
the South Africa issue and the possibility of having the conference 
this year make some mention of such a declaration in connection 
with its decision on [the] South African issue.
This solution maintained the link between the issues of membership and racial
policy, but temporally separating them by dealing with the one immediately 
while putting off the more contentious issue until later. Delay, however, 
proved impossible.
On 13 March, Verwoerd opened the meeting with a formal statement of
South Africa's intent to become a republic on 31 May, 1961. By prior
arrangement, Nehru spoke immediately afterwards and Diefenbaker followed.
The Canadian prime minister began in a conciliatory manner, talking of South 
Africa's valuable contributions to the Commonwealth. He then denounced 
apartheid and warned that South Africa's association with the Commonwealth 
would damage its credibility and value to other members. Finally, he 
suggested that since South Africa was not yet a republic, it would be
90John G. Diefenbaker, "The Need for a Declaration of Freedom's Creed. 
Speech to the Convocation of the University of Toronto, 12 January, 1959", 
Statements and Speeches 59/5. (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1959).
91Teletype 11 from Bryce to SSEA and USSEA, 10 March, 1961. PAC MG 30 
E163 vol 18. Norman Robertson Papers. Personal Correspondence, 1961 (file 2).
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97premature to act. In the meantime, he urged members to consider his idea 
of drafting a declaration of Commonwealth principles for the next CPMM. In 
the addresses of the other prime ministers which followed, a divide between 
the 'old' Commonwealth and the 'new' was unmistakable. Diefenbaker alone 
among the prime ministers of the 'old' Commonwealth accepted the link between 
the constitutional question and the apartheid question.
In the afternoon, Verwoerd gave a lengthy defence of apartheid. In 
answering the questions which followed, he showed no willingness to 
compromise, especially with respect to Diefenbaker's renewed request for 
modifications to parliamentary representation. After a short recess, 
Macmillan suggested a formula whereby Commonwealth leaders would consent to 
South African membership and issue a declaration condemning apartheid. The 
reaction was generally unfavourable on the grounds that the two elements were
gg
incompatible. At day's end, the issue was unresolved, but Diefenbaker's 
preferred route was definitely blocked. He would have to make a definitive 
choice, and with Verwoerd's refusal to compromise, Diefenbaker had more in 
common with the leaders of the 'new' Commonwealth than the 'old'.
Macmillan too saw which way the wind was blowing. Following the 
meetings of 13 March, he urged Verwoerd to make a gesture towards internal 
reform and undertake to exchange high commissioners with every member of the 
Commonwealth. Verwoerd flatly refused. He cited members' acceptance at the 
1960 CPMM of Ghana's decision to become a republic without any conditions for 
that country to return to democracy in order remain a "member of a
92Teletype 19 from the Prime Minister's Delegation in London to the SSEA 
and USSEA in Ottawa, 13 March, 1961. PAC MG 30 E163 vol 18. Norman Robertson 
Papers. Personal Correspondence, 1961 (file 2).
93Ibid.
Commonwealth which is based on democratic principles."94 Moreover, Malaya 
had never been asked to discard the discriminatory clauses in its 
constitution. As for exchanging high commissioners, Verwoerd saw no need to 
exchange them with members such as New Zealand or the soon to be admitted 
Sierra Leone because the level of relations did not demand it and other 
members such as India, Nigeria and Ghana were hostile to South Africa. What 
he might be able to accept, however, was a solution whereby members would 
accept South African membership and make a separate statement denouncing 
racial discrimination. The talks on 14 March were devoted to various drafts 
of a possible communique embodying these elements put forward by Macmillan. 
Discussion ranged back and forth as to whether the condemnation of South 
Africa was too strong, not strong enough, too much interference in the 
country's internal affairs, or a necessary statement of principle.
Diefenbaker was now definitely in the anti-South Africa camp, but demanding 
the statement as a means to keep South Africa in, not forcing it out. He was 
not seeking a statement Verwoerd could not accept, but without a change in 
apartheid, this was the minimum Diefenbaker could accept. At the end of the 
sessions on 14 March, the situation Verwoerd faced was that South African 
membership could continue if he accepted a final communique with a statement 
condemning apartheid in severe terms and "stating that the principle of non­
discrimination in respect of race and colour [was] basic to the multi racial
QC
Commonwealth." South Africa would not be asked to subscribe to the 
declaration, a concession of sorts, but the government would then be faced 
with the dilemma as to whether it really wished to be a member of a
94Dr. H.F.Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa, to Macmillan, 14 
March, 1961. PRO PREM 11/3535.
qc
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Commonwealth where all the other members had made a declaration of this sort. 
Verwoerd had the night to consider his position, but it was now "up to South 
Africa to decide whether or not to remain as a member under these 
conditions.
When the prime ministers reconvened the next day a compromise appeared 
97possible. Verwoerd agreed to the formula combining acceptance of South
African membership with a statement condemning apartheid and establishing
98non-discrimination as a fundamental Commonwealth principle. The only 
hitch was Verwoerd's demand for the opportunity to state South Africa's 
argument in more detail. Diefenbaker and Nehru protested that this would 
give the South African perspective too much prominence. There followed 
escalating attacks from leaders representing the 'new' Commonwealth, 
including indications from some, such as Nkrumah, that they might have to 
reconsider their country's membership if South Africa remained a member.
After a recess called by Macmillan to let things cool off, Verwoerd announced 
that he was withdrawing South Africa's request for continued membership.
The dire hints that South African membership might be incompatible with 
membership of some other members from the developing world only drew more 
attention to a factor of which Diefenbaker and the other Commonwealth leaders 
were already well aware. The issue of South Africa would set the tone of the 
future Commonwealth. On the Sunday before the discussions on South Africa
96Ibid.
97More detailed accounts of this meeting are contained in Hayes, "South 
Africa's Departure from the Commonwealth", International History Review, pp. 
473-6 and Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, pp. 185-6.
98Teletype 23 from Prime Minster's Delegation in London to the SSEA and 
USSEA in Ottawa, 15 March, 1961. PAC MG 30 E163 vol 18. Norman Robertson 
Papers. Personal Correspondence 1961 (file 2).
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began, an article by Julius Nyerere, the chief minister of Tanganyika,
appeared in a national newspaper in Britain. In it, he warned that without
some change in South Africa, Tanganyika could not join the Commonwealth after 
99independence. On his return to Canada, Diefenbaker cited this article and 
other similar statements as an important factor in shaping an outcome which 
"foreshadowed the course and promise of the future".100 It was, 
nevertheless, a future course with its own momentum. Diefenbaker had not 
shaped it, he had only recognized its direction.
Diefenbaker's role, especially at the final meeting is easy to 
overstate.101 He had not led the pressure on South Africa. His importance 
lay with the fact that he was the only member of the 'old' Commonwealth to 
side with the African and Asian members and so, like St.Laurent and Pearson 
over Suez, prevented a clear division by race. Diefenbaker, most of his 
Cabinet, and most of his officials were naturally inclined towards a solution 
which would have kept South Africa within the Commonwealth. But when the 
choice came, as it eventually did, between maintaining the Commonwealth as an 
effective bridge to the developing world and possibly sacrificing that
99Julius Nyerere, "Commonwealth Choice: South Africa or Us", The 
Observer. (12 March, 1961)
100John G. Diefenbaker, "A Major Test for the Commonwealth. Statement in 
the House of Commons, 17 March, 1961", Statements and Speeches 61/3. (Ottawa: 
Department of External Affairs, 1961) p. 7.
Basil Robinson mentions a direct plea prior to the meetings from Nyerere to 
Diefenbaker with a similar warning. See: Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, p. 
180.
101As do Diefenbaker in One Canada: The Years of Achievement, pp.208-21 
and Menzies in his account of the meetings contained in Robert Menzies, 
Afternoon Light: Some Memoirs of Men and Events. (London: Cassell, 1967) pp. 
194-212. Nehru's biographer ascribes the Canadian prime minister a 
supporting rather than leading role which Robinson concurs. See Sarvepalli 
Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. Volume Three: 1956-1964. (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1984) p. 159; and Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, p. 186.
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bridge, the former could be the only route. Diefenbaker was fortunate in 
that his calculation as to Canada's balance of interest with respect to South 
African membership was relatively easy and straight forward. Notwithstanding 
trade and other links with South Africa, Canada's overriding concern was for 
the Commonwealth. There, Canada's principal interest was its maintenance as 
an effective vehicle for dialogue with developing states. South African 
membership jeopardized this. If the issue had to be resolved immediately, 
there was little difficulty in calculating how Canada's interests were best 
served. Had he faced a situation such as that which confronted Macmillan, 
Diefenbaker, always with an eye to the domestic political implications of any 
action, would have had a much more difficult decision.
Settling Down with the Third Commonwealth
South Africa's voluntary withdrawal represented a victory for the 'new' 
Commonwealth. It marked the first time that a decision was taken at a CPMM 
in the face of concerted opposition from Britain. Previously, British prime 
ministers had not always achieved their aims, but they had not had to accept 
such a reversal. The new Commonwealth relationship was shaping up quite 
differently from the old one. If the 'third' Commonwealth was to be an 
effective instrument for countries such as Canada and Britain to pursue 
policy objectives, this was something with which they would have to cope.
This soon became apparent in handling the aftermath of South Africa's exit.
South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth became effective on 31 
May, 1961, when its republican constitution came into force. There were both 
bilateral and Commonwealth implications to the event. For Commonwealth 
members, like Canada, maintaining relations with the new republic, these had
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to be removed from the Commonwealth framework. The Canadian government
wanted to end the privileges it extended to South Africa, but in a manner
102which did not seem vindictive. Thus, even though the citizenship act no 
longer recognized South Africa as a Commonwealth country, South African 
citizens permanently resident in Canada retained their status as British 
subjects and students on Commonwealth scholarships were allowed to finish 
their studies. Canada also continued to extend preferential treatment to 
South African imports because these were based on a bilateral agreement.
With the end of its membership. South Africa was excluded from most 
Commonwealth activities. This included general Commonwealth consultations 
such as through the CECC, continuing bodies such as the CEC, and of course, 
the CPMMs. It also necessitated South Africa's withdrawal from more than 
thirty official and semi-official bodies which facilitated various kinds of 
technical co-operation. But even here, the break was not clean. There were 
two exceptions to this rule. South Africa continued to participate in the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission and the Commonwealth Area Communications 
Scheme for Merchant and Naval Shipping which relied on facilities at the Cape 
was extended for three years.103 There was some attempt to further broaden 
South African residual participation in Commonwealth functional organizations 
further. This was unsuccessful because the changes which were coming to the 
Commonwealth as a whole were even more evident in formal Commonwealth 
institutions. Unlike the Commonwealth as whole and CPMMs in particular, 
these institutions had defined structures, including voting procedures. The
Memorandum: Withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth, 23 
August, 1962. PAC RG 25 vol 3448 file 1-1962/1. Canadian Papers Prepared for 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, London, September, 1962. Volume II.
103Ibid.
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effect of changing membership patterns was, therefore, even clearer here than 
at the CPMMs where such formality was absent.
Soon after South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and 
Commonwealth institutions became official, the Canadian scientific liaison 
officer in London, the official responsible for coordinating Canada's 
relations within many of the functional Commonwealth organizations of a 
scientific and technical nature, reported that South Africa was anxious to 
remain a member of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux (CAB).10^ Canadian 
officials in the Department of Agriculture, the functional department 
concerned, found this idea attractive. From a financial perspective, South 
Africa's withdrawal left a budget deficit corresponding to the eight percent 
of the total budget which South Africa had previously contributed, a sum of 
approximately £38,000 per year at the time. Canada, as the second largest 
contributor after Britain (approximately seventeen percent compared with 
Britain's twenty five percent), would be expected to carry a large portion of 
this shortfall.105 Moreover, South African scientists made valuable 
contributions to the work of the bureaux, especially in areas such as 
veterinary science in African climates. For these reasons, officials 
advocated allowing South Africa to maintain an association with the bureaux 
in the same way as Ireland and Sudan which had associate status with all the 
benefits of membership except voting rights. The head of the scientific 
information section at the Department of Agriculture, who had been part of 
the Canadian delegation to the 1960 CAB Review Conference reported that on
Memorandum from Glazebrook: Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux. 4 
July. 1961. PAC RG 25 86-7/414 vol 10 file 10337-40 part 2. Activities of the 
Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux.
105SC Barry, Deputy Minister, Department of Agriculture, to Robertson, 12
July, 1961. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 10 file 10337-40 part 2.
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the basis of oral statements there, India, Pakistan, Ghana and Nigeria might 
favour continued South African membership.106 Officials at DEA and the 
Cabinet were amenable to continued South African CAB participation so long as
there really was general agreement.
In fact, the South African government was not as anxious to remain a 
member as the scientific community supposed. When the Secretary of the CAB 
broached the subject with the South African ambassador to Britain, he was 
told that the South African government was only prepared to consider
rejoining the bureaux if a formal invitation were extended detailing the
107nature of any proposed association. When the CAB Executive Council met 
in late October, 1961, the subject of a possible invitation was on the 
agenda. The bureaux were essentially scientific and technical institutions
and thus the meetings were ordinarily attended by scientific experts. But on
this occasion countries such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone, which had never
before sent representatives to bureaux meetings sent personnel from their
10fthigh commission staff. Representatives of the 'old' Commonwealth 
supported the offer of membership to South Africa on financial and scientific 
grounds. Representatives from the 'new' Commonwealth opposed this so 
vigorously that those from the 'old' Commonwealth did not even bother to
10Memorandum: Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux. By George Glazebrook, 
Commonwealth Division, 4 July, 1961. PAC RG 25 86-7/414 vol 10 file 10337-40 
part 2.
107gir Thomas Scrivener, Secretary of the Commonwealth Agricultural 
Bureaux, to Members of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux Executive 
Council, 20 July, 1961. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 10 file 10337-40 part 2.
108J.G. Malloch, Chief Scientific Liaison Officer, to Benjamin Rogers, 
Canadian Deputy High Commissioner in Britain, 3 November, 1961. PAC RG 25 ACC 
86-7/414 vol 10 file 10337-40 part 2.
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argue the other side of the case. The matter was not brought to a formal
109vote to avoid showing a division within the membership.
What appeared to be emerging in the CAB was control of the institution 
by the African and Asian members. A year later, in a review of Canadian 
scientific relations with the Commonwealth, the CAB were cited as the 
clearest example of "the changes and increasing difficulties ...coming to the 
fore with the increase in the membership of the Commonwealth.”11® While the 
situation whereby the countries shouldering most of the financial burden were 
a minority was not new, the report detected "a change in atmosphere in the 
last two years."111 Specifically, there appeared to be a growing tendency 
for the newer members to group together to outvote the older members and to 
do so with political motivations even when voting on scientific issues. The 
issue of South Africa was only one such instance but more generally:
There have been a series of actions which can only be interpreted 
as leading to the control of the organization by the countries 
which contribute least to its up-keep financially. Many of the 
representatives of the newer countries take little or no interest 
in the working of the organization and only turn up at Council 
meetings when there are matters to be discussed which may lead to 
strengthening their position, or which have some possible political 
significance.
On some occasions, including when the issue of South Africa had been 
discussed, the report claimed that Indian and Pakistani representatives 
canvassed the attendance of other representatives beforehand. Another
109Ibid.
110 Memorandum from Malloch: Commonwealth Scientific Relations. March
1962. PAC RG 25 vol 3729 file 5929-40 part 2. British Commonwealth Scientific 
Collaboration Committee - proposals re: (1946-62). p. 10.
111Ibid.
112Ibid.
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tendency, evident both at the CAB Executive Committee and at the quinquennial 
review conference in 1960 was for the newer countries, led by Pakistan, to 
press for the bureaux to assume new development oriented functions beyond 
their traditional abstracting services and to disperse the bureaux throughout 
the Commonwealth.
The challenges and frustrations of dealing with the changing 
Commonwealth for those comfortable with the 'old' were, perhaps, best summed 
up in an exchange of letters between Menzies and Macmillan at the beginning 
of 1962. Menzies complained of the Commonwealth's changing nature resulting 
from its changing composition and highlighted by the events concerning South
African membership. He stated bluntly: "The plain English of it is that the
113new Commonwealth has nothing like the appeal for us the old one had.” 
Macmillan shared many of these frustrations, replying:
The troublesome way the newly independent nations behave in the 
United Nations is very similar to the way in which the members of 
what we call the new Commonwealth tend to behave inside the
Commonwealth - especially at the Prime Ministers' Conference  I
am bound to confess that I now shrink from any Commonwealth meeting 
because I know how troublesome it will be, whatever the subjects 
immediately under discussion.
These were the same types of misgivings which had prompted misgivings within 
the Canadian Cabinet, including from Diefenbaker, about the prospect of free 
immigration within the Commonwealth somehow being foisted on Canada by the 
new members. Even if part of Diefenbaker longed for a Commonwealth he had 
never experienced, his government forged ahead with cementing ties with the 
emerging 'third' Commonwealth. It was, in the end, the exigencies of this
113Menzies to Macmillan, 15 January, 1962. PRO PREM 11/3665. 
Correspondence with Menzies on Future of Commonwealth (1962).
114Macmillan to Menzies, 8 February, 1962. PRO PREM 11/3665.
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new Commonwealth that had conditioned Canadian responses to issues such as 
the admission of small states and the continuation of South Africa's 
membership.
Changes resulting from the admission of many new and often small members 
would reduce even further the tenuous affinities between members and increase 
the already wide diversity in political and economic interests among members, 
but it was the only means of maintaining the Commonwealth's effectiveness as 
a bridge to the developing world. The South African withdrawal demonstrated 
how much of the old Commonwealth had been swept away, but it was a 
precondition for accommodating new members. As dramatic as the changes in 
the Commonwealth were, there was basic continuity in Canadian policy towards 
it. Canadian policy accepted the flow of events and went with what worked 
rather than trying to direct them to make them work towards something else. 
This was obvious in the attitude towards membership and aid where traditional 
Canadian openness continued. Even on South Africa, where Diefenbaker's final 
position marked a departure from the past practice of separating distaste for 
apartheid from the Commonwealth relationship, the critical consideration was 
preserving the Commonwealth 'bridge. Adapting to the Commonwealth's 'winds 
of change' was relatively easy for the Canadian government because its 
interests were best served by precisely that. There were no messy trade-offs 
such as those confronting Britain. Unlike the failed Commonwealth trade 
initiatives which tried to use the Commonwealth for a purpose for which it 
was unsuited, Canadian policy and objectives better matched what the 
Commonwealth could realistically be expected to do. All that Canadian 
interests required was that the Commonwealth serve as a bridge to Africa just 
as it had to Asia, and Canadian actions tried constructively to make this 
possible.
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CHAPTER 6 - THE NORTH WIND OF CHANGE: BRITAIN AND EUROPE
Adjusting to change within the Commonwealth at the beginning of the 
1960s was not simply a matter of the 'old' Commonwealth adapting to the new. 
Members also had to consider Britain's evolving relations with Europe. Like 
the issues of membership and South Africa, Britain's application for EEC- 
membership raised questions about the Commonwealth's future; its role for 
members; and the glue which would hold it together. The Canadian 
government's response was in marked contrast to the general pattern of 
Canada's Commonwealth relations. Whereas in most instances - those in which 
the stimulus for change came from new members - Canada showed itself to be 
extremely accommodative, in this case, the Diefenbaker government, for the 
most part against the advice of its officials, tried to thwart change. The 
root cause of the differences within the Canadian government were varying 
assessments not only of the economic consequences to Canada, but also of the 
effect on the Commonwealth of Britain joining the EEC.
At stake were the Commonwealth's role as an economic unit and Britain's 
centrality to this. These had lasted since the first Commonwealth.
Accepting changes to them was more difficult than accepting the other aspects 
of the third Commonwealth for a prime minister who liked to emphasize the 
Commonwealth's subsidiary role in Canadian foreign policy, that of a 
counterweight to the United States. Diefenbaker, seeing Canadian and 
Commonwealth interests as identical, embarked on a personal crusade to save 
the Commonwealth. It was, however, a misplaced effort which served neither 
and had little to do with the Commonwealth's role in Canadian foreign policy.
244
Finding a Solution to Europe: First The EFTA
Britain's trade relations with Europe had been keenly followed in 
Commonwealth economic discussions since the launching of Plan G in the autumn 
of 1956. Then, the British government argued that Britain's involvement in 
European trading arrangements was both economically necessary in view of the 
impending establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
politically desirable in terms of a strong and united Western Europe.1 
Before its electoral defeat, the St.Laurent government, notwithstanding its 
concerns regarding the possible loss of British markets, had concurred. This 
was, with varying degrees of wariness, also accepted by the prime ministers 
of the other Commonwealth members, including Diefenbaker, at the 1957 CPMM. 
Later, the September, 1957, Mont Tremblant finance ministers' meeting 
endorsed the British proposals for an 'outward' looking European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA) encompassing the six EEC states, Britain and other OEEC members
wishing to participate, on the grounds that it would broaden the advantages
2
of European unity by expanding world trade. Given the implications for 
Commonwealth members of a European trade arrangement involving Britain, the 
ministers also agreed on the need for effective and continuous consultation.
The determination to be consulted throughout any negotiations 
underscored the high salience of this aspect of British policy for other 
Commonwealth members. For each except Canada, Britain was by far the main
Memorandums U.K. Association with Europe and Developments in Other 
European Organisations. (Brief prepared by the Foreign Office, GEN 585), May, 
1957. PRO DO 35/7129 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting 1957: U.K. 
Association with Europe and Developments in Other European Organisations, 
[file WES 165/33/3]
2
Meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers, Mont Tremblant, Quebec. 
Communique, 1 October, 1957. PRO DO 35/5642 Proceedings of Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers Meeting, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, 1957. [file EC 537/88/16]
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trading partner. For Canada, Britain was the second largest market, and, 
although dwarfed Canada's trade with the US, was important beyond its nominal 
value for a government anxious to reduce Canadian dependence on the American 
market. Diefenbaker was also acutely aware of the importance of wheat sales, 
the largest component of Canadian exports to Britain, to his political base 
in Western Canada.
Agriculture was a sensitive area for other Commonwealth members as well. 
The EEC states, however, insisted that in exchange for British manufactured 
goods' duty free entry to their markets, they should gain easier access to 
British markets for their agricultural goods. As early as the summer of 
1957, it was evident that the talks would not be successful if the British 
government refused concessions on agriculture.3 Other contentious areas 
included external tariffs and commercial policy, internal economic and social 
policies and institutional arrangements.4 As before with respect to the ECSC 
and the Treaty of Rome, the British government resisted yielding national 
sovereignty in the manner envisaged by the architects of this new Europe. 
Differences over the degree of policy harmonization required from Britain 
seemed, like those over agriculture, irreconcilable. French President 
Charles de Gaulle was particularly obstreperous. Thus, as the 1 January, 
1959, implementation date for trade discrimination by the six signatories of 
the Treaty of Rome against non-members approached, the EFTA negotiations were 
stalled.
3C.C.(57)62(1), Free Trade Area, 27 August, 1957. PRO CAB 128/31 part 2. 
Cabinet Conclusions.
4Great Britain. Negotiations for a European Free Trade Area. Report on 
the Course of Negotiations up to December. 1958. Cmnd 648 (Londons HMSO, 
1959)
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Such were the problems facing the British government when Diefenbaker 
visited London at the end of October, 1958, to begin his world tour. Fresh 
from the 'successful' CTEC where the British government had again assured 
Commonwealth members that their interests would be protected in any deal with 
Europe, Diefenbaker's generally understanding attitude towards British policy 
did not stop him from publicly extolling the virtues of Commonwealth trade 
and economic cooperation.5 He did, nevertheless, undertake to do what he 
could to help the British.
Diefenbaker's next stop was Paris. The position he took in talks with 
de Gaulle on European trading arrangements was analogous in most respects to 
Britain's. He stressed that the Canadian government was not opposed to the 
idea of European integration, but did not think that this should be done 
behind barriers to cut Canadian access to existing and future markets. When 
de Gaulle responded with a reference to Commonwealth preferences and the 
objectives of the recently concluded CTEC, Diefenbaker replied that the 
preferences were not of great importance and that their "most important 
element was more of a sentimental character."6 While not specifically 
intended to convince de Gaulle that the Commonwealth relationship posed no 
obstacles to British participation in Europe, the support for a liberal, that 
is open and outward looking, Europe was clear.
Diefenbaker, "Canada and the Commonwealth". Excerpts from a Speech to 
the Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association, November 4, 1958. 
Statements and Speeches 58/44.
6Telegram from the Canadian Embassy in Paris. Prime Minister's Talks 
with General de Gaulle. 6 November, 1958. PAC RG 25 ACC 25/2/88 vol 3523 file 
12687-M-1-40. Prime Minister's Tour 1958: Discussions with Foreign and 
Commonwealth Leaders.
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The Canadian government was very concerned about the inability of 
European countries to reach an agreement before the advent of EEC 
discrimination against outsiders. It most emphatically did not want the 
problem solved through what seemed the most likely alternatives. A 
unilateral offer by the Six giving tariff reductions to all GATT countries 
but quota concessions only to OEEC members and a long term settlement 
involving British concessions at the expense of Commonwealth trade was 
undesirable.7 So too was the creation of a second European trading group 
which would crystalize the division of Western Europe. For these reasons, 
the Canadian government was willing to do what it could to help overcome the 
obstacles to the British proposals thrown up by de Gaulle.
The problem for Britain was that Canadian officials and ministers felt 
there was little that Canada could effectively do to help Britain. The 
Canadians considered Diefenbaker, and Canada along with him, to be in de 
Gaulle's 'bad books'. During their November talks, Diefenbaker had disagreed 
strenuously with de Gaulle's suggestion for an American-British-French 
triumvirate to direct NATO's policy. After discussing possible Canadian 
intervention with Fleming on 1 December, 1958, Gamer reported:
the Canadians were in rather bad odour in Paris since General de 
Gaulle was very jealous of the intimate arrangements for 
consultation which existed between the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Canada, and was irritated that Canada was not only 
usurping a position which France thought to be hers by right but 
appeared to be opposed to France securing a special position for 
herself.
7
Gamer to Rumbold, 3 December, 1958. PRO DO 35/8381. Canadian Attitudes 
to European Negotiations 1958-60. [file EC 215/1/3]
^Garner to Rumbold, 2 December, 1958. PRO DO 35/8381.
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The Canadian government did approach the American government about the 
possibility of the United States trying to bring about a settlement of the
g
EFTA question, but there was little else, Canadian officials told the 
British, that they could do. If at times, British officials despaired of 
the Canadian's inability to look beyond narrow parochial interests in some 
trade matters, such as their obsession with the remnants of British dollar 
discrimination,10 at least they could find solace in the Canadian efforts to 
be as helpful as possible with respect to the EFTA as the lesser of two 
evils.
Whether or not the Six participated in the EFTA proposal made little 
difference as far as its effects on Canada. The Six, with their Treaty of 
Rome arrangement were a separate problem. Nevertheless, while Canada's trade 
with the Six was growing, its trade with Britain was still far more than with 
all of them combined. Maintaining Canadian access to the British market was 
the Canadian government's most important trade interest in Europe. The 
EFTA's provisions allowing the Scandinavian countries, whose economies were 
similar to Canada's except with respect to agriculture, to compete equally 
with Canada were unfortunate, but at least Canadian agricultural exports 
could continue. Before, during and after the 1 January deadline, the 
Canadian government never wavered in its support for the principle that any 
European trading arrangement should work towards furthering the GATT and 
expanding world trade more generally.11
g
Minute from MJ Moynihan, Assistant Secretary, CRO, to Costar,
6 January, 1959. PRO DO 35/8381.
10Minute from Moynihan, to Costar, 2 January, 1959; and Minute from 
Rumbold to Moynihan and Costar, 6 January, 1959. PRO DO 35/8381. See Chapter 
4 (draft 1) p. 57.
^Aide Memoire Handed to the Governments of the Six and the European 
Economic Commission by the Canadian Government, June, 1959. PRO DO 35/8381.
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The EFTA talks remained blocked and the unwanted second European trade 
group became a reality. In November, 1959, representatives from Britain, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal met in 
Stockholm to sign the treaty establishing the European Free Trade Association 
(also, and henceforth, EFTA). Under its terms an industrial free trade area 
between the signatories would come into effect in July, 1960. Failing to 
establish an association with the Six compatible with safeguarding Britain's 
national sovereignty and its Commonwealth links, Britain now had its own 
'Seven'.
The Canadian government was naturally concerned about the emerging 
division within Western Europe. The Berlin Crisis, precipitated by the 
November, 1958, announcement of Soviet intentions to terminate the Four Power 
occupation of Berlin and hand Soviet responsibilities over to the East German 
government, had underscored the need for continued Western political unity to 
confront Soviet policy in Europe. There were, then, important foreign policy 
interests at stake for Canada, but the Commonwealth's survival was not, 
initially, one of them. There was nothing during the final EFTA negotiations 
to indicate that the Canadian government was alarmed that Britain's new 
trading arrangements presaged a diminution of the Commonwealth's importance 
to Britain. Indeed, as the talks neared completion, the Canadian attitude 
towards them was extremely understanding. At the CECC's inaugural meeting in 
September, 1959, for example, the Australian and New Zealand representatives 
pressed for Commonwealth participation in the EFTA negotiations and a joint
Commonwealth position there. Fleming and the Canadian delegation, together
12with the South Africans, opposed such a development. With the subsiding
Memorandum to United Kingdom High Commissioners from Lintott,
8 October, 1959. PRO DO 35/8436 Report on the First Meeting of the
Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council, London, September, 1959. [file EC
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of the government's initial frenzy about Commonwealth trade issues, it was 
less pressing for Canada than for the Antipodean duo. The traditional 
Canadian resistance to joint 'Commonwealth positions' asserted itself and the 
Canadians argued that the EFTA was a matter of British domestic policy. As 
such, consultative mechanisms, such as the CECC, were the appropriate avenue 
for informing the British government of the interests of Commonwealth members 
and it was up to the British government to act with these in mind.
The British government expected more objections from the Canadian 
government about the EFTA than turned out to be the case. In a brief 
prepared for Home for talks with Green during a visit by the Canadian SSEA to 
London two weeks before the signing of the EFTA treaty, CRO officials 
observed that the EFTA would reverse preferences where applicable and deprive 
Canada of MFN status.13 The GATT provisions dealing with free trade areas 
permitted the latter, but officials expected some resistance from the 
Canadians not least because the 1947 Exchange of Letters eliminating 
contractual preferences had guaranteed Canada MFN status. Green, in his 
talks with British ministers did not enthusiastically embrace the EFTA but 
raised no positive objections. He was more concerned about the effect of 
political sub-groups within NATO, especially by reports of the scope of 
proposed political consultation among the Six.14 The Foreign Secretary 
reassured him that
537/88/26]
13Brief for the Secretary of State (for talks with Hr. Howard Green, 
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs). European Free Trade 
Association (E.F.T.A.) and the "the Seven and the Six”, 29 October, 1959. PRO 
DO 35/8381.
14Note of a Conversation at 10 Downing Street at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday,
November 3, 1959. PRO PREM 11/2607. Discussions with Hr. H. Green, Canadian 
Hinister for External Affairs During His Visit to the United Kingdom, 
November, 1959.
251
for geographical reasons, if for no others, the Seven could never 
be a political group. Its object was to keep Europe liberal in 
trade matters and to ensure that the Six did not become a close- 
knit protectionist group.
Green accepted this and added that "his understanding was that [Britain's] 
main object in forming the Seven was to put [itself] in a better position for 
negotiation with the Six."16
Ministers such as Green were much more obliging on developments in 
Europe than the, from the British view, less forthcoming Canadian officials. 
At the meeting between Green and Home, Robertson, who had been reappointed 
USSEA in October, 1958, after Leger's appointment Canadian ambassador to 
France, made it clear that he felt British objectives would be better
achieved through GATT, where, he felt, the French were then willing to be
17flexible. Three months later, when the president of the Board of Trade 
visited Ottawa in early February, 1960, for discussions with Canadian 
ministers and their officials, this dichotomy was still evident. Ministers 
were much more sympathetic towards the British position than their officials. 
The virtual end of dollar area discrimination in keeping with British 
commitments at the 1958 CTEC no doubt helped to put Canadian ministers in a 
positive frame of mind, as did the British resolve to exclude agriculture 
from the EFTA. This made it the lesser of two evils. Gamer, however, 
focused on the fact that ministers such as Fleming had what he considered a 
good grasp of the political implications of relations between the EEC and 
EFTA and for this reason raised no objections to the possible negative
16Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr. Howard 
Green, Canadian Minister for External Affairs, 2 November, 1959. Foreign 
Office Print November 5, 1959. PRO PREM 11/2607.
16Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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consequences for Canada. This gave Canadian officials less than their 
due and was an overly optimistic assessment of Canadian ministers' 
willingness to accept too much change in European trading patterns, but with 
no overt ministerial objections to developments thus far, it was not 
unreasonable. For his part, Diefenbaker, having had his hands burned on 
trade issues early in his tenure, seemed prepared to accept the British 
line.19
Ministerial views were, if anything, what had changed in Ottawa. The 
views of Canadian officials were unmodified. Gamer pointedly observed in a 
report to Home that in the background he saw:
the traditional 'doctrinaire' outlook of Canadian officialdom, 
their relish in moralising about the duties of others and their 
readiness to see themselves as the keeper of the GATT conscience 
and the guardians of the interests of 'the rest of the world.
However, they had a good appreciation of the political dynamics as Gamer
21well knew from his contacts with them. Canadian officials sympathized
with the broad political objectives of European integration, with the caveat
22that a rift within NATO threatened core Canadian interests. What 
preoccupied officials in DEA and other departments, such as Trade and 
Commerce, was the prospect that any resolution of the differences between the 
EEC and EFTA falling short of a full free trade area under GATT would create
18Dispatch 2 from Gamer to Home, 5 February, 1960. PRO DO 35/8381.
19Ibid.
20
Dispatch 2 from Gamer to Home, 5 February, 1960. PRO DO 35/8381.
21Letter 1200/9 from Gamer to Rumbold, 31 December, 1959.
PRO DO 35/8381.
22Brief II A 2: European Economic Developments (Department of Trade and 
Commerce), April, 1960. PAC RG 25 vol 3446 file 1-1960/3 part 2. Meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers: London, May, 1960 - Briefs.
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preferences at the expense of what was left of Canadian preferences in 
British markets and Canada's MFN access to all the markets in question. This 
was clearly stated by senior Canadian officials at the June, 1960, meeting of 
the UKCCC. They had supported the original British proposal for a broad, 
liberal European free trade area in 1956, but now Canadian officials
considered that such an area was now unrealistic and all that would result
23from talks between the EEC and EFTA would be a preferential arrangement. 
Canadian officials had always been prepared to bargain away preferences, but 
the situation as it was developing offered little prospect of Canada 
receiving compensation for the loss of preferences or MFN status.
The EFTA was not comparable to the EEC in terms of the size of the 
potential market. British intentions behind its creation had been defensive, 
but having this more limited EFTA did not entirely remove the need for 
Britain to establish some form of relationship with the larger EEC. How this
*  j
might be accomplished was unclear, even to the British government. One 
thing that was clear, notwithstanding Commonwealth markets' inability to 
ensure Britain's long term economic prosperity, as demonstrated by the meager 
results on trade of the 1958 trade conference and the failed initiative for 
free trade with Canada, the British government was not prepared to sacrifice 
close ties with the Commonwealth. These ties were only one aspect of a 
strong preference within the British government for a nationally determined, 
liberal trade policy, but they were an important element distinguishing 
Britain from its erstwhile European partners and their more collective and 
protectionist approach to trade.
23UKCCC(60)4 United Kingdom/Canada Continuing Committee. London, June 
1960. European Problems. Note by the Treasury, 23 June, 1960. PRO DO 35/8381.
Macmillan, Pointing the Wav, p. 58.
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The Commonwealth and Europe in a Global British Policy
The Commonwealth helped define Britain's global role, but that role came 
with costs. These included military expenditure, keeping a strong and stable 
pound and meeting the expectations from Commonwealth countries for 
development assistance. The Suez debacle demonstrated the precariousness of 
the return on this tremendous investment in status, especially regarding 
Britain's military capacity to act independently. The white paper on defence 
issued in April, 1957, reflected this conclusion and foreshadowed severe cuts
to Britain's military forces, including the elimination of several overseas
25garrisons. Ultimately, the white paper stressed, Britain's capacity to 
bear a heavy military burden rested on a strong economy. This was equally 
important to preserving other aspects of Britain's great power trappings, 
including leadership of the Commonwealth. And, just as Britain's military 
commitments were under review, so too was the Commonwealth's role in British 
policy.
The link between Britain's economy and its world position pervaded a 
1958 report on Britain's future in world affairs. This report was the 
product of a high level interdepartmental committee of officials, chaired by 
Brook and including the permanent under-secretaries of the Treasury, the 
Ministry of Defence, the Colonial Office, the CRO and the FO. The exercise, 
a FO initiative, reviewed Britain's overseas commitments in light of the 
available resources. The main issue, as the FO saw things at the outset, was 
whether Britain's economic situation at the beginning of 1958 and the 
government's financial policy designed to meet it, could be reconciled with
25Great Britain. White Paper on Defence. Cmnd 124. (Londons HMSO, 1957).
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26the expenditure necessary to maintain Britain's position in the world.
The FO and Treasury both agreed that if, for any reason, sterling weakened,
27Britain would be unable to remain a leading state in the world system.
The CRO held similar views, but framed them in terms of Britain's 
Commonwealth relationships and their importance to Britain's world position. 
The CRO, as it did before 1956, maintained that Britain's status relied 
heavily on maintaining a cohesive Commonwealth in which Britain played the 
leading role. Were the Commonwealth to disintegrate, Britain, in this view, 
would be reduced to being a continental European power because the
association with the Commonwealth enhanced Britain's influence with its
28allies and enhanced its global status. The cohesion of the Commonwealth 
itself depended on British leadership, and, Britain's ability to fulfill this 
leadership role rested on the strength of its economy and on the strength and 
stability of sterling. This increasingly questionable premise that the 
Commonwealth could somehow be managed to replace the Empire, including some 
of its economic functions, was reiterated in the final report.
In 1959, Macmillan ordered a more extensive examination of future
British foreign policy. Again, a critical consideration was how best to
29align Britain's commitments with available resources. The study's 
evaluation of the Commonwealth relationship suggested that outside the CRO, 
there was a growing willingness to submit the changing Commonwealth to more
26ZP 9/9/G Future Policy. Brief for a Meeting of Permanent Secretaries on 
4 February, 1958, 3 February, 1958. PRO FO 371/135625. Future of the United 
Kingdom in World Affairs.
27Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29ZP 25/110/G Future Policy Exercise: Terms of Reference Request by Mr. 
Ignatief. Minute by PS Ziegler, 3 December, 1959. PRO FO 371/143709. Future 
UK Foreign Policy.
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critical, and perhaps more realistic, analysis than previously was the case. 
Its general conclusions30 predicted that in the international setting 
conditioning the policy environment, the political, economic and ideological 
struggle between East and West would intensify. This would be especially 
true in the developing world.31 From this last point should have followed a 
prominent role for the Commonwealth in the study's recommendations on 
Britain's external policies in the approaching decade. But rather than 
emphasizing the advantages which Britain's leadership of the Commonwealth 
would lend its role in world affairs in this respect, the report foresaw a 
decline in Britain's relative power and influence and the Commonwealth's 
value was phrased more ambiguously than had previously been the case in 
similar reports.
The Commonwealth was considered to be "an entity both of particular
value to the United Kingdom and contributing generally to the stability and
32survival of the free world." In both roles, however, the report 
considered that the Commonwealth's precise importance was difficult to 
assess. This was, it conceded, because of its natures "while the 
Commonwealth would not survive if its ties were made definitive and tangible, 
their lack of definition makes their value largely imponderable."33 In
30The study on future policy, F0(60)l of 24 February, 1960, was 
circulated to cabinet as memorandum C.(60)35 and is closed for fifty years. 
The discussion of its contents is based on available extracts and descriptive 
minutes.
31Notes on Overseas Policies for Discussion with Hr. Diefenbaker, Hr. 
Henzies and Hr. Nash. ZP 25/39/G Future Policy Report: Points from the Report 
Which the Prime Hinister Hight be Advised to Hake at His Heeting with the 
Prime Hinisters of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, [n.d. - February/Harch, 
I960]. PRO FO 371/152132. Future UK Foreign Relations (1960).
32Extract from Future Policy Study 1960-70 FP(60), 24 February, 1960. A
Part I. PRO FO 371/161235. Future Development of the Commonwealth, 1961.
33Ibid.
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economic terms, the Commonwealth still accounted for a high proportion of 
British trade and offered a network of trading and financial interests based 
on sterling, but Commonwealth preferences were a wasting asset and as a whole
it was eroding as an economic unit. The report conceded that the
Commonwealth might continue as a source of political influence buttressing 
Britain's standing as a world power, especially as a link to the developing 
world. It was not the "priceless political asset" possession of nuclear 
weapons represented, but the assessment was still on balance that the 
Commonwealth was a net positive asset for Britain. It was also clear that 
Britain was more important to the Commonwealth than the Commonwealth was to 
Britain. What the report concluded a strong Britain and thus a viable 
Commonwealth required, was British participation in European economic
integration. Without it, the Commonwealth would either disintegrate, or at
the very least, and equally significant for British policy, British 
leadership of the Commonwealth would be weakened.35
In considering the report, the British government was mindful of the 
relative balance of British interests respecting full EEC membership. 
Membership could prevent several dangers. Most obvious, and important, was 
the danger of Britain's exclusion from Europe with the consequences of this 
for Britain's " standing in the Commonwealth and in the Atlantic Alliance and 
the cohesion of the Alliance itself."36 Joining would also alleviate 
American suspicions that Britain did not share the American attraction to the
United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Policy, 27 January, 1960. ZP 25/24/G 
Future Policy Working Group. Minutes of a Meeting Held on 26 January, 1960. 
PRO FO 371/152131.
35Extract from Future Policy Study 1960-70 FP(60), 24 February, 1960. A
Part I. PRO FO 371/161235.
36 Ibid.
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concept of a strong united Europe. It would also reduce the risk of the EEC 
replacing Britain as America's 'chief partner'. As members, Britain could 
provide a counterweight to any short-term threat from France or long-term 
threat from Germany.
Joining the EEC would be no simple task. The British government, having
presumably surmounted its aversion to delegating elements of sovereignty,
would have to overcome probable Commonwealth objections. There would also
inevitably be objections from domestic agricultural interests, the other
groups which had posed long-standing obstacles to British participation in
the EEC. To these, was now added a new group whose interests had to be taken
into account, Britain's EFTA partners. Finally, there was the question as to
whether the Six wanted Britain as a member. The manner by which these
obstacles were overcome had profound implications for Britain's place in the
37world upon joining the EEC, as British officials knew full well. Clearly 
it was a matter which required further study.
Such a study was not long in coming. On 27 May, the British Cabinet's 
European Economic Association Committee agreed that the broad choice facing 
Britain was either to seek a close association with the EEC or to continue to 
remain aloof while trying to do all that it could to mitigate the economic 
and political dangers of a divided Western Europe. Macmillan subsequently 
circulated a list of questions among relevant departments about the future of 
the EEC and the broad economic and political considerations determining the 
best option. The responses were examined by a committee of officials from 
the departments concerned which produced a report on the subject for Cabinet. 
This report distinguished between formally joining the EEC and concluding an
37 Ibid-
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agreement closely associating Britain with it. Significantly, the study was 
done on the basis of actually joining. The immediate impact on the 
Commonwealth would likely be considerably less with close association than
with full British membership but close association was seen as a poor second
38choice. It would likely take longer to negotiate and come at a high 
price. Even then, Britain would still not be a member of the EEC's inner 
councils. Britain would continue to face the same political problems and 
French objections to an arrangement with Britain would be more difficult to 
overcome if Britain were only willing to go as far as 'close association'.
If the Six 'succeeded', Britain would suffer politically being outside
because its relative and absolute influence in world affairs would be bound
39to diminish. On the other hand, British membership in a successful EEC, 
could enhance Britain's global influence. While still retaining to some 
degree the right to speak on its own account, it would speak as part of a 
European bloc. In an alternative scenario, were the Six to 'fail'. Western 
interests would be severely damaged and the resultant weakening of Europe 
would pose serious strategic problems for Britain. It would be too late for 
Britain to join to prevent a failure when a breakdown was seen to be coming, 
but if already in, Britain might strengthen the European bloc and prevent its 
disintegration.40 Membership of the inner councils of the EEC, then, had 
attractions beyond the economic benefits.
38C.(60)107 Association with the European Economic Community. Note by the 
Secretary to the Cabinet, 6 July, 1960. Annex: The Six and the Seven - The 
Long-term Objective. Report of the Economic Steering (Europe) Committee. PRO 
CAB 120/102.
30 Ibid.
4QIbid.
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Joining the EEC would have a price. This would have to be paid in terms 
of the Commonwealth* British agriculture and horticulture, the commitment to 
the EFTA and possible negative reactions from other British trading partners 
such as the United States. Of these, the report identified political and 
economic relations with the Commonwealth, together with the more general 
question of free entry of specific goods, important to Commonwealth countries 
but to others as well, as the most difficult problems facing Britain in 
joining the EEC.41 On the political side, the report considered it likely 
that Britain could convince the EEC Six of the importance of safeguarding the 
Commonwealth political relationship by demonstrating the value to the free 
world of close ties with both the older and newer members.
The economic aspect of sorting out the arrangements under which many 
Commonwealth products (as well as those of other third parties) received 
duty-free entry to Britain would be more complicated. Handling this would 
likely emerge as the most crucial issue to be resolved in a British bid for 
EEC membership. Insisting on current arrangements would effectively preclude 
joining by forestalling any participation in EEC agricultural policies. The 
other extreme was accepting the EEC common tariff and giving the Six more 
favourable treatment than Commonwealth countries. That, the report stated, 
was inconceivable. The British government might be able to accept the common 
tariff on manufactured goods without placing too great a strain on the 
economies of Commonwealth countries since the only member with significant 
exports of such goods to Britain was Canada. In exchange, the report 
suggested that Britain seek the easing of restrictions of imports from low 
cost countries (except Japan). Raw materials posed less of a problem. For 
the most part they could enter duty free so Britain could more easily accept
41Ibid.
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the common tariff or come to an alternative arrangements. Similarly, 
tropical foodstuffs were unlikely to present much of a problem. The biggest 
problems, the report anticipated, would arise over temperate foodstuffs. The 
claims of Commonwealth, American and British producers would all have to be 
resolved in some manner.
As the British government examined opening talks with the EEC on British
membership, the Commonwealth was never forgotten. The Macmillan government
was willing to look beyond the Commonwealth but had not abandoned it. If
anything, there was simply a more businesslike approach to dealing with what
was once an unquestioned mainstay of Britain's global pretensions. This was
exemplified by the outcome of an exercise initiated in May, 1960, by the FO's
Steering Committee, its policy planning body. The committee commissioned an
examination of what Britain could get out of the Commonwealth in the next ten 
42years. It concluded that the Commonwealth's value as a prop for Britain's 
world position would continue to diminish, but Britain, basing its 
Commonwealth relationship on a solid foundation of self-interest, would still 
receive advantages from the relationship. However,
The limited scope for the development of the Commonwealth as an 
association; the possible long-term decline in its usefulness as a 
direct support for our international standing; and the need to 
bring every weapon to bear in order to ensure a satisfactory 
outcome to the East/West struggle suggest that our basic approach 
should be to regard the Commonwealth as an instrument of policy.
This would mean regarding it more as a means and less as an end in 
itself.
42WP/28/6 Minute by PE Ramsbotham, 12 December, 1960. PRO FO 371/161235.
43S.C.(61)26 The Commonwealth, June, 1961. PRO FO 371/161235.
44Ibid.
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Like the other recent assessments of the Commonwealth's place in British 
policy, a strong British economy was seen as a prerequisite for a strong 
Commonwealth capable of producing any significant benefits for Britain. The 
most obvious means to secure the strong economy on which the Commonwealth 
depended but could not provide, was through closer ties with the emerging 
European trading system.
Canada: Coming to Terms With Britain and the EEC
The British government wrestled with the problem of Britain's relations 
with Europe over the summer of 1960. In September, it informed Commonwealth 
governments of its intention to explore the possibilities of concluding a 
formal arrangement with the EEC. This notification occurred in the lead-up 
to the meeting of the CECC at the end of the month. The agenda for this 
meeting offered a neat summary of the challenges facing the Commonwealth.
The main topics of discussion included the balance of payments situation of 
sterling area countries during the global economic downturn that they were 
all experiencing and contemplation of the proposals for African development 
which the 1960 CPMM had delegated to the CECC. The most important topic, 
however, would now be Britain's possible association with the EEC. Edward 
Heath, made Lord Privy Seal in July with responsibility for the European 
trade talks, would brief the Commonwealth ministers on his recent talks with 
European governments. He planned to portray the situation as hopeful, but 
would stress that the British government was not currently engaged in formal 
talks with the EEC and thus had no proposals to present to the 
Commonwealth.45
4SC.C. (60)50(3) Commonwealth Economic Consultation, 15 September, 1960. 
PRO CAB 128/34. Cabinet Conclusions.
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The Canadian Cabinet did not wait for formal proposals as it reviewed 
instructions for the Canadian delegation's position at the CECC meeting. The 
prospect of losing even some of Canada's access to British markets was 
unwelcome, particularly at a time of worsening economic outlook for the near 
future. Lurking in the background were fears among Canadian ministers that 
British membership would weaken the Commonwealth and leave Canada more 
dependent than ever on the American market. Diefenbaker, ever fearful of 
American political and economic domination, still clung to the notion that 
Britain and the Commonwealth could somehow balance this American 
preponderance. The need to prevent any loss of access to British markets, 
therefore, required a strong response.
Officials at DEA, however, doubted that given British needs, the
Canadian bargaining position was strong enough to do much about these
problems.46 They recommended that Canada develop contingency plans to
protect essential Canadian interests. Because of this, the Canadian position
on European trade as set out by officials tried to balance Canadian interests
with British needs.
In essence, this was that the delegation would take a strong and 
forthright position in defence of Canadian essential interests, 
recognizing, at the same time that it would be JLnappropriate to try 
to veto what the U.K. might attempt in Europe.
Cabinet adopted these recommendations, but the prospect of closer British 
trade ties with Europe was still alarming. Ministers were divided only on 
how to react to what all agreed was a potentially dangerous development. 
Green, the SSEA, thought that the Canadian position was far too weak. His
46USSEA to SSEA, 7 September, 1960. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 vol 171 file 
12447-40. European Common Market (Customs Union) and Free Trade Area.
47PAC RG 2 vol 2747. Cabinet Conclusions, 14 September, 1960.
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reasoning was that since Britain was in a difficult economic position, it was 
bound to move towards Europe regardless of Canadian interests which it was 
not sufficiently considering. He therefore thought that the ministers 
attending the coming meeting should be tough and tell the British ministers 
precisely what Canada's worries were. Ironically, given the relatively 
harder bargaining position which officials in Finance, Trade and Commerce, 
and his own DEA had maintained in comparison with their political masters as 
recently as that spring, he felt that "officials dealing with this matter 
were inclined to be too considerate of non-Canadian susceptibilities."48 
Churchill, the Minister of Trade and Commerce and, together with Fleming, one 
of the Canadian representatives attending the meeting, defended the policy as 
presented by observing that preferences were being eroded anyway and that 
there was little that Canada could do without jeopardizing the existing 
cooperative relationship and risk losing the British market. An effort at 
maintaining a balanced approach would enable the Canadian government to be 
firm without risking this.
Fleming and Churchill returned from the CECC meeting with different
assessments. They reported to their cabinet colleagues that most of the
other Commonwealth delegations had strongly attacked the idea of closer
British ties with Europe. Fleming, however, observed that it was obvious
that some members of the British Cabinet felt that with the strength of the
Soviet bloc and the growing strength of the EEC, Britain had no choice but to 
49join the EEC. Churchill, on the other hand, felt that the British 
government would be forced to reconsider its position since only fourteen 
percent of its export trade was with the EEC and forty four percent was with
48Ibid.
49PAC RG 2 vol 2747. Cabinet Conclusions, 23 September, 1960.
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Commonwealth countries.50 In his opinion, the only way joining the EEC 
could be perceived as an attractive option for Britain was if the political 
aspects of the European situation were to override the economics.
Churchill also voiced what was to become a growing concern within the 
ranks of the Canadian Cabinet. This was that should the British government 
choose to neglect what he saw as the economics of the situation and join the 
EEC, a leadership vacuum would be created in the Commonwealth. This could 
severely weaken the Commonwealth and even lead to its dissolution. British 
membership in the EEC, then, could be a turning point in the Commonwealth's 
history.
Canadian officials, while remaining resolute, were not nearly as 
alarmed. Agricultural exports would be hurt if Britain joined the EEC 
because of the common tariff. Raw materials except aluminum had free entry 
to the EEC so that was not seen as a problem. But manufactured goods, a 
small but growing component of Canadian exports to Britain would be hurt. 
Nevertheless, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance wrote to the USSEA in 
June, 1961s
even if the worst happened, and Britain felt compelled to join the 
Common Market without extracting any concessions that mitigated the 
commercial danger to Canada, the Canadian economy would not be 
mortally wounded. But it would be hurt - painfully hurt in 
sensitive spots... It may be that the British government can and 
should be dissuaded from their new departure. But if they decide 
to go ahead, we must put forward our very best endeavours, at all 
levels and in all places, to promote our commercial interest and 
defend our commercial rights.
50Ibid.
51Memorandum by Plumptre: The Montreal Tories of 1849: Their Message to 
Us Today, 9 June, 1961. PAC MG 30 E163 vol 18. Norman Robertson Papers. 
Personal Correspondence 1961 (file 2).
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However much some Canadians, including members of the government, might feel 
abandoned by the 'Mother Country' if Britain joined the EEC and erected 
barriers to Canadian exports, the crux of the economic problem would likely 
come down to the impracticality or political impossibility of Canada forming 
special economic relationships of its own, especially with the United States. 
Even the previous Liberal government had concerns about Canada's growing
reliance on the United States if Britain entered into a trade agreement in
52Europe. These concerns were magnified by the Conservatives - reducing 
dependence on trade with the United States had been a constant theme of the 
government since 1957. So while a trade deal with the United States may have 
seemed an obvious solution to the problem of ensuring markets for Canadian 
goods, it was a route ruled out from the start.53
The government's view of relations with the United States presented 
something of a paradox. Despite fearing that American economic domination 
would produce political domination as well, the Diefenbaker government 
continued to link Canada's defence policy ever more closely with that of the 
United States. In February, 1959, Cabinet had cancelled the Canadian Avro 
Arrow advanced interceptor programme because of mounting costs and the 
refusal of the American military to purchase Canadian aircraft.54 This 
contributed to the January, 1960, decision to begin negotiating Canadian 
acceptance of American nuclear weapons to arm alternative, American produced,
52Meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers. Minutes of a meeting held in 
the Canadian Joint Staff Building, Washington, 28 September, 1956,
F.M.(W)(56) 2nd Meeting. PRO DO 35/5637 Commonwealth Finance Ministers 
meeting, Washington 1956: minutes and records of meetings [file EC 
537/88/10].
53Ibid.
54The 'Arrow debate' is detailed in James Dow, The Arrow. (Toronto: 
Lorimer, 1979).
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interceptor missiles.5® These developments promised even greater Canadian 
dependence on the United States in defence matters. They would also trigger 
huge political problems for the government when it subsequently tried to 
renege on accepting the warheads. In defence, there were no viable 
alternatives to the United States. Nor were there in the development of 
shared resources, and the Colombia River Treaty, signed by Eisenhower in 
January, 1961 as his last official act as American president, suggested an 
incipient continentalism at work in the Canadian economy. In trade, however, 
the government clung to the notion that the Commonwealth, through Britain, 
could serve as a counterweight to the United States. Because of this, in the 
absence of politically feasible economic alternatives, promotion of 
commercial interests was poised to take on a dangerously emotional tenor 
within the government.
By mid-1961, the British government had yet to formally announce its
intention to join the EEC. In May, however, it assured Commonwealth
governments that should it begin formal talks, it would increase
consultations.56 Because the matter required direct political discussions,
rather than relying on normal channels, the British government would send a
minister to each member. From Canada House, George Drew, urged Diefenbaker,
to hold the British to this and adopt a very high standard as to what
57constituted adequate consultation. Taking his cue from the British 
government' gesture, he advocated that it always be at the political level,
55PAC RG 2 vol 2446. Cabinet Conclusions, 12 January, 1960.
56M/635/60 Draft Telegram from the Prime Minister to Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers, May, 1961. PRO FO 371/158312. Negotiations with the EEC. 
Consultations with Commonwealth Countries, [file M/635]
57Telegram 2005, Drew to Diefenbaker, 2 June, 1961. PAC RG 25 ACC 86- 
7/414 vol 171 file 12447-40.
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even to the point of calling a special CPMM. Drew, for the same reasons as 
his ex-colleagues now in Cabinet, opposed British EEC-membership and, viewing 
the EEC as unpopular among the British public, encouraged Diefenbaker to 
embark on a campaign to convince the British and Canadian publics of the
CO
Commonwealth's markets potential. The real purpose of such high level 
consultation would be to obstruct the British bid and ensure that the 
Commonwealth remained paramount in British policy, something Canadian 
officials were not inclined to do.
The British government followed-through with its undertaking to consult 
at the political level, but did not let Canadian opposition divert it from 
its course. In preparation for the announcement of Britain's intent to begin 
negotiations on EEC membership, British cabinet ministers visited each 
Commonwealth member to gain their acquiescence. In mid-July, Duncan Sandys, 
who had replaced Home as Commonwealth Secretary the previous July, visited 
Ottawa for three days of talks with Canadian ministers. The Canadians 
acknowledged that the decision whether or not to open negotiations with EEC 
was a matter for the British government to decide, but they could not conceal 
their growing apprehension. Sandys promised that if the British government 
did decide to open negotiations, it would consult Commonwealth governments 
continuously, but to no avail. The communique issued at the meetings' 
conclusion did not disguise the growing divergence between the two 
governments. It forthrightly stated:
The Canadian Ministers indicated that their Government's assessment 
of the situation was different from that put forward by Mr. Sandys.
They expressed the grave concern of the Canadian Government about 
the implications of possible negotiations between Britain and the 
European Economic Community, and about the political and economic
58Telegram 1833 Drew to Diefenbaker, 18 May, 1961. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-7/414 
vol 171 file 12447-40.
269
effects which British membership in the European Economic Community
would have on Canada and on the Commonwealth as a whole.
Far from soothing Canadian concerns, the talks exacerbated them. Two months 
later at the 1961 CECC meeting, Fleming recounted to Selwyn Lloyd, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, that Sandys "had given them the impression that 
the U.K. Cabinet had decided to join the Six at any cost."60 This had set 
ministerial alarm bells ringing in Ottawa.
The Canadian government was not the only Commonwealth government 
concerned about the effect of a British move towards the EEC. However, in 
the communiques issued following analogous visits by British ministers, only 
Australia emphasized similar concerns about the Commonwealth as a whole.61 
Others, such as New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Cyprus and the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland dealt only with the concerns of the individual 
countries. Following the meetings, in Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone and Singapore there were only cursory statements. The West Indies, 
besides insisting that its trading relationship with Britain be protected 
also expressed concern that the trading relationship with Canada must be 
protected if Britain were to join the EEC. There was, it seemed, widespread 
apprehension about the economics of British EEC membership, but few 
indications that the Commonwealth relationship turned on this.
eg
Canada: Joint Statement Issued in Ottawa 14 July, 1961", Great 
Britain. Commonwealth Consultations on Britain's Relations with the European 
Economic Community. Cmnd 1444 (London: HMSO, 1961)
60Lloyd to Macmillan, 14 September, 1961. PRO PREM 11/3211.
61Great Britain. Commonwealth Consultations on Britain's Relations with 
the European Economic Community. Cmnd 1444.
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Despite the reservations of other Commonwealth governments, the British 
government forged ahead. On 31 July, 1961, Macmillan announced in the House 
of Commons that his government would enter into talks with the EEC to 
determine if acceptable terms for British membership could be procured. With 
the stage thus set, it seems strange that the brief prepared for the Canadian 
delegation to the CECC meeting scheduled to be held in Accra, Ghana, in 
September, 1961, anticipated that the British position for the forthcoming
negotiations with the EEC would not be the subject of detailed and
62substantive discussions. The reasoning behind this was that Canadian 
officials sensed a consensus among Commonwealth governments, including the 
British government, that extended consideration of the topic would not be 
productive at that time. Nevertheless, Cabinet felt that it was important to 
make Canada's position absolutely clear whenever the opportunity arose. The 
speaking notes for Hees, who together with Fleming would represent Canada, 
for example, stressed that "a vital Canadian concern is the preservation of 
our enormously important U.K. market on which our economy is heavily
Cl
dependent." The economic analysis was questionable, but the government's 
opposition to British membership in the EEC was clear. The language used 
would probably spark greater debate where none was supposedly expected; not 
necessarily substantive discussion given the overcharged atmosphere likely to 
be created, but discussion nonetheless.
Numerous matters were discussed at the CECC during its three days of 
meetings. The stated expectation of Canadian officials about extended
62European Economic Problems. (Notes for Statement by Mr. Hees), 7 
September, 1961. PAC RG 25 vol 3448 file 1-2-1961/1. Brief for Canadian 
Delegation to Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council, Accra, September 
12-14, 1961.
63 Ibid.
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discussion of the EEC issue came to nought, largely through Canadian actions. 
Lloyd, the leader of the British delegation, reported:
...the whole day was spent on the Common Market. There was a full 
scale bombardment of the United Kingdom, the most energetic 
onslaught being from Fleming and a strong attack from [Australia's 
Harold] Holt. The Canadian theme was that our entry into the Common 
Market would be bad for the United Kingdom because we would lose 
more than we gained, disastrous for Canada because of lost export 
markets in the United Kingdom and harmful to the Commonwealth as a 
whole. Fleming accused us of throwing out of the window the 
undertakings we had given in the past. Everyone except the 
Malayans and West Indians was gloomy about our prospects of 
reaching an agreement with the Six which would preserve 
Commonwealth interests. There was considerable suspicion about the 
motives of the Six, fear of a supra-national body being set up and 
complete skepticism whether the Six would go any distance to meet
the Commonwealth in their anxieties to preserve their present 
64
The British were clearly taken aback at the heat of the attack. Press 
accounts were replete with lurid descriptions of bitter disagreement. Rather 
than supporting the Canadian government's position, the press in Canada was 
extremely critical. Because of this, as the CECC meetings drew to a close, 
the Cabinet moderated its position and reluctantly accepted the British 
decision as a fait accomplish
Cabinet's decision to back down averted the possibility of a serious 
rift between the two governments. The final communique presented a unified 
front6* and Canadian ministers publicly reiterated the position that the 
question of British membership in the EEC was entirely up to the British
Inward CRO telegram 1112 from Lloyd to Macmillan, 14 September, 1961. 
PRO PREM 11/3211. Meeting of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Committee 
in Accra, September, 1961: Special Reference to United Kingdom Link with 
E.E.C.
66PAC RG 2 vol 6121 Cabinet Conclusions, 14 September, 1961.
65Meeting of Commonwealth Economic Consultative Committee, Accra, Ghana.
Final Communique, 14 September, 1961. PRO PREM 11/3211.
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67government, Nevertheless, the controversy refused to die. In a complete 
role reversal, the Conservative government found itself accused by Liberal
Member of Parliament Jack Pickersgill of being "consistently anti-
68British". While Fleming denounced this in the House of Commons as "cheap
cq
politics", shortly afterwards, Drew's absence from a meeting of high
commissioners on 26 October fostered a rumour that it was a deliberate snub
because of the British government's refusal to release the full text of
Heath's 10 October speech to the EEC governments formally initiating the
British approach to the Six. This set off a small media tempest, and despite
a denial issued by Drew70 on 12 November indicating that he simply had other
commitments, contributed to the impression of an Anglo-Canadian split.
Again, this caused unfavourable public comment in Canada much to the
government's chagrin. Finally Diefenbaker undertook to tell Drew to moderate
71his opposition to British entry.
Canadian behaviour was beginning to damage relations with Britain. When 
Fleming visited London in late November, the British government saw it 
primarily as an opportunity to "close the present unhappy chapter in Anglo-
07Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (4th Session, 24th 
Parliament, vol VIII, 28 September, 1961 ). p. 9054.
68"Pickersgill Charges Tories Anti-British", Ottawa Journal. 28 
September, 1961.
cq
Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (4th Session, 24th 
Parliament, vol VIII, 28 September, 1961 ). p. 9055.
70Basil Robinson relates that this denial was prompted by instructions 
from Diefenbaker to do so and that its effectiveness was undermined by the 
fact that an official at the High Commission had already informed some
journalists that a snub had been intended. See: Robinson, Diefenbaker's 
World, p. 216.
71PAC RG 2 Cabinet Conclusions, vol 6122, 15 November, 1961.
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72Canadian relations" brought about by their differences over British 
membership in the EEC. Of particular concern was what the British saw as the
Canadian government's reluctance to allow its officials to take a
73constructive part in consultations on the issue. Much to British 
officials' frustration, the instructions for Canadian officials for ten days 
of bilateral consultations following the CECC meeting had not allowed them to 
indicate any order of priority to the list of Canadian interests they wished 
British officials to safeguard.74 The negative Canadian approach would not 
stop the British government from negotiating, but it might lead to a poorer 
result for Canada. To that point, it had not been essential for the British 
government to know which of the available alternative courses might be better 
for Canadian interests, but the need was bound to arise. Despite the 
Canadian government's decision to moderate its opposition to British entry, 
it had not become a constructive partner or moderated its insistence on 
political rather than official consultation.
When Fleming met with British ministers, his primary mission was to 
deliver a message from Diefenbaker indicating that he would like to visit in 
the coming January.75 Canadian politicians evidently felt more secure 
handling consultations themselves than allowing their officials to act. He 
also reiterated the Canadian request to see the full text of Heath's speech.
72Brief for meeting between the Prime Minister, the Commonwealth 
Secretary and the Canadian Finance Minister on Monday, November 20th, 1961. 
PRO PREM 11/3230. Prime Minister saw Mr. Fleming, Canadian Minister of 
Finance, 20 November, 1961: Note of meeting and Subsequent Papers.
73 Ibid.
74M/635/366 Pre-Negotiation Consultation with Canadian Officials. Final 
Meeting, 27 September, 1961. PRO FO 371/158330.
75Note of Meeting between the Prime Minister, the Commonwealth Secretary 
and the Canadian Finance Minister, 20 November, 1961. PRO PREM 11/3230.
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While this underlined the importance which the Canadian government attached 
to seeing this speech, Macmillan and Sandys again declined. The reason 
behind this refusal was not because the British government was ashamed of 
anything in it or afraid of Commonwealth reactions.76 It was simply because 
the Commonwealth governments were not party to the negotiations. The British 
government wanted to establish the principle that it could exchange papers 
with the EEC without having to hand copies around to the Commonwealth, the 
EFTA, the Americans, or anyone else who thought they were affected.77 As 
much as anything else, this would help establish the credibility of the 
British commitment to the EEC and try to emphasize that it was Britain which 
was joining, not all of its trading partners. This was not a reassuring sign 
to those in the Canadian government who feared a shift in British 'loyalty' 
away from the Commonwealth, but the British ministers tried to reassure 
Fleming that it was their policy not to join the EEC unless essential 
Commonwealth interests were protected. They reminded Fleming that any deal 
protecting the Commonwealth, British agriculture, and the EFTA was bound to 
be in Britain's best interest and however much the Canadian government might 
now disagree, it was Britain's interests which were primarily at stake. As 
for the Canadian fear that Britain's membership in the EEC would draw it away 
from the Commonwealth, especially because of the French attitude, the British 
position was that it was unlikely that anything supra-national or confederal 
would emerge and that the Commonwealth would benefit from having a member in 
such a powerful grouping.
76 Ibid.
77Brief for meeting between the Prime Minister, the Commonwealth 
Secretary and the Canadian Finance Minister on Monday, November 20th, 1961. 
PRO PREM 11/3230.
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Neither side received what it most wanted out of Fleming's visit to 
London. Diefenbaker's marked preference for ministerial consultations 
remained, but Macmillan was unable to see him in January. Instead, Heath 
went to Ottawa on 4 January, 1962. He met Diefenbaker with only the British 
high commissioner, Amory, in attendance. Robinson, still the prime 
minister's DEA liaison officer, relates that Diefenbaker later told him that 
three main points emerged: that France's attitude was likely to be 
unfavourable to Commonwealth interests; that the United States favoured 
British entry as a means to end Commonwealth preferences; and that
Diefenbaker had pressed for a meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers as the
78only way proper consultation could take place. Heath visited Ottawa again 
in late March to discuss proposals for protecting Canadian trade interests 
and on the last day of that month, Macmillan proposed a full-scale CPMM to 
consider, among other things, Europe. Macmillan himself visited Ottawa at 
the end of April on the way back from a meeting with American President John 
Kennedy in Washington.
This ministerial consultation did not appreciably alter the positions of 
either side. Nothing had changed the British government's assessment of the 
situation which led it to initiate the process, and Diefenbaker continued to 
do as much as he could to stop it without actually having to try to use a 
veto he knew he did not have. In the text he approved for a speech to the 
Royal Commonwealth Society in Toronto on 30 March, before Macmillan's message 
about a CPMM arrived, Diefenbaker set out his views of the contemporary 
Commonwealth and where it was heading, its potential and its limitations. He 
did not directly condemn the possibility of British membership in the EEC, 
but it was easy to interpret his feelings on the subject. Among the material
78Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, p. 241.
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benefits from membership he listed, trade was the first - "an important and
essential link in the bonds of the Commonwealth throughout its successive 
79transformations." While praising the Commonwealth's flexibility which 
enabled members to make alliances beyond its confines, he questioned:
Will this hold true if Britain in the sixties moves progressively 
into the European community sketched in the Treaty of Rome? How 
much of a strain will be placed on the Commonwealth association if 
the oldest and central member commits its primary allegiance to 
Europe and accepts the decisions of Europe's institutions of the 
future?
He acknowledged the right of any member to do as it chose, but reminded his
audience of other members' reciprocal right to be consulted. Maintaining his
position that consultation on this matter had to be political, he went on to
01
demand a full CPMM before and commitment with regard to British entry.
The ministerial and prime ministerial hard line was increasingly at odds 
with the advice offered by Canadian officials. The tenor of official 
thinking was reflected in an analysis of Britain and the Commonwealth 
prepared by Benjamin Rogers, the Canadian deputy-high commissioner in Britain 
in February, 1962. Unlike Drew, a career politician who frequently 
communicated directly with Diefenbaker, side-stepping the officials at DEA, 
Rogers was a career foreign service officer. His memorandum was distributed 
to all Canadian posts in Commonwealth and former Commonwealth (South Africa 
and Ireland) countries, as well as the former Canadian high commissioner in 
India, Escott Reid, by then ambassador to West Germany, and internally to
79Diefenbaker, John G., "The Meaning of Commonwealth. Notes Prepared for 
an Address to the Royal Commonwealth Society, Toronto, 30 March, 1962", 
Statements and Speeches 62/8. (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1962) 
p. 3.
80Ibid. p. 8.
81Ibid.
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other departments concerned with Commonwealth relations such as the 
Department of Finance.
The thrust of the analysis was that Britain's Commonwealth-oriented 
economic and political strategy since 1945 had, for the most part, failed.
One of the results of this failure was that:
The seventeen years since World War II have been marked in Britain 
by recurring economic crises, by what appears to many people to be 
a reduction in the relative value to Britain of the Commonwealth 
trading system, and by growing disillusionment with the 
Commonwealth as a political system.
This disillusionment gathered force with Suez in 1956 and increased 
afterwards, especially after the forcing out of South Africa which destroyed 
the myth, still widely held in Britain at the time, of the Commonwealth as 
'mother' Britain and dutiful children. At the same time that Britain was 
experiencing recurrent economic crises and the Commonwealth proving less 
valuable, the EEC was becoming a success. All of this shifted the relative 
weight of arguments for and against British EEC membership, especially as 
they concerned the Commonwealth. British membership could not help but have 
some effect on the Commonwealth, but so too would a decision by Britain not 
to join for the sake of the Commonwealth. This would leave the Commonwealth 
open for blame whenever the British economy ran into difficulty. The 
implication of this was that since the Commonwealth could not provide an 
economic alternative to the EEC, Commonwealth interests were better served by 
not trying to block the British application.
82Numbered Letter 234 from Rogers to Robertson, 2 February, 1962. PAC RG 
19 vol 4923 file 8268-01. Miscellaneous Commonwealth Matters Generally (1957- 
1967).
83Ibid.
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Under the circumstances, effective action premised on ministers' public 
acknowledgments that Britain's EEC policy was a matter for Britain to decide 
combined with constructive efforts to protect Canadian interests as far as 
possible was the most prudent course of action. The fundamental difference 
between the government and its officials was this acceptance of the probable 
inevitability of British EEC membership by officials and the assessment that 
while Canadian interests would have to be protected as far as possible, on 
balance the Commonwealth could suffer more from taking being obstinate. 
Ministers' behaviour, from this perspective, did not advance either Canadian 
or Commonwealth interests. Despite the government's professed desire to 
protect Commonwealth interests, its inability to grasp the wider implications 
of policy bespoke a greater concern for narrowly defined short-term domestic 
interests. Behind the facade of protestations that it was a British matter, 
a facade constantly seen through in press reports, the government may have 
seen itself as fighting for Canadian jobs and exports, but it was winning 
itself no friends. Diefenbaker got his wish for a CPMM, this offered one 
more chance to act constructively if he was willing to take it.
The Denouement: The 1962 CPMM
The CPMM was to be held as usual in London, from 10 to 19 September. 
Unlike previous meetings, Diefenbaker took along the SSEA, as his ministerial 
companion. Green was a fellow Commonwealth devotee, but he had moderated his 
tone recently. He had headed the cabinet committee, which together with a 
committee of senior officials, headed by Bryce, prepared the Canadian policy 
positions and briefing material for the CPMM. These combined both 
ministerial apprehensions and official pragmatism. The basic Canadian 
position they recommended was that while Canadian and Commonwealth interests
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did not at that juncture appear sufficiently protected, it was purely a 
British decision. The Canadian delegation should, therefore, voice its 
concerns, but it should not do anything which might leave it open to taking 
the blame should the British initiative fail.84
Likewise, the Canadian briefs for the 1962 CPMM tried to offer a 
balanced appraisal of Britain's approach to the EEC. There would be 
undoubted political advantages for Canada if British membership strengthened 
the Western alliance and kept the new Europe more liberal in respect to ties
QC
with the Commonwealth and the United States. There were dangers to the 
Commonwealth relationship, especially the danger of "some attenuation of the 
sense of cohesion in the Commonwealth and eventually a sapping of interest in
oc
maintaining the institution" in Britain and in newer members should they 
see less advantage to the organization if economic benefits decreased. But, 
according to this more moderate Canadian view, gloomy predictions about the 
long-term future of the Commonwealth's future as an institution did not take 
into account the fact that the Commonwealth relationship had always been 
subject to modification. Whether or not Britain joined the EEC, other 
developments were reducing the capacity, never great, of members to act 
jointly. The growing membership presented a greater diversity of 
perspectives to accommodate on issues, and the growing radicalization of new 
members, as the South African issue had shown, was not always conducive to
84PAC PRO RG 2, Cabinet Conclusions, 30 August, 31 August, and 5 
September, 1961.
oc
Memorandums Some Possible Implications of British Membership in the EEC 
for Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance, 27 August, 1962. PAC RG 25 vol 
3448 file 1-1962/1. Canadian Papers Prepared for the Commonwealth Prime 
Minsters' Meeting, London, September, 1962. Volume I.
Of
Memorandums British membership in the Common Markets Possible 
Implications for the Future of the Commonwealth, 31 August, 1962. PAC RG 25 
vol 3448 file 1-1962/1.
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compromise and dialogue. There was a wide range in the level of intimacy in
87Canada's relations with Commonwealth partners. Regardless of a loosening 
of Commonwealth ties, Canada would probably remain close to Britain,
Australia and New Zealand, and not as close to others such as Ghana. Any 
change from either membership growth or British EEC-entry would take place 
gradually over time and would not disrupt important relationships.
Diefenbaker, ready to make a last ditch defence of his Commonwealth, did 
not temper his views. Rather than converging with the developing consensus 
in Cabinet which now included Commonwealth stalwarts such as Green, 
Diefenbaker, always more inclined to take advice from those who agreed with 
him, once again began to sound like Drew. The high commissioner's opposition 
to British entry had never abated. On the eve of Macmillan's visit to Ottawa 
in April, he had sent Diefenbaker a telegram commenting alarmingly on the 
political implications of British membership in the EEC. He reiterated the
old concern that it would weaken Britain's ties to the Commonwealth and make
88Canada more vulnerable to American control. Indeed, Drew speculated that 
this was an American motive for supporting Britain's bid. Britain's entry 
into the EEC would be a turning point not only for the Commonwealth, but also 
for Canada. The obvious implication was that the bid must be stopped. 
Diefenbaker was very susceptible to this sort of reasoning and it showed in 
the lead-up to the CPMM. He was not looking for contingency plans to ease
the transition or bargaining points to gain specific Canadian objectives. At
89the CPMM, he would be hoping to avoid British entry altogether.
87Ibid.
88Telegram 1588 from Drew to Diefenbaker, 29 April, 1962. PAC RG 25 ACC 
86-7/414 vol 171 file 12447-40.
89PAC RG 2 Cabinet Conclusions, 30 August, 1962.
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The more tempered view of Canadian officials and some ministers could 
not help but be conditioned by the fact that there were no desirable 
alternatives which Canada could offer. Canadian officials tried to find some 
and compiled a list of options for Britain besides the EEC and for Canada 
should Britain join the EEC. The options ranged from a Commonwealth free 
trade area, with or without Britain, to Canadian participation in a free
trade area involving various combinations of the United States, the EEC,
90Japan, or Latin American. None of these was attractive. Nor was the 
unlikely possibility that, if he sensed a shift in public opinion, Macmillan 
might 'seriously wish to discuss with Commonwealth prime ministers the
question of ways and means of disengaging from the Brussels negotiations and
91the possibility of setting a different course of British policy. Since a 
Commonwealth free trade area was out of the question, all Canada could do was 
offer support in seeking a broader international solution to the problems 
created by EEC tariff policy. This would entail a variety of measures aimed 
a freeing international trade generally. It amounted to little more than the 
traditional Canadian emphasis on the GATT with a greater flexibility on 
agricultural issues. Canadian officials knew that Canada had little new to 
offer.
Canada, at the time, was singularly ill placed to preach about the 
sanctity of Commonwealth economic relationships. Earlier that summer, 
shortly after the Canadian federal election in June reduced the government's 
huge majority to a tenuous minority, the Canadian dollar had experienced a 
severe crisis in international currency markets. Part of the government's
90Memorandum: British Accession to the EEC - Alternative Groupings [n.d]. 
PAC RG 25 vol 3448 file 1-1962/1.
91Memorandums British/EEC Negotiations: An Alternative to British Entry, 
31 August. 1962. PAC RG 25 vol 3448 file 1-1962/1.
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response to this had been to institute an import duty surcharge in order to 
reduce imports and improve Canada's balance of payments. Although 
Diefenbaker told the British high commissioner that he would have preferred
to apply this only against imports from the United States, he regretfully had
92to apply it to British and Commonwealth imports as well. The increase in 
tariffs against British goods did not prevent the British government, 
notwithstanding its own balance of payments difficulties which were 
aggravated by its chronic trade imbalance with Canada, taking an important 
part in helping to support the Canadian dollar. It was something which 
British ministers hoped would gain Britain reciprocal consideration.
Macmillan wrote Diefenbaker a friendly note reminding him of this 
assistance,94 but if he anticipated a more forthcoming attitude with respect 
to Britain's EEC application, he was to be disappointed. Despite having 
demonstrated in no uncertain terms the pre-eminence of national interests 
over Commonwealth considerations in his own policy, Diefenbaker expected that 
the British government give greater weight to Commonwealth interests than its 
own in its policy.
At the CPMM, Diefenbaker confidently predicted that the issue of British
99membership would all come to nought because of de Gaulle's opposition.
That belief, nevertheless, did not stop him from coming out strongly against 
British membership in the EEC. He was by no means alone in this. The
92Inward CRO Telegram 605 from Lord Amory, British High Commissioner in 
Canada, 3 July, 1962. PRO PREM 11/3674. Prime Minister's Correspondence: 
Canada.
93Minute from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Prime Minister, 28 
June, 1962. PRO PREM 11/3674.
94Macmillan to Diefenbaker, 3 July. 1962. PRO PREM 11/3674.
99John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada: The Years of Achievement 1957-1962. 
p. 205. See also: Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, p. 281.
283
British government was taken aback by the strenuousness of the criticism it
qc
faced from other Commonwealth governments. British ministers accepted
that apprehensions about the economic effects were only natural but were
surprised that their Commonwealth counterparts failed to appreciate the wider
balance of advantages over disadvantages. While in some areas, especially
temperate foodstuffs where there was nothing that could be done to protect
Canadian interests, ministers felt that, despite Diefenbaker's vehement
97protestations, Canada "had, in reality, very little to fear." In 
summarizing the meeting to his cabinet colleagues afterwards, Macmillan 
reported that
The most difficult problems had... been those of the older 
Commonwealth countries. Canada was not really concerned about her 
wheat exports, but had made the most of her other anxieties. The 
Australians had fought strenuously for their interests... New 
Zealand had taken a reasonably helpful line... The meeting had 
started badly, but had ended as well as could be expected.
The grave reservations of other Commonwealth members towards Britain's 
negotiations with the EEC were hinted at in description of the debate 
contained in the meeting's final communique. A weak effort by Diefenbaker to 
introduce the idea of alternative arrangements was not even mentioned -
"politely ignored" Pearson disparaged it afterwards in the House of
99Commons. The most important thing, however, from a British perspective, 
was that there was nothing in it to stop the negotiations from continuing.
96C.C.(62)56(3). Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 18 September, 
1962. PRO CAB 128. Cabinet Conclusions.
97Ibid.
98C.C. (62)57(2) Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 20 September,
1962. PRO CAB 128.
99Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (1st Session, 25th 
Parliament, 1 October, 1962) p. 62.
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What did stop the progress of Britain's talks with the EEC was, as 
Diefenbaker had predicted, de Gaulle. In January, 1963, he effectively vetoed 
any move to allow Britain to join. Fortunately for Canada, after the 
government's covert and not-so-covert opposition to the idea, de Gaulle did 
not specifically cite the Commonwealth, although the Commonwealth was a part 
of the non-European political and economic orientation to which the general 
objected. Shortly afterwards, in April, 1963, Rogers reported from Canada 
House that Lloyd, no longer Chancellor of the Exchequer, called in a speech 
for the creation of a Commonwealth Economic Development Council.100 Its 
purpose would be to examine the obstacles to expanding Commonwealth trade and 
development. Rogers enquired about the speech at the CRO and officials there 
agreed that it appeared to be an attempt to salvage a Commonwealth initiative 
from the collapse of the EEC talks. Lloyd was not alone in considering a 
Commonwealth alternative, but Macmillan had no intention of pursuing the 
subject - had ever been any real prospect for success, it would have already 
been tried.101 Diefenbaker, evidently not having learned from his efforts 
in 1957-8, recorded in his memoirs that had he continued as prime minister,
he too would have "launched a major initiative on Commonwealth and
102international economic questions".
100Numbered Letter 506 from Rogers to Robertson, 4 April, 1963. PAC RG 19 
vol 4923 file 8267-01. Commonwealth Trade Generally (1957-1968).
101See: Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day: 1961-1963. (London: 
Macmillan,1973) pp.374-6.
102Diefenbaker, One Canada: The Years of Achievement, p. 206. He claims 
these plans were already worked out, but it seems unlikely that he was 
referring to anything more than the programme prepared for the September,
1962 meeting in London. Certainly the briefs prepared for Pearson's May,
1963 trip to London do not indicate that there was a well developed programme 
to offer the British government.
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In an completely unrelated series of events, the Diefenbaker government 
was defeated in the House of Commons in February, 1963. In the election that 
followed, the Progressive Conservative minority government was replaced by a 
Liberal one. Lester Pearson was sworn in as Canada's prime minister on 22 
April, 1963. Even before this, preparations were underway for a visit to 
London to repair the damaged Anglo-Canadian relationship. These 
preparations, however, were not made on the basis that a Commonwealth trade 
initiative would either be suggested by the British government or a 
productive route for Canada. Indeed, the basic assumption was that despite 
the EEC set-back, the British government had not turned its back on Europe. 
While there was no immediate prospect for re-opening talks with the EEC, 
membership looked to be the long-term policy, at least of the Conservative 
Party.^ Quite the opposite of seeking a Commonwealth solution to its 
economic problems, the British government strengthened the EFTA by 
accelerating tariff removal.
For its part, the new Canadian government, anxious to retain what 
benefit there still were from Commonwealth preferences for as long as 
possible, was equally determined not to let them stand in the way of full 
Canadian participation in the "Kennedy Round" of GATT talks. Canada derived 
some economic benefits from the Commonwealth relationship, but the most 
important Canadian trade interests lay elsewhere. Distinguishing what were 
Canada's most important interests in both trade and Commonwealth relations 
would enable the government to pursue both more effectively.
Memorandums Developments in International Trading Relations, 22 April,
1963. PAC RG 25 vol 3500 file 19-1-BA-BRIT-1963/2. Visit of Prime Minister 
Pearson to London, May 1-4, 1963. Prime Minister's Briefing Papers: Trade and 
Economic Questions.
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Significantly, Pearson's visit repaired a valued bilateral relationship 
rather than Canada's Commonwealth relationship. Had Mackenzie King, or even 
St.Laurent alienated the British government to the extent Diefenbaker finally 
managed, it would have been widely perceived in Canada, not least by 
Conservatives, as a diminution of Commonwealth ties. This was a testament 
to the Commonwealth's changing character and Britain's changing role in it. 
The Diefenbaker government had not started out opposing British policy 
towards Europe, but when this policy began to threaten the vision of the 
Commonwealth held by some of its members, Diefenbaker took the lead in 
defending it. For all his constructive role in facilitating the evolution of 
the 'third Commonwealth', in some areas, Diefenbaker and his government had 
not yet fully adjusted to this new Commonwealth and yearned for the old. The
failure of Diefenbaker's own Commonwealth trade initiative should have 
demonstrated to his government the limitations of the Commonwealth's economic 
dimensions. That Diefenbaker was never alone in his quixotic effort to 
preserve them, showed that trade ties with Britain retained political or 
economic salience to other members as well. Nevertheless, Diefenbaker was 
mistaken in acting as if he were making a stand in favour of Commonwealth 
unity at a turning point in Commonwealth history. The British application to 
the EEC was no more a turning point in Commonwealth history than was Suez. 
Indeed, like Suez, it was more of a milestone showing how far Commonwealth 
developments had gone and in what direction.
Maintaining closer economic ties may well have engendered the more 
cohesive Commonwealth of Diefenbaker's rhetoric. The turning point, however, 
would have had to be one in the opposite directions a dramatic move towards 
Commonwealth economic ties. Diefenbaker had rejected what could have been 
used as such a turning point with the British free trade offer in 1957 and
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failed to produce one himself with any bold initiatives at the 1958 CTEC.
Such developments would have run counter to post-war Commonwealth and 
international political and economic trends. They had been rejected at the 
time precisely because they had not appeared to be productive. If there was 
a turning point involved in Britain's application to the EEC, it would have 
been for the Diefenbaker government to accept the end of serious prospects 
for Britain and the Commonwealth to provide Canada with an economic 
counterweight to the United States; although this too should have been 
evident by then.
Adjusting to Britain's new more European orientation should have been 
like shedding an old skin. The centrality of economic ties with Britain 
harkened back to the first Commonwealth. Although it coexisted easily with 
second, it produced periodic confusion, whether from Britain trying to read 
too much in and get too much out of Commonwealth leadership, or Diefenbaker 
trying to resurrect a spent purpose for the Commonwealth. As British reports 
on future policy observed, the Commonwealth's economic dimension facilitated 
British leadership, and it was the possible loss of this leadership for the 
Commonwealth which sparked fears for the organization's survival. However, 
it was only a particular Commonwealth which was really threatened. The most 
important Commonwealth in Canadian policy remained the 'bridge' and Canada's 
relations across it need not have been threatened by British trading 
arrangements. Canadian governments, Diefenbaker's included, had already 
shown themselves adept at meeting the needs of 'bridgemanship'. This was the 
leadership that the Commonwealth required, not the confused, misplaced 
obstructionism which Diefenbaker showed over the Europe.
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CHAPTER 7 - NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR A NEW COMMONWEALTH
The winds of change in the Commonwealth continued unabated through 1964 
and 1965. They laid the third Commonwealth's imprint over those of the first 
two, erasing much of what went before that was not in accordance with its 
direction. The Commonwealth was in the final transformation to an 
organization almost exclusively concerned with what would later be called the 
North-South dialogue. The changes being wrought on Commonwealth structure 
and purpose showed in the outcomes of a series of institutional proposals put 
forward by various members in 1964 and 1965, of which the proposal for a 
secretariat was the most dramatic. Canadian policy adapted to new 
circumstances
British Proposals: 1964 - Staving at the Centre of the Commonwealth
The idea of Britain regrouping around the Commonwealth following the 
thwarted attempt to join the EEC did not sway the government, but it 
resonated powerfully with some parliamentarians. Lloyd was not alone in 
advocating a Commonwealth Economic Development Council. The same pressures 
which in 1957 required Macmillan to actively demonstrate a commitment to the 
Commonwealth played upon his successor Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the former Lord 
Home, who assumed the premiership in October, 1963. In February, 1964, 
during a parliamentary debate on Commonwealth relations, Douglas-Home 
expressed his willingness to consider a Commonwealth Economic Development 
Council with a secretariat in the unlikely event that other Commonwealth 
members agreed to the idea.1 Such an ambitious proposal was not, however,
^reat Britain. Parliament. House of Commons Debates, vol 688, cols 
1360-1.
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included in initiatives which Douglas-Home advanced prior to the July, 1964, 
CPMM.
In two messages to the prime ministers of the 'old' Commonwealth, in 
June, 1964, Douglas-Home suggested five Commonwealth initiatives. Their
ostensible purpose was "to develop the association on 'a genuinely more
2
cooperative means' and give it 'new vitality, meaning and purpose'” by 
making it more attractive to the newer members. Thus the initiatives 
included a proposal for a new series of collaborative Commonwealth 
development projects in the areas of technical assistance, education and 
training, some possibly of regional rather than national benefit. While many 
of these projects would be extended on a bilateral basis rather than by two 
or more Commonwealth countries, the British prime minister suggested that 
they be presented as examples of Commonwealth cooperation and called 
Commonwealth projects. He also envisaged creating new administrative 
machinery to initiate projects.
Other ideas to improve educational and training opportunities for those 
in new Commonwealth countries included a suggestion that other Commonwealth 
members follow a planned British announcement of a capital aid programme for 
higher education to complement the Commonwealth scholarships programme. In 
another proposal, Douglas-Home suggested expanding training and research 
facilities in public administration. The British government was considering 
establishing a specialized institute attached to a British university to 
train senior and middle-level administrators, university teachers and
Memorandum B3: British Prime Minister's June 3 Proposals, 3 July, 1964. 
PAC RG 25 vol 3449 file 1-1964/1. Canadian Papers Prepared for Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Meeting, 1964.
3Ibid.
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researchers from Commonwealth countries. A fourth proposal suggested 
creating regional organizations for technical advice modelled on the Middle 
East Development Division attached to the British embassy in Beirut.
Finally, the British prime minister proposed endowing a foundation to 
strengthen the Commonwealth in unofficial fields. It would do this by 
promoting collaboration between professional organizations, increase visits 
between national bodies, and encourage the formation of Commonwealth 
organizations. Like the British proposals on the teaching of English put to 
the 1958 CTEC, it would encourage popular support for the Commonwealth 
connection.
The Canadian government's response to these proposals was guarded. Most 
were already part of Canadian aid programmes. Canada could, therefore, with 
few changes to existing plans, participate, although the government would 
insist, as it had always done, that any Canadian segments of joint projects 
be clearly identified as such. Problems arose, however, since many of the 
existing Canadian programmes were not specifically Commonwealth-oriented and 
the government wished to create more balance between attention specifically 
directed at the Commonwealth - which accounted for the bulk of Canadian 
bilateral aid4 - and that for French speaking countries. This was 
particularly important because the government was in the process of expanding 
Canadian links with French speaking developing countries in an effort to 
better reflect Canada's bilingual character in its foreign policy. Canada's 
bilateral relations with developing countries had hitherto been almost 
entirely accounted for by its Commonwealth links. The nascent desire to 
broaden the basis of Canadian 'bridgemanship' did not threaten to undermine
4The exact allocation of Canadian bilateral aid was: Commonwealth 
countries 82%, francophone countries 6% and all others 12%. Memorandum B7: 
Canadian External Aid - General. PAC RG 25 vol 3449 file 1-1964/1.
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the basis of Canada's Commonwealth involvement, but it did present the 
possibility that in the future the Commonwealth's pre-eminence in this area 
might be challenged.
There were also other sources of Canadian hesitation about the British 
proposals. The government was concerned that spending, either in a capital 
aid programme for universities, or by a foundation, would be 
disproportionately directed towards British goods, services and 
organizations.5 As for creating new institutional mechanisms to administer 
new programmes, the Canadian government considered that much of the work 
could be done by existing bodies, especially the CELU. In the case of the 
proposal for regional advisory groups, Canadian officials believed that in 
most cases a narrow Commonwealth context would not be the most efficient 
means of regional planning. There was, then, no predisposition to create new 
institutions or seek specifically Commonwealth solutions for the sake of 
increasing perceptions of Commonwealth unity or utility if doing so was not 
the most efficient means of delivering development assistance.
The suspicion of British motives in the Canadian analysis of 
Commonwealth initiatives was not restricted to grand proposals such as 
Douglas-Home's. It also manifested itself with respect to proposals for 
developing the Commonwealth Defence Science Organization. This body replaced 
the former Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science in 1962. The 
British representative. Sir Harold Zuckerman, was trying to "give some teeth 
to the organization [and] proposed such steps as the creation of a central
c
Memorandum B3: British Prime Minister's June 3 Proposals, 3 July, 1964. 
PAC RG 25 vol 3449 file 1-1964/1.
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Secretariat in London."6 While the Canadian government favoured, in 
principle, Commonwealth cooperation in this field, Canada's close relations 
with the United States imposed limitations on how much information the 
Canadian government could share with Commonwealth countries especially the 
newer ones. Canadian enthusiasm for the British scheme was also tempered by 
Canada's limited defence science resources and the desire not to spread them 
too thinly. There was also "some suspicion that the British scheme for a 
central secretariat [was] designed to promote continuing interest in the 
purchase of British defence equipment."7 The Canadian government, therefore, 
preferred to emphasize bilateral exchanges with Commonwealth partners old and 
new.
The Canadian government could hardly criticize the British government
for seeming to want to use the Commonwealth to encourage markets for British
goods. After all, one of the reasons for resisting proposals which enshrined
programmes in Commonwealth initiatives was that they might prevent Canadian
0
aid contributions from being spent on Canadian goods and services. The 
Canadian government shared the British government's objective of keeping the 
Commonwealth together by binding the new members more closely to it. Where 
the two differed was that the British government had the pressure of history 
to demonstrate leadership. British proposals to make the Commonwealth more 
useful for its members would invariably have, or be interpreted as having, 
the additional role of demonstrating British leadership. When the Canadian 
assessment ranked the latter as being more prominent than the former in a
Memorandum B6: Commonwealth Defence Science Organization, 12 June,
1964. PAC RG 25 vol 3449 file 1-1964/1.
7Ibid.
Memorandum B3: British Prime Minister's June 3 Proposals, 3 July, 1964. 
PAC RG 25 vol 3449 file 1-1964/1.
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British initiative the danger that Britain might try to 'mis-use' the 
Commonwealth as a prop for Britain's world position dampened Canadian 
enthusiasm for the details of a proposal even if Canada sympathized with its 
stated objective.
Canadian Preparations for the 1964 Meeting
Canada was increasingly asserting a leadership role in the Commonwealth. 
Canadian policy had always done what it could to shape the Commonwealth in 
accordance with Canadian interests. Canadian governments, however, required 
less of the Commonwealth than did Britain and did not have to contend with 
other members trying to move out from under Canadian dominance. Shorn of 
Diefenbaker's visions of the Commonwealth as an economic counterweight to the 
United States, the most important Canadian interest continued to be 
preserving and developing it as an instrument for managing relations with the 
developing world. It provided
a network of "special" contacts with the newly-emerging nations in 
Asia and Africa at a time when the crude East-West conflict centred 
in Europe [was] being transformed into a contest with international 
communism for the ideological allegiance of these new nations.
Other Western countries, especially France, were attempting to develop 
analogous links. France had been slower than Britain to offer independence 
to its colonial empire, especially in Africa, but it had quickly caught up 
and surpassed Britain in the early 1960s. The French government, however, 
tended to retain more formal residual ties in the form of defence and 
economic treaties than did the British. The Canadian government was aware 
firsthand, thanks to its Commonwealth connections, that this 'tied'
q
Memorandum B2s The Changing Commonwealth, 17 June, 1964. PAC RG 25 vol 
3449 file 1-1964/1.
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3449 file 1-1964/1.
concluded that continuing with an independent and strictly bilateral Canadian 
aid programme would have a sizable impact on recipients and produce benefits 
for Canada even without a more organized scheme.15 There was, therefore, 
little interest within the Canadian government for the idea, although there 
was a willingness to reconsider the idea if it would help promote regional 
cooperation and countries in the region requested it. The Canadian 
government was not seeking ways to institutionalize the Commonwealth merely 
for the sake of doing so.
A field in which the Canadian government considered that it could take a 
meaningful initiative to help the newer members, was satellite 
communications. Because of its own communications needs deriving from having 
a small population spread thinly over a vast area, Canada was only slightly 
behind the superpowers in developing satellite communications technology. A 
Commonwealth telecommunications conference held in London in the spring of 
1962 had discussed satellite communications, but the conflicting objectives 
of Britain and the other participants stood in the way of progress.16 At 
the 1964 meeting, Pearson came prepared with an offer of Canadian technical
assistance and training to help other members make use of the new
17technology.
15Memorandum B8as Colombo Plan for the Commonwealth Caribbean, 30 June,
1964. PAC RG 25 vol 3449 file 1-1964/1.
^Memorandums Satellite Communications, 31 August, 1962. PAC RG 25 file 
1-1962/1. Canadian Papers Prepared for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, 
London, September, 1962. Volume II.
17Memorandums Satellite Communications, 8 June, 1965. PAC vol 3451 file 
1-1965/1. Canadian Papers Prepared for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Conference, June, 1965.
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Development assistance was not* however, the main Issue on the minds of 
the representatives from the newer Commonwealth countries who assembled in
London when the meeting began on 8 July* 1964. As in 1960 and 1961* the
10
major topic, at the insistence of African members, was to be racism in
Southern Africa. The issue this time was Southern Rhodesia and the white
minority government there. The Canadian government anticipated that, as in
the case of South Africa, this would be the focus of a potentially divisive
debate. African members wanted the British government to force, militarily
if necessary, Rhodesia's government to accept majority rule. The British
government, reluctant even to discuss the matter in detail, was not prepared
to do this. The Canadian government hoped for a positive compromise
statement supporting the African position, but not giving the Rhodesian
government or its supporters grounds to claim interference in Rhodesia's
internal affairs; this might even offer aid to help Rhodesia take its place
19as an independent Commonwealth member. Pearson, therefore, came with what 
the Canadian government hoped would provide a satisfactory compromise
outcome. This took the form of a declaration on racial equality similar to
20statements made at the 1961 conference. As the Canadians had foreseen, 
the debate was intense. "The Canadian delegation actively tried to use its
16
Despite Paul Martin's recollection that Douglas-Home requested the 
conference to deal with this issue [Paul Martin, A Very Public Life. Volume 
II: So Many Worlds. (Toronto: Deneau, 1985) p. 413] most other accounts 
relate that African delegations insisted Rhodesia be given prominence.
Gamer implies that they almost hijacked the meeting [Joe Gamer, The 
Commonwealth Office 1925-68. (London: Heinemann, 1978) p. 350] while Arnold 
Smith states that Canadian pressure at the meeting of officials beforehand 
was instrumental in ensuring it a more prominent place on the agenda. [Arnold 
Smith with Clyde Sanger, Stitches in Time: The Commonwealth in World 
Politics. (Don Mills, Ontario: General, 1981) p. 11.]
19Memorandum B14: Southern Rhodesia, 26 June, 1964. PAC RG 25 vol 3449 
file 1-1964/1.
20Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (2nd Session, 26th 
Parliament, Volume VI, 17 July, 1964) p. 5604.
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21influence to prevent disintegration," by letting the African members know 
that Canada was on their side and working towards a compromise since there
was no chance that the British government would accede to their demands.
22This compromise took the form of a statement in the final communique
almost identical to the declaration which Pearson had come with for this 
23purpose.
The Canadian proposal did not deflect all of the heat directed at the 
British government by African members. Subsequent events showed that this 
meeting was only the beginning of rancour over Rhodesia. However, it was 
illustrative of the nature of Canadian leadership within the Commonwealth.
It was a different variety of leadership than the British government tried to 
exercise, less proprietorial and more consensual. The British government, as 
it had done on a regular basis since 1944, produced a series of proposals and 
took them as far as it was able. The Canadian government, notwithstanding 
Diefenbaker's efforts to re-invigorate the Commonwealth's economic aspects, 
although generous in terms of aid proposals, was generally satisfied to let 
the Commonwealth develop as the majority wished and exercised its leadership 
to allow this to happen within the bounds of practicality and efficiency.
21Lester Pearson, (edited by John A.Munro and Alex I.Inglis), Mike. The 
Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. Volume 3 1957-1968. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1975) p. 283.
22 Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1964 (London, 8-15 July). 
Final Communique", The Commonwealth at the Summit, p. 83.
23The text of the original Canadian declaration is reproduced in: Smith, 
Stitches in Time, p. 11.
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The 1964 Secretariat Proposal
Nowhere was the Canadian preference for leading where others wanted to 
follow more evident than regarding the proposal to establish a Commonwealth 
secretariat. The idea, introduced at the 1964 CPMM by Ghana's Nkrumah took 
the Canadian government by surprise, as it did other Commonwealth members.
It quickly gained support from other leaders from the newer members, 
especially the Africans. The desire to increase the flow of development 
assistance had always prompted newer members to press for greater 
institutionalization. This had been the case at the 1949 finance ministers 
meeting, where Pakistan had circulated its memorandum on aid and in 1957 and 
1958 when Malaya and Ghana supported a Commonwealth development institution. 
Nkrumah's idea was first introduced in terms of facilitating economic 
development but other Commonwealth leaders added their own twists. Milton 
Obote, Uganda's prime minister, referred specifically to a Commonwealth 
secretariat and Dr. Eric Williams, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, 
formally proposed its establishment. Other ideas included dispute 
settlement machinery and a development fund. There was no focus to the many
04
Pearson, speaking in the House of Commons afterwards [Canada. 
Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (17 July, 1964) p. 5607] and Smith 
rStitches in Time, p. 4] both make this clear. Gamer rThe Commonwealth 
Office, p. 351] states that earlier that year, he and Sandys, on a visit to 
Ottawa, discussed a multilateral secretariat with Pearson and received 
assurances that Canada would not oppose the idea were it thought of general 
value by the membership. Whether this was in conjunction with parts of 
Douglas-Home's proposals, most of which required additional administrative 
machinery or the discussions about a Commonwealth economic development 
council, is unclear, but the Canadian receptiveness to the machinery 
envisaged in these was unenthusiastic. However, the Canadian government did 
not consider the idea serious enough even to prepare a precautionary 
memorandum in preparation for the meeting as was the usual practice. If 
Pearson did offer any such assurances, they were personal and he had to 
overcome resistance from his cabinet to offer support at the meeting. [See 
below]
^Smith, Stitches in Time, p. 5.
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ideas brought forward, but it was clear that the newer members supported the 
general idea that the Commonwealth required new and more formal institutional
machinery at the service of the Commonwealth as a whole. There was a certain
26amount of implied criticism of the CRO and the British government in this, 
but also the positive sign that the Commonwealth's newer members were taking 
more interest in preserving and developing the Commonwealth.
By the meeting's midpoint, the older members had yet to recover from 
their initial surprise and state their own positions. For Pearson and the 
Canadian government, supporting the idea of a permanent central secretariat 
required a major adjustment in attitudes. Arnold Smith, who was to become 
the first Secretary-General, has given the most complete and detailed account 
of the 1964 discussions on the subject and the Canadian response. He makes 
it clear that Pearson had to overcome strong cabinet resistance to the idea, 
especially from Paul Martin, the SSEA, who recorded only that "many in the
cabinet were doubtful about giving the secretariat the functions of a
27development bank."
The traditional Canadian suspicion that Commonwealth centralization 
equalled British dominance still existed. For Pearson, it was significant 
that the pressure for the new institution came from the newer, more
26Unequal treatment of members or a perception that the British 
government 'stage managed' meetings is often cited in explaining new members' 
support for a secretariat to organize meetings. Sees Smith, Stitches in 
Time, p. 6; Kenneth Robinson, "The Intergovernmental Machinery of 
Commonwealth Consultation and Co-operation," in WB Hamilton, Kenneth Robinson 
and CDW Goodman (eds), A Decade of the Commonwealth. 1955-1964. (Durham, NCs 
Duke University, 1966) p. 123; Peter Lyon, "The Commonwealth Secretariat and 
Organization" in Peter G Taylor (ed) A Survey of International Institutions. 
(Londons NAGLO, 1982) p. 81; and Andrestinos N Papadopoulos, Multilateral 
Diplomacy within the Commonwealths A Decade of Expansion. (The Hagues 
Martinus Nijoff, 1982) p. 29.
27Martin, A Very Public Life. Volume II. p. 413.
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nationalistic members, who were, he felt, even more likely to reject
28domination by Britain than older members such as Canada. The new members 
who supported the establishment of a secretariat clearly felt that the 
continued administration of many Commonwealth affairs by the CRO was a 
greater neocolonial threat than the new body. That being the case, if 
convinced of the idea's practical value, Canada would not oppose it. Indeed, 
to do so would place Canada in the role of opposing the active desires of the 
constituency whose goodwill Canada's Commonwealth involvement was most 
intended to cultivate. The Canadian government's approach to the idea of a 
secretariat was still cautious and it would not countenance creating a new 
institution for no other purpose than having one. On the other hand, Canada 
was now committed to supporting the creation of a useful secretariat that
could fulfill its role without derogating from existing methods of
29consultation.
A critical factor was the terms of reference under which a new 
secretariat would operate. The plethora of ideas proposed by the various 
leaders gave very little clear idea as to what exactly a new body would end 
up doing. Officials from the delegations met to discuss the various ideas 
and submitted a report to the prime ministers. Among other things, it 
recommended having another committee of officials consider the issue further 
and report back at a later date. The prime ministers accepted the need for 
further study but went further than this. In the past, putting a proposal 
aside for further study could be a formula for killing the idea, as happened 
with the development agency and bank. In this case, not only was the study 
mentioned in the final communique, but the prime ministers accepted the idea
28Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates. (17 July, 1964) p. 5607.
29Ibid.
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30in principle immediately. In this, the previously unimaginable proposal 
that the Commonwealth have a secretariat received much more positive backing 
than did other ideas for developing the organization such as Douglas-Home's 
five proposals and Pearson's offer of assistance in satellite communications 
which received much more tentative wording in the final communique.
Canadian Policy Towards a Secretariat
True to form, once the Canadian government sensed which way the wind was 
blowing the Commonwealth, it did its best to see that it was not dragged off 
course or allowed to drift onto one inimicable to Canadian views. The 
secretariat was still far from a reality; the differences between members as 
to its final form and function were substantial. There quickly emerged a 
division between those favouring an active role for the new secretariat and 
those preferring a more modest frame of reference. As had now become 
commonplace, Canada sided with the main tendency among the newer members.
The division between old and new was not as otherwise clear-cut as it had 
been over Suez, South Africa or Rhodesia. India sided with Australia and 
Britain in advocating a strictly limited secretariat.
Although Canada sided openly with the forces of change, a Canadian 
background paper circulated during the preparations for the officials' 
meeting was far from radical. Being on the side of change, the Canadian 
government was well positioned to ensure that it was not extreme and this was 
reflected in the Canadian paper. Even its 'radical' departure, a suggestion 
that the Secretary-General organize meetings of Commonwealth representatives,
30"Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1964 (London, 8-15 July). 
Final Communique", The Commonwealth at the Summit, p. 90.
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possibly high commissioners, to discuss papers on political and economic 
subjects as a means to further understanding among Commonwealth members, had 
antecedents in war-time and post-war meetings of Commonwealth high 
commissioners in London under the tutelage of the Commonwealth Secretary.
The British government, however, adamantly opposed this, as it did other 
Canadian ideas such as having the new, untried secretariat assimilate 
existing institutional bodies in London and giving it a role in co-ordinating 
or providing technical assistance.31
The British government prepared its own working paper on the secretariat 
proposal. It did not oppose the idea of a secretariat, indeed, having one 
could help to distance Britain from the Commonwealth in the eyes its 
erstwhile European partners. The British government, however, envisaged a 
more limited role for the new body and a more cautious approach to its 
development. The secretariat's first priority, in this view, should be to
get itself organized and only after that should it consider taking on wider
32responsibilities. When the Commonwealth officials studying the matter met 
in London in January, 1965, a compromise between the two positions resulted. 
The report, for the most part adopted unchanged at the 1965 CPMM, set out 
general principles for the operation of the new secretariat. Its main 
function, in addition to servicing future Commonwealth meetings, was to be 
information dissemination to members on matters of mutual concern, including 
the circulation of unbiased papers prepared on its own initiative or by 
member governments. The report stressed that the new body would in no way 
impinge on the sovereignty of members and not "arrogate to itself executive
31Smith, Stitches in Time, p. 12-13.
32Gamer, The Commonwealth Office, p. 352.
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33functions." But other than these basic limitations, there were few 
restrictions placed on how it developed and fulfilled its main functions.
The future relationship of other Commonwealth bodies to the new central organ 
was left to a future evaluation. The secretariat was not immediately given a 
wide range of specific duties, but neither was it severely restricted from 
the start. On balance, the more liberal approach championed by the Canadian 
government won the day.
The Canadian government was not especially concerned about the absence 
of particular details from its preliminary paper in the final report. The 
most important aspects of the basic framework established at the January 
meeting of officials as far as the Canadian government was concerned were the 
absence of both wide-ranging restrictions on the secretariat and wide-ranging 
powers for the secretariat. In the Canadian government's view, the 
secretariat should be established on the basis that it could "evolve 
empirically and in the light of experience." The plan for the secretariat 
did not involve any acceptance of future commitments so it was quite safe to 
let the secretariat start its job and see where it went. There was, then, no 
need to begin with a comprehensive 'grand design' and large establishment. 
This being the case, the general guidelines contained in the report of the 
officials were quite compatible with the Canadian government's views.
There was, in fact, a great deal of continuity with past Canadian policy 
towards the creation of new Commonwealth institutions in the Canadian
33Agreed Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat. Meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1965 (London, 17-25 June). Final Communique. 
The Commonwealth at the Summit, p.106.
34Commonwealth Secretariat: Draft Canadian Statement, 7 June, 1965. PAC 
RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
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attitude towards the secretariat, excepting, of course, the grand 
discontinuity of accepting it in the first place. As set out in the report 
of the January meeting, the secretariat would have no powers or functions 
which in anyway could diminish the authority or sovereignty of members. True 
to Canadian policy throughout the history of the Commonwealth, there would be 
no possibility of using the new institution to introduce voting, resolutions, 
or any other means of imposing group policy. In the past, when agreeing to 
establish Commonwealth organs, the Canadian government had always ensured 
that this did not entail the delegation of specific responsibilities by 
members. The Commonwealth relationship had always been strictly 
consultative. The Canadian government could not have accepted anything that 
tried to change this,35 nor did it have to with the secretariat.
Rather than fearing domination from the new body, the Canadian 
government saw more danger in trying to restrict its activities. For the new 
institution to develop in accordance with the wishes of most Commonwealth 
members, the basic provisions of the secretariat could not hamper or 
otherwise restrict its natural growth and evolution. The Canadian government
believed that much of the secretariat's future success would depend on the
36first secretary-general and the other senior staff. Placing too many
restrictions on the secretariat at the beginning might discourage suitable
37 38candidates from accepting the position. The secretariat, then, would be
35Commonwealth Secretariats Talking Points, 7 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 
3451 file 1-1965/1.
36Commonwealth Secretariat: Draft Canadian Statement, 7 June, 1965. PAC 
RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
37The 'right man' was key to the Canadian government's faith in a benign 
evolution of the secretariat and to this end it waged a discrete campaign for 
the selection of Arnold Smith as the first secretary-general. Sees Smith, 
Stitches in Time, pp. 16-17.
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doomed from the outset, with serious consequences for the Commonwealth and 
Canadian policy objectives.
Many of the newer members expected that tangible benefits would flow 
from the creation of the secretariat. Were it to fail to deliver these for 
reasons attributable to obstacles placed in its way by the older members, 
some of the newer members - precisely the constituency which the Canadian 
government wished to influence - might become disillusioned with the 
Commonwealth. The attachment to the Commonwealth of many of the newer 
members was already secondary to regional loyalties (such as through the 
Organization of African Unity, established in 1963) and the balance of 
benefits accruing to them via the Commonwealth was subject to change.
Already, the trade benefits which they derived from the Commonwealth 
relationship were being eroded. Future developments of the GATT would 
inevitably reduce this further, to say nothing of the uncertainties around 
what might happen if Britain were to join the EEC at some later date. This 
last was less of an immediate possibility following the election of a Labour 
government in Britain in October, 1964, but could have similar effects as the 
GATT for members not covered by special EEC arrangements. A possible threat 
to the Commonwealth's long-term survival was a growing movement towards 
dealing with development assistance on a world-wide basis. For the 
Commonwealth to continue to function as an effective mechanism for the 
Canadian government to manage its relations with the developing world, it had 
to come up with new means of maintaining the interests of its newer members 
and an unhobbled secretariat offered a promising means to this.
3ftCommonwealth Secretariat: Draft Canadian Statement, 7 June, 1965. PAC 
RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
39Commonwealth Secretariat: Talking Points, 7 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol
3451 file 1-1965/1.
Allowed to operate without undue hindrance, the secretariat could 
provide a valuable link between the increasingly diverse members of the 
Commonwealth. Since its commencement, the Cold War had figured prominently 
in Canadian calculations as to the Commonwealth's utility. The fundamentally 
nationalist struggle against Western domination on the part of elements 
within the societies of colonial dependencies was susceptible to being 
equated with the ideological struggle between Eastern communism and Western 
capitalism. This created the danger that the inevitable urge to assert 
independence could be subverted into hostility towards the West in general.
If newer members of the Commonwealth felt that they would be better served by 
a body other than one belonging to the bureaucracy of their former colonial 
master, then it was better to create a body more likely to engender a sense 
of inclusiveness. It was the only viable response to the forces at work 
within the world, "negative and divisive, which seek to set race against 
race, region against region, the developing against the industrialized, the 
newly independent against the older independent."41*
The Canadian government recognized that most of the newer members of the 
Commonwealth, especially the most recent additions, had only limited 
resources, at best, to enable them to keep up to date on a wide range of 
international issues and, at any rate, were more pre-occupied with domestic 
or regional concerns. The new secretariat could provide them with a more 
balanced view of international problems than they might otherwise receive.41 
The presentation of a balanced appraisal of issues was one of the few 
strictures on the secretariat's activities contained in the officials'
40Commonwealth Secretariats Draft Canadian Statement, 7 June, 1965. PAC
RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
41Commonwealth Secretariats Talking Points, 7 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol
3451 file 1-1965/1.
report. Notwithstanding past efforts at providing what would certainly be 
claimed as a balanced presentation of views by CRO officials, the new 
institution would be less open to suspicion of bias, especially over the 
looming controversy of Rhodesia. The secretariat, then, was the best means 
of keeping the peace within the Commonwealth, thereby keeping it together.
It was in the interest of Canada to do so; it was in the interest of the 
newer members to do so; and it was in the interest of Britain and the other 
older members to do so. In short, it was in the entire Commonwealth's 
interest to proceed with the loosely delineated secretariat.
Overcoming the Last Obstacles
Despite basic agreement from all members on the contents of the January
report, the issue of the secretariat was still not settled by the next CPMM
in mid-June, 1965. The main cause of the delay in accepting the report was
42resistance towards it from Australia's Menzies. In one of the great 
ironies of Commonwealth history, after years of Canadian opposition to 
Australian proposals for creating central Commonwealth institutions, when the 
time came to create a Commonwealth secretariat, the Canadian prime minister 
had to actively try to neutralize the objections of his Australian 
counterpart to ensure the effort's success. The dramatic role reversal of 
Mackenzie King's and Curtin's successors was indicative of how much the 
Commonwealth had changed over the years.
^Commonwealth Secretariats Memorandum, 7 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451
file 1-1965/1.
The Australian prime minister had held serious reservations about the
secretariat proposal from the outset. This fact was generally known and was
43reflected in the attitude of Australian officials at the January meeting. 
Despite being uncomfortable with the initiative, Menzies had not actively 
tries to obstruct its progress or otherwise prevent the emergence of 
consensus. The depth of his opposition to the plan only became evident in 
early April, 1965, when he sent a letter to the new British prime minister, 
Harold Wilson, detailing his concerns. In this letter, Menzies reiterated 
his longstanding support for the principle of establishing a central 
Commonwealth secretariat, but expressed grave reservations about the plans 
for one as they then stood. Such an undertaking, he averred, required a 
detailed examination of the proposed secretariat's functions and the nature 
and authority of its staff.44 The implication clearly being that the 
current proposal had not received adequate consideration. Oddly enough, 
considering the terms of the January report, Menzies stated his broad concern 
that in the Australian government:
we do not wish the Secretariat to have any executive authority 
which could cut across or diminish the authority which Prime 
Ministers and their Governments have in, and in relation to, their 
own country and national policies. There is we fear, some 
disposition to equate the position of the proposed Secretary- 
General (which seems a somewhat inflated title) with that of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. We would regard this as 
dangerous. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has in the 
course of time, and with the acquiescence of the General Assembly, 
gathered to himself a species of authority, and a quasi-diplomatic 
staff responsible to and directed by him, which if it developed in
It is often mentioned in accounts of the secretariat's creation, but 
not in detail. Smith comes closest to disclosing Menzies' vehemence. See 
for example: M.Margaret Ball, The 'Open' Commonwealth. (Durham, NC: Duke 
University, 1971) p. 88; Gamer, The Commonwealth Office, p. 352; Richard H. 
Leach, "The Secretariat", International Journal. (26:2, Spring 1971) p. 377; 
and Smith, Stitches in Time, p. 15;
44Annex: Text of Menzies' Message to Wilson of 3 April, 1965. 
Commonwealth Secretariat: Memorandum, 7 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 
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the Commonwealth, could drastically change the nature of our 
association and lead to the exacerbation of differences. It still 
remains the essence of the Commonwealth relationship that we are 
autonomous and equal and remain the masters of our own houses.
The report did not re-assure him on this count. Its lack of clearly 
elucidated parameters, and especially limitations, for the secretariat left 
him apprehensive about how it would develop. At the 1964 CPMM, he had 
envisaged the prime function of a secretariat being limited to the 
dissemination of factual information on matters of common concern to members. 
This would allow prime ministers to better prepare themselves for issues 
which would arise at meetings rather than having issues sprung upon them by 
others at the meeting itself. Menzies' preference was for the secretariat to 
have little scope for activity beyond this.
Fundamentally, Menzies was still unreconciled to the outcome of the 
debate over whether to have an active secretariat or a more limited, passive 
secretariat. The discretion allowed the secretariat by the report as then 
drafted was still a critical issue for the Australian prime minister. So too 
was a provision enabling the secretariat to offer expert and advisory 
opinions on development problems. In Menzies' opinion, any institution 
charged with being expert and advisory on the many and varied development 
problems faced by countries in the Commonwealth would have to be more 
elaborate even than the body being recommended to Commonwealth governments 
which he saw as already far too large.46 He wanted a smaller, more strictly 
defined organ, the functions of which could be expanded if experience 
demonstrated a need.
45Ibid.
46Ibid.
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Menzies only communicated his worries to Wilson. The British 
government, however, very quickly passed the message on to the prime 
ministers of Canada and New Zealand, the other two remaining members of the 
'first' Commonwealth. The Canadian government had never expected the 
Australian prime minister to be enthusiastic about the secretariat, but was 
surprised at the tone of the message to Wilson.47 Since CPMMs had no voting 
procedure, any decision on the secretariat would need, at the very least, the 
acquiesence of every member. This made it important to soften Menzies' 
position. In a development unthinkable in Mackenzie King's time, the 
Canadian government, as the old Commonwealth member most supportive of the 
secretariat proposal, now found itself taking a prominent role in dealing 
with the problem of how to get the Australian government to take a more 
flexible approach to the issue. There was, as usual, to be a meeting of 
officials immediately prior to the CPMM in June. The Canadian government 
hoped at the very least to get Australian agreement to consider the January 
report there to see how their concerns might be addressed.
i a
The Canadians saw the Australian fears as "far-fetched." The United 
Nations analogy in particular seemed impossible to sustain. The accretion of 
authority to the United Nations Secretary-General arose from the inability of 
United Nations organs to perform their functions effectively because of Cold 
War deadlock. Since the Commonwealth had no organs to which members had 
delegated the type of authority which bodies such as the Security Council
Commonwealth Secretariat: Talking points, 3 May, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 
3452 file 1-1-1965/3. Papers Prepared for Discussions with British Ministers, 
May 10, 1965.
48Ibid.
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wielded, there was no danger of a Commonwealth secretariat following suit.
In giving themselves over to such fantastic anxieties, the Canadian 
government felt that the Australians had
given no consideration to the positive features of the proposal and 
that they have thought insufficiently about the hazards to the 
Commonwealth of establishing a Secretariat which would fail to 
meet the legitimate aspirations of the newer members.
Canadian officials could only conclude that Menzies harboured the notion that
control of the proposed secretariat could somehow be "captured by radical,
probably African, elements which would ultimately impose policies on member 
-51governments.
Overcoming Menzies' strong objections was one of the subjects discussed 
when Martin, the SSEA, visited London for talks with British ministers on 10 
May, 1965. At that stage, the Commonwealth's older members were trying to 
resolve the matter among themselves, but Canadian officials were worried that
it would be difficult to keep the vehemence of Australian objections
52suppressed much longer. If the efforts of the older members could not 
remove the Australian objections, the other members of the Commonwealth would 
have to informed, at least in general terms, of the negative Australian 
response. The Canadian government, supporting the secretariat as a means to 
strengthen Commonwealth bonds did not want the issue to become a source of
^Commonwealth Secretariat: Talking Points, 7 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol
3451 file 1-1965/1.
^Commonwealth Secretariat: Talking points, 3 May, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol
3452 file 1-1-1965/3.
51Commonwealth Secretariat: Memorandum, 7 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 
file 1-1965/1.
52Commonwealth Secretariat: Talking points, 3 May, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol
3452 file 1-1-1965/3.
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division, especially if it might amount to a rebuff of new members' efforts 
to create a stake in the organization for themselves. The most productive 
route to follow in trying to resolve this problem, the Canadians felt, would 
be a direct approach to the Australians by the British. This seemed more 
likely to be productive than either an initiative from themselves or the New 
Zealanders; although the Canadians were willing to follow-up a British 
approach. These efforts, while unsuccessful in completely eliminating 
Menzies' anxieties, assuaged them sufficiently to enable the proposal to 
proceed.
The Australian government was not the only potential source of 
disruption for the planned secretariat. The Canadian government also 
believed that some officials at the CRO, although not the minister, opposed 
the plans as well.53 Like Menzies, they were believed to be dissatisfied 
with the latitude accorded the new body for future development and would have 
preferred firmer restrictions on its powers and functions.54 The reason for 
this suspected reluctance to see the January report implemented was concern 
over the new British government's planned merger of the CRO with the Foreign 
Office. With this prospect, these officials did not want to see the CRO's 
functions diminished or assumed by the secretariat. Canadian officials' 
assessment of the problems this would present was that CRO officials could 
hardly openly adopt the position attributed to them and so were unlikely to
Cl
Gamer insists that far from seeking to limit the secretariat, it was 
in the CRO's interest to be relieved of the "invidious task" of organizing 
Commonwealth meetings. However, he also makes clear the preference for a 
"cautious and pragmatic line" in determining the secretariat's scope. Sees 
Gamer, The Commonwealth Relations Office, pp. 351-2.
54Commonwealth Secretariat: Memorandum, 7 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451
file 1-1965/1.
313
do more than "unobtrusively support the Australian position."55 The key, 
then, remained overcoming the Australian objections.
British Proposals 1965: Labour's Programme
The establishment of the new secretariat was not the only proposal for 
expanding the range of Commonwealth co-operation and institutions anticipated 
at the 1965 CPMM. There were a veritable host of other initiatives. Some 
had been put over for additional study at the 1964 meeting, but there were 
numerous others which were coming forth for the first time, or at least, 
given the tendency of such proposals to emerge and re-emerge, were 
resurfacing in time for the 1965 meeting. The most far-reaching of these 
emanated from the new British government.
The British Labour Party, while in opposition, had made much of the 
Conservative government's alleged neglect and disregard for the Commonwealth. 
Labour's election manifesto in the October, 1964, castigated the 
Conservatives for allowing the Commonwealth's share of British trade drop by 
a third and bringing the organization near to disintegration through its 
negotiations with the EEC. The 1964 CPMM, Labour claimed, had shown the 
Commonwealth to be strong despite the actions of their Conservative opponents 
but lacking a coherent policy at its centre. Labour proposed to provide this 
by promoting closer consultation, possibly via the creation of a Commonwealth 
Consultative Assembly, and initiating a new drive to promote Commonwealth 
trade.56 Canadian officials monitored political developments in Britain
55Ibid.
56Extracts from "Let's Go With Labour - The New Britain" (The Labour 
Party Manifesto for the General Election, 1964). PAC RG 19 vol 4923 file 
8267-01. Commonwealth Trade Generally.
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closely. After Labour's victory, they felt that with this election platform 
and Wilson's past record of speeches in the House of Commons criticizing the
government on Commonwealth trade, the matter would loom large in the new
57government's objectives for the next CPMM.
These expectations that a Commonwealth initiative would be forthcoming 
from Labour were at least partly substantiated in a 13 April message from 
Wilson to Pearson about the agenda for the June meeting. In it Wilson 
included the comment:
I have felt for some time that Commonwealth understanding could be 
enhanced by developing inter-parliamentary consultations which 
would draw Commonwealth Parliamentarians closer together and 
encourage them to gain an understanding of each other's problems 
and thus help to promote the Commonwealth concept. Useful ideas 
for Commonwealth co-operation might well be generated this way.
In the past, such an idea would have triggered alarm bells in Ottawa. It 
still did among some Canadians and parts of the Liberal press still denounced 
the idea as "a back door through which the concept of a consolidated group of
cq
nations could be reintroduced after many failures." Within the 
government, however, the idea was so implausible that it provoked more 
mystification than outrage.
When Martin was in London in May, he queried the new Commonwealth 
Secretary, Arthur Bottomley, as to what exactly the proposal for 
parliamentary links meant. The closest parallel which existed was the
^Numbered Letter 295 From the Office of the Canadian High Commissioner 
in London to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 February, 
1965. PAC RG 19 vol 4923 file 8267-01.
CO
Quoted in Memorandum: Commonwealth Parliamentary Assembly, 4 June,
1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
cq
The Old Dream", Winnipeg Free Press. 19 April, 1965
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Council of Europe and the Canadian government failed to see how a 
Commonwealth body could in any way be compared to that body.60 The 
Commonwealth already had CPMMs to exchange views at the highest level and the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association to provide personal exchanges among 
parliamentarians. There were no any indications of public support anywhere 
in the Commonwealth for a move towards political unity of any sort. Indeed, 
within Canada, even Diefenbaker publicly rejected the idea.61
Bottomley confirmed that the basic notion was analogous to the Council 
of Europe. The proposal's purpose was to give Commonwealth parliamentarians 
an opportunity to come together and give parliamentary examination to 
problems of mutual interest. It would have no executive power or authority 
and would fundamentally be a forum for the exchange of ideas. The Canadian 
government, however, remained unconvinced as to either the idea's utility or 
its practicality. The proposal, so long as it remained confined to the 
outline given by British ministers did not differ substantially from the 
objectives and benefits of the existing Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association. There seemed, then, no need to recreate an existing body and it 
was deemed undesirable to create a new one which would go any further. It 
was difficult for Canadian officials to believe that many of the newer
Commonwealth members would have any enthusiasm for a centralizing institution
62bearing any resemblance to the Council of Europe. That body had received 
its impetus from a strong movement within many European countries towards
60Commonwealth Parliamentary Assembly: Talking Points, 4 May, 1965. PAC 
RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1-1965/3.
61 "Commonwealth Group Not Feasible: Ex-PM", The Toronto Globe and Mail.
24 April. 1965.
62Memorandum: Commonwealth Parliamentary Assembly, 4 June, 1965. PAC RG
25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
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greater political unity. The exact opposite trend had been a conspicuous 
feature of the Commonwealth throughout its history. But while this trend had 
been fostered by previous Canadian governments, the first critical criterion 
for acceptance or rejection of this proposal with centralizing implications 
was no longer its implications for Canadian sovereignty and independence, 
rather it was the acceptability of such a proposal to the Commonwealth's 
newer members. The outcome was identical to what it would have been in the 
first Commonwealth, but its reasoning now reflected the third Commonwealth.
This determination to stick to the needs and operation of the third 
Commonwealth also manifested itself in the Canadian attitude towards the 
anticipated British trade initiative. Unlike other issues on the meeting's 
agenda, the Canadian government had not received any indication as to what 
proposals the British government might present and so could only prepare a 
general response. In reviewing the possibilities, Canadian officials found 
it difficult to imagine any Commonwealth trade initiatives which would confer 
substantial benefit on any member other than Britain. They anticipated that 
a British initiative put forward in the context of a strengthening of 
Commonwealth ties would almost certainly be directed toward one or more of 
the following objectives:
strengthening the position of sterling, arresting the decline in 
Britain's share of intra- Commonwealth trade, expanding British 
exports to particular markets such as Canada's or, as a gesture to 
the majority of members, proposing special Commonwealth 
arrangements to assist less developed countries.
If the British aim was to secure support for sterling they would probably 
revive the suggestion that Commonwealth countries, Canada as well as members
Memorandum: Commonwealth Trade, 11 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file
1-1965/1.
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of the Sterling Area, hold additional sterling in their national reserves. 
This idea was associated with Thomas Balogh who was now an advisor to Wilson. 
The Canadian government had resisted the idea in the past and did not 
anticipate that it would find any favour with other members either.
The probable asymmetry of benefits of any British trade proposal made it 
less likely that there would be general agreement to them. There remained 
the problem that "such initiatives could be presented in a way which would 
have considerable public appeal and be embarrassing for Canada."64 The 
Canadian government had no desire to be depicted as an obstacle to 
Commonwealth cooperation, even if the sort of cooperation envisaged belonged 
more to the first Commonwealth than the third. The Liberal government was in 
a minority situation with Diefenbaker sitting across the House of Commons 
waiting for ammunition to use against the government. While determined to 
resist any attempt by Wilson to in effect revive an aspect of the first 
Commonwealth, the Canadian government could take solace from the fact that 
privately, British officials had indicated that the British prime minister 
faced a situation much like that of Canadian Conservatives in 1957. There 
was a general desire within the Labour government to see Commonwealth trade 
expanded, but there was a dearth of concrete ideas as to how it would be 
accomplished.65 Such were the difficulties in trying to make the unworkable 
work. If there was anything which typified Canadian governments' approach to 
developing the Commonwealth, it was to go with what would work. Diefenbaker 
had neglected this to his peril, but Pearson was intent on holding the line.
64 Ibid.
65Ibid.
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Other Proposals
Of the many other proposals likely to be dealt with at the 1965 CPMM, 
the two most significant were anticipated suggestions for the establishment 
of a Commonwealth court and the previous year's British proposal for a 
Commonwealth Foundation. As with most suggestions for Commonwealth 
institutions, neither of these was entirely novel or ground breaking. At one 
time, the countries which comprised the Commonwealth did have what amounted 
to a Commonwealth court in the guise of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council. Over time its jurisdiction had gradually diminished as independent 
members abolished appeals to the British body in favour of establishing their 
own supreme courts as the final arbiter of cases within their countries. 
Proposals to replace the Privy Council with an Imperial or Commonwealth court 
started as far back as the 1911 Imperial Conference. The Canadians and South 
Africans invariably opposed such moves and a functioning body was never 
established.
More recently, the past dozen years had seen several suggestions for
means to either replace the Privy Council or make its continued use more
attractive.66 The last was in 1960 from the Ceylonese Minister of Justice,
Edmund Cooray. With his country poised to become a republic, he suggested
that a Commonwealth Court could provide a means for countries wishing to
67maintain judicial links. At the 1960 CPMM, Diefenbaker, citing Canada's
A variety of official and semi-official proposals are ins 
PRO DO 35/5430 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the possible 
setting up of a Commonwealth Court (1953-60) [file CON 379/3]
67Edmund Cooray, "Note on the Proposal for a Commonwealth Court", nd [May 
I960?]. PRO DO 35/5430.
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abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1949 (which he had apposed at 
the time), refused to subordinate Canada's Supreme Court to any new body. 
Other objections, such as the danger that institutionalization would reduce 
the spirit of frank discussion within the Commonwealth, and even that it 
would overlap with the Privy Council's functions, led Macmillan, when summing 
up the discussion as chairman, to recommend that it would be better not even
CQ
to study the idea or mention it in the final communique.
Canadian officials anticipated that support for a Commonwealth court 
proposal would come from two sources. In Britain, a small group of 
Conservative backbenchers were urging such a move. More importantly, 
however, the government of Malaysia (as Malaya came to be called with the 
addition of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah in 1963) had supported the 1960 
proposal and still favoured the establishment of some form of regional 
Commonwealth court. Before the 1965 meeting, Canadian officials lacked 
precise details as to what the Malaysians might suggest, but they considered
CQ
two possibilities as most likely. These were for a body dealing with 
private-law disputes to replace the Privy Council or for one dealing with 
disputes between Commonwealth members.
The Canadian government sympathized with the objectives underlying such 
proposals, especially with the need to preserve common legal traditions among 
members. There were, however, important implications for Canada, the 
Commonwealth, and relations between Commonwealth members which made the 
Canadian government extremely reluctant to agree even to a regional court.
CO
Memorandum: Commonwealth Court, 9 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 
1-1965/1.
69 Ibid.
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It was no more willing to resubordinate Canada's Supreme Court to any other 
judicial body than in I960,70 and did not want to see the precedent 
established of any Commonwealth country's supreme court being superceded.71 
Moreover, the Canadian government was not convinced of the need for 
additional machinery of this kind for settling intergovernmental disputes.
There was a danger that it might duplicate or weaken the International Court
72of Justice. The pre-eminent Canadian commitment remained, as ever, to 
wider multilateral institutions. The court could, however, in addition to 
undermining these, damage the image of the Commonwealth if, once established, 
it were not used. In that event, it could further weaken the image of 
international arbitration generally.
A regional court of any sort would still be a Commonwealth institution 
and create a precedent for the future evolution of the Commonwealth. The 
fact of creating a regional court could create the impression within 
Commonwealth countries, including Canada, that this route was taken because 
of opposition from certain countries to a universal Commonwealth court. The
Canadian government feared that "pressure might thus be brought to bear on
73Canada to participate if such a court were to exist." In sum, the 
Canadian objections to any such proposal harkened back, as did indeed the 
idea itself, to the first Commonwealth. The Canadian government was resolute
70Commonwealth Court: Talking Points, 9 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 
file 1-1965/1.
71Commonwealth Court: Supplementary Talking Points, 10 June, 1965. PAC RG 
25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
72Commonwealth Court: Memorandum, 9 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 
1-1965/1.
73Supplementary Memorandum: Commonwealth Court, 10 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 
vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
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in its defence of the third Commonwealth as the most effective one for 
Canadian policy.
The proposal for a Commonwealth Foundation had much less sinister 
implications. The 1964 CPMM had set out the scope of the body for further 
study. The January meeting of officials concluded that there was a genuine 
need to better develop non-governmental interchanges like those envisioned in 
the British proposal. The idea behind the Commonwealth Foundation, to 
broaden the basis of personal and professional contacts within the 
Commonwealth, was not ground breaking by any means. A variety of 
Commonwealth non-governmental organizations, especially professional or trade 
groups existed, and the Commonwealth Institute, with a largely complementary 
mandate to encourage understanding about the Commonwealth and other members, 
although active almost exclusively in Britain, provided an example of an 
institution funded by subscription by Commonwealth governments, but not 
itself an intergovernmental organization.
The Canadian approach to the Foundation proposal was that if the
preponderant majority of Commonwealth members favoured its establishment,
74Canada would also contribute to its financing. Using the CELU budget 
sharing arrangement as a model, Canada was prepared to cover twenty percent 
of the costs, Britain having offered to pay half of the £250,000 planned 
initial budget. An important consideration in the Canadian decision was the 
reaction of Canadian professional organizations and other groups such as the 
Canadian Labour Congress. When asked if they were willing to participate, 
most of the organizations canvassed showed an active interest. Satisfied
Memorandums Commonwealth Foundation, 9 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451
file 1-1965/1.
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that there was a domestic constituency willing to make use of the 
government's investment, the government would proceed. The Canadian 
government did not appear as vigorous in pursuing the British initiative on 
the Commonwealth Foundation as it did with the African one for the
secretariat. All in all, the attitude was reminiscent to that of the early
1950s when in an effort not to disrupt a growing cohesiveness which Canada 
wanted to foster, the Canadian government went along with some proposals it 
might not otherwise have supported.
Just as it was prepared to accept proposals so as not to strike a 
disharmonious chord, the Canadian government also held back on initiating one 
in an area where it was beginning to develop reservations. The Canadian 
government had consistently supported Commonwealth membership for any former 
British dependency desiring to join. In the 1960 CSG, Bryce, the Canadian 
representative had insisted on this. There had, nevertheless, always been 
the implied reservation on the Canadian position that cases should be 
considered individually, whether Ceylon in 1947, Ghana in 1957 or Cyprus in
1960. By 1965, the pace of independence, and, pursuant to the policy
articulated in the 1960 report, Commonwealth membership, had accelerated 
beyond anything envisioned in 1960. Cyprus was followed by even smaller 
states such as Malta and the brief membership of an independent Zanzibar in
1964. The near future, held the prospect of additional small members from 
the Caribbean region and Africa starting with the Gambia in 1965. The 
Canadian government had held doubts about approving the membership of very
75
small members in the past, but had not expressed them to other members.
With the faster pace of independence, Canadian officials felt that the
75
Membership in the Commonwealth of Remaining British Dependencies:
Talking Points, 3 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
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Commonwealth would face problems they had not sufficiently considered in 
1960.
The 'open door' membership policy which Canada had always supported had
resulted in a broadly based international association which provided an
effective instrument for maintaining relations between European, Asian,
African and Caribbean cultures. This was the Commonwealth's primary function
now as far as Canada was concerned, but officials were concerned that in
1960, the numbers involved were not fully anticipated. Instead, they felt,
the 1960 exercise placed too much emphasis on the importance of providing
guidance to newly independent countries and not enough on how the
Commonwealth might usefully accommodate the then unforeseen profusion of 
76members. Although Canadian officials had themselves used the idea of
guidance in 1960 to counter British arguments in favour of restricting
membership, they did not hold by it now. A diluted, less cohesive.
Commonwealth might be less able to provide the guidance anticipated in 1960,
if there was even any point in pretending that this function had any real
substance. The prime ministers of the smallest members such as Cyprus and
Zanzibar which possessed the most limited government resources and thus might
be said to be most in need of guidance did not use the contacts available
77through the Commonwealth to seek it. For these reasons, Pearson, in a 
message to Wilson on 25 March, 1965, queried whether it might not be
76Memorandums Membership in the Commonwealth of Remaining British 
Dependencies, 3 May, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1-1965/3.
77Membership in the Commonwealth of Remaining British Dependenciess
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appropriate to re-open the question of membership of smaller states at the 
approaching CPMM.78
The British prime minister, while sympathetic to the Canadian concerns,
counselled against pursuing them. In his response to Pearson's letter,
Wilson raised the issue, stressed in the 1960 report, that it would be
paradoxical were the Commonwealth more restrictive than the United 
79Nations. He conceded that there were strong arguments against membership 
regardless of size, particularly the possibility that the consequence would 
be to make it "impossible to maintain the essential value of the Commonwealth
on
association." The British government had held these reservations, not 
only in 1960, but in earlier considerations of membership. On these 
occasions, Canadian governments had supported open membership so as to 
facilitate the Commonwealth's function as an instrument to promote dialogue 
between the West and developing countries. At the time, the Commonwealth's 
most probable alternative function was use as an instrument to promote 
British influence. The likelihood of this was now fast receding, if not long 
gone. Now, the point having been ensured, the Canadian government was 
considering the possibility that:
The effectiveness of the Commonwealth as an institution for 
communication between continents, races, ideologies and religions, 
between the industrialized and the underdeveloped... [was] not 
necessarily served by the principle of universality. A relatively 
limited group of relatively large countries may provide more
78Note: Membership in the Commonwealth of Remaining British Dependencies, 
3 May, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1-1965/3.
79Membership in the Commonwealth of Remaining British Dependencies: 
Talking Points, 3 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/1.
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effectively for the kind of political interchange which in our view 
[was] the main value of the Prime Minister's meetings.
The Canadian government was not dissatisfied with the Commonwealth as it had 
developed after 1960, but the value of additional inexperienced interlocutors 
from economically and politically weak, even non-viable, states, diminished 
as their numbers grew.
The political interchange which the Canadian government saw as the main 
value of CPMMs was becoming ever more important as developing countries in 
and out of the Commonwealth assumed greater importance in international 
politics. It had always been important in a Cold War context where, since 
the mid-1950s, competition for the allegiance of developing countries had 
increasingly served as the principal battleground of East-West rivalry. To 
this was now added the developing tendency among new states to take advantage 
of their growing numbers to exert collective pressure to shape the 
international agenda in accordance with their needs. The 1955 Bandung 
Conference and its successor, the 1961 Belgrade Conference had focused on 
non-alignment, but Belgrade also served as the point of departure for a 
growing movement to assert collective economic interests. From March to 
June, 1964, 120 states had assembled in Geneva for the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Two thirds of them were from 
the developing world. Even though such states were still unable to wield 
much economic influence, their ability to shape the international political 
agenda, especially within multilateral institutions, appeared to be growing. 
Commonwealth leaders, especially Nehru (before his death in 1964) and 
Nkrumah, had played central roles in these international developments. The 
Commonwealth provided the Canadian government with a unique mechanism to
81Ibid.
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engage key leaders from developing countries In a more Intimate dialogue than 
was possible at the United Nations. The leaders of very small states were 
much less valuable as interlocutors in this regard.
The Canadian concerns about the membership of small states were not 
simply a matter of the Commonwealth's use to Canada, but also its use to the 
new members. Canadian officials felt that some smaller states might more 
usefully be served with alternatives to full membership. This, they felt, 
could take a form such as Samoa's treaty arrangement with New Zealand or 
partial membership allowing them to receive benefits from some Commonwealth 
institutions such as aid programmes and the scholarship plan. The examples 
of Cyprus's self-imposed delayed membership, Zanzibar's short-lived 
membership, and Samoa's alternative to membership demonstrated that new 
states wanted to choose for themselves how they would be associated with the 
Commonwealth. The Canadian government, whatever its reservations, was not 
about to deny them this.
Membership structure was not a high priority issue for the Canadian 
government. Officials did not even prepare a formal memorandum in 
preparation for the June meetings. The Canadian government had no intention 
of pressing the matter without general support. Should the opportunity 
arise, Pearson would have done no more than suggest that the topic of the 
future of small territories be referred to another study group of 
officials. Such a group would be more anonymous than raising the issue 
before the assembled prime ministers and the Canadian government had no
Memorandums Membership in the Commonwealth of Remaining British 
Dependencies, 3 May, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1-1965/3.
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intention of alienating members from developing countries. The issue did, 
however, suggest that the Canadian government was taking the use and 
development of the Commonwealth very seriously. Now that the long-term 
economic future of Britain appeared to be with Europe, notwithstanding 
whatever surprises Wilson might have, and old-style Commonwealth unity 
advocates such as Menzies were showing signs of disenchantment with the idea, 
the possibility that the modalities of the first Commonwealth could be 
resurrected was receding. Like the Canadian government's acceptance of a 
secretariat, this appearance of a changed Canadian attitude towards the 
Commonwealth was more apparent than real. Both, together with the policy 
towards other institutional proposals, pointed to a desire to refine the 
Commonwealth so as to be better able to exploit the full potential of the 
contacts it afforded with the third Commonwealth. This was now firmly 
established as the only viable function for the Commonwealth in Canadian 
policy and in the policies of other members, regardless of any ideas they 
might have had to the contrary.
The 1965 CPMM: Outcomes
The future of dependencies was discussed at the 1965 CPMM, but not in a 
way conducive to raising the issue of small states. The burning membership 
question at the 1965 meeting was again Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the meeting 
still found time to deal with the many proposals for Commonwealth 
institutional development. Officials meeting beforehand reviewed the January 
report on the secretariat bearing in mind that governments were already on 
record as agreeing in principle to the new body and only seeking to finalize
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fiddetails for the prime ministers' approval. The report they submitted did 
not differ substantially from the January report.
Nothing had happened to substantially change Menzies' view either. He 
was still unhappy about the potential for the secretariat to grow in size and 
scope. Stating his position for the record, but not as a veto, he warned 
that "
if the Secretariat sought to invade the field of policy and 
executive action or trespass on the rights of individual 
governments, it would do great harm to the Commonwealth.
Pearson spoke next and just as the Canadian government's championing of the 
secretariat had precluded any possibility that anything invidious was ever 
seriously entertained, he neutralized Menzies arguments by agreeing with him. 
True to the Commonwealth tradition of seeking out areas of agreement despite 
any differences, the Canadian prime minister was quick to support Menzies' 
point about the undesirability of the secretariat acting as Menzies feared, 
but pointed out the limitations placed on the scope and function of the 
secretariat would prevent this from coming to pass. At the same time,
Pearson argued, the secretariat had to have the opportunity to grow as 
changing circumstances required. The prime ministers were not going to adopt 
anything to which any of their members disagreed and Menzies, whatever 
residual doubts he harboured, did not object further. The meeting approved 
the report of officials subject only to consideration of procedures for
Al
P.P.M(65)4 Commonwealth Secretariat: Report by Officials, 16 June,
1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-1965/3. Meeting of Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers, June 1965. Minutes and Memoranda.
85P.M.M(65) 6th Meeting. Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 1965.
Minutes of the Sixth Meeting, 18 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 1-
1965/3.
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circulating reports on dependent territories. Five days later, the
Canadian effort on behalf of the new Commonwealth Secretariat was crowned by
87the selection of Arnold Smith as the first Secretary-General.
The next day, the second last before the meetings wrapped up, Wilson 
made his anticipated economic initiative. Being confronted with a disturbing 
reduction in Britain's share of Commonwealth trade, Wilson explained, led the 
British government to thinking that the Commonwealth as a whole should 
consider how to expand mutual trade. Assuming they would all contribute to 
the GATT talks, the question as to how specifically Commonwealth trade might 
be increased remained. He offered some suggestions for consideration. The 
first possibility was to use government purchasing for national development 
plans. As an example, Wilson cited the Province of Saskatchewan's preference 
for British goods in recognition of the amount of Saskatchewan wheat sold to 
Britain. The British government thought other governments should give 
consideration as to how similar provisions could be built into their 
development programmes. Wilson's s second idea was to expand the use of 
commodity agreements in which Commonwealth members would agreed to buy or 
supply set amounts of commodities at agreed prices. This idea was reflected 
in one of three main British proposals for action. Wilson suggested that 
national planning authorities from around the Commonwealth meet so as to 
compare plans in order to take one another's plans into account. The other 
two proposals included a revival of the old canard of holding a meeting of 
Commonwealth trade ministers and, in an obvious attempt to generate orders 
for the British aeronautics industry, a proposal to reactivate the
86 Ibid.
87P.M.M(65)llth Meeting. Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Minsters 1965. 
Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, 23 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 1- 
1965/3.
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Commonwealth Air Transport Council which had fallen into disuse so that
aircraft manufacturers could take into account other Commonwealth countries'
00
requirements before developing new aircraft.
Other leaders had their own ideas for developing closer economic ties. 
One of these was put to the meeting as a formal proposal. President Ayub 
Khan of Pakistan suggested that members share research results in specific 
areas. But when Pearson spoke to the issue at the next session, by which time 
the Canadian delegation had had time to quickly examine the morning's events, 
he took aim specifically at the British proposals. He noted that in Canada 
many development projects were under provincial jurisdiction so the federal 
government could not interfere by committing itself to the kind of 
coordination proposed. He also warned that by seeking to increase 
Commonwealth trade, members must not do anything to prejudice world trade in 
general, especially the efforts of GATT and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. Pearson conceded that:
It might be useful to have meetings of Commonwealth countries at 
United Nations conferences; possibly this would help to stop such 
conferences hardening the divisions between the developed and the 
developing countries.
In so doing, he left no doubt as to what Canada saw as the Commonwealth's 
main purpose. If others were intent on reviving the trade aspect, however, 
he made it clear that it could not be a one way street. Canada had a net
P.M.M. (65) 12th Meeting. Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. 
Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting, 24 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 
1-1965/3.
8*P.M.M.(65)13th Meeting. Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. 
Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting, 24 June, 1965. PAC RG 25 vol 3451 file 
1-1965/3.
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trade balance In Its favour with the Commonwealth as a whole and would 
welcome more Commonwealth trade aimed at changing trade balances both with 
countries enjoying favourable balance with Canada and those like Britain with 
unfavourable balances with Canada.
Increased trade with Commonwealth countries would be a welcome help to 
reduce Canadian dependence on the United States. Accomplishing this 
objective was the difficult part, as Diefenbaker had learned. Pearson 
acknowledged, rather generously, that past trade ministers' meetings had 
proven useful, but he felt it would best not to hold such a meeting 
immediately following the finance ministers' annual September meeting to give 
time for preparatory work by officials. Likewise reviving the CATC was a 
good idea, as far as routes and information concerning aircraft were 
concerned, and Pearson said he would gladly consider ways Canadian airlines 
and manufacturers could cooperate. In sum, without directly saying no to 
anything, Pearson had done his best to ensure Wilson's proposals gained no 
momentum.
The final outcome of the economic proposals was much in line with 
Pearson's views. The CATC proposal went nowhere. With respect to the 
economic planners' meeting, institutional differences among members posed 
difficulties but the governments would do what they could. They felt that a 
trade ministers' meeting needed more preparations and directed officials and 
the new Secretariat to work on it. Likewise, Khan's suggestion was also 
referred to the Secretariat. The Secretariat was already demonstrating its 
usefulness in promoting Commonwealth cooperation. Nothing was rejected, but 
this attempt at reviving old-style Commonwealth relationships was turned back 
with the help of the new.
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Most of the other proposals for developing the Commonwealth relationship 
fared no better than Wilson's economic initiatives. As Canadian officials 
had surmised, the British proposal for a Commonwealth Parliamentary Assembly 
met a quick end, without, in fact, Pearson having to say anything. All of 
the delegates speaking to the issue, representing the first, second and third 
Commonwealth,
took the view that such an institution would be incompatible with 
the nature of the Commonwealth and would only be justified if 
there were the intention of proceeding to form a Commonwealth 
government. It would in any event be unwise to seek to establish 
too many Commonwealth institutions at the present time...
Instead, the prime ministers agreed that the more limited objectives 
appropriate to the Commonwealth would be best carried out by the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association.
Similarly, the meeting quickly disposed of the Malaysian government's 
proposal for a Commonwealth court. Not having an existing organization which 
it could be claimed would achieve the same objectives other than the British 
Privy Council itself, the meeting turned the issue back to the Malaysian 
government to raise at the forthcoming Conference of Government Law Officers 
in Canberra, Australia. The prime minister thus avoided totally rejecting 
the idea at the political level in preference for a rejection later when 
dealt with at a technical level. The Commonwealth Foundation met much less 
resistance. The Kenyan delegation said that it was not authorized to commit 
its government to participate. The rest, therefore, agreed to establish the 
Commonwealth Foundation with the understanding that Kenya would not 
participate.
9QIbid.
The assembled Commonwealth leaders had made a clear statement of the 
sorts of institutions possible in the new Commonwealth and the sort of 
relationship they implied. Efforts to promote cooperation among the 
independent members, especially involving a transfer of resources from the 
richer to the poorer were acceptable. Anything remotely suggesting greater 
political or economic unity was not. Important trading relationships still 
existed within the Commonwealth, but the organization's real economic focus 
was development. As for the Commonwealth's political basis, it was and would 
remain cooperation and discussion without commitment beyond that. Far from 
indicating a new desire for unity among members, the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat marked another step away from Britain's preponderant 
place at the centre of the Commonwealth which had always posed a latent 
threat of dominating any focus of unity. As Commonwealth members had shown 
in previous instances such as the resolution of the South African membership 
issue, the determination of membership structure in general and the gradual 
winnowing out of policy areas managed via the Commonwealth, only by drawing 
apart could the basis of continuing cooperation in other areas be laid. The 
rejection of any institutions which would have actually given effect to unity 
demonstrated clearly the desire to maintain the Commonwealth as a forum for 
sharing viewpoints, not shared viewpoints. The Pearson government subscribed 
to this view as had the Diefenbaker, St.Laurent and Mackenzie King 
governments before it.
For the Canadian government, the developments of 1964 and 1965 meshed 
well with what had been the Commonwealth's most important function in 
Canadian policy since the independence of the Indian sub-continent. The 
Commonwealth had shed many roles since the 1940s and the Canadian 
government's positions at the 1965 CPMM showed that it would accept neither
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backsliding into old roles like trade and the general bolstering of Britain, 
nor accretion of new areas of activity such as the proposals for a court 
entailed. The only possible role for the third Commonwealth, the Canadian 
government recognized, was as a bridge between the West and the developing 
countries. The formation of the Secretariat secured the bridge without 
compromising the traditional Canadian stance on the nature of Commonwealth 
consultation and cooperation. It was the culmination of a progression of aid 
initiatives and political efforts to diffuse divisive issues and prevent 
splits on the basis of colour since the 1940s. A once unthinkable mechanism 
became thinkable in a Commonwealth no longer susceptible to British control 
and needing ways of engaging the interests of an expanding membership.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
A Canadian brief on the Commonwealth's future prepared for the 1957 CPMM
dismissed Commonwealth economic integration as unfeasible and observed:
Nor is it to be anticipated that the Commonwealth will develop 
constitutionally in the sense of the introduction of more organized 
political relationships such as a council or a secretariat.
Yet within the next eight years, one Canadian prime minister had declared his 
intention to attempt the first, and another had agreed to the second. Even 
more remarkably, each had done so while maintaining a basically consistent 
view of the Commonwealth's role in Canadian foreign policy. That policy, 
however, had been obliged to adapt to new circumstances which had transformed 
the institution and the context in which it operated.
The Commonwealth had been thoroughly exposed to the winds of change in 
the period between 1956 and 1965. Its membership expanded from eight to 
twenty-one, with populations ranging from Nigeria's tens of millions to 
Malta's hundreds of thousands. The old relatively wealthy, white members 
were reduced to a small minority demographically and numerically beside the 
large number of underdeveloped members from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean 
which were intent on putting their imprint on the organization. South Africa 
had been forced to withdraw. The British government had clearly indicated 
that it saw Britain's economic future within Europe, thus threatening 
Commonwealth markets in Britain. Aid initiatives, joint Commonwealth ones as 
well as bilateral programmes developed by wealthier members such as Canada 
and targeted specifically at Commonwealth recipients, were put in place for 
the new members' benefit. And by 1965, members had even established a once
lnThe Present and Future Character of the Commonwealth", 4 June, 1957.
PAC RG 25 vol 3445 file 1-1957/3A.
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unthinkable secretariat - an old idea repeatedly rejected in earlier 
Commonwealth-Empire history.
As the Commonwealth's third incarnation emerged in the years 1956-1965, 
its demise, or at least serious enfeeblement, had been forecast time and time 
again. Its end had been predicted in South Asia at the time of Suez. Some 
ministers and officials from the old Commonwealth had feared that encouraging 
an open membership policy would ruin it. Menzies had lamented that the type 
of behaviour that had pushed out South Africa was spoiling it. Diefenbaker 
and some of his ministers were convinced that British membership in the EEC 
would destroy it. The danger of disintegration or obsolescence could never 
be entirely dismissed, yet, in typical British fashion as behooves an 
imperial spin-off, the Commonwealth somehow muddled through.
This outcome was not inevitable. There is a destructive component to 
any change and the Commonwealth could easily have fallen victim to it. At 
the same time, neither was its survival surprising or entirely a matter of 
luck. As the Canadian government tackled changes in the Commonwealth, it was 
seeing similar changes in the wider international community. The United 
Nations, for example, was also experiencing rapid membership growth and the 
same Afro-Asian states which were asserting themselves in the Commonwealth, 
with calls for a secretariat, were, together with similar states outside the 
Commonwealth, asserting themselves in the General Assembly and helping to 
launch new institutions such as UNCTAD in which to pursue their agenda. The 
new states were beginning to organize themselves through initiatives such as 
the Group of 77, the non-aligned movement and the OAU. The existence of this 
more organized, growing body of states in the international system underlined 
the usefulness of a sounding-board to maintain as good a relationship as
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possible between the West and the new states. Had the Commonwealth fallen 
apart or never existed, Canada would still have had to deal with the effects 
of decolonization at the United Nations and the implications of European 
economic integration. The Commonwealth, however, gave the Canadian 
government an additional tool to use in the case of the former, and mis-use 
on occasion with the latter.
The manner in which Canadian governments used the post-war Commonwealth, 
and the types of interest pursued, differed fundamentally between the pre- 
and post-war periods. Unlike Mackenzie King's inter-war crusade for full 
Dominion autonomy, the Canadian government was not in the vanguard pressing 
for change between 1956 and 1965. Canadian policy responded to circumstances 
that were for the most part created by others. Thus, Canada supported a 
membership policy to accommodate the wishes of new and prospective members.
It funded a variety of aid programmes to meet the needs of new members. 
Diefenbaker initially tried to avoid having to make a decision on South 
African membership; but pressure from new members made this impossible and 
ultimately swayed him to act as he did. Pearson supported new members when 
they pressed for a secretariat, but it is extremely unlikely that he would 
ever have proposed the idea. Even Diefenbaker's reaction to Britain's 
negotiations with the EEC was reactive rather than proactive. Diefenbaker's 
trade proposals in 1957 and 1958 were exceptions to this trend. But these, 
like his opposition to British EEC membership, were out of character with the 
main line of Canadian policy towards the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth's 
main role in Canadian foreign policy.
In the past, Canada had used the Commonwealth directly to seek solutions 
to important policy problems that defined Canada's political and economic
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interests. To extend constitutional autonomy in foreign affairs or create a 
preferential trading community when markets elsewhere, especially the all 
important American market, were being closed off behind tariff walls, the 
Commonwealth was either an appropriate or the best available forum. Canada 
had few alternatives before 1945, and none for the task of constitutional 
development. In the post-1945 Commonwealth, however, Canada was very much a 
'satisfied' power. There was little or nothing which Canadian governments, 
aside from Diefenbaker's, wanted to do by directly using the Commonwealth. 
Canada had successfully gained its complete independence within the 
Commonwealth, but had a plethora of other multilateral bodies with which to 
pursue its now vigorous foreign policy. In the mid-1940s, the residual 
attachment to Britain and the Crown on the part of Canadians of British 
descent, still well over half of the population, offered a strong inducement 
for continued Canadian membership in the Commonwealth, but did not 
necessarily provide a rationale for an active Commonwealth policy on the part 
of the Canadian government and definitely was not the basis for a 'common 
policy' Commonwealth. Canada was satisfied with a loose Commonwealth - that 
is, one that did not impede members' freedom of action elsewhere by expecting 
foreign policy conformity. Functional Commonwealth bodies such as the CATC 
were useful, but only to supplement the growing number of international 
organizations. Relations with Britain, one of the 'big three' in the 1940s, 
were still important, but the Canadian government preferred to pursue these 
bilaterally. It was the addition of the three South Asian members and the 
existence of the Cold War which catalyzed Canadian policy towards the 
Commonwealth in the late 1940s. The basic tenets of Canadian policy did not 
change, especially where policy commitments were concerned, but their 
presence in the organization stimulated the Canadian government to channel 
some of its internationalist activism into the Commonwealth.
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A 'bridge' between 'East' and 'West', as Kipling knew the terms, 
provided a suitably vague, yet still important objective for Canadian policy. 
The Asian members gave the Commonwealth a renewed role in Canadian policy.
The Cold War provided the reason to pursue it. Keeping newly independent 
countries, especially if not aligned with the West, out of the Communist 
bloc, offered a moral basis for the Commonwealth which was acceptable to 
Canada in a way which developing it as a replacement for the Empire could 
never be. Furthermore, the Canadian interests served by this bridging role 
were defined in terms of broader Western interests rather than narrow 
Canadian ones. This, then, was another area where Diefenbaker's trade 
initiative and his campaign against British membership in the EEC diverged 
from the general pattern of Canada's post-war Commonwealth relations. His 
pursuit of more narrowly defined Canadian interests had more in common with 
Canadian pre-war usage of the Commonwealth than with the post-war pattern.
Bridgemanship differed fundamentally from pre-war Canadian objectives in 
that the benefits accruing from it were essentially indirect. Gaining 
autonomy meant not being subordinate to Britain, gaining preferential access 
to markets meant trade, but the 'bridge' simply meant facilitating 
relationships. These relationships could only be converted into benefits 
elsewhere since Canadian governments shied away from using the 'consultative' 
Commonwealth to take direct action in the international community. It 
nevertheless constituted the motivating factor behind most constructive 
Canadian activity in the Commonwealth between 1956 and 1965.
After having given Canada an entree to South Asia in the first post-war 
decade, the Commonwealth bridge did the same with respect to Canada's 
relations with Africa in the second. In so doing, the Commonwealth accounted
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for the preponderance of Canada's relationships with developing countries. 
There were other sources of Canadian ties with developing countries. 
Missionary activity and periodically, especially towards the end of the 
period, the need to have Canada's foreign policy reflect its bilingual 
nature, meant that Quebec could be said to account for some part of them.
But in general, through to 1965, Canada's relations with developing countries 
coincided with Canada's relations with new Commonwealth members. This was 
reflected by the fact that most of Canada's bilateral development assistance 
funding was directed to Commonwealth recipients. Even assistance to non- 
Commonwealth participants of the Colombo Plan had Commonwealth roots. 
Elsewhere, Canada's relations with Latin America states had never been 
developed by Canadian governments to the extent that relations with more 
geographically distant Commonwealth members, symbolized by their continuing
insistence to remain outside the Organization of American States and its
2
predecessor, the Pan-American Union. The nascent 'Quebec factor' in 
Canadian foreign policy, however, suggested that this strong correlation 
between Canadian bilateral relations with developing countries and the 
Commonwealth was beginning to change. As it did, the Commonwealth's relative 
importance to Canadian foreign policy was bound to diminish as other links to 
developing countries were established.
2
American pressure to join the OAS was strongest in the 1940s. The 
Canadian government was reluctant to be associated with American policy in 
the region or, alternatively, to face the prospect of having to oppose it. 
During the war and in the late 1940s, the incongruity of joining a group with 
a formal secretariat while opposing such a development in the Commonwealth 
was also a consideration, albeit a secondary one. See: Memorandum to
Cabinet: Canadian Participation in the Pan- American System, 14 October,
1947. PAC RG 25 ACC 86-87/159 vol 11 file 2226-40 part 3. Canadian 
Participation in the Pan-American Union (1947-51) and Memorandum from 
Pearson to St.Laurent, 21 April, 1948. RG 25 ACC 86-87/159 vol 11 file 
2226-40 part 3. Kennedy resurrected the issue of Canadian membership, and 
before Diefenbaker's relations with the US president soured, the Canadian 
prime minister briefly considered joining in 1960. See: Robinson,
Diefenbaker's World, pp. 200-1.
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Maintaining and developing the bridge to the Commonwealth's new members* 
provided a rationale for aspects of Canada's foreign policy, but required 
some modifications to Canadian attitudes towards the modalities of 
Commonwealth cooperation. Whereas Mackenzie King had relentlessly obstructed 
any effort to create new Commonwealth institutions, seeing them as a means to 
exert British direction over other members, his successors recognized their 
utility. They did not, however, depart from Mackenzie King's concept of a 
Commonwealth built primarily of bilateral relationships. At no point in the 
post-war period could Canadian governments be said to have controlled how the 
Commonwealth developed, but they could, and did, try to encourage some types 
of developments and discourage others. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the Canadian government continued to block what it saw as British efforts to 
multilateralize the Commonwealth to better control its direction and promote 
more active cooperation or more formal institutional arrangements in the 
Commonwealth than Canadian governments felt appropriate to an association 
based on consultation rather than common policy.
In the midst of turning aside repeated pulls towards the centre, often 
in the guise of multilateral cooperation, Canadian governments had to accept 
that for the Commonwealth to be used as an instrument of foreign policy, it 
had to have a framework within which cooperation could take place. Finding 
the right balance of Commonwealth ties, in fact, conditioned much of Canadian 
policy in the 1950s and 1960s. The links between members, once secured by 
constitutional bonds, were now based on what were sometimes more intangible 
affinities which were also eroding through the 1950s and 1960s. The common 
legal and political institutions bequeathed by British rule, such as 
parliamentary government and an independent judiciary, were no longer held in 
common and the growing diversity of policy outlook and perceived interest
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among members made coordinated action less and less realistic, especially as 
new members developed relationships with other states. To maintain the 
Commonwealth, Canadian governments did not try to resist this 'diminishment' 
of Commonwealth relations; nor did they try to counter it by actively trying 
to build stronger links between members which sought to overcome these 
differences. Instead, Canadian governments always accepted that the 
Commonwealth existed as a flexible association where members had always 
pursued their own policies as they saw fit. But within that association, 
Canadian governments recognized the need for actions to mitigate the gradual 
reduction of the traditional ties centred on Britain.
Countervailing actions helped both to reconcile the conflicting 
tendencies in Canadian approaches towards the Commonwealth and to retain new 
members' interest. Canadian governments always resisted assuming firm 
Commonwealth commitments which might entail policy harmonization and limit 
Canadian freedom of action. But they also did not want the Commonwealth to 
dissolve completely or become totally irrelevant to its members. Canadian 
governments were never as disposed as the their British counterparts to plan 
or forecast the Commonwealth's future shape, but the more positive role of 
the Commonwealth in post-war Canadian foreign policy meant that they had to 
be sensitive to the state of the Commonwealth as a whole. The sorts of
*
measures which can be characterized as 'countervailing' did not try to oppose 
or reverse the gradual reduction of 'Commonwealth' ties (as opposed to 
bilateral which had developed from these) between members but nevertheless 
reinforced appropriate cooperation between members to maintain a Commonwealth 
identity. Because this type of initiative did not try to counteract the 
increasingly heterogeneous perspectives which the Commonwealth had to 
accommodate, it was acceptable to other members, especially newer ones.
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Moreover, because they tended to be exercised bilaterally within the 
multilateral framework provided by the Commonwealth, the Secretariat being a 
major exception to this, they did not give any semblance of yielding control 
to Britain. This was always a key consideration and even the new 
Commonwealth multilateralism in 1964-5 came about in circumstances in which 
Britain would not dominate the result. To reduce the chance that Britain 
could use Commonwealth cooperative initiatives to exercise control, Canadian 
governments insisted that any new programmes had to be primarily functional 
and not overtly political, although indirect political objectives underlay 
Canadian policy. It meant, to borrow a construction from Mackenzie King, 
Commonwealth cooperative institutions if necessary, but not necessarily 
Commonwealth cooperative institutions.
The general pattern of adapting Canadian policy to accommodate the needs 
of new members was frequently evident between 1956 and 1965. The BWI aid 
programme as conceived by the St.Laurent government and implemented by the 
Diefenbaker government was a bilateral scheme constructed to maximize the 
advantage to Canada and avoid committing Canada to a joint Commonwealth 
effort, yet also solidify the multilateral foundation of the bilateral 
action. The only 'Commonwealth' aspect of the BWI aid programme was, of 
course, that it was extended from one member to another largely because of 
that particular link. The main political benefits were intended to flow to 
the Canadian government as it demonstrated its sensitivity to the needs of 
developing countries. Nevertheless, some of this reflected back on the 
Commonwealth, the institution without which such bilateral Canadian largess 
would not necessarily be forthcoming and in the name of whose solidarity the 
Canadian government made its generous, self-promoting gesture. Likewise, the 
Canadian government's response to the Commonwealth aspects of the Suez Crisis
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did not counter, but countervailed their damaging effects. If ever the 
diversity of Commonwealth interests and perspectives threatened to lead to 
actual disintegration in the first decade of multiracial membership, Suez was 
that time. The Suez Crisis dramatically demonstrated the folly and 
impracticality of expectations of ever being able to produce common policies 
on most international issues. Under the circumstances, any effort during or 
immediately after the crisis to counter directly what at its height was not 
so much a relaxation of ties between members as an unravelling, would almost 
certainly have failed. Rather than trying to pull the Commonwealth back 
together around a centre which, despite Canadian preferences for a 
Commonwealth of bilateral relationships, was still Britain, most of Canada's 
Commonwealth diplomacy during the crisis countervailed the forces pulling 
away by demonstrating that the old Commonwealth was not, in fact, tied to 
British policy - and that in some respects the UN was a more relevant and 
useful institution with which to take action.
The Canadian government's desire to counter the effects of Suez on the 
Commonwealth did not lead it to abandon its general foreign policy and the 
relatively limited role the Commonwealth had in it. Thus, Canada rejected 
proposals for a Commonwealth development bank as being an unrealistic effort 
to pursue objectives more appropriately pursued elsewhere. Such an 
institution might have been consistent with the Commonwealth's role as a 
bridge to developing countries, but it was far beyond Commonwealth members' 
ability to manage by themselves. On the other hand, more limited initiatives 
such as those unveiled at the 1958 CTEC and the 1960 SCAAP were within the 
capacities and collective wills of Commonwealth members themselves. Alone, 
these assistance programmes would not solve the development problems of 
members, but they helped to keep new members interested in the Commonwealth.
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Maintaining the interest of new members meant accommodating their needs. 
Aid was only one way of doing this. Another important factor was how issues
which shaped the structure of the Commonwealth were resolved. The Canadian
government recognized that membership questions such as South Africa and 
general membership criteria could influence whether or not new members 
maintained their links with the Commonwealth. As Canadian policy makers 
observed when considering Commonwealth membership, the newly independent 
countries were going to be in the United Nations. Thus, even when the 
Canadian government had some initial reservations, as in the case of South 
Africa's forced withdrawal, the need to maintain new members' interest in the 
Commonwealth ultimately determined Canadian policy. Like St.Laurent before 
him over Suez, and, to some extent, Pearson after him over the secretariat, 
Diefenbaker found himself aligned with new members against the old. This put 
Canadian governments in step with the forces of change within the
Commonwealth and thus better placed to be able to deal with them in a manner
which helped the Commonwealth in relations with developing countries. 
Notwithstanding Diefenbaker's failed attempt to produce a turning point in 
Canadian policy towards the Commonwealth in 1957-8 when he intensified 
traditional Canadian activity and launched his trade initiatives and prevent 
what he thought was a turning point in 1961-3 with his opposition to 
Britain's EEC application, the important milestones for Canadian policy came 
not from Canadian decisions, but from these developments in the Commonwealth, 
most of which were the result of the admission of new members. The emergence 
of the 'third Commonwealth' provided impetus behind key outcomes, most 
critically in the period 1960-1 which saw the existing members agree to 
welcome all potential new members and the newer members assert their 
influence on the issue of South Africa.
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In the period 1956 to 1965, the rewards from Commonwealth bridgemanship 
were rarely spectacular. In the first decade of the multiracial 
Commonwealth, the problems of Asia drew much of the world's and the 
Commonwealth's attention. Korea, Indo-China, the 1954 Geneva Conference 
settlement and the question of relations with China provided highly visible 
evidence of Indian and Canadian partnership in action. The two governments 
did not always agree on specifics, but they worked together. In the next 
decade, the Commonwealth's focus turned more towards the problems of Black 
Africa. The Canadian and Indian governments still wound up on the same side 
on issues such as South African membership, but there was no Geneva 
Conference to finalize Algerian independence and the Congo, for all of its 
horrors, was not as internationalized as was the Korea War. The earlier 
Indo-Canadian cooperation had been facilitated by the personal chemistry 
between St.Laurent, Pearson, and Reid, on the one hand, and Nehru and his 
principal foreign policy advisors, including even the mercurial Krishna 
Menon. The Liberal defeat in 1957, the same year that Reid's term as 
Canada's high commissioner in India ended, removed these factors making for 
cooperation. Diefenbaker was never on the same good terms with the Indian 
leadership as his predecessor had been. There were no African leaders on 
whom to base a similar bilateral relationship for dealing with the problems 
of Africa. Nkrumah may have fancied himself as an African Nehru, but the 
Canadian government never placed much trust in him. The multilateral 
alternative, the Secretariat, with a Canadian as Secretary-General no less, 
could offer only a partial replacement for such a relationship.
Indo-Canadian cooperation during the Suez Crisis was the most visible 
demonstration of any advantage from the 'bridge' in the period between 1956 
and 1965. Otherwise, the return on the Canadian investment was restricted to
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measures such as trying to get new Commonwealth members to moderate the 
wording of United Nations resolutions condemning colonialism so as not to 
humiliate Britain and France, both Canada's allies in NATO, and cause them to 
harden their positions. Invariably, any benefit came outside the 
Commonwealth. As Suez showed, in the crunch, Canadian governments relied on 
other means to solve international problems. The Commonwealth was not up to 
the task and far from that being a criticism of it, the Canadian government 
would have had it no other way.
Canadian concerns about policy independence in the 1940s had effectively 
precluded the Commonwealth from becoming anything other than a forum for 
discussion. The direct pursuit of important policy Canadian objectives 
occurred elsewhere. General political relations were handled at the United 
Nations; defence was handled through NATO; international economic matters 
were handled through institutions such as the GATT, IMF and IBRD; and even 
Anglo-Canadian relations had the UKCCC. The Commonwealth was developed as an 
extremely specialized relationship, whose scope was limited, but which could 
complement Canadian activities in other organizations, especially the United 
Nations. There was never any need to forego the advantages of Commonwealth 
membership in order to participate in other groupings, but the Commonwealth, 
when it could be used, was generally subordinate to Canadian priorities in 
those other groupings. Thus, Canadian relationships with developing 
countries were for use at the United Nations and in support of Western 
interests. Canada's Commonwealth preferences were negotiable at the GATT.
The Canadian government at all times strove to ensure that the activities of 
Commonwealth bodies and programmes, from the Colombo Plan, to the CEC, CLC, 
CATC and all the rest, did not challenge the preeminence of other 
international institutions, especially those in the United Nations system,
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which were active in the same field. Canada's close relationship with 
Sterling Area countries was used to put pressure on them to ease currency 
restrictions; it did not argue elsewhere on behalf of its Commonwealth 
partners. Canadian governments before and after Diefenbaker's basically 
supported British participation in European economic integration because 
NATO's European members probably would be strengthened. Above all, Canadian 
governments, even Diefenbaker, did not let the Commonwealth long obscure the 
fact that the United States was Canada's most important partner and the 
dominant Western power regardless of the temptation at times to see the 
Commonwealth as an economic or political counterweight to Canada's southern 
neighbour.
The Commonwealth could not enable Canada to escape from the United 
States, even if the Canadian government had wanted to try. The Commonwealth, 
could only provide a counterweight as a serendipitous outcome of being able 
to conduct part of Canadian foreign policy through an association of which 
the United States was not a member. As Canadian post-war planners realized 
in the early 1940s, multilateral organizations offered the best means for 
Canada to play an effective role in international issues in a world dominated 
by bigger powers. This implicitly accepted the need to balance them by 
cooperating with other states. The Commonwealth contributed to this general 
objective of facilitating Canadian international activity and provided a 
focus for Canadian diplomacy beyond the confines of the American dominated 
Atlantic world, but was neither developed nor wielded by Canadian governments 
as a counterweight to the United States. Diefenbaker's impetuous and 
impractical efforts at realigning Canadian trade represented an exception to 
this. Even then, the possible measures to implement his rhetoric held 
alarming implications for a Canadian economy which depended on, and gained
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immensely from, ties with the Americans. For example, the balance of 
respective benefits from a free trade agreement with Britain could not 
justify exposing Canadian producers to British competition or reducing their 
access to American markets, especially for capital goods. Still more 
indicative of the limited room for manoeuvre available to Diefenbaker, the 
modifications to Canada's government procurement policies in order to assist 
Commonwealth producers were immediately jettisoned when they proved 
incompatible with gaining equal access for Canadian producers to the American 
defence procurement. Diefenbaker, demonstrating the dualism that had often 
marked Canadian relations with Britain since 1867, certainly wanted the 
Commonwealth to function as a means to balance ties with the United States, 
but he was not prepared to make any of the sacrifices of Canadian economic or 
political autonomy which were to required in order to move beyond wishful 
thinking.
Despite Diefenbaker's stated fears that a British turn to Europe would 
destroy the Commonwealth and leave Canada exposed to American predations, any 
increase in Canada's concentration of ties with the United States in the late 
1950s and early 1960s is better explained by Canadian rather than British 
action. A review of the period 1956 to 1965 offers far more examples of 
Canada's growing ties with the United States than efforts to develop a 
counterweight against them. In 1957, the Diefenbaker government signed the 
NORAD agreement negotiated by the previous Liberal government, which 
established a joint command for North American air defence. In the next 
three years, it established a Joint Ministerial Committee on Defence, signed 
the Defence Production Sharing Agreement, agreed to jointly develop the 
Colombia River basin, and embarked on a tortuous road leading to Canada's 
acquisition of American nuclear weapons and the Diefenbaker government's
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collapse in indecision. After the Liberals were back in power, their finance 
minister, Walter Gordon, tried to stem the American take-over of Canadian 
industry, but was forced to back down amid an outcry from Canadian business 
leaders. Finally, in 1965, Canada entered into a managed free trade 
agreement with the United States covering the vitally important automobile 
industry. Ironically, however, Canadian trade did become slightly less 
concentrated on the United States in the early 1960s, but not as a result of 
Commonwealth markets. Nevertheless, even this could not enable Canada to 
defy geography. Canada was firmly rooted on the North American continent and 
no matter how much Diefenbaker, in particular, may have wished, a declining 
Britain leading a loose Commonwealth could not cause things to be otherwise.
The Diefenbaker government's hope that the old world could redress the 
imbalance of the new caused it to deviate from the general pattern of 
Canadian behaviour towards the Commonwealth in two important instances.
While it was quick to grasp the importance of the 'bridging' aspect of the 
Commonwealth, it was less astute when it came to accepting that just as the 
Commonwealth could acquire new roles, it could shed old ones. Diefenbaker's 
quixotic efforts to strengthen Commonwealth trading relationships and block 
British entry into the EEC tried to make the Commonwealth an instrument of 
direct action. The temptation for Diefenbaker to try to use the Commonwealth 
was, in some ways, understandable. Diefenbaker's efforts were analogous to 
the British efforts to develop the Commonwealth for their own purposes in the 
first post-war decade. If Canadians sometimes thought that British 
governments sometimes tried too hard to use the Commonwealth to cushion or 
compensate for Britain's declining position in international affairs, 
Diefenbaker could be accused of attempting the same thing for Canada. The 
first post-war decade represented a 'golden-age' for Canadian foreign policy
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because of the temporarily enhanced position Canada occupied in the world as 
a result of its emergence from the war physically unscathed and newly 
industrialized. By the mid-1950s, much the same factors which were reducing 
Britain's relative international position were also reducing Canada's. For 
example, the consolidation of the US and Soviet Union as the only states 
capable of acting as superpowers and the apparently growing technological and 
military capability gap between them and other states in the international 
system reduced the importance of middle powers. So too the resurgence of the 
Japanese and West European economies reduced Canada's relative share of world 
trade and made competition in overseas markets more intense. But adopting a 
Commonwealth-oriented strategy to deal with these changes ignored the 
realities of the changed and changing Commonwealth. The very drive for an 
unemcumbering Commonwealth which Canada had pushed for in the past and strove 
to maintain in the decade between 1956 and 1965 made this impossible. 
Diefenbaker's confusion as to what the Commonwealth could effectively be used 
for antagonized Britain, the Commonwealth partner that he most valued, and 
did nothing towards realizing the goals he had hoped to achieve.
Ultimately, the Commonwealth may be accurately characterized more by 
what it was incapable of doing than praised for what it could do. In 
practice, however, its limited scope only presented a problem when Canadian 
policy was based on unrealistic expectations. For the most part, Canadian 
governments, having taken care to ensure that the Commonwealth did not 
develop as a major negotiating or coordinating body were content to use it as 
a means to pursue special contacts with developing countries through 
discussion and limited cooperation in appropriate fields to maintain the new 
members' interest in the institution. Contemporaneous French policy 
maintained strong neocolonial ties, especially in defence and economics, with
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France's former colonies in Africa. American policy was more narrowly 
focused on waging the Cold War and often lacked sensitivity to the concerns 
of new states. The Canadian government was aware, not least during its 
consideration of the Secretariat's establishment, that the British policy and 
the Commonwealth too could generate suspicions of neocolonialism or 
imperialism. Nevertheless, in Ottawa's view, the Commonwealth remained the 
best available means to promote Western interests by facilitating mutual 
understanding between the West and a sizeable number of developing countries 
in a manner that was not tied directly to furthering any single power's 
specific interests. Canada was thus in part a shaper of the post-1956 
Commonwealth and yet also, much more than is sometimes recognized, a 
responder to others' initiatives within the Commonwealth.
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APPENDIX : PATTERNS IN CANADIAN TRADE
The accompanying charts1 portray aspects of Canadian trade patterns 
between 1926 and 1965. They are grouped in three sets. The first set (charts 
1 and 2) portrays the relative shares of total Canadian imports and exports 
accounted for by the US and Britain for the years 1926 to 1965. The second 
(charts 3 and 4), does the same for the years 1946 to 1965, but includes data 
for Commonwealth countries other than Britain (as a group) and other non- 
Commonwealth countries (as a group) as well. The third set (charts 5 and 6), 
charts the value of Canadian imports and exports to and from these groups of 
trading partners for the same period.
Most immediately obvious is the concentration of Canadian trade on the 
United States. The premise that Britain could provide an economic 
counterweight to the United States as an alternative market for Canadian goods 
was plausible until the end of the Second World War when British currency 
controls drastically curtailed British purchases of Canadian goods.(Chart 2) 
But on the import side, American suppliers dominated the Canadian market even 
at the height of Commonwealth preferences in the 1930s.(chart 1) In the 
postwar period, the distribution of Canadian markets showed considerable 
stability (chart 4). The preponderant share of Canadian exports accounted for 
by the American market diminished somewhat as other economies regained 
strength. Even here, Canadian imports showed less tendency to shift away from 
the US than did Canadian exports.(charts 3 and 4)
1 All data is derived from figures contained ini Canada. Dominion Bureau of 
Statistics. External Trade Division. Trade of Canada Volume 1. Summary and 
Analytical Tables - Calendar Years 1966-1968. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 
1971) pp. 26-7. All figures are in current Canadian dollars.
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The proportion of Canadian exports taken by Britain and the Commonwealth 
tended to decline, even with the gradual loosening of exchange controls 
through the 1950s.(Chart 4) The value of trade with Britain and the 
Commonwealth did increase during the late 1950s (charts 5 and 6), but not 
nearly as rapidly as trade
with other countries. Indeed, the decline in the proportion of Canadian trade 
with the United States in the late 1950s occurred more because of growing 
trade elsewhere, much of it with Western Europe and Japan. There were slight 
increases in the shares of Canadian exports taken by Britain and Canadian 
imports supplied by Britain in the second half of the 1950s.(charts 3 and 4) 
These proportions, however, tended to fluctuate up and down over time anyway. 
The upward momentum in the percentage of Canadian imports from Britain, for 
example however, began between 1956 and 1957, before Diefenbaker's trade 
initiative could have had much if any effect. This momentum was not 
sustained beyond the early 1960s. The proportions of Canadian exports going 
to various markets also varied slightly up or down over time. Even with the 
lifting of British currency controls, the percentage of Canadian exports to 
Britain never attained the proportion they held in 1955, for example, in any 
year of Diefenbaker's premiership. Diefenbaker's Commonwealth trade policy, 
then, cannot be said to have had any significant impact on Canadian trade 
patterns.
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHIC STUDY - CANADA AND THE COMMONWEALTH: 1956-1965
This thesis is based on Canadian and British archival records, most of 
which were not previously available for use by researchers. The evaluation 
of this archival material, however, was aided materially by a review of 
existing literature. There has, however, been no broad treatment of the 
Commonwealth's role in Canadian foreign policy over the decade which forms 
the primary focus of this thesis. The period was included in a more sweeping 
study of Canadian policy towards the Commonwealth undertaken in an 
unpublished thesis by Frank Haves. The Evolution of Canada's Commonwealth 
Relations. 1945 - 1968. submitted at the University of Toronto in 1979. This 
work had a similar, although not identical focus, as the present thesis, but 
in contrast to the present thesis, identifies an "extraordinary 
transformation" in Canadian policy towards the Commonwealth between the 1940s 
and 1960s. This is both a matter of interpretation and available materials. 
The author cites a paucity of primary material for the study, which although 
in theory made up for by the availability of interview subjects, many of whom 
are now dead, and partially overcome by means of restricted (non- 
attributable) access to some records, did affect his ability to assess the 
subject. Thus, Diefenbaker's announcement of aid to the British West Indies 
is given as proof of his broadening Canadian involvement even though records 
now available demonstrated that Diefenbaker was announcing a programme 
developed by his Liberal predecessors.
Published works on Canada's foreign policy since the Second World War 
are plentiful, but the coverage of the topic can be uneven. Understandably, 
the period from 1945 to 1957, the so-called 'golden-age' of Canadian 
diplomacy, is extremely well covered. So too are the more recent decades 
from the mid-1960s onward thanks in part to the coincidental spread of 
foreign policy studies at Canadian universities and the growing public
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awareness of foreign policy issues which started with highly public 
reassessment of Canadian foreign policy by Pierre Trudeau's first government. 
Most of the decade which forms the basis of this study has received 
relatively little attention, although it has been by no means ignored. What 
has been overlooked, however, are Canada's relations with the Commonwealth.
In all of the literature dealing with Canada's post-war foreign policy, there 
have been no single volume works published on this subject. As a result, the 
published literature on the subject consists of chapters in collections, 
periodical articles, and portions of larger works dealing with broader 
issues.
The closest thing to a comprehensive bibliographic tool for accessing 
the literature on Canadian foreign policy is provided by a series of 
bibliographies produced by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs 
(CIIA) in Toronto. Volumes of the Bibliography on Canadian Foreign Relations 
covering materials published in the periods 1945-1975, 1976-80, and 1981-85 
are available. A volume covering 1986-90 has just been published, and the 
entire period 1981 to the present is also available via an on-line 
bibliographic database, the 'Canadian Foreign Relations Database'. Less 
exhaustive, but more frequently published, are the bibliographic listings 
contained in journals, especially the Canadian Historical Review. This 
journal has the advantage that it is old enough that it was in publication at 
the time under study so that contemporary writings on Canada and the 
Commonwealth may be easily found, although most, if not all, would be in the 
CIIA bibliographies. Material written in the past decade can also be found 
in the Journal of Canadian Studies, and Etudes Internationales, the latter 
being the CIIA's french language journal but which surveys works published on 
both of Canada's official languages.
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Canadian documentary sources do not cover the period well. The 
Department of External Affairs' official compilations, Canadian External 
Affairs do not extend beyond the early 1950s. The only other collections are 
those produced in paperback as part of the Carlton Library series, Canadian 
Foreign Policy 1945-54. edited by R.A. Mackay (1971), and Canadian Foreign 
Policy 1955-1965. edited by Arthur Blanchette (1977). These, however, 
consist of speeches, official statements, and published agreements. There 
are, however, separate sections on Commonwealth issues. James Eayrs has done 
much the same thing, with the addition of press comment, for the Suez Crisis, 
in The Commonwealth and Suez (1964). This covers other Commonwealth members 
in addition to Canada. Another basic documentary source is DEA's Statements 
and Speeches series.
The best means of establishing a fairly detailed outline of Canadian 
external activity is through another CIIA publication. The biennial Canada 
in World Affairs monograph series (covering pre-1939 to 1965 without break), 
surveys all areas of Canadian international activity, including Commonwealth 
affairs. Another source which does much the same thing from 1960 onwards, 
more briefly, but on an annual basis is the Canadian Annual Review. The 
DEA's annual reports are even shorter, but very useful in establishing the 
basic chronology. For Canada's Commonwealth relations, a series of annual 
articles in the Canadian Historical Review by D.J. McDougall does much the
same thing, but only for the period 1946 to 1958.
Important general historical surveys of Canada during this period which 
cover Canada's international relations include Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond 
and John English's, Canada Since 1945 (1981), Donald Creighton's The Forked 
Road (1976) and J.L. Granatstein's Canada 1957-1967 (1986). Only a small
portion of each is devoted to Commonwealth matters, but they have the
advantage of providing the broad context of Canadian policy. What is
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unmistakable from this is the relative decline in the amount of foreign 
policy activity conducted through the Commonwealth. Where the accounts 
differ is in their explanation for this. Creighton, who does not use 
archival sources, argues in his chapter on Canada and the Commonwealth, that 
the post-war Commonwealth lost any purpose and that Canadian governments' 
denigration of ties with Britain in preference for closer ties with the US 
contributed to this. George Grant makes much the same point in Lament for a 
Nation (1965). Bothwell, Drummond and English, and Granatstein, on the other 
hand, describe a shift away from the Commonwealth as a result of policy 
differences between members and America's rise to dominance. Nowhere does 
Granatstein make this point more explicitly than in How Britain's Weakness 
Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States (1989).
The battle as to the cause of the Commonwealth's relative decline in 
importance to Canadian foreign policy is also played out in political memoirs 
and biographies. John Diefenbaker is the only one to take deliberate aim in 
this regard in his three volume One Canada (1975-6-7). These are poorly 
organized, highly partisan and self-serving, but their obvious flaws make for 
interesting insights into their author When used carefully. A particularly 
interesting comparison is with Harold Macmillan's account of the same events, 
and especially of the relationship between the two men. Where Diefenbaker 
respectfully boasts of his close relationship with one he considers to be 
among the powerful, Macmillan is at times thinly contemptuous of the erratic 
Diefenbaker. Of more substance are Donald Fleming's two volumes So Very Near 
(1985), although since the partisanship is less obvious, it is perhaps more 
ensnaring. Lester Pearson completed only the first volume of his memoirs, 
Mike (1972) before he died. This takes the story as far as 1948. The two 
subsequent volumes were edited and produced posthumously (1973-5) and lack 
Pearson's wit and humour. As might be expected, these are very good on the 
foreign policy aspects, although they suffer at times from the problem common
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to many genial memoir writers, that is, they skirt around controversy. This 
is particularly evident in the account on Suez in the second volume.
Pearson has been the subject of several biographies, the most recent and 
historically rigorous are English's two volumes The Shadow of Heaven (1989) 
and The Worldly Years (1993). As their contribution to the 'did or did not 
the Liberals downplay the Commonwealth' debate, both Pearson and English 
point to the continuing importance accorded relations with Britain and the 
Commonwealth by the St.Laurent government. Pearson's son, Geoffrey, himself 
a former diplomat, has also contributed to the literature on his father's 
career. In Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy (1994), he 
focuses on key issues rather than a broad historical narrative. Among the 
many he deals with are the establishment of the Colombo Plan and Suez. 
Needless to say, the brief treatments he is able to give both in a compact 
book that covers a lot of territory are complementary, although not 
uncritical. They are parts of a whole which explains Pearson's role and 
methods as a statesman committed to building an international order founded 
on democratic values. Pearson's foreign minister, Paul Martin, produced his 
own versions of events in A Very Public Life (1985). He is a highly personal 
account which needs to be used carefully. It is uncharacteristically silent 
on the Commonwealth and the Secretariat, perhaps not wanting to draw 
attention to Martin's initial reservations about what became a very 
successful institution.
Louis St.Laurent, the other prime minister whose term of office overlaps 
with the decade under consideration did not write memoirs, although two of 
his advisors have produced books. Jack Pickersgill's Mv Years with 
St.Laurent (1975) and Dale Thomson's Louis St.Laurent: Canadian (1967) have 
yet to be superceded. Thomson's is more of a biography than Pickersgill's
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which is fundamentally the author's own memoir and explanation of the Liberal 
government of the time.
Diefenbaker is not nearly so well served by biographers. Peter Newman's 
rather journalistic endeavour, Renegade in Power (1963) is more of a critique 
than a political biography. There are other books about him, but like 
Newman, they tend to concentrate on the enigmatic and controversial man 
himself and his domestic polities with less emphasis on his foreign policy. 
These will have to do until Denis Smith from the University of Western 
Ontario completes his work, the fruits of being the first to be given access 
to Diefenbaker's papers. Knowlton Nash's Kennedy and Diefenbaker (1990), by 
another journalist, is a worthwhile examination of Canada-US relations under 
Diefenbaker, but touches only incidently on the Commonwealth. Both 
Diefenbaker and Pearson are the focus of interview collections by Peter 
Stursberg. The volumes which deal with foreign policy issues are 
Diefenbaker8 Leadership Gained (1975) and Lester Pearson and the American 
Dilemma (1980). These are highly regarded and the interviews can contain 
interesting illuminations on policy debates, especially opinion within 
Cabinet, however, factual errors in the accompanying commentary suggest that 
both should be used with caution. Of the two, the one on Diefenbaker is of 
more direct use for Commonwealth matters since the subject does not 
specifically arise in the Pearson book.
The general thrust of four key surveys of post-war Canadian foreign 
relations is similar to that of Granatstein and Bothwell and company. Eayrs' 
Northern Approaches (1961) and the volume of In Defence of Canada (1972) 
dealing with this period, John W. Holmes' The Shaping of the Peace (1979, 
1981), and A.F.W. Plumptre's Three Decades of Decision, by a scholar, a 
diplomat turned scholar, and a retired senior official respectively, discuss 
Canadian diplomacy and defence policy, diplomacy and activity in multilateral
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institutions, and diplomacy with respect to international economic policy. 
Each offers lucid and insightful analysis, with Holmes' and Plumptre's 
benefiting from their careers close to the decision-making centre of Canadian 
policy. These works are primarily concerned with Canada's role in the 
creation of international institutions and the source of the Canadian policy 
drive towards them rather than the role of specific institutions in Canadian 
policy. They serve, however, to provide the foreign policy framework within 
which Canadian governments sought to use the Commonwealth in the post-war 
period.
Of special note is the theoretical framework of functionalism which is 
not only applied by scholars, but was actually an important consideration for 
politicians and officials in the mid-1940s as they developed the rationale 
for expanding Canada's international activities. The functionalism of 
Canadian officials differed in some respects from that of David Mitrany's in 
the The Functional Theory of Politics and Towards a Working Peace System 
(1946) in that they wanted participation in decision-making within 
international bodies to reflect a country's capacity to contribute to the 
matter at hand. They, like Mitrany, supported the creation of specific 
institutions to handle designated issues, but they did so as to be able to 
better differentiate functional capacities between issues, not to 
depoliticize areas of international activity with the view to gradually 
eroding state sovereignty. While the theory was no longer explicitly 
mentioned in Canadian documents after the mid-1940s, the pattern of behaviour 
it produced, ably described by Holmes in The Shaping of the Peace, endured.
He describes the 'new age of functionalism' in an essay in Canada? A Middle 
Aged Power (1976). The concept also endured in the literature of Canadian 
foreign policy, and is discussed, for example, in an International Journal 
article by A.J. Miller in 1980, forms a strand of continuity in John Kirton 
and David Dewitt's study of changing paradigms in Canadian foreign policy.
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Canada as a Principle Power (1983), and pervades Tom Keating's Canada and 
World Order (1993), which extends the study of Canadian activity in 
international organizations to the present. Keating's book is worth noting 
because while he is by no means the only political scientist to have treated 
multilateralism in Canadian foreign policy (for example, Kirton and Dewitt 
and a host of others), he at least relies on archival sources as far as they 
run.
Another important current which runs through the literature on Canadian 
foreign policy, and is particularly important to any consideration of the 
Diefenbaker years, relates to the concept of 'counterweight'. This concept 
occurs at some point in many works on Canadian foreign policy, but is 
explored specifically Michael Dolan's chapter "Western Europe as a 
Counterweight: An Analysis of Canadian-European Policy Behaviour in the Post- 
War Era" in Brian Tomlin's Canadian Foreign Policy (1978) and in terms of a 
'countervailing influence', in Peyton V. Lyon's article in International 
Perspectives (1972), to mention but two. Frank Underhill gives this concept 
some historical depth in In Search of Canadian Liberalism (1960) where he 
examines the workings of the North Atlantic Triangle. Holmes devotes an 
entire section of Canada: A Middle Aged Power (1976) to the topic with five 
essays exploring different facets of the search for counterweights in 
Canadian foreign policy, the one dealing specifically with Britain is also 
available in Peter Lyon's Canada and Britain (1976).
There are no studies of Canadian foreign policy specifically covering 
the decade 1956 to 1965 as it does not neatly fit the political chronology. 
Nevertheless, there are a few studies on Canadian foreign policy during the 
Diefenbaker years which take up the bulk of the decade. For obvious reasons, 
the best treatment of Diefenbaker's foreign policy, not likely to be soon 
superceded, is by H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's DEA liaison officer for
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most of his premiership. Diefenbaker's World (1989) describes an 
idiosyncratic, intensely partisan, domestically focused prime minister who, 
despite his strong attachment to Britain and desire to re-orient Canadian 
foreign policy towards the 'Mother Country', did not significantly change the 
priorities he inherited from his Liberal predecessors. John McLin's Canada's 
Changing Defence Policy 1957-1963 (1967), focuses on an aspect of policy not 
directly handled through the Commonwealth, but gives a good general account 
of other key foreign policy considerations. It does, however, lack much in 
the way of historical perspective. Soloman Gabriel is better placed 
temporally, but geography may have been a problem. His book Foreign Policy 
of Canada: A Study of the Diefenbaker Years (1987) is very interesting in 
that it conveys an Indian perspective and devotes a great deal of attention 
to Canada's Commonwealth relations. It does not, however, use archival 
material and is based entirely on published documents and media sources.
Canada's relations with the Commonwealth are often dealt with as part of 
the voluminous literature on the Commonwealth itself. Not unnaturally, given 
the Commonwealth's historical origins, these works tend to focus on Britain, 
but just as the literature which imbeds discussion of Canada in the 
Commonwealth in a discussion of general Canadian foreign policy provides one 
sort of context, so too, this kind of treatment provides another. Nicholas 
Mansergh's The Commonwealth Experience (1969, second edition 1982) is too 
grand in scope to treat Canadian policy in this period in any detail, but he 
provides an unparalleled overview of Commonwealth history. Frank Underhill 
covers much the same territory as far as 1956, but much more briefly and from 
a Canadian perspective, in The British Commonwealth (1956). The different 
judgements as to whether "Britain jumped or was pushed" along the way make an 
interesting comparison. J.D.B. Miller, in The Commonwealth and the World 
(1965), Britain and the Old Dominions (1966), and Survey of Commonwealth 
Affairs (1974), is able to devote more attention to Canada. Indeed. Britain
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and the Old Dominions, a study into the changing relationships among the old 
Commonwealth members, has a section devoted exclusively to Canada. His 
notion of the Commonwealth being a 'concert of convenience', which he 
discusses in The Commonwealth and the World, is, in many ways, particularly 
apt as far as Canada is concerned. David McIntyre's two books, The 
Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact 1869-1971 (1977) and The 
Significance of the Commonwealth 1965-90 (1991) touch on Canadian activity 
only superficially. McIntyre's main focus is on Britain as it coped with 
changes in Commonwealth. In the first book, especially, he describes Britain 
in the 1950s and 1960s as an American protectorate, disenchanted with the 
Commonwealth, as it showed itself unresponsive to British efforts at control. 
The second book gives more credit to British efforts to engage new members in 
new forms of cooperation in the early 1960s. McIntyre's description of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat's creation seems to rely heavily on Joe Gamer's The 
Commonwealth Office. 1925-1968 (1978). In and of itself, this is not 
entirely a bad thing because it is an excellent book, but this might account 
at least in part for the tone of the second book. Gamer's book itself, is 
of course, written from the perspective of a senior British official, but one 
on intimate terms with the Commonwealth and Canada. Together with Arnold 
Smith's A Stitch in Time (1981), which gives a Canadian perspective, Gamer's 
account stands as a key source on the Secretariat's creation. He covers much 
more than this, needless to say, and a common theme which pervades the book 
is the Commonwealth's importance to British policy throughout the decade 1956 
to 1965.
Arnold Smith's book, of course, deals mostly with post-1965 
Commonwealth, but it stands as the last major Canadian monograph dedicated 
exclusively to the Commonwealth. Indeed, the last book specifically on 
Canada and the Commonwealth is George Brown's Canada and the Commonwealth 
(1957). Historical assessments of Canadian relations with the Commonwealth
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are at present confined to journal articles and chapters in collections.
Once again, Holmes lead the way with a section of his collection The Better 
Part of Valour (1970) devoted to the Commonwealth. These essays bring 
together several pieces, some easily available elsewhere (Round Table (1966) 
and W.B. Hamilton and company's A Decade of the Commonwealth 1955-1964) and 
others not easily found. Margaret Doxey, another political scientist 
comfortable in archives has supplemented her work on the contemporary 
Commonwealth with more historical pieces on Canadian involvement. Her most 
recent treatment of the topic is her contribution to English and Norman 
Hillmer's Making A Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World 
Order (1993). This, however, touches only slightly on events in the period 
1956-1965. She deals with this period in more depth in other works such as 
her chapter in Paul Painchaud's From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau (1989) 
and her Behind the Headlines piece for the CIIA (1982).
There are also some similar works dealing with specific episodes related 
to Canadian relations with the Commonwealth. Michael Fry's chapter in Roger 
Louis and Roger Owen's Suez (1989) stands out as a valuable source on this 
subject. The same book also has an article by Peter Lyon on the Commonwealth 
and Suez, which although not dealing specifically with Canadian policy, is a 
valuable assessment of the crisis and the Commonwealth context of Canadian 
policy during it. Tareq Ismael also assesses the source and conduct of 
Canadian policy during Suez in his chapter in Canada and the Middle East 
(1976) which he and Peyton Lyon edited. This, however, is more concerned 
with the evolution of Canadian policy towards the Middle East than the 
Commonwealth. Robert Reford's Canada and Three Crises (1968) is rather 
journalistic, not based on archival material, and any one he spoke with to 
supplement the public record went no further. The best sources on Canadian 
policy at the time of Suez, however, are Escott Reid's first hand accounts. 
The three, Envoy to Nehru (1981), Hungary and Suez 1956: A View from New
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Delhi (1986) and Radical Mandarin (1989), tend, inevitably, to repeat 
themselves on details, but since each is written as a part of a different 
whole, all three can be usefully reviewed.
South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth has also a few articles 
in addition to the mentions it receives elsewhere. Both Peter Hametty's 
article in the Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (1963) and Frank 
Hayes' in the International History Review (1980) probably give Diefenbaker 
too great a role than he deserves in the matter. Hametty's account is 
restricted by the fact that he could not go beyond parliamentary debates and 
press reports. Hayes' article, a by-blow of his PhD thesis, was able to make 
use of partial, non-attributable access to Canadian documents. Brian 
Tennyson's Canadian Relations with South Africa (1982) chronicles the whole 
history of Canada-South Africa diplomatic relations up to the early 1980s. 
However, although his source material for the discussion of the South African 
withdrawal includes an interview with Diefenbaker, most of his material 
appears to be drawn from the public record and no archival material seems to 
have been used. Each in its own way gives a good account of the event, 
although Hametty could now be considered superceded by Hayes and Basil 
Robinson and even by Tennyson.
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